in any other way and because I am sure that all these things can
quickly be brought to pass under your strong leadership. The United
States would stand, as no other nation has ever stood in the
world--predominant and unselfish--on the highest ideals ever
reached in human government. It is a vision as splendid as the Holy
Grael. Nor have I a shadow of doubt of the eager and faithful
following of our people, who would thereby reëstablish once for all
our weakened nationality. We are made of the stuff that our Fathers
were made of.

And I write this now for the additional reason that I am within
sight of the early end of my service here. When you called me I
answered, not only because you did me great honour and laid a
definite patriotic duty on me, but because also of my personal
loyalty to you and my pride in helping forward the great principles
in which we both believe. But I understood then (and I am sure the
subject lay in your mind in the same way) that my service would be
for four years at the most. I made all my arrangements,
professional and domestic, on this supposition. I shall, therefore,
be ready to lay down my work here on March 4th or as soon
thereafter as meets your pleasure.

I am more than proud of the confidence that you have shown in me.
To it I am indebted for the opportunity I have had to give such
public service to my country as I could, as well as for the most
profitable experience of my life. A proper and sympathetic
understanding between the two English-speaking worlds seems to me
the most important duty of far-seeing men in either country. It has
taken such a profound hold on me that I shall, in whatever way I
can, work for its complete realization as long as I can work for
anything.

I am, Mr. President, most faithfully and gratefully yours,

WALTER H. PAGE.

This letter was written at a time when President Wilson was exerting his
best energies to bring about peace. The Presidential campaign had caused
him to postpone these efforts, for he believed that neither Germany nor
Great Britain could take seriously the activities of a President whose
own political position was insecure. At the time Page's letter was
received, the President was thinking only of a peace based upon a
stalemate; it was then his apparent conviction that both sides to the
struggle were about equally in the wrong and that a decisive victory of
either would not be a good thing for the world. Yet it is interesting to
compare this letter with the famous speech which the President made six
months afterward when he asked Congress to declare the existence of a
state of war with Germany. Practically all the important reasons which
Mr. Wilson then advanced for this declaration are found in Page's letter
of the preceding November. That autocracies are a constant menace to
world peace, that the United States owes it to its democratic tradition
to take up arms against the enemy of free government, that in doing
this, it was not making war upon the German people, but upon its
imperialistic masters--these were the arguments which Page laid before
the President in his letter of resignation, and these were the leading
ideas in Mr. Wilson's address of April 2nd. There are even sentences in
Page's communication which seem to foreshadow Mr. Wilson's assertion
that "The world must be made safe for democracy." This letter in itself
sufficiently makes it clear that Page's correspondence, irritating in
its later phases as it may have been, strongly influenced Mr. Wilson in
his final determination on war.

On one point, indeed, Colonel House afterward called the Ambassador to
account. When America was preparing to raise armies by the millions and
to spend its treasure by the billions, he reminded Page of his statement
that the severance of diplomatic relations "would probably not cost us a
man in battle nor any considerable treasure." Page's statement in this
November letter merely reiterated a conviction which for more than a
year he had been forcing upon the President and Colonel House--that the
dismissal of Bernstorff would not necessarily imply war with Germany,
but that it would in itself be enough to bring the war to an end. On
this point Page never changed his mind, as is evident from the letter
which he wrote to Colonel House when this matter was called to his
attention:

_To Edward M. House_

London, June 29, 1917.

MY DEAR HOUSE:

I never put any particular value on my own prophecies nor on
anybody else's. I have therefore no pride as a prophet. Yet I do
think that I hit it off accurately a year or a year and a half ago
when I said that we could then have ended the war without any
appreciable cost. And these are my reasons:

If we had then come in and absolutely prevented supplies from
reaching Germany, as we are now about to do, the war would then
have been much sooner ended than it can now be ended:

(1) Our supplies enabled her to go on.

(2) She got time in this way to build her great submarine fleet.
She went at it the day she promised the President to reform.

(3) She got time and strength to overrun Rumania whence she got
food and oil; and continues to get it.

(4) During this time Russia fell down as a military force and gave
her more time, more armies for France and more supplies. Russian
guns have been sold to the Germans.

If a year and a half ago we had starved her out, it would have been
over before any of these things happened. This delay is what will
cost us billions and billions and men and men.

And it cost us one thing more. During the neutrality period we
were as eager to get goods to the little neutral states which were
in large measure undoubtedly bound to Germany as we are now eager
to keep them out. Grey, who was and is our best friend, and who was
unwilling to quarrel with us more than he was obliged to, was
thrown out of office and his career ended because the blockade,
owing to his consideration for us, was not tight enough. Our delay
caused his fall.

But most of all, it gave the Germans time (and to some extent
material) to build their present fleet of submarines. They were at
work on them all the while and according to the best opinion here
they continue to build them faster than the British destroy them;
and the submarines are destroying more merchant ships than all the
shipbuilding docks of all the world are now turning out. This is
the most serious aspect of the war--by far the most serious. I am
trying to get our Government to send over hundreds of improvised
destroyers--armed tugs, yachts, etc., etc. Admiral Sims and the
British Admiralty have fears that unless such help come the full
fruits of the war may never be gathered by the Allies--that some
sort of a compromise peace may have to be made.

It is, therefore, true that the year and a half we waited after the
_Lusitania_ will prove to be the most costly year and a half in our
history; and for once at least my old prophecy was quite a good
guess. But that water has flowed over the dam and it is worth
mentioning now only because you challenged me....

That part of Page's letter which refers to his retirement had a curious
history. It was practically a resignation and therefore called for an
immediate reply, but Mr. Wilson did not even acknowledge its receipt.
For two months the Ambassador was left in the dark as to the attitude
of Washington. Finally, in the latter part of January, 1917, Page wrote
urgently to Mr. Lansing, asking him to bring the matter to the
President's attention. On February 5, 1917, Mr. Lansing's reply was
received. "The President," he said, "under extreme pressure of the
present situation, has been unable to consider your communication in
regard to your resignation. He desires me to inform you that he hopes
that, at the present time, you will not press to be relieved from
service; that he realizes that he is asking you to make a personal
sacrifice, but he believes that you will appreciate the importance, in
the crisis which has developed, that no change should be made. I hardly
need to add my personal hope that you will put aside any thought of
resigning your post for the present."

At this time, of course, any idea of retiring was out of the question.
The President had dismissed Bernstorff and there was every likelihood
that the country would soon be at war. Page would have regarded his
retirement at this crisis as little less than the desertion of his post.
Moreover, since Mr. Wilson had adopted the policy which the Ambassador
had been urging for nearly two years, and had sent Bernstorff home, any
logical excuse that may have existed for his resignation existed no
longer. Mr. Wilson had now adopted a course which Page could
enthusiastically support.

"I am happy to serve here at any sacrifice"--such was his reply to Mr.
Lansing--"until after the end of the war, and I am making my
arrangements to stay for this period."

The months that intervened between the Presidential election and the
declaration of war were especially difficult for the American Embassy in
London. Page had informed the President, in the course of his interview
of September 22nd, how unfavourably Great Britain regarded his efforts
in the direction of peace; he had in fact delivered a message from the
Foreign Office that any Presidential attempt to "mediate" would be
rejected by the Allies. Yet his earnest representation on this point had
produced no effect upon Mr. Wilson. The pressure which Germany was
bringing to bear upon Washington was apparently irresistible. Count
Bernstorff's memoirs, with their accompanying documents, have revealed
the intensity of the German efforts during this period; the most
startling fact revealed by the German Ambassador is that the Kaiser, on
October 9th, notified the President, almost in so many words, that,
unless he promptly moved in the direction of peace, the German
Government "would be forced to regain the freedom of action which it has
reserved to itself in the note of May 4th last[49]." It is unlikely that
the annals of diplomacy contain many documents so cool and insolent as
this one. It was a notification from the Kaiser to the President that
the so-called "Sussex pledge" was not regarded as an unconditional one
by the Imperial Government; that it was given merely to furnish Mr.
Wilson an opportunity to bring the war to an end; and that unless the
Presidential attempt to accomplish this were successful, there would be
a resumption of the indiscriminate submarine campaign. The curious
developments of the next two months are now a familiar story. Possibly
because the British Government had notified him, through Page, that his
proffer of mediation would be unacceptable, Mr. Wilson moved cautiously
and slowly, and Germany became impatient. The successful campaign
against Rumania, resulting in the capture of Bucharest on December 6th,
and the new vista which it opened to Germany of large food supplies,
strengthened the Teutonic purpose. Perhaps Germany, with her
characteristic lack of finesse, imagined that her own open efforts would
lend emphasis to Mr. Wilson's pacific exertions. At any rate, on
December 12th, just as Mr. Wilson was preparing to launch his own
campaign for mediation, Germany herself approached her enemies with a
proposal for a peace conference. A few days afterward Page, as the
representative of Germany, called at the Foreign Office to deliver the
large white envelope which contained the Kaiser's "peace proposal." In
delivering this to Lord Robert Cecil, who was acting as Foreign
Secretary in the temporary absence of Mr. Balfour, Page emphasized the
fact that the American Government entirely disassociated itself from its
contents and that he was acting merely in his capacity of "German
Ambassador." Two communications from Lord Robert to Sir Cecil Spring
Rice, British Ambassador at Washington, tell the story and also reveal
that it was almost impossible for Page, even when engaged in an official
proceeding, to conceal his contempt for the whole enterprise:

_Lord R. Cecil to Sir C. Spring Rice_

Foreign Office,

December 18, 1916.

SIR:

The American Ambassador came to see me this morning and presented
to me the German note containing what is called in it the "offer of
peace." He explained that he did so on instructions of his
Government as representing the German Government, and not in any
way as representing their own opinions. He also explained that the
note must be regarded as coming from the four Central Powers, and
as being addressed to all the Entente Powers who were represented
by the United States.

He then read to me a telegram from his Government, but declined to
leave me a copy of it. The first part of the telegram explained
that the Government of the United States would deeply appreciate a
confidential intimation of the response to be made to the German
note and that they would themselves have certain representations to
make to the Entente Powers, to which they urgently begged the
closest consideration. The telegram went on to explain that the
Government of the United States had had it in mind for some time
past to make such representations on behalf of neutral nations and
humanity, and that it must not be thought that they were prompted
by the Governments of the Central Powers. They wished us to
understand that the note of the Central Powers created a good
opportunity for making the American representations, but was not
the cause of such representations being made.

I replied that I could of course say nothing to him on such an
important matter without consulting my colleagues.

I am, etc.,

ROBERT CECIL.

_Lord R. Cecil to Sir C. Spring Rice_

Foreign Office,

19 December, 1916.

SIR:

The American Ambassador came to see me this afternoon.

I asked him whether he could tell me why his government were
anxious to have confidential information as to the nature of our
response to the German peace note. He replied that he did not know,
but he imagined it was to enable them to frame the representations
of which he had spoken to me.

I then told him that we had asked the French to draft a reply, and
that it would then be considered by the Allies, and in all
probability an identic note would be presented in answer to the
German note. I thought it probable that we should express our view
that it was impossible to deal with the German offer, since it
contained no specific proposals.

He said that he quite understood this, and that we should in fact
reply that it was an offer "to buy a pig in a poke" which we were
not prepared to accept. He added that he thought his Government
would fully anticipate a reply in this sense, and he himself
obviously approved it.

Then, speaking quite seriously, he said that he had heard people in
London treating the German offer with derision, but that no doubt
the belligerent governments would treat it seriously.

I said that it was certainly a serious thing, and no doubt would be
treated seriously.

I asked him if he knew what would be contained in the proposed
representations from his government.

He said that he did not; but as he understood that they were to be
made to all the belligerents, he did not think that they could be
much more than a pious aspiration for peace; since that was the
only thing that was equally applicable to the Germans and to us.

As he was leaving he suggested that the German note might be
published in our press.

I am, etc.,

ROBERT CECIL.

This so-called German "peace proposal" began with the statement that the
war "had been forced" upon Germany, contained the usual reference to the
military might of the Central Powers, and declared that the Fatherland
was fighting for "the honour and liberty of national evolution." It is
therefore not surprising that Lord Robert received it somewhat
sardonically, especially as the communication contained no specific
proposals, but merely a vague suggestion of "negotiations." But another
spectacular performance now drove the German manoeuvre out of
everybody's mind. That President Wilson resented this German
interference with his own plans is well known; he did not drop them,
however, but on December 18th, he sent his long-contemplated peace
communication to all the warring Powers. His appeal took the form of
asking that they state the objects for which they were fighting, the
Presidential belief evidently being that, if they did this, a common
meeting ground might possibly be found. The suggestion that the Allied
war aims were not public property, despite the fact that British
statesmen had been broadly proclaiming them for three years, caused a
momentary irritation in England, but this was not a serious matter,
especially as the British Cabinet quickly saw that this request gave
them a position of advantage over Germany, which had always refused to
make public the terms on which it would end the war. The main substance
in this Presidential approach, therefore, would have produced no
ill-feeling; as usual, it was a few parenthetical phrases--phrases which
were not essential to the main argument--which set the allied countries
seething with indignation. The President, this section of his note ran,
"takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects
which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in
this war, are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their
own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and
privileges of weak peoples and small states as secure against aggression
and denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and
powerful states now at war." This idea was elaborated in several
sentences of a similar strain, the general purport of the whole passage
being that there was little to choose between the combatants, inasmuch
as both were apparently fighting for about the same things. Mr. Wilson's
purpose in this paragraph is not obscure; he was making his long
expected appearance as a mediator, and he evidently believed that it was
essential to this rôle that he should not seem to be prejudiced in
favour of either side, but should hold the balance impartially between
them.

It is true that a minute reading indicates that Mr. Wilson was merely
quoting, or attempting to paraphrase, the statements of the leaders of
both sides, but there is such a thing as quoting with approval, and no
explanation could convince the British public that the ruler of the
greatest neutral nation had not declared that the Allies and the Central
Powers stood morally upon the same level. The popular indignation which
this caused in Great Britain was so intense that it alarmed the British
authorities. The publication of this note in the British press was
withheld for several hours, in order to give the Government an
opportunity to control the expression of editorial opinion; otherwise it
was feared that this would be so unrestrained in its bitterness that
relations with the United States might be imperilled. The messages which
the London correspondents were permitted to send to the United States
were carefully censored for the same reason. The dispatch sent by the
Associated Press was the product of a long struggle between the Foreign
Office and its London correspondent. The representatives spent half an
hour considering whether the American correspondents could cable their
country that the note had been received in England with "surprise and
irritation." After much discussion it was decided that "irritation"
could not be used, and the message of the Associated Press, after
undergoing this careful editing by the Foreign Office, was a weak and
ridiculous description of the high state of excitement which prevailed
in Great Britain. The fact that the British Foreign Office should have
given all this trouble over the expressions sent to American newspapers
and should even have spent half an hour debating whether a particular
word should be used, almost pathetically illustrates the great care
taken by the British Government not to influence American opinion
against the Allies.

The Government took the same precautions with its own press in England.
When the note was finally released the Foreign Office explicitly
directed the London newspapers to comment with the utmost caution and in
no case to question the President's sincerity. Most of them acquiesced
in these instructions by maintaining silence. There was only one London
newspaper, the _Westminster Gazette_, which made even a faint-hearted
attempt to explain away the President's statement. From the first day of
the war the British people had declared that President Wilson did not
understand the issues at stake; and they now declared that this note
confirmed their worst forebodings. The comments of the man-in-the-street
were unprintable, but more serious than these was the impression which
Mr. Wilson's dubious remarks made upon those Englishmen who had always
been especially friendly to the United States and who had even defended
the President in previous crises. Lord Bryce, who had accepted
philosophically the Presidential statement that the United States was
not "concerned with the causes" of the war, could not regard so
indulgently this latest judgment of Great Britain and Germany. "Bryce
came to see me in a state of great depression," wrote Page. "He has sent
Mr. Wilson a personal letter on this matter." Northcliffe commanded his
newspapers, the _Times_ and the _Daily Mail_, to discuss the note in a
judicial spirit, but he himself told Mr. Page that "everybody is as
angry as hell." When someone attempted to discuss the Wilson note with
Mr. Asquith, he brushed the subject away with a despairing gesture.
"Don't talk to me about it," he said. "It is most disheartening." But
the one man in England who was perhaps the most affected was King
George. A man who had attended luncheon at Buckingham Palace on December
21st gave Page a description of the royal distress. The King, expressing
his surprise and dismay that Mr. Wilson should think that Englishmen
were fighting for the same things in this war as the Germans, broke
down.

The world only now understands the dreadful prospect which was opening
before Europe at the moment when this Presidential note added a new
cause for general despondency. Rumania had collapsed, the first inkling
of the Russian revolution had been obtained, the British well knew that
the submarine warfare was to be resumed, and British finances were also
in a desperate plight. More and more it was becoming evident to the
British statesmen that they needed the intervention of the United
States. This is the reason why they could not destroy the chances of
American help by taking official offense even at what Page, in a
communication to the Secretary of State, did not hesitate to call
President Wilson's "insulting words"; and hence their determination to
silence the press and to give no outward expression of what they felt.
Page's interview with Lord Robert Cecil on December 26th, while the
Presidential communication was lying on his desk, discloses the real
emotions of Englishmen. Apparently Page's frank cables concerning the
reception of this paragraph had caused a certain interest in the State
Department; at least the Ambassador was instructed to call at the
Foreign Office and explain that the interpretation which had been
commonly put upon the President's words was not the one which he had
intended. At the same time Page was instructed to request the British
Foreign Office, in case its reply were "favourable," not to publish it,
but to communicate it secretly to the American Government. The purpose
of this request is a little obscure; possibly it was the President's
plan to use such a favourable reply to force Germany likewise to display
an acquiescent mood. The object of Page's call was to present this
disclaimer.

Lord Robert Cecil, the son of the late Lord Salisbury,--that same Lord
Salisbury whose combats with Secretary Blaine and Secretary Olney form
piquant chapters in British-American history--is one of the most able
and respected of British statesmen. In his earlier life Lord Salisbury
had been somewhat overbearing in his attitude toward the United States;
in his later years, however, perhaps owing to the influence of his
nephew, Mr. Balfour, his manner had changed. In his attitude toward the
United States Lord Robert Cecil reflected only the later phases of his
father's career. To this country and to its peaceful ideals he had
always been extremely sympathetic, and to Page especially he had never
manifested anything but cordiality. Yet it was evident, as Page came
into his office this morning, that to Lord Robert, as to every member of
the Government, the President's note, with its equivocal phrases, had
been a terrible shock. His manner was extremely courteous, as always,
but he made no attempt to conceal his feelings. Ordinarily Lord Robert
did not wear his emotions on the surface; but he took occasion on this
visit to tell Page how greatly the President's communication had grieved
him.

"The President," he said, "has seemed to pass judgment on the allied
cause by putting it on the same level as the German. I am deeply hurt."

Page conveyed Mr. Lansing's message that no such inference was
justified. But this was not reassuring.

"Moreover," Lord Robert added, "there is one sentence in the note--that
in which the President says that the position of neutrals is becoming
intolerable--that seems almost a veiled threat."

Page hastened to assure Lord Robert that no threat was intended.

Lord Robert's manner became increasingly serious.

"There is nothing that the American Government or any other human power
can do," he remarked slowly and solemnly, "which will bring this war to
a close before the Allies have spent their utmost force to secure a
victory. A failure to secure such a victory will leave the world at the
mercy of the most arrogant and the bloodiest tyranny that has ever been
organized. It is far better to die in an effort to defeat that tyranny
than to perish under its success."

On any occasion Lord Robert is an impressive or at least a striking and
unusual figure; he is tall, lank, and ungainly, almost Lincolnesque in
the carelessness of his apparel and the exceeding awkwardness of his
postures and manners. His angular features, sharp nose, pale face, and
dark hair suggest the strain of ascetism, almost of fanaticism, which
runs in the present generation of his family. And the deep sincerity and
power of his words on this occasion made an impression which Page never
forgot; they transformed the British statesman into an eloquent, almost
an heroic figure. If we are to understand the full tragedy of this
moment we must remember that, incredible as it now seems, there was a
fear in British officialdom that the United States might not only not
pursue a course favourable to the Allies, but that it might even throw
its support to Germany. The fear, of course, was baseless; any
suggestion of such a policy in the United States would have destroyed
any official who had brought it forward; but Lord Robert knew and Page
knew that there were insidious influences at work at that time, both in
the United States and in Great Britain, which looked in this direction.
A group of Americans, whom Page used to refer to as "peace spies," were
associated with English pacifists, for the purpose of bringing about
peace on almost any terms. These "peace spies" had worked out a
programme all their own. The purpose was to compel Great Britain to
accept the German terms for ending the war. Unless she did accept them,
then it was intended that the American Government should place an
embargo on the shipment of foodstuffs and munitions to the Allies. There
is little question that the United States, by taking such action, could
have ended the war almost instantaneously. Should the food of her people
and the great quantities of munitions which were coming from this
country be suddenly cut off, there is little likelihood that Great
Britain could have long survived. The possibility that an embargo might
shut out these supplies had hung over the heads of British statesmen
ever since the war began; they knew that the possession of this mighty
power made the United States the potential dictator of events; and the
fear that it might be used had never ceased to influence their thoughts
or their actions. Even while this interview was taking place, certain
anti-British forces in the United States, such as Senator Hoke Smith of
Georgia, were urging action of this kind.

"I have always been almost a Pacifist," Lord Robert continued. "No man
has ever hated war worse than I. No man has ever had a more earnest
faith that war can be abolished. But European civilization has been
murderously assaulted and there is nothing now to do but to defeat this
desperate enemy or to perish in the effort. I had hoped that the United
States understood what is at stake."

Lord Robert went on:

"I will go so far as to say that if the United States will come into the
war it will decide which will win, freedom or organized tyranny. If the
United States shall help the Germans, civilization will perish and it
will be necessary to build it up slowly again--if indeed it will ever
appear again. If the United States will help the Allies, civilization
will triumph[50]."

As to the proposal that the British terms should be conveyed
confidentially to Mr. Wilson, Lord Robert said that that would be a
difficult thing to do. The President's note had been published, and it
therefore seemed necessary that the reply should also be given to the
press. This was the procedure that was ultimately adopted.

*       *       *       *       *

Startling as was the sensation caused by the President's December note,
it was mild compared with that which was now to come. Page naturally
sent prompt reports of all these conversations to the President and
likewise kept him completely informed as to the state of public feeling,
but his best exertions apparently did not immediately affect the Wilson
policy. The overwhelming fact is that the President's mind was fixed on
a determination to compel the warring powers to make peace and in this
way to keep the United States out of the conflict. Even the disturbance
caused by his note of December 18th did not make him pause in this peace
campaign. To that note the British sent a manly and definite reply,
drafted by Mr. Balfour, giving in detail precisely the terms upon which
the Allies would compose their differences with the Central Powers. The
Germans sent a reply consisting of ten or a dozen lines, which did not
give their terms, but merely asked again for a conference. Events were
now moving with the utmost rapidity. On January 9th, a council of German
military chieftains was held at Pless; in this it was decided to resume
unrestricted submarine warfare. On January 16th the Zimmermann-Mexico
telegram was intercepted; this informed Bernstorff, among other things,
that this decision had been made. On January 16th, at nine o'clock in
the morning, the American Embassy in London began receiving a long
cipher despatch from Washington. The preamble announced that the
despatch contained a copy of an address which the President proposed to
deliver before the Senate "in a few days." Page was directed to have
copies of the address "secretly prepared" and to hand them to the
British Foreign Office and to newspapers of the type of the Nation, the
Daily News, and the Manchester Guardian--all three newspapers well known
for their Pacifist tendencies. As the speech approached its end, this
sentence appeared: "It must be a peace without victory." The words
greatly puzzled the secretary in charge, for they seemed almost
meaningless. Suspecting that an error had been made in transmission, the
secretary directed the code room to cable Washington for a verification
of the cipher groups. Very soon the answer was received; there had been
no mistake; the Presidential words were precisely those which had been
first received: "Peace without victory." The slips were then taken to
Page, who read the document, especially these fateful syllables, with a
consternation which he made no effort to conceal. He immediately wrote a
cable to President Wilson, telling him of the deplorable effect this
sentence would produce and imploring him to cut it out of his
speech--with what success the world now knows.

An astonishing feature of this episode is that Page had recently
explained to the Foreign Office, in obedience to instructions from
Washington, that Mr. Wilson's December note should not be interpreted as
placing the Allies and the Central Powers on the same moral level. Now
Mr. Wilson, in this "peace without victory" phrase, had repeated
practically the same idea in another form. On the day the speech was
received at the Embassy, about a week before it was delivered in the
Senate, Page made the following memorandum:

The President's address to the Senate, which was received to-day
(January 16th)[51], shows that he thinks he can play peace-maker.
He does not at all understand, (or, if he do, so much the worse for
him) that the Entente Powers, especially Great Britain and France,
cannot make "peace without victory." If they do, they will become
vassals of Germany. In a word, the President does not know the
Germans; and he is, unconsciously, under their influence in his
thought. His speech plays into their hands.

This address will give great offense in England, since it puts each
side in the war on the same moral level.

I immediately saw the grave danger to our relations with Great
Britain by the Peace-without-Victory plan; and I telegraphed the
President, venturing to advise him to omit that phrase--with no
result.

Afterward Page added this to the above:

Compare this Senate speech with his speech in April calling for
war: Just when and how did the President come to see the true
nature of the German? What made him change from Peace-Maker to
War-Maker? The Zimmermann telegram, or the February U-boat renewal
of warfare? Had he been so credulous as to believe the German
promise? This promise had been continuously and repeatedly broken.

Or was it the pressure of public opinion, the growing impatience of
the people that pushed him in?

This distressing peace-move--utterly out of touch with the facts of
the origin of the war or of its conduct or of the mood and
necessities of Great Britain--a remote, academic deliverance, while
Great Britain and France were fighting for their very lives--made a
profoundly dejected feeling; and it made my place and work more
uncomfortable than ever. "Peace without victory" brought us to the
very depths of European disfavour.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 49: "My Three Years in America," by Count Bernstorff, p. 294.]

[Footnote 50: This narrative is based upon memoranda made by Page.]

[Footnote 51: It was delivered and published on January 22nd.]




CHAPTER XXI

THE UNITED STATES AT WAR


I

The United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany on
February 3, 1917. The occasion was a memorable one in the American
Embassy in London, not unrelieved by a touch of the ridiculous. All day
long a nervous and rather weary company had waited in the Ambassador's
room for the decisive word from Washington. Mr. and Mrs. Page, Mr. and
Mrs. Laughlin, Mr. Shoecraft, the Ambassador's secretary, sat there hour
after hour, hardly speaking to one another in their tense excitement,
waiting for the news that would inform them that Bernstorff's course had
been run and that their country had taken its decision on the side of
the Allies. Finally, at nine o'clock in the evening, the front door bell
rang. Mr. Shoecraft excitedly left the room; half way downstairs he met
Admiral William Reginald Hall, the head of the British Naval
Intelligence, who was hurrying up to the Ambassador. Admiral Hall, as he
spied Mr. Shoecraft, stopped abruptly and uttered just two words:

"Thank God!"

He then went into the Ambassador's room and read a secret code message
which he had just received from Captain Gaunt, the British naval attaché
at Washington. It was as follows:

"Bernstorff has just been given his passports. I shall probably get
drunk to-night!"

It was in this way that Page first learned that the long tension had
passed.

Page well understood that the dismissal of Bernstorff at that time meant
war with the Central Empires. Had this dismissal taken place in 1915,
after the sinking of the _Lusitania_, or in 1916, after the sinking of
the _Sussex_, Page believed that a simple break in relations would in
itself have brought the war to an early end. But by February, 1917,
things had gone too far. For Germany had now decided to stake everything
upon the chance of winning a quick victory with the submarine. Our
policy had persuaded the Kaiser's advisers that America would not
intervene; and the likelihood of rapidly starving Great Britain was so
great--indeed the Germans had reduced the situation to a mathematical
calculation of success--that an American declaration of war seemed to
Berlin to be a matter of no particular importance. The American
Ambassador in London regarded Bernstorff's dismissal much more
seriously. It justified the interpretations of events which he had been
sending to Mr. Wilson, Colonel House, and others for nearly three years.
If Page had been inclined to take satisfaction in the fulfilment of his
own prophecies, Germany's disregard of her promises and the American
declaration of war would have seemed an ample justification of his
course as ambassador.

[Illustration: Walter H. Page, at the time of America's entry into the
war, April, 1917]

[Illustration: Resolution passed by the two Houses of Parliament, April
18, 1917, on America's entry into the war]

But Page had little time for such vain communings. "All that water," as
he now wrote, "has flowed over the dam." Occasionally his mind would
revert to the dreadful period of "neutrality," but in the main his
activities, mental and physical, were devoted to the future. A letter
addressed to his son Arthur shows how quickly and how sympathetically he
was adjusting himself to the new prospect. His mind was now occupied
with ships, food, armies, warfare on submarines, and the approaching
resettlement of the world. How completely he foresaw the part that
the United States must play in the actual waging of hostilities, and to
what an extent he himself was responsible for the policies that
ultimately prevailed, appears in this letter:

_To Arthur W. Page_

25 March, 1917, London.