we began to ascend the first ledge of the mountain, under a hail of
bullets. I do not remember how many, but there were certainly several
terraces to be gained before reaching the crest of the heights, and
every time we climbed from one terrace to the next--during which
operation we were totally unprotected--we were under a tremendous fire.
The orders given to our men to fire but few shots were well adapted to
the wretched weapons presented to us by the Sardinian Government, which
nearly always missed fire. On this occasion, too, great service was
rendered by the gallant Genoese, who, being excellent shots and armed
with good carbines, sustained the honor of our cause. This ought to be
an encouragement to all young Italians to exercise themselves in the use
of arms, in the conviction that valor alone is not enough on modern
battlefields; great dexterity in the use of weapons is also necessary.

Calatafimi! The survivor of a hundred battles, if in my last moments my
friends see me smile once more with pride, it will be at the
recollection of that fight--for I remember none more glorious. The
Thousand, attired just as at home, worthy representatives of their
people, attacked--with heroic coolness, fighting their way from one
formidable position to another--the soldiers of tyranny, brilliant in
gaudily trimmed uniforms, gold lace, and epaulettes, and completely
routed them. How can I forget that knot of youths who, fearing to see me
wounded, surrounded me, pressing themselves closely together and
sheltering me with their bodies? If, while I write, I am deeply touched
at the recollection, I have good reason. Is it not my duty at least to
remind Italy of those brave sons of hers who fell there?--Montanari,
Schiaffino, Sertorio, Nullo, Vigo, Tukery, Taddei, and many more whose
names I grieve to say I cannot remember.

As I have already said, the southern slope of Monte Romano, which we had
to ascend, was formed of those ledges or narrow terraces used by the
cultivators of the soil in mountainous countries. We made all possible
haste to reach the bank of each terrace, driving the enemy before us,
and then halting under cover of the bank to take breath and prepare for
the attack. Proceeding thus, we gained one ledge after another, till we
reached the top, where the Bourbon troops made a last effort, defending
their position with great intrepidity; many of their chasseurs, who had
come to the end of their ammunition, even throwing down stones on us. At
last we gave the final charge. The bravest of the Thousand, massed
together under the last bank, after taking breath and measuring with
their eye the space yet to be traversed before crossing swords with the
enemy, rushed on like lions, confident of victory and trusting in their
sacred cause. The Bourbon force could not resist the terrible onset of
men fighting for freedom; they fled, and never stopped till they reached
the town of Calatafimi, several miles from the battlefield. We ceased
our pursuit a short distance from the entrance to the town, which is
very strongly situated. If one gives battle, one ought to be sure of
victory; this axiom is very true under all circumstances, but especially
at the beginning of a campaign.

The victory of Calatafimi, though of slight importance as regards
acquisitions--for we took only one cannon, a few rifles, and a few
prisoners--had an immeasurable moral result in encouraging the
population and demoralizing the hostile army. The handful of
filibusters, without gold lace or epaulettes, who were spoken of with
such solemn contempt, had routed several thousand of the Bourbon's best
troops, artillery and all, commanded by one of those generals who, like
Lucullus, are ready to spend the revenue of a province on one night's
supper. One corps of citizens--not to say filibusters--animated by love
of their country, can therefore gain a victory unaided by all this
needless splendor.

The first important result was the enemy's retreat from Calatafimi,
which town we occupied on the following morning, May 16, 1860. The
second result, and one abundantly noteworthy, was the attack made by the
population of Partinicio, Borgetto, Montelepre, and other places, on the
retreating army. In every place volunteer companies were formed which
speedily joined us, and the enthusiasm in the surrounding villages
reached its height. The disbanded troops of the enemy did not stop till
they reached Palermo, where they brought terror to the Bourbon party and
confidence to the patriots. Our wounded, and those of the enemy, were
brought in to Vita and Calatafimi. Among ours were some men who could
ill be spared.

Montanari, my comrade at Rome and in Lombardy, was dangerously wounded
and died a few days after. He was one of those whom doctrinaires call
demagogues, because they are impatient of servitude, love their country,
and refuse to bow the knee to the caprices and vices of the great.
Montanari was a Modenese. Schiaffino, a young Ligurian from Camogli, who
had also served in the Cacciatori delle Alpi and in the Guides, was
among the first to fall on the field, bereaving Italy of one of her
bravest soldiers. He worked hard on the night of our start from Genoa,
and greatly assisted Bixio in that delicate undertaking. De Amici, also
of the Cacciatori and Guides, was another who fell at the beginning of
the battle. Not a few of the chosen band of the Thousand fell at
Calatafimi as our Roman forefathers fell--rushing on the enemy with cold
steel, cut down in front without a complaint, without a cry, except that
of _"Viva L'Italia!"_ I may have seen battles more desperate and more
obstinately contested, but in none have I seen finer soldiers than my
citizen filibusters of Calatafimi.

The victory of Calatafimi was indisputably the decisive battle in the
brilliant campaign of 1860. It was absolutely necessary to begin the
expedition with some striking engagement such as this, which so
demoralized the enemy that their fervent southern imaginations even
exaggerated the valor of the Thousand. There were some among them who
declared they had seen the bullets of their carbines rebound from the
breasts of the soldiers of liberty as if from a plate of bronze. Far
more men were killed and wounded at Palermo, Milazzo, and the Volturno,
but still I believe Calatafimi to have been the decisive battle. After a
fight like that, our men knew they were bound to win; and the gallant
Sicilians, whose courage had been previously shaken by the imposing
numbers and superior equipment of the Bourbon force, were encouraged.
When a battle begins with such prestige, with omens drawn from such a
precedent, victory is sure.


JOHN WEBB PROBYN

On June 27, 1860, about three weeks after Garibaldi had taken possession
of Palermo, Francis II solemnly announced his intention to give a
constitution to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, adopt the Italian flag,
and ally himself with Sardinia. These promises only provoked the cry of
"Too late!" They did but recall how often the Neapolitan Bourbons had
promised in the hour of danger, and proved faithless to every promise
when the danger was passed. Victor Emmanuel and his Government were now
both unable and unwilling to agree to any such terms with a sovereign
who had rejected similar offers at the beginning of his reign when such
a settlement was possible. Every friend of freedom felt that the time
had gone by for any common action between the houses of Savoy and
Bourbon. Each had taken its own line of action, and each was now to
abide by the result.

Garibaldi had overthrown the Neapolitan rule in Sicily, and raised the
cry of "Italy and Victor Emmanuel!" which found a hearty response.
Having been so successful he now determined, despite the warnings of
friendly advisers and the hostility of enemies, to carry his forces from
Sicily to the mainland, and take possession of Naples itself. He was at
the head of about twenty thousand men under the command of Generals
Medici, Bixio, Cosenz, and Turr. He had also the prestige of victory
mingled with a kind of legendary fame which continually increased. These
were formidable aids to further success, especially when brought to bear
on the fervid feelings and imagination of a southern people. Francis of
Naples still possessed an army of eighty thousand men, of which he
despatched more than twenty thousand to arrest, if possible, the
progress of his formidable opponent.

Victor Emmanuel sought to dissuade Garibaldi from an enterprise so full
of danger as that of marching upon Naples against the wishes of the
united cabinets of Continental Europe. The King desired that matters
should proceed by negotiation, the basis of which should be that
Neapolitans and Sicilians should be allowed to decide their future
destinies for themselves. Garibaldi, who loved and trusted the honest
King, replied that the actual state of Italy compelled him to disobey
his majesty. "When," said the noble-hearted patriot, "I shall have
delivered the populations from the yoke that weighs them down, I will
throw my sword at your feet, and will then obey you for the rest of my
life." In truth, Italians of all ranks were now so roused that neither
Victor Emmanuel, Cavour, nor even Garibaldi himself could have stayed
the movement.

The overpowering strength of foreign armies could alone have put it
down. Circumstances, however, happily prevented so gross an abuse of
mere force. For once Italians were allowed to do as they wished in their
own country instead of being compelled by foreign powers to do as those
powers commanded. Many things concurred to bring about this result. The
French Emperor had just received Savoy and Nice; he had been spending
the blood and treasure of France in giving the first blow to the old
despotisms of Italy; how could he now fly in the face of his own
principle of the national will in order to save the worst of those
despotisms? He could not declare that Sicilians and Neapolitans should
not dare have the opportunity of doing what he had at last permitted in
Central Italy and profited by in Nice and Savoy. To have allowed Austria
to do so would be to stultify himself in the eyes of Europe, to enrage
Italians, and to lead France to ask what was the use of calling on her
to make sacrifices for the overthrow of Austrian domination in the
Peninsula if within a few months that domination was to be in a large
measure restored.

Austria too had her own difficulties to encounter, and they were both
numerous and complicated. Her military and priestly despotism had
suffered defeat; her people disliked its rule and desired freer
institutions; her finances were terribly disordered.

The Emperor was beginning to see the necessity of a change of system--a
change by no means easy to effect--for the Hungarians were demanding the
restoration of their ancient constitutional rights. Russia and Prussia
contented themselves with protests which had, it may be, some diplomatic
value, but were wholly without practical effect. England was favorable
to the extension of Italian liberties, and France was her ally in Syria
and in China. So it was that Garibaldi, having only to encounter the
naval and military forces of Francis II, crossed the Straits of Messina,
landed in Calabria, and marched on Reggio. On August 21st the town was
occupied, and the citadel, with its commander and soldiers, capitulated.
Another victory was gained on the 23d, dispersing the forces of the
Neapolitan Generals Melendez and Briganti. Some of their soldiers joined
Garibaldi; the rest returned to their homes and increased both his real
and his legendary fame by their account of his victories. The
insurrection against the Bourbon dynasty was now rapidly spreading.

At Cosenza in Calabria, and at Potenza in the Basilicata, provisional
governments were proclaimed and were hailing with delight the progress
of Garibaldi. The forces of Francis were disappearing from those
provinces and leaving the road to Naples unprotected. The fleet was as
little to be counted on as the army.

In Naples itself all was confusion and contradiction in the Government.
None of its members trusted the others or believed in the duration of
the Bourbon dynasty. Years of corruption, tyranny, falsehood, and
cruelty had undermined the whole system, and it fell before the storm as
if by magic. Francis II determined to leave his capital. When he ordered
the troops which still remained faithful to him to retreat upon Capua
and Gaeta, two-thirds of the staff sent in their resignation, as did
many of the officers of the Neapolitan fleet. The King addressed a
protest to the foreign powers in which he declared he only quitted his
capital to save it from the horrors of a siege. He issued a proclamation
to his people in which he expressed his wishes for their happiness, and
declared that when restored to his throne it would be all the more
splendid from the institutions he had now irrevocably given. On
September 6, 1860, he left the capital on board a steamer accompanied by
two Spanish frigates, and was taken to Gaeta. On September 7th Garibaldi
entered Naples at midday in an open carriage, accompanied by some of his
staff. For long hours he received a welcome such as has seldom if ever
been given to any other man. Again and again he had to appear on the
balcony of the Palazzo d'Angri, where he had taken up his quarters, to
receive the applause of the multitude. At eight o'clock that evening it
was at length announced that, worn out with fatigue and emotion, he had
retired to rest. A sudden quiet fell upon the vast crowds, and repeating
to one another "Our father sleeps," they dispersed to their homes, their
right hands raised above their heads, with the first finger alone
extended, a sign expressive of the cry reiterated again and again that
day, "_Italia Una_!" ("One Italy").

On September 10th Garibaldi issued a proclamation to his soldiers,
headed "Italy and Victor Emmanuel." In it the General called upon them
to aid him in carrying to a successful termination the work so well
begun. Nor did he hesitate to declare that Rome must be Italian, and the
line of the Alps the frontier of Italy. He addressed another
proclamation to the people in which he especially called on them to be
united: "The first need of Italy is concord in order to realize the
union of the great Italian family; to-day Providence has given us this
concord, since all the provinces are unanimous and labor with
magnanimous zeal at the national reconstruction. As to unity, Providence
has further given us Victor Emmanuel--a model sovereign who will
inculcate in his descendants the duties which they should fulfil for the
happiness of a people who have chosen him as their chief with
enthusiastic homage." The proclamation went on to speak with kindly
warmth of those Italian priests who had sided with the national cause,
and declared that such conduct was a sure means of gaining respect for
their mission and work. Repeating again the demand for concord, the
concluding words justly protested against all foreign interference:
"Finally (be it known) we respect the houses of others; but we insist
upon being masters in our own whether it please or displease the rulers
of the earth."

Garibaldi united the Neapolitan to the Sardinian fleet, so forming an
Italian naval force. He appointed a ministry comprising Liborio Romano
(who had served under Francis II), Scialoia, Cosenz, and Pisanelli; he
then proceeded to promulgate the Sardinian Constitution throughout the
Neapolitan Provinces. But the Bourbon forces were still in possession of
Capua and Gaeta. It became necessary, therefore, to undertake military
operations against them.

Meanwhile the agitation in the Papal Provinces was increasing. The
Pope's Government had refused to modify its policy or agree to any
reduction of its territory. It accepted the protection of France in Rome
and its immediate neighborhood, but declined further aid, as it was
raising forces of its own under a French general, Lamoriciere. These
soldiers were men of various European nationalities belonging to that
Roman Catholic party which was determined to maintain intact the
temporal rule of the Pope as against the wishes of the vast majority of
Italians, themselves Roman Catholics, who desired to substitute for that
rule the constitutional sovereignty of King Victor Emmanuel. The
Italians were willing enough to remain under the spiritual headship of
the Roman Pontiff, but they would not have a temporal power upheld by
foreign soldiers. The moment was, like many others, a very critical one
in the history of Italy. Garibaldi was victorious in Naples. The Papal
forces, composed chiefly of Germans and French, under Lamoriciere, were
holding the inhabitants of Umbria and the Marches who were longing to
join the national movement. Indeed, some of the most influential men of
those provinces, among others Marquis Filippo Gualterio of Orvieto, had
already come to Turin to obtain the intervention of its Government and
protection from the Papal troops, whose foreign extraction rendered them
odious to the people.

On September 7th Count Delia Minerva was sent to Rome to demand, on the
part of Victor Emmanuel, the disbandment of the foreign troops which the
Papal Government had got together under the command of General
Lamoriciere. The demand was refused. This refusal the Papal Government
was quite competent to give, but whether its policy in upholding its
temporal power by the aid of foreign mercenaries was wise or not was
another matter. It was hardly to be expected that Italians, any more
than Frenchmen, Germans, or English, would endure such a state of things
if they could prevent it. The Government of Turin now ordered its troops
to enter the Papal Provinces of Umbria and the Marches. On September **nth
General Fanti crossed the frontier, easily took possession of Perugia
with the aid of the inhabitants, and obliged Colonel Schmidt, the Papal
commander, to capitulate. The General advanced with equal success
against Spoleto, and in a few days was master of all the upper valley of
the Tiber. At the same time General Cialdini, operating on the eastern
side of the Apennines, marched rapidly to meet General Lamoriciere's
forces, which he encountered and defeated completely at Castelfidardo,
compelling the French General to fly to Ancona, which he entered in
company with only a few horsemen who had escaped with him from the rout
of the Papal army. The Italian fleet was off Ancona, before which
General Cialdini's troops now appeared, thus completely preventing the
escape of Lamoriciere, who was obliged to surrender. In less than three
weeks the campaign was over. The Sardinian troops having thus occupied
Umbria and the Marches, proceeded to cross into the Neapolitan Provinces
and march upon Capua and Gaeta.

Austria, Prussia, and Russia protested against the course thus pursued by
the Government of Victor Emmanuel. The Pope excommunicated all who had
participated in the invasion of his territory. Francis II protested with
no less earnestness. The Emperor of the French withdrew his minister from
Turin and blamed the proceedings of Victor Emmanuel's Government; but in
other respects Napoleon remained a passive spectator of all that occurred,
and maintained the principle of non-intervention--at least as regarded
Umbria and the Marches, Sicily and Naples--excepting at Gaeta, where his
fleet prevented for a time any attack being made against that fortress
from the sea. He also raised the number of his troops in Rome and the
province in which it is situated, called the Patrimony of St. Peter, to
twenty-two thousand men. This was now all the territory left to the
temporal power of the Pope. Napoleon determined to preserve that much to
the Roman See, defending it from the attacks of Garibaldi, and forbidding
its annexation to the kingdom of Italy.

The English Government, however, decidedly vindicated the course taken
under the circumstances by Victor Emmanuel and his advisers. Lord
Russell, who was Secretary of Foreign Affairs under Lord Palmerston,
wrote, on October 27, 1860, an admirable despatch to Sir James Hudson,
the English minister at Turin, who was allowed to give a copy of it to
Count Cavour. In that despatch Lord Russell gives good reasons for
dissenting from the views expressed by the Governments of Austria,
Prussia, Russia, and France; he justifies the action of the Government
of Turin, admits that Italians themselves are the best judges of their
own interests, shows how in times past they vainly attempted regularly
and temperately to reform their governments, says such attempts were put
down by foreign powers, and concludes by declaring that "Her Majesty's
Government will turn their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a
people building up the edifice of their liberties and consolidating the
work of their independence amid the sympathies and good wishes of
Europe."

It is gratifying to remember that at this very critical juncture in the
cause of Italian unity and independence, the English Government gave its
very cordial support to that cause, and ably defended the course pursued
by King Victor Emmanuel, his ministers, and his people.

The cause of Italian unity and independence had indeed made prodigious
strides, due not only to the marvellous victories of Garibaldi, which
had brought him in four months from Marsala to Naples, but also to the
skilful campaigns of Generals Fanti and Cialdini in Umbria and the
Marches. Cavour now followed up these successes by advising a course
calculated to give them consistency and endurance. He counselled the
immediate assembling of Parliament, the acceptance by Victor Emmanuel of
the sovereignty of the Papal, Neapolitan, and Sicilian Provinces, if
such were the will of their inhabitants, and the departure of the King
from Turin to take the command of his troops now advancing toward Capua.
Victor Emmanuel entirely agreed with his minister's advice. On October
2, 1860, Cavour asked Parliament for full powers to annex all the new
provinces of Central and Southern Italy if they desired it. He contended
that the events which had taken place were due to the initiative of the
people, the noble audacity of General Garibaldi, and the constitutional
rule of Victor Emmanuel, united to his devotion to the cause of Italian
freedom.

Even those deputies who represented the views of the extreme Left, some
of whose members avowed a preference for Republicanism--in theory at any
rate--supported the Government. One of them, Signor Bertani, declared he
would not now raise any point of difference, and frankly acknowledged
that in reality all Italians wished the same thing--"Italy one and free,
under Victor Emmanuel." Cavour further satisfied the Chamber by saying
that Rome and Venice must in the end be united to the mother country,
though the questions involved in such union must, out of deference to
Europe and France, be postponed for the present. A vote of two hundred
ninety against six confirmed the policy of the Government and gave full
expression to the wishes of the country.

Garibaldi had in the mean time pushed on his forces from Naples toward
Capua and the line of the River Volturno. On September 19th his troops
took Caiazzo, from which, however, they were dislodged on the 23d of the
month. After this success Francis II determined to take the offensive
and attack in force the Garibaldian lines with the object of driving
them back to Naples or cutting them off from that city. This attempt was
well planned and conducted on October 1, 1860. The struggle was hotly
maintained on both sides throughout the day. Some companies of
bersaglieri arrived from Naples and united in resisting the attacks of
the Bourbon troops, who were in the end repelled and compelled to
retire. But though beaten they had fought well and still held the
fortresses of Gaeta and Capua, to which they had retreated. The army of
Victor Emmanuel, however, led by the King in person, was now rapidly
advancing, easily overcoming whatever resistance the Bourbon troops were
able to offer. Francis II, unable to prevent the junction of the King's
forces with those of Garibaldi, withdrew with the bulk of his soldiers
to Gaeta, leaving four thousand men in Capua, who were soon obliged to
capitulate.

On October 26th Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi met near the little town
of Teano. They greeted each other with great cordiality, for though
Garibaldi had little faith in ministers or diplomatists, and could not
forgive their cession of Nice to France, he felt the utmost confidence
in the King himself. Victor Emmanuel on his part had the greatest regard
for the heroic patriot who had ever been so devoted to his country's
cause and whose marvellous exploits had now given freedom to Sicily and
Naples. As they grasped each other's hands Garibaldi cried, "Behold the
King of Italy! Long live the King!" The soldiers of both leaders
shouted, "Long live Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy!"

On November 7th the King entered Naples with Garibaldi at his side. The
reception was enthusiastic in the extreme; it reached its culminating
point as Victor Emmanuel entered the royal palace. Long had it been the
abode of those who hated and betrayed both constitutional liberty and
national freedom; now it was taken possession of by one who had risked
life and crown in their cause. The King issued a proclamation, in which
he called to mind the increased responsibilities which fell henceforth
upon himself and his people alike; nor did he fail to remind them of the
necessity for union and abnegation: "All parties must bow before the
majesty of Italy which God has raised up. We must establish a government
which gives guarantees of liberty to the people and of severe probity to
the public at large." In the succeeding days his majesty received the
deputations of the newly acquired Provinces of Umbria, the Marches,
Naples, and Sicily, which came to present to him officially the result
of the plebiscite by which the inhabitants of those provinces declared
their wish to be united to the rest of the King's dominions and so form
a single Kingdom of Italy.

Many other receptions there were of societies belonging to several ranks
and classes of men. Particularly impressive was the welcome given to the
deputation which came from the Senate and Chamber at Turin in honor of
so great an event as the union of Southern with Northern Italy under the
constitutional rule of one sovereign. On December 1st Victor Emmanuel
embarked for Palermo, where he was received with an enthusiasm at least
as great as that which marked his arrival in Naples. In the capital of
Sicily all orders of citizens pressed forward to pay him their willing
homage.

These great results were not, however, achieved without difficulty, for
there was considerable diversity of opinion and not a little jealousy
between those that surrounded Garibaldi and those that followed the lead
of Cavour in Parliament and in the country. Nor can it be denied that
faults and mistakes may fairly be laid to the charge of both those
parties, despite their sincere attachment to the cause of their common
fatherland. A mistake was made by Garibaldi himself when he wished to
postpone the immediate annexation of the Southern Provinces to the
Northern Kingdom, and asked to be named Dictator of Naples for two years
by Victor Emmanuel, whom he further requested to dismiss Cavour and his
actual advisers.

The King rightly refused to agree to a course so subversive of all
constitutional proceedings and liberties. He could not even entertain
the idea of dismissing ministers at the request of any citizen, however
illustrious, or however great the services he had rendered his country.
It was for the national representatives alone to decide to what minister
the King should give his confidence, and what course should be taken as
to the annexation of Naples and Sicily. Garibaldi's good sense and
honesty of purpose led him to give in to the King's judgment. Victor
Emmanuel took the right view of the course to be pursued in this matter,
just as he had taken the right view of the course to be pursued at the
moment of the Peace of Villafranca. In the one case he showed himself
wiser than Cavour, and in the other wiser than Garibaldi. The
single-minded patriotism of the latter, and the statesmanship of the
former, combined with the remarkably sure judgment and unfailing honesty
of the King, gradually overcame all the difficulties of the situation.
Victor Emmanuel ever kept aloof from political coteries, while deferring
to the advice of his responsible ministers so long as they had the
confidence of Parliament. He ever showed himself to be the head of the
nation, not the head of a party.

His unswerving determination to be guided by the nation's will as
expressed by the nation's chosen representatives, though nothing new in
his career, won for him the absolute confidence of all Italians, not one
of whom avowed it more frankly than Garibaldi himself. But what shall be
said of the popular hero, sprung from the ranks of the people, who had
given a kingdom to his sovereign? Rarely, if ever, has history recorded
nobler conduct than that of the conqueror of Sicily and Naples when,
having liberated those provinces, he laid down all power, refused all
honors, turned away alike wealth and titles, to betake himself to his
island home of Caprera, there to work with his own hands, to rejoice as
he thought of how greatly he had advanced the independence of Italy, and
to pray for the hour of its completion. Whatever defects may be found in
the character or judgment of this heroic patriot, his name will
assuredly be held in grateful remembrance wherever men are found who
love freedom and rejoice as they see its blessings spread more and more
among the nations of the earth. As Garibaldi retired to his quiet abode
in Caprera, Victor Emmanuel returned to his duties in Turin. But neither
the one nor the other forgot Rome and Venice.

The siege of Gaeta was now being carried forward with great
determination. The place was defended with courage and endurance by
Francis II and his Queen. For a time the French fleet prevented the
Italians from attacking Gaeta by sea, but when Napoleon withdrew his
ships further resistance became hopeless. On February 13, 1861, Gaeta
surrendered after a defence of which those who took part in it had a
right to be proud. The garrison marched out with the honors of war, the
officers retained their rank. Francis and his wife embarked for
Terracina, and went thence to Rome, where they were received by the Pope
and lodged in the Quirinal palace. The citadels of Messina and of
Civitella del Tronto surrendered soon after, and so passed away forever
the rule of the Neapolitan Bourbons over the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies.

No less than twenty-two million of Italians were now united under the
sceptre of Victor Emmanuel, who, in accordance with the advice of his
Prime Minister, Count Cavour, dissolved the Parliament. The new election
took place at the end of January, 1861. The constitution as established
in Sardinia was put in force from Turin to Palermo. At the same time the
King nominated, as suggested by his responsible advisers, sixty new
Senators or Members of the Upper House. They were selected chiefly among
the most prominent and influential men of the Provinces of Central and
Southern Italy. The elections were everywhere favorable to the new order
of things; namely, the formation of the single Kingdom of Italy under
the constitutional rule of Victor Emmanuel. The majority of the new
Chamber gave a hearty support to Count Cavour.

On February 18, 1861, the first Italian Parliament, representing all the
Provinces of Italy--Venetia and the Roman patrimony alone
excepted--assembled in the Palazzo Carignano at Turin. The title assumed
by the King in concert with his ministers and Parliament was "Victor
Emmanuel II, by the grace of God and the will of the nation, King of
Italy." [Footnote: It was almost ten years later--when Victor Emmanuel
entered Rome, September 20, 1870--that the emancipation and union of
Italy were made complete.--ED.]




(1861) EMANCIPATION OF RUSSIAN SERFS, Andrew D. White and Nikolai
Turgenieff


By the act that freed the serfs in Russia, Alexander II, to whom it was
in great measure due, obtained a place of unusual honor among the
sovereigns that have ruled his nation. It was the grand achievement of
Alexander's reign, and caused him to be hailed as one of the world's
liberators. The importance of this event in Russian history is not
diminished by the fact that its practical benefits have not as yet been
realized to the full extent anticipated. In 1888 Stepniak, the Russian
author and reformer, declared that emancipation had utterly failed to
realize the ardent expectations of its advocates and promoters, had
failed to improve the material condition of the former serfs, who on the
whole were worse off than before emancipation. The same assertion has
been made with respect to the emancipation of slaves in the United
States, but in neither case does the objection invalidate the historical
significance of an act that formally liberated millions of human beings
from hereditary and legalized bondage.

In the two views here presented, the subject of the emancipation in
Russia is considered in various aspects. Andrew D. White's account,
being that of an American scholar and diplomatist familiar with the
history and people of Russia through his residence at St. Petersburg, is
of peculiar value, embodying the most intelligent foreign judgment.
White's synopsis covers the entire subject of the serf system from its
beginning to its overthrow. Nikolai Turgenieff, the Russian historian,
writing while the emancipation act was bearing its first fruits,
describes its workings and effects as observed by one intimately
connected with the serfs and the movement that resulted in their
freedom.


ANDREW D. WHITE

Close upon the end of the fifteenth century the Muscovite ideas of right
were subjected to the strong mind of Ivan the Great and compressed into
a code. Therein were embodied the best processes known to his land and
time: for discovering crime, torture and trial by battle; for punishing
crime, the knout and death.

But hidden in this tough mass was one law of greater import than others.
Thereby were all peasants forbidden to leave the lands they were then
tilling, except during the eight days before and after St. George's Day.
This provision sprang from Ivan's highest views of justice and broadest
views of political economy; the nobles received it with plaudits, which
have found echoes even in these days; the peasants received it with no
murmurs which history has found any trouble in drowning.

Just one hundred years later upon the Muscovite throne, as nominal Czar,
sat the weakling Feodor I; but behind the throne stood, as real Czar,
hard, strong Boris Godunoff. Looking forward to Feodor's death, Boris
made ready to mount the throne; and he saw--what all other "Mayors of
the Palace" climbing into the places of _faineant_ kings have seen--that
he must link to his fortunes the fortunes of some strong body in the
nation; he broke, however, from the general rule among usurpers--bribing
the church--and determined to bribe the nobility.

The greatest grief of the Muscovite nobles seemed to be that the
peasants could escape from their oppression by the emigration allowed on
St. George's Day. Boris saw his opportunity: he cut off the privilege of
St. George's Day, and the peasant was fixed to the soil forever. No
Russian law ever directly enslaved the peasantry, but, through this
decree of Boris, the lord who owned the soil came to own the peasants,
just as he owned its immovable boulders and ledges. To this the peasants
submitted; but history has not been able to drown their sighs over this
wrong; their proverbs and ballads make St. George's Day representative
of all ill-luck and disappointment.

A few years later Boris made another bid for oligarchic favor. He issued
a rigorous fugitive-serf law, and even wrenched liberty from certain
free peasants who had entered service for wages before his edicts. This
completed the work, and Russia, which never had had the benefits of
feudalism, had now fastened upon her feudalism's worst curse, a serf
caste, bound to the glebe.

The great good things done by Peter the world knows by heart. The world
knows well how he tore his way out of the fetichism of his time; how,
despite ignorance and unreason, he dragged his nation after him; how he
dowered the nation with things and thoughts that transformed it from a
petty Asiatic horde to a great European Power.

We were present a few years since when one of those lesser triumphs of
his genius was first unfolded. It was in that room at the
Hermitage--adjoining the Winter Palace--set apart for the relics of
Peter. Our companions were two men noted as leaders in American
industry--one famed as an inventor, the other famed as a champion of
inventors' rights.

Suddenly from the inventor, pulling over some old dust-covered machines
in a corner, came loud cries of surprise. The cries were natural indeed.
In that heap of rubbish he had found a lathe for turning irregular
forms, and a screw-cutting engine once used by Peter himself: specimens
of his unfinished work were still in them. They had lain there unheeded
a hundred fifty years; their principle had died with Peter and his
workmen; and not many years since, they were reinvented in America, and
gave their inventors fame and fortune. At the late Paris Universal
Exposition crowds flocked about an American lathe for copying statuary;
and that lathe was, in principle, identical with this old, forgotten
machine of Peter's.

Yet, though Peter fought so well and thought so well, he made some
mistakes which hang to this day over his country as bitter curses. For
in all his plan and work to advance the mass of men was one supreme
lack--lack of any account of the worth and right of the individual man.
Lesser examples of this are seen in his grim jest at Westminster
Hall--"What use of so many lawyers? I have but two lawyers in Russia,
and one of those I mean to hang as soon as I return;" or when at Berlin,
having been shown a new gibbet, he ordered one of his servants to be
hanged in order to test it; or in his review of parade fights, when he
ordered his men to use ball, and to take the buttons off their bayonets.

Greater examples are seen in his Battle of Narva, when he threw away an
army to learn his opponent's game; in his building of St. Petersburg,
where, in draining marshes, he sacrificed a hundred thousand men the
first year. But the greatest proof of this great lack was shown in his
dealings with the serf system. Serfage was already recognized in Peter's
time as an evil. Peter himself once stormed forth in protestations and
invectives against what he stigmatized as "selling men like beasts;
separating parents from children, husbands from wives; which takes place
nowhere else in the world, and which causes many tears to flow." He
declared that a law should be made against it. Yet it was by his
misguided hand that serfage was compacted into its final black mass of
foulness.

For Peter saw other nations spinning and weaving, and he determined that
Russia should at once spin and weave; he saw other nations forging iron,
and he determined that Russia should at once forge iron. He never
stopped to consider that what might cost little in other lands as a
natural growth, might cost far too much in Russia as a forced growth. In
lack, then, of quick brain and sturdy spine and strong arm of paid
workmen, he forced into his manufactories the flaccid muscle of serfs.
These, thus lifted from the earth, lost even the little force in the
State they had before; great bodies of serfs thus became slaves; worse
than that, the idea of a serf developed toward the idea of a slave.

And Peter, misguided, dealt one blow more. Cold-blooded officials were
set at taking the census. These adopted easy classifications; free
peasants, serfs, and slaves were often huddled into the lists under a
single denomination. So serfage became still more difficult to be
distinguished from slavery. As this base of hideous wrong was thus
widened and deepened the nobles built higher and stronger their
superstructure of arrogance and pretension. Not many years after Peter's
death, they so overawed the Empress Anne that she thrust into the codes
of the empire statutes which allowed the nobles to sell serfs apart from
the soil. So did serfage bloom fully into slavery.

But in the latter half of the eighteenth century Russia gained a ruler
from whom the world came to expect much. To mount the throne, Catharine
II had murdered her husband; to keep the throne she had murdered two
claimants whose title was better than her own. She then became, with her
agents in these horrors, a second Messalina. To set herself right in the
eyes of Europe, she paid eager court to that hierarchy of scepticism
which in that age made or marred European reputations. She flattered the
fierce deists by owning fealty to "_Le Roi_" Voltaire; she flattered the
mild deists by calling in La Harpe as the tutor of her grandson; she
flattered the atheists by calling in Diderot as a tutor for herself.

Her murders and orgies were soon forgotten in the new hopes for Russian
regeneration. Her dealings with Russia strengthened these hopes. The
official style required that all persons presenting petitions should
subscribe themselves "Your Majesty's humble serf." This formula she
abolished, and boasted that she had cast out the word serf from the
Russian language. Poets and philosophers echoed this boast over
Europe--and the serfs waited.

The great Empress spurred hope by another movement. She proposed to an
academy the question of serf emancipation as a subject for their prize
essay. The essay was written and crowned. It was filled with beautiful
things about liberty, practical things about moderation, flattering
things about the "Great Catharine"--and the serfs waited.

Again she aroused hope. It was given out that her most intense delight
came from the sight of happy serfs and prosperous villages. Accordingly,
in her journey to the Crimea, Potemkin squandered millions on millions
in rearing pasteboard villages, in dragging forth thousands of wretched
peasants to fill them, in costuming them to look thrifty, in training
them to look happy. Catharine was rejoiced, Europe sang paeans--the
serfs waited.

She seemed to go further: she issued a decree prohibiting the
enslavement of serfs. But unfortunately the palace intrigues, and the
correspondence with the philosophers, and the destruction of Polish
nationality left her no time to see the edict carried out. But Europe
applauded--and the serfs waited. Two years after this came a deed which
put an end to all this uncertainty. An edict was prepared ordering the
peasants of Little Russia to remain forever on the estates where the day
of publication should find them. This was vile; but what followed was
diabolic. Court pets were let into the secret. These, by good promises,
enticed hosts of peasants to their estates. The edict was now sprung; in
an hour the courtiers were made rich, the peasants were made serfs, and
Catharine II was made infamous forever. So, about a century after Peter,
a wave of wrong rolled over Russia that not only drowned honor in the
nobility, but drowned hope in the people.

As Russia entered the nineteenth century, the hearts of earnest men must
have sunk within them. For Paul I, Catharine's son and successor, was
infinitely more despotic than Catharine, and infinitely less restrained
by public opinion. He had been born with savage instincts, and educated
into ferocity. Tyranny was written on his features in his childhood. If
he remained in Russia his mother sneered and showed hatred of him; if he
journeyed in Western Europe crowds gathered about his coach to jeer at
his ugliness. Most of those who have seen Gillray's caricature of him,
issued in the height of English spite at Paul's homage to Bonaparte,
have thought it hideously overdrawn; but those who have seen the
portrait of Paul in the Cadet-Corps of St. Petersburg know well that
Gillray did not exaggerate Paul's ugliness, for he could not.

And Paul's face was but a mirror of his character. Tyranny was wrought
into his every fibre. He demanded an oriental homage. As his carriage
whirled by, it was held the duty of all others in carriages to stop,
descend into the mud, and bow themselves. Himself threw his despotism
into this formula: "Know, Sir Ambassador, that in Russia there is no one
noble or powerful except the man to whom I speak, and while I speak."

And yet within that hideous mass glowed sparks of reverence for right.
When the nobles tried to get Paul's assent to more open arrangements for
selling serfs apart from the soil, he utterly refused; and when they
overtasked their human chattels Paul made a law that no serf should be