|
|
the Crystal Palace 3,964
Number of ships visited by officer instructors 6,927
Numbers attending these lectures:
Masters 1,361
Officers 5,921
Number of officers and men instructed in signalling 10,487
The keenness shown by officers and men of the merchant service
contributed in a marked degree to the success of the courses instituted;
just one example may be given. I visited the Royal Naval Depot at the
Crystal Palace early in 1918, and amongst other most interesting scenes
witnessed a large number of men of the merchant service at gun drill. I
questioned several of them as to their experiences, and many of the men
had had their ships torpedoed under them three, four or five times.
Amongst the gun crews was a steward who had been through this experience
four times. On my asking why he, as a steward, should be going through
the gunnery course, he replied that he hoped that by so doing he might
stand a chance of getting his own back by assisting to sink a submarine.
The knowledge which I possessed of the measures introduced during the
year 1917 to combat the German submarine warfare, and the continual
increase in the efficiency of the anti-submarine work which I knew would
result from increased production of anti-submarine vessels and weapons,
led me in February, 1918, to state that in my opinion the submarine
menace would be "held" by the autumn of the year 1918. The remark, which
was made at what I understood to be a private gathering, was given very
wide publicity, and was criticized at the time, but it was fulfilled, as
the figures will indicate.
CHAPTER IV
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM
The question of the introduction of convoys for the protection of
merchant ships was under consideration at various times during the war.
The system had been employed during the old wars and had proved its
value in the case of attack by vessels on the surface, and it was
natural that thoughts should be directed towards its reintroduction when
the submarine campaign developed. There is one inherent disadvantage in
this system which cannot be overcome, although it can be mitigated by
careful organization, viz. the delay involved. Delay means, of course, a
loss of carrying-power, and when tonnage is already short any proposal
which must reduce its efficiency has to be very carefully examined. The
delay of the convoy system is due to two causes, (a) because the speed
of the convoy must necessarily be fixed by the speed of the slowest
ship, and (b) the fact that the arrival of a large number of ships at
one time may cause congestion and consequent delay at the port of
unloading. However, if additional safety is given there is compensation
for this delay when the risk is great. One danger of a convoy system
under modern conditions should be mentioned, viz. the increased risk
from attack by mines. If ships are sailing singly a minefield will in
all probability sink only one vessel--the first ship entering it. The
fate of that ship reveals the presence of the field, and with adequate
organization it is improbable that other vessels will be sunk in the
same field. In the case of a convoy encountering a minefield, as in the
case of a fleet, several ships may be sunk practically simultaneously.
During the year 1916, whilst I was still in command of the Grand Fleet,
suggestions as to convoys had been forwarded to the Admiralty for the
better protection of the ocean trade against attack by surface vessels;
but it was pointed out to me that the number of cruisers available for
escort work was entirely insufficient, and that, consequently, the
suggestions could not be adopted. This objection was one that could only
be overcome by removing some of the faster merchant ships from the trade
routes and arming them. To this course there was the objection that we
were already--that is before the intensive campaign began--very short of
shipping.
Shortly after my taking up the post of First Sea Lord at the Admiralty,
at the end of 1916, the question was discussed once more. At that time
the danger of attack by enemy raiders on shipping in the North Atlantic
was small; the protection needed was against attack by submarines, and
the dangerous area commenced some 300-400 miles from the British
Islands. It was known that unrestricted submarine warfare was about to
commence, and that this would mean that shipping would usually be
subjected to torpedo attack from submarines when in a submerged
condition. Against this form of attack the gun armament of cruisers or
armed merchant ships was practically useless, and, however powerfully
armed, ships of this type were themselves in peril of being torpedoed.
Small vessels of shallow draught, possessing high speed, offered the
only practicable form of protection. Shallow draught was necessary in
order that the protecting vessels should themselves be comparatively
immune from successful torpedo fire, and speed was essential for
offensive operations against the submarines.
Convoy sailing was, as has been stated, the recognized method of trade
protection in the old wars, and this was a strong argument in favour of
its adoption in the late war. It should, however, be clearly understood
that the conditions had entirely changed. Convoy sailing for the
protection of merchant ships against torpedo attack by submarines was
quite a different matter from such a system as a preventive against
attack by surface vessels and involved far greater difficulties. In the
days of sailing ships especially, accurate station keeping was not very
necessary, and the ships comprising the convoy sailed in loose order and
covered a considerable area of water. On a strange vessel, also a
sailing vessel, being sighted, the protecting frigate or frigates would
proceed to investigate her character, whilst the ships composing the
convoy closed in towards one another or steered a course that would take
them out of danger.
In the circumstances with which we were dealing in 1917 the requirements
were quite otherwise. It was essential for the protection of the convoy
that the ships should keep close and accurate station and should be able
to manoeuvre by signal. Close station was enjoined by the necessity of
reducing the area covered by the convoy; accurate station was required
to ensure safety from collision and freedom of manoeuvre. It will be
realized that a convoy comprising twenty to thirty vessels occupies
considerable space, even when steaming in the usual formation of four,
five or six columns. Since the number of destroyers or sloops that could
be provided for screening the convoy from torpedo attack by submarines
was bound to be very limited under any conditions, it was essential that
the columns of ships should be as short as possible; in other words,
that the ships should follow one another at close intervals, so that the
destroyers on each side of the convoy should be able as far as possible
to guard it from attack by submarines working from the flank, and that
they should be able with great rapidity to counter-attack a submarine
with depth charges should a periscope be sighted for a brief moment
above the surface, or the track of a torpedo be seen. In fact, it was
necessary, if the protection of a convoy was to be real protection, that
the ships composing the convoy should be handled in a manner that
approached the handling of battleships in a squadron. The diagram on p.
107 shows an ideal convoy with six destroyers protecting it, disposed in
the manner ordered at the start of the convoy system.
[Illustration on page 107, with caption "Diagram illustrating a convoy
of 25 Merchant Ships, with an escort of 6 Destroyers zigzagging at high
speed for protection. The convoy shown in close order and on its normal
course."]
[Illustration on page 108 shows, according to its caption, "Typical
convoy and escort of 10 Trawlers in the early days of convoy."]
How far this ideal was attainable was a matter of doubt. Prior to 1917
our experience of merchant ships sailing in company had been confined to
troop transports. These vessels were well officered and well manned,
carried experienced engine-room staffs, were capable of attaining
moderate speeds, and were generally not comparable to ordinary cargo
vessels, many of which were of very slow speed, and possessed a large
proportion of officers and men of limited sea experience, owing to the
very considerable personnel of the Mercantile Marine which had joined
the Royal Naval Reserve and was serving in the Fleet or in patrol craft.
Moreover, even the troop transports had not crossed the submarine zone
in company, but had been escorted independently; and many naval officers
who had been in charge of convoys, when questioned, were not convinced
that sailing in convoy under the conditions mentioned above was a
feasible proposition, nor, moreover, were the masters of the transports.
In February, 1917, in order to investigate this aspect of the question,
a conference took place between the Naval Staff and the masters of cargo
steamers which were lying in the London docks. The masters were asked
their opinion as to how far their ships could be depended on to keep
station in a convoy of 12 to 20 vessels. They expressed a unanimous
opinion that it was not practicable to keep station under the conditions
mentioned, the difficulty being due to two causes: (1) the inexperience
of their deck officers owing to so many of them having been taken for
the Royal Naval Reserve, and (2) the inexperience of their engineers,
combined with the impossibility of obtaining delicate adjustments of
speed by reason of the absence of suitable engine-room telegraphs and
the poor quality of much of the coal used. When pressed as to the
greatest number of ships that could be expected to manoeuvre together in
safety, the masters of these cargo steamers, all experienced seamen,
gave it as their opinion that two or possibly three was the maximum
number. The opinions thus expressed were confirmed later by other
masters of merchant ships who were consulted on the subject. It is to
the eternal credit of the British Merchant Marine, which rendered
service of absolutely inestimable value to the Empire throughout the
war, that when put to the test by the adoption of the convoy system,
officers and men proved that they could achieve far more than they
themselves had considered possible. At the same time it should be
recognized how severe a strain was imposed on officers, particularly the
masters, of vessels sailing in convoy.
The matter was kept constantly under review. In February, 1917, the
Germans commenced unrestricted submarine warfare against merchant ships
of all nationalities, and as a consequence our shipping losses, as well
as those of Allied and neutral countries, began to mount steadily each
succeeding month. The effect of this new phase of submarine warfare is
best illustrated by a few figures.
During the last four months of 1916 the gross tonnage lost by _submarine
attack_ alone gave the following monthly average: British, 121,500;
Allies, 59,500; neutrals, 87,500; total, 268,500.
In the first four months of 1917 the figures became, in round numbers:
British. Allies. Neutrals. Total.
January 104,000 62,000 116,000 282,000
February 256,000 77,000 131,000 464,000
March 283,000 74,000 149,000 506,000
April 513,000 133,000 185,000 831,000
(The United States entered the war on April 6, 1917.)
NOTE.--In neither case is the loss of fishing craft included.
It will be realized that, since the losses towards the end of 1916 were
such as to give just cause for considerable anxiety, the later figures
made it clear that some method of counteracting the submarines must be
found and found quickly if the Allied cause was to be saved from
disaster.
None of the anti-submarine measures that had been under consideration or
trial since the formation of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval
Staff in December, 1916, could _by any possibility_ mature for some
months, since time was necessary for the production of vessels and more
or less complicated materiel, and in these circumstances the only step
that could be taken was that of giving a trial to the convoy system for
the ocean trade, although the time was by no means yet ripe for
effective use of the system, by reason of the shortage of destroyers,
sloops and cruisers, which was still most acute, although the situation
was improving slowly month by month as new vessels were completed.
Prior to this date we had already had some experience of convoys as a
protection against submarine attack. The coal trade of France had been
brought under convoy in March, 1917. The trade between Scandinavia and
North Sea ports was also organized in convoys in April of the same year,
this trade having since December, 1916, been carried out on a system of
"protected sailings." It is true that these convoys were always very
much scattered, particularly the Scandinavian convoy, which was composed
largely of neutral vessels and therefore presented exceptional
difficulties in the matter of organization and handling. The number of
destroyers which could be spared for screening the convoys was also very
small. The protection afforded was therefore more apparent than real,
but even so the results had been very good in reducing the losses by
submarine attack. The protection of the vessels employed in the French
coal trade was entrusted very largely to trawlers, as the ships
composing the convoy were mostly slow, so that in this case more
screening vessels were available, although they were not so efficient,
being themselves of slow speed.
For the introduction of a system of convoy which would protect merchant
ships as far as their port of discharge in the United Kingdom, there
were two requirements: (a) A sufficient number of convoying cruisers or
armed merchant ships, whose role would be that of bringing the ships
comprising the convoy to some selected rendezvous outside the zone of
submarine activity, where it would be met by the flotilla of small
vessels which would protect the convoy through the submarine area. It
was essential that the ships of the convoy should arrive at this
rendezvous as an organized unit, well practised in station-keeping by
day, and at night, with the ships darkened, and that the vessels should
be capable also of zigzagging together and of carrying out such
necessary movements as alterations of course, etc.; otherwise the convoy
could not be safely escorted through the danger area. (b) The other
essential was the presence of the escorting flotilla in sufficient
strength.
It has been mentioned that there was an insufficient number of vessels
available for use as convoying cruisers. It was estimated that about
fifty cruisers or armed merchant ships would be required for this
service if the homeward-bound trade to the British Isles alone was
considered. An additional twelve vessels would be necessary to deal with
the outward-bound trade. At the time only eighteen vessels were
available, and these could only be obtained by denuding the North
Atlantic entirely of cruisers.
The situation in regard to destroyers or other fast vessels presented
equal difficulties. Early in February, 1917, we had available for
general convoy or patrol work only fourteen destroyers stationed at
Devonport and twelve sloops at Queenstown, and owing to repairs and the
necessity of resting officers and men periodically, only a proportion of
these were available at any one time. A number of these vessels were
required to escort troop transports through the submarine danger zone.
During the month of February six sloops were diverted from their proper
work of minesweeping in the North Sea and added to the patrol force at
Queenstown, and eight destroyers were taken from the Grand Fleet and
sent to southern waters for patrol and escort duty. There were obvious
objections to this weakening of the North Sea forces, but it was
necessary in the circumstances to ignore them.
This total of forty destroyers and sloops represented the whole
available force at the end of February. Simultaneously a careful
investigation showed that for the institution of a system of convoy and
escort for homeward-bound Atlantic trade alone to the United Kingdom,
our requirements would be eighty-one destroyers or sloops and
forty-eight trawlers (the latter vessels being only suitable for
escorting the slow 6-7-knot ships of the trade from Gibraltar to the
United Kingdom). For the outward Atlantic trade from the United Kingdom
our estimated requirements were forty-four additional destroyers or
sloops.
The deficiency in suitable vessels of this class is best shown by the
following table, which reveals the destroyer position at different
periods during the year 1917:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Mediterranean.
----------------------------------------------------------------+
Pembroke. |
-------------------------------------------------------------+ |
Queenstown. | |
---------------------------------------------------------+ | |
Bunerana. | | |
------------------------------------------------------+ | | |
North Channel. | | | |
---------------------------------------------------+ | | | |
Scapa and Invergordon. | | | | |
------------------------------------------------+ | | | | |
The Tyne. | | | | | |
---------------------------------------------+ | | | | | |
The Humber. | | | | | | |
------------------------------------------+ | | | | | | |
Lowestoft. | | | | | | | |
---------------------------------------+ | | | | | | | |
The Nore. | | | | | | | | |
------------------------------------+ | | | | | | | | |
Portsmouth. | | | | | | | | | |
---------------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | |
Devonport. | | | | | | | | | | |
------------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | |
Dover. | | | | | | | | | | | |
---------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | | |
Harwich Fleet. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Grand Fleet. | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
--------------------+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+--+---
January. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Flotilla Leaders | 10| 2| 3| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Modern destroyers | 97|45|18|14|13| | | | | | | | | |29
|[A]| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Destroyers of River | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
class and earlier | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
construction | | |11| 6|16| 9| | 9|11|15| 4| | | | 8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
P boats | | 2| 5| | 4|10| 4| 1| | | | | | |
--------------------+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+--+---
June. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Flotilla Leaders | 10| 3| 4| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Modern destroyers | 95|23|29|38|15| | | 5| | | | 4| 32| |29
|[A]| | | | | | | | | | | |[B]| |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Destroyers of River | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
class and earlier | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
construction | | |10| 5|16| 7| |29| 1|11| 4| | | | 8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
P boats | | 2| 6| | 8| 9| 4| 1| | | | | | 5|
--------------------+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+--+---
November. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Flotilla Leaders | 11| 4| 6| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Modern destroyers |101|24|26|37| 9| | | 4| | | |29| 35| |32
|[A]| | | | | | | | | | | |[B]| |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
Destroyers of River | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
class and earlier | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
construction | | |10| 4| 8|12| 2|30| |11| 4| | | | 8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
P boats | | 2| 6| |31| | | 1| | | | | |10|
--------------------+---+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+--+---
[Footnote A: Includes destroyers detached for protection work in other
commands.]
[Footnote B: Includes United States destroyers.]
There was the possible alternative of bringing only a small portion of
the trade under convoy by taking all the available fast small craft from
patrol duty and utilizing them to escort this portion of the trade, but
it was felt that as this would leave the _whole_ of the remaining trade
entirely without protection, and no fast patrol craft would be on the
trade routes to pick up the crews of any merchant ships that might be
sunk by submarines, the step was not justified.
The next point for consideration was the possibility of obtaining
destroyers or sloops from other sources with which to increase the
forces for trade protection. The only commands on which it was possible
to draw further were the Grand Fleet, the Harwich and Dover forces, the
destroyers of old types working on the East Coast, or the destroyers and
"P" boats protecting our cross-Channel communications west of the Dover
Command.
It was out of the question to reduce the Harwich or Dover flotillas
materially, as we were already running the gravest risks from the
inadequacy of these forces to deal with enemy destroyers and submarines
operating in southern waters from Zeebrugge or from German ports, and in
addition the Harwich Force furnished the sole protection for the weekly
convoy running between the Thames and Dutch ports, besides being much
required for reconnaissance and offensive operations in the Heligoland
Bight so far as it could be spared for this purpose. However, the
emergency was such that destroyers were taken from Harwich, as the force
obtained new vessels of a faster and more powerful type. The destroyers
on the East Coast and in the Portsmouth Command were already inadequate
to afford proper protection to the trade and the cross-Channel
communications, as evidenced by our losses. Here again, however, in
order to meet the very serious situation, some destroyers were
eventually transferred to Devonport from Portsmouth, but at the expense
of still less protection and fewer opportunities for offensive action
against submarines. There remained only the Grand Fleet destroyers on
which we could draw yet further. It had always been held that the Grand
Fleet required a total force of one hundred destroyers and ten flotilla
leaders for the double purpose of screening the ships from submarine
attack when at sea and of countering the enemy's destroyers and
attacking his heavy ships with torpedo fire in a fleet action. We had
gradually built the destroyer force of the Grand Fleet up to this figure
by the early spring of 1917, although, of course, it fell far short of
requirements in earlier months. It was well known to us that the High
Sea Fleet would be accompanied by at least eight flotillas, or
eighty-eight destroyers, when proceeding to sea at its _selected_
moment, and it was quite probable that the number might be much higher,
as many more vessels were available. At our _average_ moment, even with
a nominal force of one hundred destroyers and ten flotilla leaders, we
could not expect that more than seventy destroyers and eight leaders
would be present with the Fleet, since, in addition to those absent
refitting, a considerable number were always engaged on trade protection
or anti-submarine work in northern waters which could not join up in
time to accompany the Fleet to sea. When the Scandinavian convoy was
started in April, 1917, one flotilla leader and six destroyers from the
Grand Fleet were used for its protection; other vessels in northern
waters also depended on Grand Fleet destroyers for protection. Any
further transference, therefore, of destroyers from the Grand Fleet to
southern waters for trade protection was a highly dangerous expedient,
involving increased risk from submarine attack on the heavy ships in the
event of the Fleet proceeding to sea, as well as disadvantages in a
Fleet action. The necessity, however, was so great that the risk had to
be faced, and for some months of 1917 from eight to twelve Grand Fleet
destroyers were used for trade protection in the Atlantic, principally
from Irish ports, in addition to those protecting trade in the North
Sea.
It is interesting to note the number of persons who claim to have been
the first to urge the Admiralty to adopt convoys as a method of
protecting merchant ships against submarine attack. The claimants for
this distinction are not confined to Great Britain; the great majority
of them are people without any knowledge of the sea and naval matters,
certainly none of them possessed any knowledge of the number of vessels
needed to afford protection to the ships under convoy, nor of the
vessels which we could produce for the purpose at the time.
Possibly the facts related above may serve to show that convoys were
commenced by Admiralty direction, and that they were started as soon as
and extended as rapidly as the necessary protecting vessels could be
provided. Those who argued then, or who have argued since, that we
should have reduced the number of destroyers with the Grand Fleet will
not, I think, meet with any support from those who served in that Fleet,
especially from the officers upon whom lay the responsibility for
countering any move of the High Sea Fleet.
The entry of the United States into the war early in April eased the
situation somewhat. First it was hoped that the United States Navy would
assist us with destroyers and other small craft, and secondly it was a
fact that the great majority of the material imported into countries
contiguous to Germany came from the United States. There was reason to
anticipate that steps would be taken by the United States authorities in
the direction of some form of rationing of these countries, and in these
circumstances it was justifiable to reduce gradually the strength of our
blockading squadron of armed merchant vessels known as the 10th Cruiser
Squadron. By this means we could at once provide additional vessels to
act as convoying cruisers.
Vice-Admiral W.S. Sims had arrived in this country in March, 1917, after
passing through an exciting experience, the ship in which he crossed
(the United States steamer _St. Louis_) being mined outside Liverpool.
He came to visit me at the Admiralty immediately after his arrival in
London, and from that day until I left the Admiralty at the end of the
year it was my privilege and pleasure to work in the very closest
co-operation with him. My friendship with the Admiral was of very long
standing. We had during many years exchanged views on different naval
subjects, but principally on gunnery questions. I, in common with other
British naval officers who had the honour of his acquaintance, had
always been greatly struck by his wonderful success in the post of
Inspector of Target Practice in the United States Navy. That success was
due not only to his intimate knowledge of gunnery, but also to his
attractive personality, charm of manner, keen sense of humour, and quick
and accurate grasp of any problem with which he was confronted. It was
fortunate indeed for the Allied cause that Admiral Sims should have been
selected to command the United States forces in European waters, for to
the qualities mentioned above he added a habit of speaking his mind with
absolutely fearless disregard of the consequences. This characteristic
has led him on more than one occasion into difficulty, but in the
circumstances with which we had to deal in 1917 it was just the quality
that was needed. It was a very difficult matter for those in authority
in the United States, separated as they were by 3,000 miles of sea from
the theatres of war, to realize the conditions in European waters, for
the Admiralty was not concerned only with the North Sea and Atlantic,
and the terse and straightforward reports of Admiral Sims, and his
convincing statements, went a long way towards bringing home to the
United States people at that time the extreme gravity of the situation
and the need for immediate action. He was consistently backed up by that
great ambassador, the late Mr. W.H. Page, who also honoured me with his
confidence, and to whom I spoke perfectly freely on all occasions.
The assistance from the United States that it was hoped was now in sight
made the prospect of success following on the adoption of the convoy
system far more favourable, and preparations were put in hand for the
institution of an ocean convoy system on a large scale. In order to gain
some experience of the difficulties attending the working of cargo
ships, directions were given for an experimental convoy to be collected
at Gibraltar. The necessary officers were sent out to Gibraltar with
orders to assemble the convoy, to instruct the masters in the work that
lay before them, and to explain to them the system of sailing, the
manner in which the convoy would be handled, and the protection that
would be afforded. This naturally took time, and the convoy did not
arrive in England until after the middle of May. The experience gained
showed, however, that the difficulties apprehended by the officers of
the Mercantile Marine were not insuperable, and that, given adequate
protection by cruisers and small fast craft, the system was at least
practicable. It was accordingly decided to put it into operation at
once, and to extend it as rapidly as the increase in the numbers of our
destroyers and sloops permitted.
The North Atlantic homeward-bound trade was brought under convoy in May,
1917, and the Gibraltar homeward-bound trade in July, but for some
months it was impossible to provide for the institution of a complete
convoy system. At first some 40 per cent, of the homeward-bound trade
was convoyed. Then the system was gradually extended to include first 60
per cent., then 80 per cent., and finally 100 per cent, of the homeward
Atlantic trade and the trade from Gibraltar, trawlers being used as
escorts for the Gibraltar trade, as the majority of the ships therein
engaged were slow. But trawlers are unsatisfactory escort vessels.
In the early stages of the convoy system difficulties were experienced
from the fact that all the available destroyers and most of the sloops
were used as escorts, with the result that the ships not under convoy
were left with but little protection.
CHAPTER V
THE CONVOY SYSTEM AT WORK
As has been mentioned in Chapter II., the first ships to be brought
under a system of convoy were those engaged in the French coal trade and
in the trade between Scandinavia and the United Kingdom.
In the case of the _French coal trade_, commencing in March, 1917, the
steamships engaged in the trade were sailed in groups from four
different assembly ports, viz.:
Southend to Boulogne and Calais.
St. Helens to Havre.
Portland to Cherbourg.
Penzance to Brest.
Between Southend and Boulogne and Calais the protection was given by the
vessels of the Dover Patrol in the course of their ordinary duties, but
for the other three routes special escort forces were utilized, and
daily convoys were the rule.
Owing to the great demand for coal in France, sailing vessels were also
used, and sailed under convoy from several of the south-west ports.
A large organization was required to deal with the trade, and this was
built up under the supervision of Captain Reginald G.H. Henderson, C.B.,
of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, working under
Vice-Admiral (then Rear-Admiral) Sir Alexander Duff, head of the
Division, in conference with the Commanders-in-Chief, Portsmouth and
Plymouth, under whose direction and protection the convoys were run. The
immunity of this trade, carried out in the infested waters of the
English Channel, from successful attack by submarines was extraordinary.
No doubt the small size of the vessels concerned and their comparatively
shallow draught were a contributory cause to this immunity. The figures
for the period March to August, 1917, show that 8,825 vessels crossed
the Channel under convoy, and that only fourteen were lost.
The history of the _Scandinavian and East Coast convoys_ dates back to
the autumn of 1916, when heavy losses were being incurred amongst
Scandinavian ships due to submarine attack. Thus in October, 1916, the
losses amongst Norwegian and Swedish ships by submarine attack were more
than three times as great as the previous highest monthly losses. Some
fear existed that the neutral Scandinavian countries might refuse to run
such risks and go to the extreme of prohibiting sailings. Towards the
end of 1916, before I left the Fleet, a system of "protected" sailings
was therefore introduced. In this system the Commander-in-Chief, Grand
Fleet, fixed upon a number of alternative routes between Norway and the
Shetland Islands, which were used by all vessels trading between
Scandinavia and Allied countries. The particular route in use at any
given moment was patrolled by the local forces from the Orkneys and
Shetlands, assisted when possible by small craft from the Grand Fleet.
The Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands was placed in charge of
the arrangements, which were carried out by the Senior Naval Officer at
Lerwick, in the Shetland Islands. At this period the intention was that
the shipping from Norway should sail at dusk, reach a certain rendezvous
at dawn, and thence be escorted to Lerwick. The shipping from Lerwick
sailed at dawn under protection, dispersed at dark, and reached the
Norwegian coast at dawn. Difficulties, of course, arose in the event of
bad weather, or when the slow speed of the ships prevented the passage
of about 180 miles being made in approximately twenty-four hours, and by
April, 1917, it was evident that further steps were necessary to meet
these difficulties, which were again causing heavy losses. Early in
April, then, by direction from the Admiralty, a conference was held at
Longhope on the subject. Admiral Sir Frederick Brock, Commanding the
Orkneys and Shetlands, presided, and representatives from the Admiralty
and the Commands affected were present, and the adoption of a complete
convoy system to include the whole trade between the East Coast and
Norway was recommended. This proposal was approved by the Admiralty and
was put into force as soon as the necessary organization had matured.
Escorting vessels had with difficulty been provided, although in
inadequate numbers. The first convoys sailed towards the end of April,
1917.
The system may be described briefly as follows. The convoys all put into
Lerwick, in the Shetland Islands, both on the eastward and westward
passages, so that Lerwick acted as a junction for the whole system. From
Lerwick, convoys to Scandinavia left in the afternoon under the
protection of two or three destroyers, and, with some armed patrol
vessels in company up to a certain stage, made the Norwegian coast at
varying points, and there dispersed, and the destroyers then picked up
the west-bound convoy at a rendezvous off the Norwegian coast shortly
before dark, and steered for a rendezvous between Norway and the
Shetland Islands, where an escort of armed patrol vessels joined the
convoy at daylight to assist in its protection to Lerwick. From Lerwick
convoys were dispatched to various points on the coast of the United
Kingdom; those making for southern ports on the East Coast were escorted
by a force composed of some of the old "River" class or of 30-knot class
destroyers, and trawlers belonging to the East Coast Command based on
the Humber, and those making for more northerly ports or ports on the
West Coast were escorted merely by armed patrol vessels, as the danger
of submarine attack to these convoys was not so great.
The main difficulty was the provision of the destroyers required for the
proper protection of the convoys, and to a lesser degree the provision
of armed patrol vessels of the trawler, whaler, or drifter types.
The conference held early in April, 1917, had reported that whilst
stronger protection was naturally desirable, the very least force that
could give defence to the convoys between Lerwick and the East Coast
ports would be a total of twenty-three destroyers and fifty trawlers,
whilst for each convoy between Lerwick and Norway at least two
destroyers and four trawlers were needed. The destroyers for the latter
convoys were provided by the Grand Fleet, although they could ill be
spared. The total number so utilized was six. It was only possible to
provide a force of twenty old destroyers and forty-five trawlers for the
East Coast convoys instead of the numbers recommended by the conference,
and owing to the age of a large majority of these destroyers and the
inevitable resultant occasional breakdown of machinery, the number
available frequently fell below twenty, although it was really
marvellous how those old destroyers stuck to the work to the eternal
credit of their crews, and particularly the engineering staffs. The
adoption of the system, however, resulted during the comparatively fine
summer weather in a considerable reduction in the number of merchant
ships lost, in spite of the fact that great difficulty was experienced
in keeping the ships of the convoys together, particularly at night,
dawn frequently finding the convoy very much scattered.
It became obvious, however, that with the approach of winter the old
destroyers of the 30-knot class would have the greatest difficulty in
facing the heavy weather, and very urgent representations were made by
Sir Frederick Brock for their replacement by more modern vessels before
the winter set in. All that could be effected in this direction was
done, though at the expense of some of the Channel escorts. Urgent
requests for good destroyers were being received at the Admiralty from
every Command, and it was impossible to comply with them since the
vessels were not in existence.
Certain other steps which may be enumerated were taken in connection
with the Scandinavian traffic.
The convoys received such additional protection as could be given by the
airships which were gradually being stationed on the East Coast during
the year 1917, and decoy ships occasionally joined the convoys in order
to invite submarine attack on themselves. This procedure was indeed
adopted on all convoy routes as they were brought into being, the rule
being for the decoy ship to drop behind the convoy in the guise of a
straggler.
Some of our submarines were also detailed to work in the vicinity of
convoy routes in order that they might take advantage of any opportunity
to attack enemy submarines if sighted; due precautions for their safety
were made.
Among the difficulties with which the very energetic and resourceful
Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands had to contend in his
working of the convoys was the persistent mining of the approach to
Lerwick Harbour by German submarines; a second difficulty was the great
congestion that took place in that harbour as soon as bad weather set in
during the autumn of 1917. The weather during the latter part of 1917
was exceptionally bad, and great congestion and consequent delay to
shipping occurred both at Lerwick and in the Norwegian ports. As the
result of this congestion it became necessary to increase largely the
number of ships in each convoy, thereby enhancing the difficulty of
handling the convoy.
At the commencement it had been decided to limit the size of a
Scandinavian convoy to six or eight vessels, but as the congestion
increased it became necessary to exceed this number considerably,
occasional convoys composed of as many as thirty to forty ships being
formed. A contributory cause to the increase in the size of convoys was
due to the fact that the trade between Lerwick and the White Sea, which
had been proceeding direct between those places during the first half of
1917, became the target of persistent submarine attack during the
summer, and in order to afford them protection it was necessary in the
autumn to include these ships also in the Scandinavian convoy for the
passage across the North Sea. Between the coast of Norway and the White
Sea they proceeded independently, hugging territorial waters as far as
possible.
It will be realized that the institution of the convoy system of sailing
for the Scandinavian trade necessitated an extensive organization on the
Norwegian as well as on the British side of the North Sea. For this
reason Captain Arthur Halsey, R.N., was appointed in March, 1917, as
Naval Vice-Consul at Bergen, and the whole of the arrangements in regard
to the working of the convoys, the issue of orders, etc., from the
Norwegian side came under him and his staff, to which additions were
made from time to time. The position was peculiar in that British naval
officers were working in this manner in a neutral country, and it says
much for the discretion and tact of Captain Halsey and his staff and the
courtesy of the Norwegian Government officials that no difficulties
occurred.
Steps were also taken to appoint officers at British ports for the work
of controlling the mercantile traffic, and as the organization became
perfected so the conditions gradually improved.
By the end of September the bad weather prevalent in the North Sea had
caused great dislocation in the convoy system. Ships composing convoys
became much scattered and arrived so late off Lerwick as to prevent them
proceeding on their passage without entering harbour. Owing to the
overcrowding of Lerwick Harbour the system of changing convoy escorts
without entering harbour had been introduced, and the delays due to bad
weather were causing great difficulties in this respect. The question of
substituting the Tyne for Lerwick as the collecting port was first
discussed at this period, but the objections to the Tyne as an assembly
port were so strong as to prevent the adoption of the proposal.
The system of convoy outlined above continued in force from April to
December, 1917, during which period some 6,000 vessels were convoyed
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