So far as a meeting between a British diplomat and the President of the
United States could solve the Mexican problem, that problem was
apparently solved. The dearest wish of Mr. Wilson, the elimination of
Huerta, seemed to be approaching realization, now that he had persuaded
Great Britain to support him in this enterprise. Whether Sir William
Tyrrell, or Sir Edward Grey, had really become converted to the
President's "idealistic" plans for Mexico is an entirely different
question. At this time there was another matter in which Great Britain's
interest was even greater than in Mexico. These letters have already
contained reference to tolls on the Panama Canal. Colonel House's letter
shows that the President discussed this topic with Sir William Tyrrell
and gave him assurances that this would be settled on terms satisfactory
to Great Britain. It cannot be maintained that that assurance was really
the consideration which paved the way to an understanding on Huerta. The
conversation was entirely informal; indeed, it could not be otherwise,
for Sir William Tyrrell brought no credentials; there could be no
definite bargain or agreement, but there is little question that Mr.
Wilson's friendly disposition toward British shipping through the Panama
Canal made it easy for Great Britain to give him a free hand in Mexico.

A few days after this White House interview Sir Lionel Carden performed
what must have been for him an uncongenial duty. This loquacious
minister led a procession of European diplomats to General Huerta,
formally advised that warrior to yield to the American demands and
withdraw from the Presidency of Mexico. The delegation informed the grim
dictator that their governments were supporting the American policy and
Sir Lionel brought him the unwelcome news that he could not depend upon
British support. About the same time Premier Asquith made conciliatory
remarks on Mexico at the Guildhall banquet. He denied that the British
Government had undertaken any policy "deliberately opposed to that of
the United States. There is no vestige of foundation for such a rumour."
These events changed the atmosphere at Washington, which now became
almost as cordial to Great Britain as it had for several months been
suspicious.

_To Edward M. House_

London, November 15, 1913.

DEAR HOUSE:

All's well here. The whole trouble was caused not here but in
Mexico City; and that is to be remedied yet. And it will be! For
the moment it is nullified. But you need give yourself no concern
about the English Government or people, in the long run. It is
taking them some time to see the vast difference between acting by
a principle and acting by what they call a "policy." They and we
ourselves too have from immemorial time been recognizing successful
adventurers, and they didn't instantly understand this new
"idealistic" move; they didn't know the man at the helm! I preached
many sermons to our friend, I explained the difference to many
private groups, I made after-dinner speeches leading right up to
the point--as far as I dared, I inspired many newspaper articles;
and they see it now and have said it and have made it public; and
the British people are enthusiastic as far as they understand it.

And anybody concerned here understands the language that the
President speaks now. You mustn't forget that in all previous
experiences in Latin America we ourselves have been as much to
blame as anybody else. Now we have a clear road to travel, a policy
based on character to follow forever--a new era. Our dealing with
Cuba was a new chapter in the history of the world. Our dealing
with Mexico is Chapter II of the same Revelation. Tell 'em this in
Washington.

The remaining task will be done too and I think pretty soon. For
that I need well-loaded shells. I'll supply the gunpowder.

And don't you concern yourself about the English. They're all
right--a little slow, but all right.

Heartily yours,

WALTER H. PAGE.

_To Edward M. House_

Newtimber Place, Hassocks, Sussex,
Sunday, November 23, 1913.

DEAR HOUSE:

Your letter telling me about Tyrrell and the President brought me
great joy. Tyrrell is in every way a square fellow, much like his
Chief; and, you may depend on it, they are playing fair--in their
slow way. They always think of India and of Egypt--never of Cuba.
Lord! Lord! the fun I've had, the holy joy I am having (I never
expected to have such exalted and invigorating felicity) in
delivering elementary courses of instruction in democracy to the
British Government. Deep down at the bottom, they don't know what
Democracy means. Their Empire is in the way. Their centuries of
land-stealing are in the way. Their unsleeping watchfulness of
British commerce is in the way. "You say you'll shoot men into
self-government," said Sir Edward. "Doesn't that strike you as
comical?" And I answered, "It is comical only to the Briton and to
others who have associated shooting with subjugation. We associate
shooting with freedom." Half this blessed Sunday at this country
house I have been ramming the idea down the throat of the Lord
Chancellor[37]. _He_ sees it, too, being a Scotchman. I take the
members of the Government, as I get the chance or can make it, and
go over with them the A B C of the President's principle: no
territorial annexation; no trafficking with tyrants; no stealing of
American governments by concession or financial thimble-rigging.
They'll not recognize another Huerta--they're sick of that. And
they'll not endanger our friendship. They didn't see the idea in
the beginning. Of course the real trouble has been in Mexico
City--Carden. They don't know yet just what he did. But they will,
if _I_ can find out. I haven't yet been able to make them tell me
at Washington. Washington is a deep hole of silence toward
ambassadors. By gradual approaches, I'm going to prove that Carden
can do--and in a degree has already done--as much harm as Bryce did
good--and all about a paltry few hundreds of million dollars' worth
of oil. What the devil does the oil or the commerce of Mexico or
the investments there amount to in comparison with the close
friendship of the two nations? Carden can't be good long: he'll
break out again presently. He has no political imagination. That's
a rather common disease here, too. Few men have. It's good fun. I'm
inviting the Central and South American Ministers to lunch with me,
one by one, and I'm incidentally loading them up. I have all the
boys in the Embassy full of zeal and they are tackling the
Secretaries of the Central and South American legations. We've got
a _principle_ now to deal by with them. They'll see after a while.

English people are all right, too--except the Doctrinaires. They
write much rank ignorance. But the learned men learn things last of
all.

I thank you heartily for your good news about Tyrrell, about the
President (but I'm sorry he's tired: make him quit eating meat and
play golf); about the Panama tolls; about the Currency Bill (my
love to McAdoo); about my own little affairs.--We are looking with
the very greatest pleasure to the coming of the young White House
couple. I've got two big dinners for them--Sir Edward, the Lord
Chancellor, a duchess or two, some good folk, Ruth Bryan, a couple
of ambassadors, etc., etc., etc. Then we'll take 'em to a literary
speaking-feast or two, have 'em invited to a few great houses; then
we'll give 'em another dinner, and then we'll get a guide for them
to see all the reforming institutions in London, to their hearts'
content--lots of fun.

Lots of fun: I got the American Society for its Thanksgiving dinner
to invite the Lord Chancellor to respond to a toast to the
President. He's been to the United States lately and he is greatly
pleased. So far, so good. Then I came down here--where he, too, is
staying. After five or six hours' talk about everything else he
said, "By the way, your countrymen have invited me," etc., etc.
"Now what would be appropriate to talk about?" Then I poured him
full of the New Principle as regards Central and South America;
for, if he will talk on that, what he says will be reported and
read on both continents. He's a foxy Scot, and he didn't say he
would, but he said that he'd consider it. "Consider it" means that
he will confer with Sir Edward. I'm beginning to learn their
vocabulary. Anyhow the Lord Chancellor is in line.

It's good news you send always. Keep it up--keep it up. The volume
of silence that I get is oppressive. You remember the old nigger
that wished to pick a quarrel with another old nigger? Nigger No. 1
swore and stormed at nigger No. 2, and kept on swearing and
storming, hoping to provoke him. Nigger No. 2 said not a word, but
kept at his work. Nigger No. 1 swore and stormed more. Nigger No. 2
said not a word. Nigger No. 1 frothed still more. Nigger No. 2,
still silent. Nigger No. 1 got desperate and said: "Look here, you
kinky-headed, flat-nosed, slab-footed nigger, I warns you 'fore
God, don't you keep givin' me none o' your damned silence!" I wish
you'd tell all my friends that story.

Always heartily yours,

WALTER H. PAGE.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 34: Prince Arthur of Connaught and the Duchess of Fife were
married in the Chapel Royal, October 16, 1913.]

[Footnote 35: See the Appendix (at end of Vol. II) for this episode in
detail.]

[Footnote 36: There was a suggestion, which the Ambassador endorsed,
that President Wilson should visit England to accept, in the name of the
United States, Sulgrave Manor, the ancestral hone, of the Washingtons.
See Chapter IX, page 274.]

[Footnote 37: Viscount Haldane, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain
since 1912.]




CHAPTER VII

PERSONALITIES OF THE MEXICAN PROBLEM


Page's remarks about the "trouble in Mexico City" and the "remaining
task" refer, of course, to Sir Lionel Carden. "As I make Carden out," he
wrote about this time, "he's a slow-minded, unimaginative, commercial
Briton, with as much nimbleness as an elephant. British commerce is his
deity, British advantage his duty and mission; and he goes about his
work with blunt dullness and ineptitude. That's his mental calibre as I
read him--a dull, commercial man."

Although Sir Lionel Carden had been compelled to harmonize himself with
the American policy, Page regarded his continued presence in Mexico City
as a standing menace to British-American relations. He therefore set
himself to accomplish the minister's removal. The failure of President
Taft's attempt to obtain Carden's transfer from Havana, in 1912, showed
that Page's new enterprise was a delicate and difficult one; yet he did
not hesitate.

The part that the wives of diplomats and statesmen play in international
relations is one that few Americans understand. Yet in London, the
Ambassador's wife is almost as important a person as the Ambassador
himself. An event which now took place in the American Embassy
emphasized this point. A certain lady, well known in London, called upon
Mrs. Page and gave her a message on Mexican affairs for the Ambassador's
benefit. The purport was that the activities of certain British
commercial interests in Mexico, if not checked, would produce a serious
situation between Great Britain and the United States. The lady in
question was herself a sincere worker for Anglo-American amity, and this
was the motive that led her to take an unusual step.

"It's all being done for the benefit of one man," she said.

The facts were presented in the form of a memorandum, which Mrs. Page
copied and gave the Ambassador. This, in turn, Page sent to President
Wilson.

_To Edward M. House_

London, November 26, 1913.

DEAR HOUSE:

Won't you read the enclosed and get it to the President? It is
somewhat extra-official but it is very confidential, and I have a
special reason for wishing it to go through your hands. Perhaps it
will interest you.

The lady that wrote it is one of the very best-informed women I
know, one of those active and most influential women in the high
political society of this Kingdom, at whose table statesmen and
diplomats meet and important things come to pass. . . .

I am sure she has no motive but the avowed one. She has taken a
liking to Mrs. Page and this is merely a friendly and patriotic
act.

I had heard most of the things before as gossip--never before as
here put together by a responsible hand.

Mrs. Page went to see her and, as evidence of our appreciation and
safety, gave the original back to her. We have kept no copy, and I
wish this burned, if you please. It would raise a riot here, if any
breath of it were to get out, that would put bedlam to shame.

Lord Cowdray has been to see me for four successive days. I have a
suspicion (though I don't know) that, instead of his running the
Government, the Government has now turned the tables and is running
him. His government contract is becoming a bad thing to sleep with.
He told me this morning that he (through Lord Murray) had withdrawn
the request for any concession in Colombia[38]. I congratulated
him. "That, Lord Cowdray, will save you as well as some other
people I know a good deal of possible trouble." I have explained to
him the whole New Principle _in extenso_, "so that you may see
clearly where the line of danger runs." Lord! how he's changed!
Several weeks ago when I ran across him accidentally he was
humorous, almost cynical. Now he's very serious. I explained to him
that the only thing that had kept South America from being
parcelled out as Africa has been is the Monroe Doctrine and the
United States behind it. He granted that.

"In Monroe's time," said I, "the only way to take a part of South
America was to take land. Now finance has new ways of its own!"

"Perhaps," said he.

"Right there," I answered, "where you put your 'perhaps,' I put a
danger signal. That, I assure you, you will read about in the
histories as 'The Wilson Doctrine'!"

You don't know how easy it all is with our friend and leader in
command. I've almost grown bold. You feel steady ground beneath
you. They are taking to their tents.

"What's going to happen in Mexico City?"

"A peaceful tragedy, followed by emancipation."

"And the great industries of Mexico?"

"They will not have to depend on adventurers' favours!"

"But in the meantime, what?"

"Patience, looking towards justice!"

Yours heartily and in health (you bet!)
W.H.P.


_From Edward M. House_

145 East 35th Street,
New York City.
December 12, 1913.

DEAR PAGE:

Your budget under dates, November 15th, 23rd, and 26th came to me
last week, just after the President had been here. I saved the
letters until I went to Washington, from which place I have just
returned.

The President has been in bed for nearly a week and Doctor Grayson
permitted no one to see him but me. Yesterday before I left he was
feeling so well that I asked him if he did not want to feel better
and then I read him your letters. Mrs. Wilson was present.

I cannot tell you how pleased he was. He laughed repeatedly at the
different comments you made and he was delighted with what you had
to say concerning Lord Cowdray. We do not love him for we think
that between Cowdray and Carden a large part of our troubles in
Mexico has been made. Your description of his attitude at the
beginning and his present one pleased us much.

After I had read the confidential letter the President said "now
let me see if I have the facts." He then recited them in
consecutive order just as the English lady had written them, almost
using the same phrases, showing the well-trained mind that he has.
I then dropped the letter in the grate.

He enjoyed heartily the expression "Washington is a deep hole of
silence towards ambassadors," and again "The volume of silence that
I get is oppressive," and of course the story apropos of this last
remark.

I was with him for more than an hour and he was distinctly better
when I left. I hated to look at him in bed for I could not help
realizing what his life means to the Democratic Party, to the
Nation and almost to the world.

Of course you know that I only read your letters to him. Mr. Bryan
was my guest on Wednesday and I returned to Washington with him but
I made no mention of our correspondence and I never have. The
President seems to like our way of doing things and further than
that I do not care.

Upon my soul I do not believe the President could be better pleased
than he is with the work you are doing.

Faithfully yours,

E.M. HOUSE.

From now on the Ambassador exerted a round-about pressure--the method of
"gradual approach" already referred to--upon the Foreign Office for
Carden's removal. An extract from a letter to the President gives a hint
concerning this method:

*       *       *       *       *

I have already worked upon Sir Edward's mind about his Minister to
Mexico as far as I could. Now that the other matter is settled and while
Carden is behaving, I go at it. Two years ago Mr. Knox made a bad
blunder in protesting against Carden's "anti-Americanism" in Cuba. Mr.
Knox sent Mr. Reid no definite facts nor even accusations to base a
protest on. The result was a failure--a bad failure. I have again asked
Mr. Bryan for all the definite reports he has heard about Carden. That
man, in my judgment, has caused nine tenths of the trouble here.

*       *       *       *       *

Naturally Page did not ask the Minister's removal directly--that would
have been an unpardonable blunder. His meetings during this period with
Sir Edward were taking place almost every day, and Carden, in one way or
another, kept coming to the front in their conversation. Sir Edward,
like Page, would sacrifice much in the cause of Anglo-American
relations; Page would occasionally express his regret that the British
Minister to Mexico was not a man who shared their enthusiasm on this
subject; in numerous other ways the impression was conveyed that the two
countries could solve the Mexican entanglement much better if a more
congenial person represented British interests in the Southern Republic.
This reasoning evidently produced the desired results. In early January,
1914, a hint was unofficially conveyed to the American Ambassador that
Carden was to be summoned to London for a "conversation" with Sir Edward
Grey, and that his return to Mexico would depend upon the outcome of
that interview. There was a likelihood that, in future, Sir Lionel
Carden would represent the British Empire in Brazil.

This news, sent in discreet cipher to Washington, delighted the
Administration. "It is fine about Carden," wrote Colonel House on
January 10th. "I knew you had done it when I saw it in the papers, but I
did not know just how. You could not have brought it about in a more
diplomatic and effectual way."

And the following came from the President:

From President Wilson

Pass Christian,

January 6, 1914.

MY DEAR PAGE:

I have your letter of December twenty-first, which I have greatly
enjoyed.

Almost at the very time I was reading it, the report came through
the Associated Press from London that Carden was to be transferred
immediately to Brazil. If this is true, it is indeed a most
fortunate thing and I feel sure it is to be ascribed to your
tactful and yet very plain representations to Sir Edward Grey. I do
not think you realize how hard we worked to get from either Lind or
O'Shaughnessy[39] definite items of speech or conduct which we
could furnish you as material for what you had to say to the
Ministers about Carden. It simply was not obtainable. Everything
that we got was at second or third hand. That he was working
against us was too plain for denial, and yet he seems to have done
it in a very astute way which nobody could take direct hold of. I
congratulate you with all my heart on his transference.

I long, as you do, for an opportunity to do constructive work all
along the line in our foreign relations, particularly with Great
Britain and the Latin-American states, but surely, my dear fellow,
you are deceiving yourself in supposing that constructive work is
not now actually going on, and going on at your hands quite as much
as at ours. The change of attitude and the growing ability to
understand what we are thinking about and purposing on the part of
the official circle in London is directly attributable to what you
have been doing, and I feel more and more grateful every day that
you are our spokesman and interpreter there. This is the only
possible constructive work in foreign affairs, aside from definite
acts of policy. So far as the policy is concerned, you may be sure
I will strive to the utmost to obtain both a repeal of the
discrimination in the matter of tolls and a renewal of the
arbitration treaties, and I am not without hope that I can
accomplish both at this session. Indeed this is the session in
which these things must be done if they are to be done at all.

Back of the smile which came to my face when you spoke of the
impenetrable silence of the State Department toward its foreign
representatives lay thoughts of very serious concern. We must
certainly manage to keep our foreign representatives properly
informed. The real trouble is to conduct genuinely confidential
correspondence except through private letters, but surely the thing
can be changed and it will be if I can manage it.

We are deeply indebted to you for your kindness and generous
hospitality to our young folks[40] and we have learned with delight
through your letters and theirs of their happy days in England.

With deep regard and appreciation,

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

HON. WALTER H. PAGE,

American Embassy,

London, England.

Yet for the American Ambassador the experience was not one of unmixed
satisfaction. These letters have contained references to the demoralized
condition of the State Department under Mr. Bryan and the succeeding
ones will contain more; the Carden episode portrayed the stupidity and
ignorance of that Department at their worst. By commanding Carden to
cease his anti-American tactics and to support the American policy the
Foreign Office had performed an act of the utmost courtesy and
consideration to this country. By quietly "promoting" the same minister
to another sphere, several thousand miles away from Mexico and
Washington, it was now preparing to eliminate all possible causes of
friction between the two countries. The British, that is, had met the
wishes of the United States in the two great matters that were then
making serious trouble--Huerta and Carden. Yet no government, Great
Britain least of all, wishes to be placed in the position of moving its
diplomats about at the request of another Power. The whole deplorable
story appears in the following letter.

_To Edward M. House_

January 8th, 1914.

MY DEAR HOUSE:

Two days ago I sent a telegram to the Department saying that I had
information from a private, _unofficial_ source that the report
that Carden would be transferred was true, and from another source
that Marling would succeed him. The Government here has given out
nothing. I know nothing from official sources. Of course the only
decent thing to do at Washington was to sit still till this
Government should see fit to make an announcement. But what do they
do? Give my telegram to the press! It appears here almost verbatim
in this morning's _Mail_.--I have to make an humiliating
explanation to the Foreign Office. This is the third time I've had
to make such an humiliating explanation to Sir Edward. It's getting
a little monotonous. He's getting tired, and so am I. They now deny
at the Foreign Office that anything has been decided about Carden,
and this meddling by us (as they look at it) will surely cause a
delay and may even cause a change of purpose.

That's the practical result of their leaking at Washington. On a
previous occasion they leaked the same way. When I telegraphed a
remonstrance, they telegraphed back to me that the leak had been
_here_! That was the end of it--except that I had to explain to Sir
Edward the best I could. And about a lesser matter, I did the same
thing a third time, in a conversation. Three times this sort of
thing has happened.--On the other hand, the King's Master of
Ceremonies called on me on the President's Birthday and requested
for His Majesty that I send His Majesty's congratulations. Just ten
days passed before a telegraphic answer came! The very hour it
came, I was myself making up an answer for the President that I was
going to send, to save our face.

Now, I'm trying with all my might to do this job. I spend all my
time, all my ingenuity, all my money at it. I have organized my
staff as a sort of Cabinet. We meet every day. We go over
everything conceivable that we may do or try to do. We do good team
work. I am not sure but I doubt whether these secretaries have
before been taken into just such a relation to their chief. They
are enthusiastic and ambitious and industrious and--_safe_. There's
no possibility of any leak. We arrange our dinners with reference
to the possibility of getting information and of carrying points.
Mrs. Page gives and accepts invitations with the same end in view.
We're on the job to the very limit of our abilities.

And I've got the Foreign Office in such a relation that they are
frank and friendly. (I can't keep 'em so, if this sort of thing
goes on.)

Now the State Department seems (as it touches us) to be utterly
chaotic--silent when it ought to respond, loquacious when it ought
to be silent. There are questions that I have put to it at this
Government's request to which I can get no answer.

It's hard to keep my staff enthusiastic under these conditions.
When I reached the Chancery this morning, they were in my room,
with all the morning papers marked, on the table, eagerly
discussing what we ought to do about this publication of my
dispatch. The enthusiasm and buoyancy were all gone out of them. By
their looks they said, "Oh! what's the use of our bestirring
ourselves to send news to Washington when they use it to embarrass
us?"--While we are thus at work, the only two communications from
the Department to-day are two letters from two of the Secretaries
about--presenting "Democratic" ladies from Texas and Oklahoma at
court! And Bryan is now lecturing in Kansas.

Since I began to write this letter, Lord Cowdray came here to the
house and stayed two and a half hours, talking about possible joint
intervention in Mexico. Possibly he came from the Foreign Office. I
don't know whether to dare send a despatch to the State Department,
telling what he told me, for fear they'd leak. And to leak
this--Good Lord! Two of the Secretaries were here to dinner, and I
asked them if I should send such a despatch. They both answered
instantly: "No, sir, don't dare: _write_ it to the President." I
said: "No, I have no right to bother the President with regular
business nor with frequent letters." To that they agreed; but the
interesting and somewhat appalling thing is, they're actually
afraid to have a confidential despatch go to the State Department.

I see nothing to do but to suggest to the President to put
somebody in the Department who will stay there and give intelligent
attention to the diplomatic telegrams and letters--some
conscientious assistant or clerk. For I hear mutterings, somewhat
like these mutterings of mine, from some of the continental
embassies.--The whole thing is disorganizing and demoralizing
beyond description.

All these and more are _my_ troubles. I'll take care of them. But
remember what I am going to write on the next sheet. For here may
come a trouble for _you:_

Mrs. Page has learned something more about Secretary Bryan's
proposed visit here in the spring. He's coming to talk his peace
plan which, you know, is a sort of grape-juice arbitration--a
distinct step backward from a real arbitration treaty. Well, if he
comes with _that_, when you come to talk about reducing armaments,
you'll wish you'd never been born. Get your ingenuity together,
then, and prevent that visit[41].

Not the least funny thing in the world is--Senator X turned up
to-day. As he danced around the room begging everybody's pardon
(nobody knew what for) he complimented everybody in sight,
explained the forged letter, dilated on state politics, set the
Irish question on the right end, cleared Bacon[42] of all hostility
to me, declined tea because he had insomnia and explained just how
it works to keep you awake, danced more and declared himself happy
and bowed himself out--well pleased. He's as funny a cuss as I've
seen in many a day. Lord Cowdray, who was telling Mexican woes to
Katharine in the corner, looked up and asked, "Who's the little
dancing gentleman?" Suppose X had known he was dancing for--Lord
Cowdray's amusement, what do y' suppose he'd've thought? There are
some strange combinations in our house on Mrs. Page's days at home.
Cowdray has, I am sure, lost (that is, failed to make) a hundred
million dollars that he had within easy reach by this Wilson
Doctrine, but he's game. He doesn't lie awake. He's a dead-game
sport, and he knows he's knocked out in that quarter and he doesn't
squeal. His experiences will serve us many a good turn in the
future--as a warning. I rather like him. He eats out of my hand in
the afternoon and has one of his papers jump on me in the morning.
Some time in the twenty-four hours, he must attain about the normal
temperature--say about noon. He admires the President
greatly--sincerely. Force meets force, you see. With the President
behind me I could really enjoy Cowdray centuries after X had danced
himself into oblivion.

By the way, Cowdray said to me to-day: "Whatever the United States
and Great Britain agree on the world must do." He's right. (1) The
President must come here, perhaps in his second term; (2) these two
Governments must enter a compact for peace and for gradual
disarmament. Then we can go about our business for (say) a hundred
years.

Heartily,
W.H.P.

In spite of the continued pressure of the United States and the passive
support of its anti-Huerta policy by Great Britain, the Mexican usurper
refused to resign. President Wilson now began to espouse the interests
of Villa and Carranza. His letters to Page indicate that he took these
men at their own valuation, believed that they were sincere patriots
working for the cause of "democracy" and "constitutionalism" and that
their triumph would usher in a day of enlightenment and progress for
Mexico. It was the opinion of the Foreign Office that Villa and Carranza
were worse men than Huerta and that any recognition of their
revolutionary activities would represent no moral gain.

_From President Wilson_

The White House, Washington,
May 18, 1914.

MY DEAR PAGE:

. . . As to the attitude of mind on that side of the water toward the
Constitutionalists, it is based upon prejudices which cannot be
sustained by the facts. I am enclosing a copy of an interview by a
Mr. Reid[43] which appeared in one of the afternoon papers recently
and which sums up as well as they could be summed up my own
conclusions with regard to the issues and the personnel of the
pending contest in Mexico. I can verify it from a hundred different
sources, most of them sources not in the least touched by
predilections for such men as our friends in London have supposed
Carranza and Villa to be.

Cordially and faithfully yours,
WOODROW WILSON.

HON. WALTER H. PAGE,
U.S. Embassy,
London, England.

The White House, Washington,
June 1, 1914.

MY DEAR PAGE:

. . . The fundamental thing is that they (British critics of Villa)
are all radically mistaken. There has been less disorder and less
danger to life where the Constitutionalists have gained control
than there has been where Huerta is in control. I should think that
if they are getting correct advices from Tampico, people in England
would be very much enlightened by what has happened there. Before
the Constitutionalists took the place there was constant danger to
the oil properties and to foreign residents. Now there is no danger
and the men who felt obliged to leave the oil wells to their
Mexican employees are returning, to find, by the way, that their
Mexican employees guarded them most faithfully without wages, and
in some instances almost without food. I am told that the
Constitutionalists cheered the American flag when they entered
Tampico.

I believe that Mexico City will be much quieter and a much safer
place to live in after the Constitutionalists get there than it is
now. The men who are approaching and are sure to reach it are much
less savage and much more capable of government than Huerta.