till they gained a small ridge overlooking the front, and opened fire by
section volleys on to a ridge about 800 yards in front, from which a
rather heavy fire was coming.

The Maxim gun under Lieutenant Price-Dent came into action in rear of
the left of the line and fired at the enemy to the left front.

The enemy's fire from this ridge was soon silenced, and from that time
the only objective the line had was a few scattered Boers and their
horses on the rear slope of the high hill to the left front, some 2000
yards distant.

The reserve was deployed into two lines of double companies on and below
a small ridge of rocks some 250 yards in rear of the firing-line. At
about 2 p.m. the retirement commenced, and the battalion gradually
followed the Liverpool Regiment and became rearguard. Ladysmith was
reached about 3.30 p.m., after a sixteen-mile march in torrents of rain.

The casualties of the battalion during the day were:--

1 private killed.[1]
25 privates wounded, none dangerously.

[Footnote 1: This private, the first man of the Regiment killed in the
war, was Private Winsor. He was shot dead through the heart by a stray
bullet.]

This action was known as the action of Reitfontein.

On October 26th General Yule's force marched into Ladysmith. They had
had a bad time, having marched in drenching rain, day and night, from
Sunday till Wednesday. The garrison of Ladysmith gave them food on
arrival, the Regiment supplying the Dublin Fusiliers (officers and men)
with refreshments.

On October 27th it was reported that the Boers were nearing Ladysmith
and attempting to surround the place, and a large force was ordered out
by Sir George White to reconnoitre.

This reconnaissance was under the command of Colonel Ian Hamilton, and
his column consisted of three cavalry regiments, three batteries, and
four infantry battalions, to which was added later one infantry
battalion and one battery.

Having advanced beyond the Nek between Lombards Kop and Bulwana, and
having crossed the Modder Spruit on the Helpmakaar road, the Regiment
was sent on outpost duty to the left front, whilst the main body of the
force halted on the bank of the stream.

From the outpost line large bodies of the enemy were observed advancing
over Long Hill. Boers were also seen very busy on the kopjes south of
Long Hill, entrenching.

At 8 p.m. orders were received from the officer commanding the column,
in which it was explained that the force was to make a night march and
attack, the infantry to advance at 2 a.m.

The Boer position as seen by the Regiment on the outpost line was some
three miles in length, and the point of attack was to be the extreme
left of their position, viz. Farquhar's Farm.

In the opinion of some the attack would have succeeded and the evil days
of the siege put back; in the opinion of others the attack could not
possibly have succeeded on account of the length of the Boer position,
which they had had time to strengthen and entrench, and which had not
been definitely reconnoitred.

At midnight fresh orders were received from Sir George White in
Ladysmith. The whole force was ordered to retire and to proceed back at
once into their positions in and about the town.

It was reported that the Boers were in great numbers, some 17,000 under
Joubert, and that they had their big guns with them.

The Regiment commenced their retirement as rearguard to the force at 4
a.m., and reached camp at 6.30 a.m. on October 28th.

October 29th was a Sunday, and except for rumours, which were prolific,
a quiet day was spent.

The Boers were reported to be entrenching themselves a mile and a half
out on the Dundee road, and at the same time the Ladysmith defences were
being prepared, and blasting operations were being carried out for the
construction of military roads.

The battle of Farquhar's Farm was fought on October 30th, 1899.

The whole army was ordered out at 3 a.m.

The battalion formed part of the reserve brigade under Colonel Ian
Hamilton. This reserve brigade took up a position under Limit Hill, and
facing Pepworth Hill from the south.

The plan of the day was to have been as follows, had everything gone as
it was proposed:--

Five regiments of infantry, all the mounted troops, and four batteries
of artillery were to move round the enemy's left up the Helpmakaar road
towards Farquhar's Farm (the direction of the proposed night attack on
the night 27th-28th) to attack and drive in his left.

Two regiments of infantry with one mountain battery were to move off to
the left of the British position to hold the enemy's right (which
comprised the whole of the Free State Army), and prevent him from
getting into Ladysmith.

The main attack was to be made in the centre by Colonel Ian Hamilton's
Brigade by an assault on Pepworth Hill, where the Boer big guns were
located, and which was the key of the position.

The above was the plan; the result and the way in which it was carried
out is told in a few words.

The two infantry battalions and mountain battery, detailed to guard the
left flank, knocked up against the Free State Army under Cronje (which
was seen in the forenoon by the main body of General White's force,
coming over Walker's Hoek) on what is known now as Surprise Hill, and
which place is situated a little above and nearer Ladysmith than
Nicholson's Nek. Cronje attacked them in the dark, scattered the gun
mules which stampeded, and after some hours of hard fighting captured
the lot.

The force on the right, under Sir George White's personal command, ran
prematurely into Joubert's Transvaal Army, which had advanced from its
previous and partly reconnoitred position, and which had formed up ready
to receive them in a position somewhat nearer Ladysmith. It received a
very heavy cross fire from big guns, field guns, machine guns, and
musketry, and was put to confusion, the artillery and the cavalry having
some difficulty in extricating themselves. General White took the
Manchester Regiment and the Gordon Highlanders from Hamilton's Brigade
to cover the retirement, and his force came back into Ladysmith fired
into with wonderful accuracy, at a range of about 7000 yards, by the big
gun on Pepworth. Of the remainder of Hamilton's Brigade, the Rifle
Brigade (which had only arrived in Ladysmith that day) and a half
battalion Devon Regiment were told off to bring up the rear, whilst the
other half battalion of the Devons was left on Limit Hill, two miles
outside Ladysmith, to act as a covering force.

*       *       *       *       *

The Naval Brigade under Lambton arrived at Limit Hill with three naval
12-pounders just as the retirement was taking place, and they were at
once ordered back into the town. They returned without coming into
action. As they were retiring down the road past the Piggery by the
Orange Free State Junction Station, a well-aimed shell from Pepworth
Hill upset one of their guns, killing some of the ox-team and a gunner
who was being carried back wounded in an ambulance.

The half battalion of the regiment under Major Curry was ordered to take
up a defensive position on Limit Hill and to stay there for the night.

The Boer force was within 1000 yards, and it was thought probable that
they would follow up their defeated foe. Their patrols were continually
coming to within 300-500 yards of the Devons' outpost line.

As the half battalion was well covered from view, it was deemed
expedient and prudent not to expose their position and weakness by
firing, but rather by lying quiet to trust to the Boer imagination,
allowing them to think there was a larger force in position at Limit
Hill than there really was. This plan was eminently successful, for
except for Boer patrols the position was not threatened.

Orders were received by this half battalion at 9 a.m. on November 2nd to
retire on to Ladysmith. The defenders of Ladysmith being unaware of the
fact that any of their own troops were in front of them, and mistaking
friend for foe, got down on their knees to fire as the companies of the
Devons appeared in sight.

The half battalion which had retired with the rest of the force into
Ladysmith on October 30th received orders at 10 a.m. on the 31st to
strike camp, move off and form part of the garrison of section "A" of
the defences of Ladysmith, under the command of Colonel W.G. Knox, C.B.
The second half battalion followed them.




CHAPTER II

SIEGE OF LADYSMITH

1899-1900


The siege of Ladysmith had now commenced; communication to the south was
interrupted on November 2nd, and on the same day the Boers had their
guns in action on Bulwana Mountain and were shelling the works and town
freely.

The perimeter of Ladysmith was divided into four sections, A, B, C, D,
under Colonel W.G. Knox, General Howard, Colonel Hamilton, and Colonel
Royston respectively. Section A extended from Devon Post to Cove
Redoubt; on the west of this was section B, extending as far as Range
Post on the Klip River. Section C included Maiden Castle, Wagon Hill,
and Caesar's Camp, whilst the plain between Caesar's Camp and Devon Post
was held by the Natal Volunteers under Colonel Royston.

The battalion was ordered to take up the two posts of Cemetery Hill and
Helpmakaar Hill. These were the most eastern kopjes of the defences.
They skirted the Helpmakaar road and were immediately under Bulwana and
Gun Hill. These were distant only some five thousand yards, and
dominated Devon Post.

The battalion was distributed: three companies on Helpmakaar Hill, two
companies on Cemetery Hill, with three companies in reserve near the
road and river-bed immediately beneath Cemetery Hill.

Devon Post received its first shells on the morning of the 3rd. These
were aimed at the tents of the reserve companies, which were rather
ostentatiously pitched on the plain by the river-bed under Cemetery
Hill. The shells were fired from a high-velocity 3-inch gun on Bulwana.
The tents were immediately moved closer under the hill, where they were
out of sight from Bulwana. The Boer guns were then trained on to the
working parties, and some fifty shells were burst in the works (just
commenced and affording little cover) on Helpmakaar and Cemetery Hill
posts, but without doing much damage. After this, owing to shell fire,
it was impossible to work except at night, or when Bulwana was obscured
by fog. The fortifications and defences were, however, hastily pushed
forward, and the platforms for the two large and ancient howitzers known
as "Castor" and "Pollux" were soon completed.

Shortly after the commencement of the siege one of the few shells fired
into Ladysmith which did any damage, burst amongst a party of Natal
Carbineers on the road under Cemetery Hill, killing five men and seven
horses.

On November 5th the Intombi Camp was formed, and all the wounded and
most of the women and children, with a few of the able-bodied male
civilian inhabitants of Ladysmith, were moved into the neutral camp.

On November 6th and 7th, with the exception of a shell or two, things
were quiet on Devon Post, but on the evening of the 7th a furious
bombardment began at four o'clock, the Boer guns all round firing into
the town and at anything they could see moving. No damage was done.

In addition to the works on Devon Post, which were manned by the
Regiment, a half-company picquet was told off nightly. This picquet
extended and lay down across the main road at the foot of the forward
work. It mounted after dark and was relieved before daylight in the
morning. Many will remember the spot where this picquet was posted as
the most ill-chosen, inconvenient, and hard platform for a bed on a
rainy night.

The nights of the 6th, 7th, and 8th were occupied in making the works
stronger and building additional works.

On November 9th the Boers made their first attempt against Ladysmith.
The attack commenced at 6 a.m. with heavy musketry fire directed on to
the northern defences; and three hours later the attack developed on
Helpmakaar Post and Caesar's Camp. Shells came very thickly from two
howitzers and three high-velocity Creusot guns into Devon Post. This
lasted till about 2 p.m., when the action was concluded with a royal
salute from the naval batteries and three hearty cheers, which, started
by the Naval Brigade, were taken up all round the defences in honour of
the birthday of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales. A curious ending to a
battle.

During the action a well-directed shell from one of Christie's ancient
howitzers, which were now located on Helpmakaar Hill, pitched with good
effect into the middle of a large group of Boers who were entrenching
themselves on a small rise of ground underneath Gun Hill.

Helpmakaar, which had always been a single-day post, was now turned into
a three days' post, companies remaining in the fort for three days
before being relieved.

On the 11th three companies of the Regiment were sent out under Captain
Lafone to blow up a farm building under Bulwana, about one and half
miles distant from Devon Post. After a long delay, owing to the blasting
materials having been forgotten, the operation was successfully carried
out, and the party returned with only some slight annoyance from the
enemy's pompom and a few shots from a high-velocity gun stationed on
Bulwana.

The Boer artillery on Bulwana and Gun Hill was well served, and their
shooting was excellent. One morning they opened with a 40-pounder
howitzer, known under the name of "Weary Willy," on to the main work at
Devon Post, at a portion of the work occupied by "Walker's Hotchkiss Gun
Detachment." About twelve consecutive shots pitched within a five yards'
radius, and one crashed into and nearly breached the parapet, which was
here about six feet thick and built of large stones.

The men worked on the 11th from dark till 1 a.m., when the works were
practically completed and sufficiently strengthened to answer all
purposes, although building was being carried on till the last day of
the siege, and the men were still building at the actual moment when the
relief cavalry were marching across the plain into Ladysmith.

The willingness and the cheery manner in which the men of the battalion
worked at these defences are worthy of record. On pitch-dark nights in
pouring rain the men, wet to the skin, covered with mud and filth,
without a smoke, groping about in the dark to find a likely stone,
carried on the work in silence; and when the word was passed along to
knock off work, they "turned in" without a grumble into a wet bivouac.
There was no complaining, and the men were never required by their
officers to bring along the stones faster. The only noise that broke the
stillness of the night was the incessant "click, click, click" of the
picks at work loosening the stones, and the men, in spite of the
conditions under which the work was being carried on, joked among
themselves in an undertone.

Work was nightly carried on from dark till midnight and sometimes till 2
a.m., and the men turned out again to stand to arms at 3.30 a.m.

By the middle of November the works at Devon Post were from 4-1/2 to 10
feet high, from 8 to 10 feet thick at the top (the whole built roughly
of stone), with the superior slope nearly flat, exterior slope about
1/1, interior slope nearly upright. The front work had a thickness at
the bottom of about 18 feet, owing to the work being constructed on the
slope of the hill.

[Illustration: In the trenches, Ladysmith]

Things passed quietly with intermittent shell fire till the afternoon of
the 14th, when General Brocklehurst took out the Cavalry Brigade and two
batteries of artillery, with the intention of turning the Boers off
Rifleman's Ridge. This they failed to do, and returned to their lines
about 5 p.m. well peppered by the Boer big guns, one shell from the big
gun on Pepworth pitching into the centre of the road just short of a
battery of artillery which was coming back into Ladysmith, near the
defences on the north-west front held by a detachment of the Dublin
Fusiliers--an accurate shot, and the distance measured on the map 10,500
yards. Shortly afterwards the Naval Brigade in their turn did some good
shooting, pitching a shell on to the muzzle of the big gun on Pepworth,
and a few moments after this shot, another on to his parapet. Boers were
afterwards seen carrying litters away from the work. This big gun never
fired again during the siege, but the Boers patched him up and he lived
to do good work for them against General Buller in his advance north to
Lydenburg, and the Boers finally blew him up in front of the battalion
near Waterval, in the Lydenburg district, when engaged with a column
under General Walter Kitchener.

For the next few days nothing of consequence occurred beyond the usual
shell fire, varied at intervals from day to night time. It rained in
torrents most of the time, and the men were continually wet through.
They however kept very fit, and there were very few in hospital.

An amusing incident occurred on the 17th. Good targets being scarce the
Boers continually fired shell at any moving or stationary object they
could catch sight of--sometimes at a single scout. They often fired
their pompom at a range of about 5000 yards at the vultures feeding on
the dead horses under Devon Post. On this day they sent three 40-lb.
shells at an old man named Brown who contracted for the dead horses.
Brown used to take these out into the open in full view of the Boers, to
some flat ground under the Post, and there skin them at his leisure. The
old man would take his load out once a day in a four-horsed cart. If he
was seen by the Boers he would come back at a gallop pursued by Boer
shells. This time he came back on three wheels, much to the amusement of
Section A of the defences; the fourth wheel had come off and he was in
too great a hurry to readjust it, and it was in consequence left behind.
The old man was never hit.

On November 20th the Boers mounted some more guns on Bulwana and also on
Umbrella Tree Hill, which lay in the Nek between Bulwana and Gun Hill.
Colonel Knox ordered a dummy battery to be made at night on the further
side of the Klip River and out in the open. Wooden imitation guns and
imitation gunners were erected, and these were worked with a string by a
gunner concealed in the bank of the river.

Captain Kincaid-Smith, with the two Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns captured at
Elandslaagte, of which he was now in charge, was to open fire from Devon
Post on to the Boer guns newly placed on Umbrella Tree Hill, and as he
was perfectly concealed and fired smokeless powder, it was supposed that
the Boers would imagine that the firing came from the new dummy battery
just erected.

Kincaid-Smith began firing at about six o'clock on the following
morning. He fired some five shells in perfect silence unanswered by the
Boers. He was then suddenly located by them, and shells were hurled on
to him from all sides and from all descriptions of guns. This continued
for a quarter of an hour and then slackened off. The Boers burst their
shrapnel better than usual, and in the evening just before dark one
shrapnel got into a working party on Devon Post, killing one man and
severely wounding another.

There was some heavy musketry fire during the night at a reconnaissance
party sent out from Ladysmith towards Umbrella Tree Hill. The party had
orders to disturb the Boers and draw their fire. This they very
successfully accomplished. On the 22nd night another "disturbing party"
was sent out under Captain Jacson, consisting of one company of the
Regiment and a party of cavalry, to "stir up" the Boers on Flag Hill. It
was pitch-dark, pouring with rain, and the ground was covered with
boulders of rocks. The cavalry were obliged to leave their horses behind
and proceed on foot in front of the infantry; so little was gained by
the enterprise and no "stirring up" was effected.

Up to this date there had been very little news from the outside world,
but now the Regiment was informed that General French had fought a
successful engagement at Estcourt and had got in with the cavalry. They
were also told that the garrison might expect to be relieved by the 13th
December by one division which was coming up from Durban.

About November 22nd the news was received that the armoured train at
Colenso had been attacked, derailed, and captured.

On the 23rd Kincaid-Smith received orders to proceed with one of his
guns during the following night down to the river-bed near the dummy
battery and open fire if the Boers fired at it in the morning. This they
had done the previous day, much to every one's amusement. At daybreak he
opened fire from the river-bed. After his second shot the Boers found
him and made wonderful practice, bursting shrapnel all over him. No
damage, however, was done as he was well dug into the bank. They
continued their shelling for an hour, after which they turned their big
guns on to Tunnel Hill for a short time. This hill was held by the
Liverpool Regiment, who lost two killed and twelve wounded, of whom five
died of their wounds next day.

The works on Devon Post and Cemetery Hill were strengthened during the
next few nights until the front walls were from twelve to fifteen feet
thick. Most of this work was carried on in heavy rain, which greatly
added to the general discomfort of the men.

On November 28th the garrison was encouraged by the information that the
Boers had been badly beaten near Estcourt, that 3000 of them had gone
off (it was not reported where to!), and that General Clery was at
Colenso.

On November 30th General Clery opened up signalling communication with
Ladysmith by flashing his message with his searchlight at night on to
the clouds. The message, which was in cipher, could be easily read by
every one, but the garrison was unable to reply as they had no
searchlight.

In the early days of December, in order to keep the men as far as
possible in a condition for any eventualities, the Regiment evacuated
their works twice a week at dusk and went for a march twice round the
town. Starting at nightfall the works were regained about 10 p.m. The
exercise was good for the men's limbs and the change of scene
undoubtedly nourishment for their minds, but it is doubtful if it
conduced to the health of the men, as during the march they were
smothered in their own dust, and also in that kicked up by the artillery
horses exercising at the same time and on the same roads. It certainly
gave the men something to think about besides rocks and stones and
building, and the walking stretched their legs.

On December 2nd Colonel Knox, desirous of carrying on the work of
building in the daytime as well as by night, ordered some canvas screens
to be put up in the Post, behind which the men could work concealed from
view. But although stained the colour of the surroundings, the screens
were seen at once by the Boers, and the battalion was much troubled by a
new gun stationed near Pepworth Hill, which opened fire shortly after
they were erected. One shell from this howitzer topping the hill pitched
within a yard of the guard tent underneath, which was full of men. No
damage was done, however, beyond scattering the ammunition boxes and
covering the men with mud. The screens were then taken down, and on the
disappearance of the noxious objects the firing ceased, and the Boers
appeared pacified. At 10 p.m., whilst the Regiment was at work building
on Cemetery Hill, an order came to parade at once and march to a
rendezvous down in the town in Lyle Street. It was given out "for
operations near Limit Hill." On reaching the rendezvous it was learnt
that the force consisted of two brigades of infantry, some batteries,
and all the mounted troops. After half an hour's wait, a staff officer
rode up to say that the operations were cancelled.

About this time the siege newspaper, the _Ladysmith Lyre_, came into
existence. There were only four issues, on account of want of paper.

Shelling continued daily with but little or no result. The Boers were
apparently much incensed with the Town Hall, upon which the Geneva red
cross flag was flying, and which was being used as a hospital, for they
continually fired at it till the flag was taken down early in December,
when they scarcely ever fired at it again.

[Illustration: Town Hall, Ladysmith, Clock-tower damaged by shell fire]

On December 7th General Hunter made his sortie to Gun Hill. The secret
was well kept. In the evening, at dark, the battalion was sent to
Abattis Hill with orders to entrench, the scheme ostensibly being that a
force was to go out and stir up the Boers round Pepworth Hill whilst the
Regiment threatened to attack the Boers on the other flank.

At 11 p.m. a letter was received telling the officer commanding the
Devon Regiment to meet General Hunter under Devon Post at 11.30 p.m.
Shortly after this hour a force of Colonial mounted infantry, with
General Hunter at their head, passed the post to assault Gun Hill. This
they found but sparsely guarded, and, dispersing the small picquet, they
succeeded in blowing up the two big guns and a Maxim located there. The
Regiment remained out till the operation was over. It had been placed in
this position on Abattis Hill to act as a flank guard, with the object
of preventing the Boers attacking from the left round General Hunter's
rear, which was very open, and to act as a support upon which General
Hunter could fall back in case his surprise failed and he was driven in.

This successful operation was accomplished with the loss of seven men
wounded.

The operation that followed was not, however, so successful. Colonel
Knox reported that his mounted troops had gone out eight miles up the
Newcastle road past Limit Hill, and had not met or seen a single Boer.
He suggested that the Cavalry Brigade should go out and capture and burn
the Boer stores at Elandslaagte Station. They proceeded to carry out the
suggestion, starting at 7 a.m., but they fell in with a large force of
Boers under Pepworth Hill who had been in their laagers when the
reconnaissance was made and had thus escaped detection. They came under
heavy musketry fire as well as shell fire, and retired back to Ladysmith
with a loss of three killed and fifteen wounded.

On December 10th an attack on Devon Post was expected, and precautions
taken accordingly. The attack, however, did not come off.

On the night of December 10th the Rifle Brigade made a sortie and blew
up a Boer big gun on Surprise Hill. This attack was admirably planned
and carried out, but the losses sustained by the Rifle Brigade were
heavy, being fourteen killed and fifty wounded out of the five companies
employed. The Boers attacked them as they were retiring; there was a
good deal of indiscriminate firing, and the bayonet was freely used. The
Boers lost considerably, partly in the general mix-up, from their own
fire, and partly owing to the close-quarter combat with the Rifle
Brigade.

The Regiment, with other troops, was ordered out with all baggage on the
night of the 12th, the rendezvous being the iron bridge on the
Vanreenen's Pass road. On arrival there the order was received to go
home. This was supposed to be a rehearsal for a sortie. On December 13th
General Buller's guns were heard for the first time due south from
Ladysmith, and at 8 p.m. the Regiment and transport were inspected by
Colonel Knox to see if everything was complete and in readiness to move
out, and on the 14th the Regiment was placed with other troops in a
flying column formed under the personal command of Sir George White.

It was expected by all that General Buller would relieve the Ladysmith
garrison on December 15th.

The following day, December 15th, a very heavy cannonade commenced at 6
a.m. in the direction of Colenso; and at 7 a.m. a heliograph message was
sent into Ladysmith which told the garrison that "the Boers are
suffering terribly from our thirty guns and 23,000 men." The cannonade
ceased at about 1 p.m.

This day the meat ration was reduced to 9 oz. per man, but 1-1/4 lb. of
bread per man was still being issued.

December 16th being Dingaan's Day, the garrison of Ladysmith was treated
to heavy shell fire at daybreak.

On December 17th the Regiment and the Gordon Highlanders were told off
as reserve battalions under the immediate orders of Sir George White.

It was officially given out that Sir R. Buller had been unable to make
good his advance at Colenso, and that the garrison must be prepared to
hold on for another two weeks. The orders publishing this news stated
that the "Lieutenant-General regrets to have to announce that the
Lieutenant-General Commanding-in-Chief in South Africa failed to make
good his first attack on Colenso; reinforcements will therefore not
arrive as early as expected."

On the evening of December 18th the Regiment gave over the good works
they had completed on Devon Post and Cemetery Hill to the Liverpool
Regiment, and moved into the latter's camp at Tunnel Hill, or, as it was
otherwise known, Railway Cutting Camp.

*       *       *       *       *

Helpmakaar Hill, on account of being so exposed, had, at the
commencement of the siege, been considered indefensible and untenable.

Under the vigorous superintendence of Colonel Knox, the commandant of
the section who planned the defences, the works on this hill had by now
been almost completed by the officers and men of the Battalion.

The defences were as complete as possible--flanking works, covered ways,
splinter and shell-proof covers were dug or erected, and the main
trenches had been turned into defensible barracks with head cover to
keep off the rain.

It was possible to proceed from the reserve under Cemetery Hill up to
and round the front and main works, and round the other side of the hill
back to the reserve again, without once coming into view from the Boer
positions on Gun Hill, Bulwana, or elsewhere, a six-feet covering wall
having been built for this purpose. It was thus possible to send
reinforcements to any part of the works without exposure to fire or
view.

During the siege this post was never attacked or seriously threatened.

The Regiment, being now in the general reserve, was ordered to be ready
to jump into mule wagons, and be carted at a gallop to any place where
they might be required, at any moment, and on the 20th the manoeuvre was
put into execution.

It was not altogether a success.

At dusk the Regiment proceeded to the railway station and the men were
duly loaded up in the wagons. A start was then made, but as the second
wagon nearly took the whole station with it in its endeavours to
negotiate the first corner of the galvanized iron goods shed, no great
speed was effected, for this wagon and the demolished corner of the shed
blocked all further egress from the station till the road was cleared.
Shortly afterwards the wagons, at last let loose, came into contact with
the two city filth carts, the "Powerful" and "Terrible," which were
parading about the streets on their own. These exceedingly powerful
ironclads completed the defeat of the mule wagons, upset finally their
order of going, and the retirement was effected in detachments. The
manoeuvre was never repeated.

Wonderful tales and reports were continually being circulated from day
to day. On one day there would perhaps be no news of any value, followed
on the next day by the most woeful tidings; but on the third day, as if
ashamed of themselves for furnishing such bad news the previous day, the
tale-bearers would turn the winter of its discontent into the most
glorious summer, by sending forth to the garrison shaves bubbling over
with pleasing items.

On the evening of the 21st a heliograph message was received from the
2nd Battalion, which was with Sir Redvers Buller, stating that at the
Colenso fight on the 15th December Colonel Bullock, Major Walter, and
Lieutenant Smyth-Osbourne had been taken prisoners, and Captains
Goodwyn, Vigors, and Radcliffe and Lieutenants Gardiner and Storey
wounded.

After standing to arms daily at 4.15 a.m. till daylight, the Regiment
was employed in building long stone traverses, behind which the men were
to live, and this work was carried on again in the evening after dark by
the light of candles. The dimensions of the traverses were sixty yards
long, eight feet high, six feet (of stonework) thick at the top, and
nine feet of stonework at the base, the earth from a ditch in front
being thrown up at an angle of 1/1. They had a topping of sand-bags,
with intervals for air passage; and a tent, stretched lengthways from
the top down to ground, afforded the men shelter and accommodation.

On December 22nd a serious catastrophe happened to a party of the
Gloucester Regiment, who were quartered in a small traverse near those
occupied by the Regiment. A shell caught the whole party of twelve men
as they were sitting away from the cover of the traverse. Five were
killed, four died of their wounds almost immediately, and three were
severely wounded.

A man with a telescope was now placed on the look-out, with orders to
blow a whistle if he saw the big gun on Bulwana turned towards the lines
when firing; and as the shell took about thirty seconds from the time of
the discharge to reach its mark, the warning gave the men time to get
under cover.

There were frequently some very amusing incidents when the look-out man
blew his whistle. One morning whilst the business at the orderly-room
was being conducted, and a culprit being told off, the whistle gave
warning that the gun on Bulwana had fired, and in the direction of
Tunnel Hill. As all could not get inside the orderly-room shelter, which
was merely a hole dug into the side of the hill, there was a general
scuttle and _sauve qui peut_. One officer, trying to get into the
orderly-room from outside, ran into another who was escaping from it to
get into the first traverse, and each tumbled over the other. The
Quartermaster, trying to crawl on his hands and knees under the tenting
of the second traverse, got blocked out, and at the same time shut out
another officer flying for safety. At the same moment a man jumped from
above on the Quartermaster's back, and he, fancying that it was the
shell and that his end had come, gave himself up for lost. All, however,
ended happily for the immediate neighbourhood, for the look-out man had
made a mistake, and the shell, instead of arriving at Tunnel Hill,
crashed into the town.

All these incidents and accidents, individually very serious at the
time, were always amusing in the telling as soon as the tyranny was
overpast, and, resulting in a hearty laugh, helped to relieve the
strain.

The London _Gazette_ of October 9th was signalled into Ladysmith by the
2nd Battalion. This stated: "Major Park to be Lieutenant-Colonel;
Davies, 2nd-in-Command; Ellicombe, Major; Radcliffe, Captain."

A list of prices at this time in Ladysmith at the public auction is of
interest:--

Eggs per dozen, 11s. 6d.
Small vegetable marrow, 1s. 6d.
Twelve small carrots, 2s. 6d.
Small water melon (worth 1d.), 6s. 6d.
Condensed milk per tin, 5s. 6d.
Fifty-two small potatoes, L1 10s.
Chickens, each, 8s.
Ducks, 13s. 6d.
Dutch butter in tins, 6s. 6d. per lb.
1/2d. Manilla cigars, 1s.

There was no English smoking tobacco obtainable, and one bottle of
whisky changed hands at L5 10s.

December 25th, Christmas Day.

"Hark, the herald angels sing!" was forcibly brought to notice by the
whistling of shells passing overhead at daylight. No Divine Service was
therefore held. The garrison received the following message from Her