Admiralty, as Gallipoli did. If this public finds out the whole
truth, it will demand somebody's head. But I'm only a baseball man;
cricket is beyond me.

But Lloyd George will outlive the war as an active force, whatever
happen to him in the meantime. He's too heavily charged with
electricity to stop activity. The war has ended a good many careers
that seemed to have long promise. It is ending more every day. But
there is only one Lloyd George, and, whatever else he lack, he
doesn't lack life.

I heard all the speeches in both Houses on the resolution of
appreciation of our coming into the war--Bonar Law's, Asquith's
(one of the best), Dillon's, a Labour man's, and, in the Lords,
Curzon's, Crewe's, the Archbishop's (who delivered in the course of
his remarks a benediction on me) and Bryce's (almost the best of
all). It wasn't "oratory," but it was well said and well meant.
They know how badly they need help and they do mean to be as good
to us as their benignant insularity will permit. They are changing.
I can't describe the great difference that the war has made in
them. They'll almost become docile in a little more time.

And we came in in the nick of time for them--in very truth. If we
hadn't, their exchange would have gone down soon and they know it.
I shall never forget the afternoon I spent with Mr. Balfour and Mr.
Bonar Law on that subject. They saw blue ruin without our financial
help. And now, if we can save them from submarines, those that know
will know how vital our help was. Again, the submarine is the great
and grave and perhaps the only danger now. If that can be scotched,
I believe the whole Teutonic military structure would soon tumble.
If not, the Germans may go on as long as they can feed their army,
allowing their people to starve.

Of course, you know, we're on rations now--yet we suffer no
inconvenience on that score. But these queer people (they are the
most amusing and confusing and contradictory of all God's
creatures, these English, whose possibilities are infinite and
whose actualities, in many ways, are pitiful)--these queer people
are fiercely pursuing food-economy by discussing in the newspapers
whether a hen consumes more food than she produces, and whether
what dogs eat contains enough human food to justify the shooting of
every one in the Kingdom. That's the way we are coming down to
humble fare. But nothing can quite starve a people who all live
near the sea which yields fish enough near shore to feed them
wastefully.

All along this South shore, where I am to-day[60], I see the Stars
and Stripes; and everywhere there is a demand for the words and
music of the Battle Hymn of the Republic and the Star Spangled
Banner.

This our-new-Ally business is bringing me a lot of amusing
troubles. Theatres offer me boxes, universities offer me degrees,
hospitals solicit visits from me, clubs offer me dinners--I'll have
to get a new private secretary or two well-trained to say "No"
politely, else I shall not have my work done. But all that will
presently wear away as everything wears away (quickly, too) in the
grim face of this bloody monster of war which is consuming men as a
prairie fire consumes blades of grass. There's a family that lives
around the corner from this hotel. One son is in the trenches,
another is in a madhouse from shell-shock, a third coming home
wounded the other day was barely rescued when a torpedo sunk a
hospital ship and may lose his reason. I suppose I saw one hundred
men this afternoon on a single mile of beach who had lost both
legs. Through the wall from my house in London is a hospital. A
young Texan has been there, whose legs are gone at the thighs and
one arm at the elbow. God pity us for not having organized the
world better than this! We'll do it, yet, Mr. President--_you'll_
do it; and thank God for you. If we do not organize Europe and
make another such catastrophe impossible, life will not be worth
being born into except to the few whose days happen to fall between
recurring devastations of the world.

Yours sincerely,

WALTER H. PAGE.

"I hope that the English people," Colonel House wrote to Page about this
time, "realize how successful Mr. Balfour's visit to America really was.
There is no man they could have sent who could have done it better. He
and the President got along marvellously well. The three of us dined and
spent the evening together and it was delightful to see how sympathetic
their minds were."

A letter from Mr. Polk also discloses the impression which Mr. Balfour
made upon Washington:

_From Frank L. Polk_

Washington, May 25, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PAGE:

I just want to get off a line to catch the pouch.

You probably know what a wonderful success the British Mission has
been, but I do not think you can realize what a deep impression
they have made on all of us. Mr. Balfour really won the affection
of us all, and I do not know when I was more sorry to have a man
leave than I was to have him go last night. He expressed himself as
having been very much impressed with his reception and the way he
was treated. He was most fair in all discussions, and I think has a
better understanding of our point of view. I had the good fortune
of being present at the financial and the diplomatic conferences,
and I think we all felt that we were dealing with a sympathetic
friend.

He and the President got on tremendously. The best evidence of that
was the fact that the President went up to Congress and sat in the
gallery while Mr. Balfour addressed the House. This is without
precedent.

The difficult problem of course was the blacklist and bunkering
agreement, but I think we are by that. The important thing now is
for the British to make all the concessions possible in connection
with the release of goods in Rotterdam and the release of goods in
Prize Court, though the cases have not been begun. Of course I mean
cases of merely suspicion rather than where there is evidence of
wrongdoing.

The sending of the destroyers and troops abroad is going to do a
great deal toward impressing our people with the fact that we
really are in the war. I do not think it is thoroughly borne home
on the majority yet what a serious road we have chosen.

With warm regards,

Yours faithfully,

FRANK L. POLK.

Mr. Polk's reference to the blacklist recalls an episode which in itself
illustrates the changed character of the relations that had now been
established between the American and the British governments. Mr.
Balfour discussed shipping problems for the most part with Mr. Polk,
under whose jurisdiction these matters fell. As one of these conferences
was approaching its end Mr. Balfour slightly coughed, uttered an "er,"
and gave other indications that he was about to touch upon a ticklish
question.

"Before I go," he said, "there--er--is one subject I would--er--like to
say something about."

Mr. Polk at once grasped what was coming.

"I know what you have in mind," said Mr. Polk in his characteristically
quick way. "You want us to apply your blacklist to neutrals."

In other words, the British hoped that the United States, now that it
was in the war, would adopt against South America and other offenders
those same discriminations which this country had so fiercely objected
to, when it was itself a neutral.

The British statesman gave Mr. Polk one of his most winning smiles and
nodded.

"Mr. Balfour," said Mr. Polk, "it took Great Britain three years to
reach a point where it was prepared to violate all the laws of blockade.
You will find that it will take us only two months to become as great
criminals as you are!"

Mr. Balfour is usually not explosive in his manifestations of mirth, but
his laughter, in reply to this statement, was almost uproarious. And the
State Department was as good as its word. It immediately forgot all the
elaborate "notes" and "protests" which it had been addressing to Great
Britain. It became more inexorable than Great Britain had ever been in
keeping foodstuffs out of neutral countries that were contiguous to
Germany. Up to the time the United States entered the war, Germany, in
spite of the watchful British fleet, had been obtaining large supplies
from the United States through Holland, Denmark, and the Scandinavian
peninsula. But the United States now immediately closed these leaks. In
the main this country adopted a policy of "rationing"; that is, it would
furnish the little nations adjoining Germany precisely the amount of
food which they needed for their own consumption. This policy was one of
the chief influences in undermining the German people and forcing their
surrender. The American Government extended likewise the blacklist to
South America and other countries, and, in doing so, it bettered the
instruction of Great Britain herself.

Though the whole story of the blockade thus seems finally to have ended
in a joke, the whole proceeding has its serious side. The United States
had been posing for three years as the champion of neutral rights; the
point of view of Washington had been that there was a great principle at
stake. If such a principle were involved, it was certainly present in
just the same degree after the United States became belligerent as in
the days when we were neutrals. The lofty ideals by which the
Administration had professed to be guided should have still controlled
its actions; the mere fact that we, as a belligerent, could obtain
certain advantages would hardly have justified a great and high-minded
nation in abandoning its principles. Yet abandon them we did from the
day that we declared war. We became just as remorseless in disregarding
the rights of small states as Great Britain--according to our numerous
blockade notes--had been. Possibly, therefore, Mr. Balfour's mirth was
not merely sympathetic or humorous; it perhaps echoed his discovery that
our position for three years had really been nothing but a sham; that
the State Department had been forcing points in which it did not really
believe, or in which it did not believe when American interests were
involved. At any rate, this ending of our long argument with Great
Britain was a splendid justification for Page; his contention had always
been that the preservation of civilization was more important than the
technicalities of the international lawyers. And now the Wilson
Administration, by throwing into the waste basket all the finespun
theories with which it had been embarrassing the Allied cause since
August 4, 1914, accepted--and accepted joyously--his point of view.


II

One of the first things which Mr. Balfour did, on his arrival in
Washington, was personally to explain to President Wilson about the
so-called "secret treaties." The "secret treaty" that especially preyed
upon Mr. Wilson's mind, and which led to a famous episode at the
Versailles Conference, was that which had been made with Italy in 1915,
as consideration for Italy's participation in the war. Mr. Balfour, in
telling the President of these territorial arrangements with Italy,
naturally did not criticise his ally, but it was evident that he
regarded the matter as something about which the United States should be
informed.

"This is the sort of thing you have to do when you are engaged in a
war," he explained, and then he gave Mr. Wilson the details.

Probably the most important information which Mr. Balfour and the French
and Italian Commissions brought to Washington was the desperate
situation of the Allied cause. On that point not one of the visiting
statesmen or military and naval advisers made the slightest attempt at
concealment. Mr. Balfour emphasized the seriousness of the crisis in one
of his earliest talks with Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury. The
British statesman was especially interested in the financial situation
and he therefore took up this matter at an early date with the Treasury
Department.

"Mr. Balfour," said Mr. McAdoo, "before we make any plans of financial
assistance it is absolutely necessary that we know precisely where we
stand. The all-important thing is the question as to how long the war is
likely to last. If it is only to last a few months, it is evident that
we need to make very different arrangements than if it is to last
several years. Just what must we make provision for? Let us assume that
the United States goes in with all its men and resources--that we
dedicate all our money, our manufacturing plants, our army, our navy,
everything we have got, to bringing the war to an end. How long will it
take?"

Mr. Balfour replied that it would be necessary to consult his naval and
military advisers before he answered that question. He said that he
would return in a day or two and make an explicit statement. He did so
and his answer was this: Under these circumstances--that the United
States should make war to the full limit of its power, in men and
resources--the war could not be ended until the summer or the autumn of
1919. Mr. McAdoo put the same question in the same form to the French
and Italian Missions and obtained precisely the same answer.

Page's papers show that Mr. Balfour, in the early stages of American
participation, regarded the financial situation as the thing which
chiefly threatened the success of the Allied cause. So much greater
emphasis has been laid upon the submarine warfare that this may at first
seem rather a misreading of Great Britain's peril. Yet the fact is that
the high rate of exchange and the depredatory U-boat represented almost
identically the same danger. The prospect that so darkened the horizon
in the spring of 1917 was the possible isolation of Great Britain.
England's weakness, as always, consisted in the fact that she was an
island, that she could not feed herself with her own resources and that
she had only about six weeks' supply of food ahead of her at any one
time. If Germany could cut the lines of communication and so prevent
essential supplies from reaching British ports, the population of Great
Britain could be starved into surrender in a very brief time, France
would be overwhelmed, and the triumph of the Prussian cause would be
complete. That the success of the German submarine campaign would
accomplish this result was a fact that the popular mind readily grasped.
What it did not so clearly see, however, was that the financial collapse
of Great Britain would cut these lines of communication quite as
effectually as the submarine itself. The British were practically
dependent for their existence upon the food brought from the United
States, just as the Allied armies were largely dependent upon the steel
which came from the great industrial plants of this country. If Great
Britain could not find the money with which to purchase these supplies,
it is quite apparent that they could not be shipped. The collapse of
British credit therefore would have produced the isolation of the
British Isles and led to a British surrender, just as effectively as
would the success of the German submarine campaign.

As soon as Bernstorff was sent home, therefore, and the participation of
this country in the war became extremely probable, Mr. Balfour took up
the financial question with Page.

_To the President_
March 5, 1917.

The inquiries which I have made here about financial conditions
disclose an international situation which is most alarming to the
financial and industrial outlook of the United States. England has
not only to pay her own war bills, but is obliged to finance her
Allies as well. Up to the present time she has done these tasks out
of her own capital. But she cannot continue her present extensive
purchases in the United States without shipping gold as payment for
them, and there are two reasons why she cannot make large
shipments of gold. In the first place, both England and France must
keep the larger part of the gold they have to maintain issues of
their paper at par; and, in the second place, the German U-boat has
made the shipping of gold a dangerous procedure even if they had it
to ship. There is therefore a pressing danger that the
Franco-American and Anglo-American exchange will be greatly
disturbed; the inevitable consequence will be that orders by all
the Allied Governments will be reduced to the lowest possible
amount and that trans-Atlantic trade will practically come to an
end. The result of such a stoppage will be a panic in the United
States. The world will therefore be divided into two hemispheres,
one of them, our own, will have the gold and the commodities; the
other, Great Britain and Europe, will need these commodities, but
it will have no money with which to pay for them. Moreover, it will
have practically no commodities of its own to exchange for them.
The financial and commercial result will be almost as bad for the
United States as for Europe. We shall soon reach this condition
unless we take quick action to prevent it. Great Britain and France
must have a credit in the United States which will be large enough
to prevent the collapse of world trade and the whole financial
structure of Europe.

If the United States declare war against Germany, the greatest help
we could give Great Britain and its Allies would be such a credit.
If we should adopt this policy, an excellent plan would be for our
Government to make a large investment in a Franco-British loan.
Another plan would be to guarantee such a loan. A great advantage
would be that all the money would be kept in the United States. We
could keep on with our trade and increase it, till the war ends,
and after the war Europe would purchase food and an enormous supply
of materials with which to reëquip her peace industries. We should
thus reap the profit of an uninterrupted and perhaps an enlarging
trade over a number of years and we should hold their securities in
payment.

On the other hand, if we keep nearly all the gold and Europe cannot
pay for reëstablishing its economic life, there may be a world-wide
panic for an indefinite period.

Of course we cannot extend such a credit unless we go to war with
Germany. But is there no way in which our Government might
immediately and indirectly help the establishment in the United
States of a large Franco-British credit without violating armed
neutrality? I do not know enough about our own reserve bank law to
form an opinion. But these banks would avert such a danger if they
were able to establish such a credit. Danger for us is more real
and imminent, I think, than the public on either side the Atlantic
understands. If it be not averted before its manifestations become
apparent, it will then be too late to save the day.

The pressure of this approaching crisis, I am certain, has gone
beyond the ability of the Morgan financial agency for the British
and French governments. The financial necessities of the Allies are
too great and urgent for any private agency to handle, for every
such agency has to encounter business rivalries and sectional
antagonisms.

It is not improbable that the only way of maintaining our present
preëminent trade position and averting a panic is by declaring war
on Germany. The submarine has added the last item to the danger of
a financial world crash. There is now an uncertainty about our
being drawn into the war; no more considerable credits can be
privately placed in the United States. In the meantime a collapse
may come.

PAGE.

Urgent as this message was, it really understated the desperate
condition of British and Allied finances. That the warring powers were
extremely pressed for money has long been known; but Page's papers
reveal for the first time the fact that they were facing the prospect of
bankruptcy itself. "The whole Allied combination on this side the ocean
are very much nearer the end of their financial resources," he wrote in
July, "than anybody has guessed or imagined. We only can save them....
The submarines are steadily winning the war. Pershing and his army have
bucked up the French for the moment. But for his coming there was more
or less danger of a revolution in Paris and of serious defection in the
army. Everybody here fears that the French will fail before another
winter of the trenches. Yet--the Germans must be still worse off."

The matter that was chiefly pressing at the time of the Balfour visit
was the fact that the British balances in the New York banks were in a
serious condition. It should always be remembered, however, that Great
Britain was financing not only herself, but her Allies, and that the
difficult condition in which she now found herself was caused by the not
too considerate demands of the nations with which she was allied in the
war. Thus by April 6, 1917, Great Britain had overdrawn her account with
J.P. Morgan to the extent of $400,000,000 and had no cash available with
which to meet this overdraft. This obligation had been incurred in the
purchase of supplies, both for Great Britain and the allied governments;
and securities, largely British owned stocks and bonds, had been
deposited to protect the bankers. The money was now coming due; if the
obligations were not met, the credit of Great Britain in this country
would reach the vanishing point. Though at first there was a slight
misunderstanding about this matter, the American Government finally
paid this over-draft out of the proceeds of the first Liberty Loan. This
act saved the credit of the allied countries; it was, of course, only
the beginning of the financial support that America brought to the
allied cause; the advances that were afterward furnished from the
American Treasury made possible the purchases of food and supplies in
enormous quantities. The first danger that threatened, the isolation and
starvation of Great Britain, was therefore overcome. It was the joint
product of Page's work in London and that of the Balfour Commission in
the United States.


III

Until these financial arrangements had been made there was no certainty
that the supplies which were so essential to victory would ever leave
the United States; this obstruction at the source had now been removed.
But the greater difficulty still remained. The German submarines were
lying off the waters south and west of Ireland ready to sink the supply
ships as soon as they entered the prohibited zone. Mr. Balfour and his
associates were working also on this problem in Washington; and, at the
same time, Page and Admiral Sims and the British Admiralty were bending
all their energies in London to obtain immediate coöperation.

A remark which Mr. Balfour afterward made to Admiral Sims shows the
frightful nature of the problem which was confronting Great Britain at
that time.

"That was a terrible week we spent at sea in that voyage to the United
States," Mr. Balfour said. "We knew that the German submarine campaign
was succeeding. Their submarines were destroying our shipping and we
had no means of preventing it. I could not help thinking that we were
facing the defeat of Great Britain."

Page's papers show that as early as February 25th he understood in a
general way the disheartening proportions of the German success. "It is
a momentous crisis," he wrote at that time. "The submarines are
destroying shipping at an appalling rate." Yet it was not until Admiral
Sims arrived in London, on April 9th, that the Ambassador learned all
the details. In sending the Admiral to England the Navy Department had
acted on an earnest recommendation from Page. The fact that the American
Navy was inadequately represented in the British capital had long been a
matter of embarrassment to him. The ability and personal qualifications
of our attachés had been unquestioned; but none of them during the war
had been men of high rank, and this in itself proved to be a constant
impediment to their success. While America was represented by
Commanders, Japan, Italy, and France had all sent Admirals to London.
Page's repeated requests for an American Admiral had so far met with no
response, but the probability that this country would become involved in
the war now gave new point to his representations. In the latter part of
March, Page renewed his request in still more urgent form, and this time
the President and the Navy Department responded favourably. The result
was that, on April 9th, three days after the American declaration of
war, Admiral Sims and his flag-lieutenant, Commander Babcock, presented
themselves at the American Embassy. There was little in the appearance
of these men to suggest a violent naval demonstration against Germany.
Both wore civilian dress, their instructions having commanded them not
to bring uniforms; both were travelling under assumed names, and both
had no more definite orders than to investigate the naval situation and
cable the results to Washington. In spite of these attempts at secrecy,
the British had learned that Admiral Sims was on the way; they rejoiced
not only in this fact, but in the fact that Sims had been chosen, for
there was no American naval officer whose professional reputation stood
so high in the British Navy or who was so personally acceptable to
British officialdom and the British public. The Admiralty therefore met
Admiral Sims at Liverpool, brought him to London in a special train,
and, a few hours after his arrival, gave him the innermost secrets on
the submarine situation--secrets which were so dangerous that not all
the members of the British Cabinet had been let into them.

Page welcomed Admiral Sims with a cordiality which that experienced sea
veteran still gratefully remembers. He at once turned over to him two
rooms in the Embassy. "You can have everything we've got," the
Ambassador said. "If necessary to give you room, we'll turn the whole
Embassy force out into the street." The two men had not previously met,
but in an instant they became close friends. A common sympathy and a
common enthusiasm were greatly needed at that crisis. As soon as Admiral
Sims had finished his interview with Admiral Jellicoe, he immediately
sought out the Ambassador and laid all the facts before him. Germany was
winning the war. Great Britain had only six weeks' food supply on hand,
and the submarines were sinking the ships at a rate which, unless the
depredations should be checked, meant an early and unconditional
surrender of the British Empire. Only the help of the United States
could prevent this calamity.

Page, of course, was aghast: the facts and figures Admiral Sims gave him
disclosed a situation which was even more desperate than he had
imagined. He advised the Admiral to cable the whole story immediately to
Washington. Admiral Sims at first had some difficulty in obtaining the
Admiralty's consent to doing this, and the reason was the one with which
Page had long been familiar--the fear, altogether too justified, that
the news would "leak" out of Washington. Of course there was no
suspicion in British naval circles of the good faith of the Washington
officials, but important facts had been sent so many times under the
seal of the strictest secrecy and had then found their way into the
newspapers that there was a deep distrust of American discretion.
Certainly no greater damage could have been done the allied cause at
that time than to have the Germans learn how successfully their
submarine campaign was progressing. The question was referred to the
Imperial War Council and its consent obtained. The report, however, was
sent to the Navy Department in the British naval code, and decoded in
the British Embassy in Washington.

Admiral Sims's message gave all the facts about the submarine situation,
and concluded with the recommendation that the United States should
assemble all floating craft that could be used in the anti-submarine
warfare, destroyers, tugs, yachts, light cruisers, and similar vessels,
and send them immediately to Queenstown, where they would do valuable
service in convoying merchant vessels and destroying the U-boats. At
that time the American Navy had between fifty and sixty destroyers that
were patrolling the American coast; these could have been despatched,
almost immediately, to the scene of operations; but, in response to this
request, the Department sent six to Queentown.

The next few months were very unhappy ones for Admiral Sims. He was the
representative in London of one of the world's greatest naval powers,
participating in the greatest war that had ever enlisted its energies,
yet his constant appeals for warships elicited the most inadequate
response, his well-reasoned recommendations for meeting the crisis were
frequently unanswered and at other times were met with counter-proposals
so childish that they seemed almost to have originated in the brains of
newspaper amateurs, and his urgent pictures of a civilization rapidly
going to wreck were apparently looked upon with suspicion as the
utterances of a man who had been completely led astray by British guile.
To give a fair idea of Washington's neglect during this period it is
only necessary to point out that, for four months, Admiral Sims occupied
the two rooms in the Embassy directly above Page's, with Commander
Babcock as his only aid. Sims's repeated requests to Secretary Daniels
for an additional staff went unheeded. Had it not been for the Admiral's
constant daily association with Page and the comfort and encouragement
which the Ambassador gave him, this experience would have been almost
unbearable. In the latter part of April, the Admiral's appeals to
Washington having apparently fallen on deaf ears, he asked Page to
second his efforts. The Admiral and Commander Babcock wrote another
message, and drove in a motor car to Brighton, where Page was taking a
little rest. The Admiral did not know just how strong a statement the
Ambassador would care to sponsor, and so he did not make this
representation as emphatic as the judgment of both men would have
preferred.

The Admiral handed Page the paper, saying that he had prepared it with
the hope that the Ambassador would sign it and send it directly to
President Wilson.

"It is quite apparent," Admiral Sims said, "that the Department doesn't
believe what I have been saying. Or they don't believe what the British
are saying. They think that England is exaggerating the peril for
reasons of its own. They think I am hopelessly pro-British and that I
am being used. But if you'll take it up directly with the President,
then they may be convinced."

Page put on his spectacles, took the paper, and read it through. Then,
looking over the rim of his glasses in his characteristic way, he leaned
toward Admiral Sims and said:

"Admiral, it isn't half strong enough! I think I can write a better
despatch than that, myself! At least let me try."

He immediately took a pen and paper and in a few minutes he had written
his own version which he gave the Admiral to read. The latter was
delighted with it and in a brief time it was on its way to Washington.

From: Ambassador Page.
To: Secretary of State.
Sent: 27 April, 1917.

_Very confidential for Secretary and President_

There is reason for the greatest alarm about the issue of the war
caused by the increasing success of the German submarines. I have
it from official sources that during the week ending 22nd April, 88
ships of 237,000 tons, allied and neutral, were lost. The number of
vessels unsuccessfully attacked indicated a great increase in the
number of submarines in action.

This means practically a million tons lost every month till the
shorter days of autumn come. By that time the sea will be about
clear of shipping. Most of the ships are sunk to the westward and
southward of Ireland. The British have in that area every available
anti-submarine craft, but their force is so insufficient that they
hardly discourage the submarines.

The British transport of troops and supplies is already strained to
the utmost, and the maintenance of the armies in the field is
threatened. There is food enough here to last the civil population
only not more than six weeks or two months.

Whatever help the United States may render at any time in the
future, or in any theatre of the war, our help is now more
seriously needed in this submarine area for the sake of all the
Allies than it can ever be needed again, or anywhere else.

After talking over this critical situation with the Prime Minister
and other members of the Government, I can not refrain from most
strongly recommending the immediate sending over of every destroyer
and all other craft that can be of anti-submarine use. This seems
to me the sharpest crisis of the war, and the most dangerous
situation for the Allies that has arisen or could arise.

If enough submarines can be destroyed in the next two or three
months, the war will be won, and if we can contribute effective
help immediately, it will be won directly by our aid. I cannot
exaggerate the pressing and increasing danger of this situation.
Thirty or more destroyers and other similar craft sent by us
immediately would very likely be decisive.

There is no time to be lost.

(Signed) PAGE.

This cablegram had a certain effect. The reply came from Washington that
"eventually" thirty-six destroyers would be sent.

*       *       *       *       *

Page's letters of this period are full of the same subject.

_To the President_

London, May 4, 1917.

Dear Mr. President:

The submarines have become a very grave danger. The loss of British
and allied tonnage increases with the longer and brighter days--as
I telegraphed you, 237,000 tons last week; and the worst of it is,
the British are not destroying them. The Admiralty publishes a
weekly report which, though true, is not the whole truth. It is
known in official circles here that the Germans are turning out at
least two a week--some say three; and the British are not
destroying them as fast as new ones are turned out. If merely the
present situation continue, the war will pretty soon become a
contest of endurance under hunger, with an increasing proportion of
starvation. Germany is yet much the worse off, but it will be
easily possible for Great Britain to suffer to the danger point
next winter or earlier unless some decided change be wrought in
this situation.

The greatest help, I hope, can come from us--our destroyers and
similar armed craft--provided we can send enough of them quickly.
The area to be watched is so big that many submarine hunters are
needed. Early in the war the submarines worked near shore. There
are very many more of them now and their range is one hundred
miles, or even two hundred, at sea.

The public is becoming very restive with its half information, and
it is more and more loudly demanding all the facts. There are
already angry threats to change the personnel of the Admiralty;
there is even talk of turning out the Government. "We must have
results, we must have results." I hear confidentially that Jellicoe
has threatened to resign unless the Salonica expedition is brought
back: to feed and equip that force requires too many ships.

And there are other troubles impending. Norway has lost so many of
her ships that she dare not send what are left to sea. Unarmed
they'll all perish. If she arms them, Germany will declare war
against her. There is a plan on foot for the British to charter
these Norwegian ships and to arm them, taking the risk of German
war against Norway. If war comes (as it is expected) England must
then defend Norway the best she can. And _then England may ask for
our big ships to help in these waters_. All this is yet in the
future, but possibly not far in the future.

For the present the only anti-submarine help is the help we may be
able to give to patrol the wide area off Ireland. If we had one
hundred destroyers to send, the job there could, I am told, be
quickly done. A third of that number will help mightily. At the
present rate of destruction more than four million tons will be
sunk before the summer is gone.

Such is this dire submarine danger. The English thought that they
controlled the sea; the Germans, that they were invincible on land.
Each side is losing where it thought itself strongest.

Admiral Sims is of the greatest help imaginable. Of course, I gave
him an office in one of our Embassy buildings, and the Admiralty
has given him an office also with them. He spends much of his time
there, and they have opened all doors and all desks and drawers to
him. He strikes me (and the English so regard him) as a man of
admirable judgment--unexcitable and indefatigable. I hope we'll
soon send a general over, to whom the War Department will act
similarly. Hoover, too, must have a good man here as, I dare say,
he has already made known. These will cover the Navy, the Army,
Food, and Shipping. Perhaps a Censor and an Intelligence (Secret
Service) group ought to come. I mean these for permanent--at least
indefinite--service. Exchange visits by a Congressional Committee
(such as the French and British make) and by high official persons
such as members of your Cabinet (such also as the French and
British make)--you will have got ideas about these from Mr.
Balfour.

W.H.P.

In the latter part of June Admiral Sims went to Queenstown. Admiral
Bayly, who directed the operation of the anti-submarine forces there,
had gone away for a brief rest, and Admiral Sims had taken over the
command of both the British and American forces at that point. This
experience gave Admiral Sims a first-hand picture of a really deplorable
situation. The crisis was so desperate that he made another appeal to
Page.

_From Admiral William S. Sims_

Admiralty House, Queenstown,
June 25, 1917.

My Dear Mr. Page:

I enclose herewith a letter on the submarine situation[61].

I think I have made it plain therein that the Allies are losing the
war; that it will be already lost when the loss of shipping reaches
the point where fully adequate supplies cannot be maintained on the
various battle fronts.

I cannot understand why our Government should hesitate to send the