WALTER H. PAGE.
P.S. By Jove, I didn't know that I'd ever have to put the British
Government through an elementary course in Democracy!

To the President.

Occasionally Page discussed with Sir Edward Grey an alternative
American policy which was in the minds of most people at that time:

_To the President_

. . . The foregoing I wrote before this Mexican business took its
present place. I can't get away from the feeling that the English
simply do not and will not believe in any unselfish public
action--further than the keeping of order. They have a mania for
order, sheer order, order for the sake of order. They can't see how
anything can come in any one's thought before order or how anything
need come afterward. Even Sir Edward Grey jocularly ran me across
our history with questions like this:

"Suppose you have to intervene, what then?"

"Make 'em vote and live by their decisions."

"But suppose they will not so live?"

"We'll go in again and make 'em vote again."

"And keep this up 200 years?" asked he.

"Yes," said I. "The United States will he here two hundred years
and it can continue to shoot men for that little space till they
learn to vote and to rule themselves."

I have never seen him laugh so heartily. Shooting men into
self-government! Shooting them into orderliness--he comprehends
that; and that's all right. But that's as far as his habit of mind
goes. At Sheffield last night, when I had to make a speech, I
explained "idealism" (they always quote it) in Government. They
listened attentively and even eagerly. Then they came up and asked
if I really meant that Government should concern itself with
idealistic things--beyond keeping order. Ought they to do so in
India?--I assure you they don't think beyond order. A nigger
lynched in Mississippi offends them more than a tyrant in Mexico.

_To Edward M. House_

London, November 2, 1913.

DEAR HOUSE:

I've been writing to the President that the Englishman has a mania
for order, order for order's sake, and for--trade. He has reduced a
large part of the world to order. He is the best policeman in
creation; and--he has the policeman's ethics! Talk to him about
character as a basis of government or about a moral basis of
government in any outlying country, he'll think you daft. Bah! what
matter who governs or how he governs or where he got his authority
or how, so long as he keeps order. He won't see anything else. The
lesson of our dealing with Cuba is lost on him. He doesn't believe
_that_. We may bring this Government in line with us on Mexico. But
in this case and in general, the moral uplift of government must be
forced by us--I mean government in outlying countries.

Mexico is only part of Central America, and the only way we can
ever forge a Central and South American policy that will endure is
_this_ way, precisely, by saying that your momentarily successful
adventurer can't count on us anywhere; the man that rules must
govern for the governed. Then we have a policy; and nobody else has
that policy. This Mexican business is worth worlds to us--to
establish this.

We may have a diplomatic fight here; and I'm ready! Very ready on
this, for its own sake and for reasons that follow, to wit:

Extraordinary and sincere and profound as is the respect of the
English for the American people, they hold the American Government
in contempt. It shifts and doesn't keep its treaty, etc.,
etc.--They are right, too. But they need to feel the hand that now
has the helm.

But one or two things have first to be got out of the way. That
Panama tolls is the worst. We are dead wrong in that, as we are
dead right on the Mexican matter. If it were possible (I don't know
that it is) for the President to say (quietly, not openly) that he
agrees with us--if he do--then the field would be open for a fight
on Mexico; and the reenforcement of our position would he
incalculable.

Then we need in Washington some sort of Bureau or Master of
Courtesies for the Government, to do and to permit us to do those
little courtesies that the English spend half their time in
doing--this in the course of our everyday life and intercourse. For
example: When I was instructed to inform this Government that our
fleet would go to the Mediterranean, I was instructed also to say
that they mustn't trouble to welcome us--don't pay no 'tention to
us! Well, that's what they live for in times of peace--ceremonies.
We come along and say, "We're comin' but, hell! don't kick up no
fuss over us, we're from Missouri, we are!" And the Briton shrugs
his shoulders and says, "Boor!" These things are happening all the
time. Of course no one nor a dozen nor a hundred count; but
generations of 'em have counted badly. A Government without
manners.

If I could outdo these folk at their game of courtesy, and could
keep our treaty faith with 'em, then I could lick 'em into the next
century on the moral aspects of the Mexican Government, and make
'em look up and salute every time the American Government is
mentioned. See?--Is there any hope?--Such is the job exactly. And
you know what it would lead to--even in our lifetime--_to the
leadership of the world_: and we should presently be considering
how we may best use the British fleet, the British Empire, and the
English race for the betterment of mankind.

Yours eagerly,
W.H.P.

A word of caution is necessary to understand Page's references to the
British democracy. That the parliamentary system is democratic in the
sense that it is responsive to public opinion he would have been the
first to admit. That Great Britain is a democracy in the sense that the
suffrage is general is also apparent. But, in these reflections on the
British commonwealth, the Ambassador was thinking of his old familiar
figure, the "Forgotten Man"--the neglected man, woman, and child of the
masses. In an address delivered, in June, 1914, before the Royal
Institution of Great Britain, Page gave what he regarded as the
definition of the American ideal. "The fundamental article in the creed
of the American democracy--you may call it the fundamental dogma if you
like--is the unchanging and unchangeable resolve that every human being
shall have his opportunity for his utmost development--his chance to
become and to do the best that he can." Democracy is not only a system
of government--"it is a scheme of society." Every citizen must have not
only the suffrage, he must likewise enjoy the same advantages as his
neighbour for education, for social opportunity, for good health, for
success in agriculture, manufacture, finance, and business and
professional life. The country that most successfully opened all these
avenues to every boy or girl, exclusively on individual merit, was in
Page's view the most democratic. He believed that the United States did
this more completely than Great Britain or any other country; and
therefore he believed that we were far more democratic. He had not found
in other countries the splendid phenomenon presented by America's great
agricultural region. "The most striking single fact about the United
States is, I think, this spectacle, which, so far as I know, is new in
the world: On that great agricultural area are about seven million farms
of an average size of about 140 acres, most of which are tilled by the
owners themselves, a population that varies greatly, of course, in its
thrift and efficiency, but most of which is well housed, in houses they
themselves own, well clad, well fed, and a population that trains
practically all its children in schools maintained by public taxation."
It was some such vision as this that Page hoped to see realized
ultimately in Mexico. And some such development as this would make
Mexico a democracy. It was his difficulty in making the British see the
Mexican problem in this light that persuaded him that, in this
comprehensive meaning of the word, the democratic ideal had made an
inappreciable progress in Europe--and even in Great Britain itself.


II

These letters are printed somewhat out of their chronological order
because they picture definitely the two opposing viewpoints of Great
Britain and the United States on Mexico and Latin-America generally.
Here, then, was the sharp issue drawn between the Old World and the
New--on one side the dreary conception of outlying countries as fields
to be exploited for the benefit of "investors," successful
revolutionists to be recognized in so far as they promoted such ends,
and no consideration to be shown to the victims of their rapacity; and
the new American idea, the idea which had been made reality in Cuba and
the Philippines, that the enlightened and successful nations stood
something in the position of trustees to such unfortunate lands and that
it was their duty to lead them along the slow pathway of progress and
democracy. So far the Wilsonian principle could be joyfully supported by
the Ambassador. Page disagreed with the President, however, in that he
accepted the logical consequences of this programme. His formula of
"shooting people into self-government," which had so entertained the
British Foreign Secretary, was a characteristically breezy description
of the alternative that Page, in the last resort, was ready to adopt,
but which President Wilson and Secretary Bryan persistently refused to
consider. Page was just as insistent as the Washington Administration
that Huerta should resign and that Great Britain should assist the
United States in accomplishing his dethronement, and that the Mexican
people should have a real opportunity of setting up for themselves. He
was not enough of an "idealist," however, to believe that the Mexicans,
without the assistance of their powerful neighbours, could succeed in
establishing a constitutional government. In early August, 1913,
President Wilson sent Mr. John Lind, ex-Governor of Minnesota, to Mexico
as his personal representative. His mission was to invite Huerta to
remove himself from Mexican politics, and to permit the Mexican people
to hold a presidential election at which Huerta would himself agree not
to be a candidate. Mr. Lind presented these proposals on August 15th,
and President Huerta rejected every one of them with a somewhat
disconcerting promptitude.

That Page was prepared to accept the consequences of this failure
appears in the following letter. The lack of confidence which it
discloses in Secretary Bryan was a feeling that became stronger as the
Mexican drama unfolded.

_To Edward M. House_

London, August 25, 1913.

MY DEAR HOUSE:

. . . If you find a chance, get the substance of this memorandum into
the hands of two men: the President and the Secretary of
Agriculture. Get 'em in Houston's at once--into the President's
whenever the time is ripe. I send the substance to Washington and I
send many other such things. But I never feel sure that they reach
the President. The most confidential letter I have written was lost
in Washington, and there is pretty good testimony that it reached
the Secretary's desk. He does not acknowledge the important things,
but writes me confidentially to inquire if the office of the man
who attends to the mail pouches (the diplomatic and naval
despatches in London[35]) is not an office into which he might put
a Democrat.--But I keep at it. It would he a pleasure to know that
the President knows what I am trying to do. . . .

Yours heartily,
WALTER H. PAGE.

Following is the memorandum:

In October the provisional recognition of Huerta by England will
end. Then this Government will be free. Then is the time for the
United States to propose to England joint intervention merely to
reduce this turbulent scandal of a country to order--on an
agreement, of course, to preserve the territorial integrity of
Mexico. It's a mere police duty that all great nations have to
do--as they did in the case of the Boxer riots in China. Of course
Germany and France, etc., ought to be invited--on the same pledge:
the preservation of territorial integrity. If Germany should come
in, she will thereby practically acknowledge the Monroe Doctrine,
as England has already done. If Germany stay out, then she can't
complain. England and the United States would have only to announce
their intention: there'd be no need to fire a gun. Besides settling
the Mexican trouble, we'd gain much--having had England by our side
in a praise-worthy enterprise. That, and the President's visit[36]
would give the world notice to whom it belongs, and cause it to be
quiet and to go about its proper business of peaceful industry.

Moreover, it would show all the Central and South American States
that we don't want any of their territory, that we will not let
anybody else have any, but that they, too, must keep orderly
government or the great Nations of the earth, will, at our bidding,
forcibly demand quiet in their borders. I believe a new era of
security would come in all Spanish America. Investments would be
safer, governments more careful and orderly. And--we would not have
made any entangling alliance with anybody. All this would prevent
perhaps dozens of little wars. It's merely using the English fleet
and ours to make the world understand that the time has come for
orderliness and peace and for the honest development of backward,
turbulent lands and peoples.

If you don't put this through, tell me what's the matter with it.
I've sent it to Washington after talking and being talked to for a
month and after the hardest kind of thinking. Isn't this
constructive? Isn't it using the great power lying idle about the
world, to do the thing that most needs to be done?

Colonel House presented this memorandum to the President, but events
sufficiently disclosed that it had no influence upon his Mexican policy.
Two days after it was written Mr. Wilson went before Congress, announced
that the Lind Mission had failed, and that conditions in Mexico had
grown worse. He advised all Americans to leave the country, and declared
that he would lay an embargo on the shipment of munitions--an embargo
that would affect both the Huerta forces and the revolutionary groups
that were fighting them.

Meanwhile Great Britain had taken another step that made as unpleasant
an impression on Washington as had the recognition of Huerta. Sir Lionel
Edward Gresley Carden had for several years been occupying British
diplomatic posts in Central America, in all of which he had had
disagreeable social and diplomatic relations with Americans. Sir Lionel
had always shown great zeal in promoting British commercial interests,
and, justly or unjustly, had acquired the fame of being intensely
anti-American. From 1911 to 1913 Carden had served as British Minister
to Cuba; here his anti-Americanism had shown itself in such obnoxious
ways that Mr. Knox, Secretary of State under President Taft, had
instructed Ambassador Reid to bring his behaviour to the attention of
the British Foreign Office. These representations took practically the
form of requesting Carden's removal from Cuba. Perhaps the unusual
relations that the United States bore toward Cuba warranted Mr. Knox in
making such an approach; yet the British refused to see the matter in
that light; not only did they fail to displace Carden, but they knighted
him--the traditional British way of defending a faithful public servant
who has been attacked. Sir Lionel Carden refused to mend his ways; he
continued to indulge in what Washington regarded as anti-American
propaganda; and a second time Secretary Knox intimated that his removal
would he acceptable to this country, and a second time this request was
refused. With this preliminary history of Carden as a background, and
with the British-American misunderstanding over Huerta at its most
serious stage, the emotions of Washington may well be imagined when the
news came, in July, 1913, that this same gentleman had been appointed
British Minister to Mexico. If the British Government had ransacked its
diplomatic force to find the one man who would have been most
objectionable to the United States, it could have made no better
selection. The President and Mr. Bryan were pretty well persuaded that
the "oil concessionaires" were dictating British-Mexican policy, and
this appointment translated their suspicion into a conviction. Carden
had seen much service in Mexico; he had been on the friendliest terms
with Diaz; and the newspapers openly charged that the British oil
capitalists had dictated his selection. All these assertions Carden and
the oil interests denied; yet Carden's behaviour from the day of his
appointment showed great hostility to the United States. A few days
after he had reached New York, on his way to his new post, the New York
_World_ published an interview with Carden in which he was reported as
declaring that President Wilson knew nothing about the Mexican situation
and in which he took the stand that Huerta was the man to handle Mexico
at this crisis. His appearance in the Mexican capital was accompanied by
other highly undiplomatic publications. In late October President Huerta
arrested all his enemies in the Mexican Congress, threw them into jail,
and proclaimed himself dictator. Washington was much displeased that Sir
Lionel Carden should have selected the day of these high-handed
proceedings to present to Huerta his credentials as minister; in its
sensitive condition, the State Department interpreted this act as a
reaffirmation of that recognition that had already caused so much
confusion in Mexican affairs.

Carden made things worse by giving out more newspaper interviews, a
tendency that had apparently grown into a habit. "I do not believe that
the United States recognizes the seriousness of the situation here. . . . I
see no reason why Huerta should be displaced by another man whose
abilities are yet to be tried. . . . Safety in Mexico can be secured only
by punitive and remedial methods, and a strong man;"--such were a few of
the reflections that the reporters attributed to this astonishing
diplomat. Meanwhile, the newspapers were filled with reports that the
British Minister was daily consorting with Huerta, that he was
constantly strengthening that chieftain's backbone in opposition to the
United States and that he was obtaining concessions in return for this
support. To what extent these press accounts rested on fact cannot be
ascertained definitely at this time; yet it is a truth that Carden's
general behaviour gave great encouragement to Huerta and that it had the
deplorable effect of placing Great Britain and the United States in
opposition. The interpretation of the casual reader was that Great
Britain was determined to seat Huerta in the Presidency against the
determination of the United States to keep him out. The attitude of the
Washington cabinet was almost bitter at this time against the British
Government. "There is a feeling here," wrote Secretary Lane to Page,
"that England is playing a game unworthy of her."

The British Government promptly denied the authenticity of the Carden
interview, but that helped matters little, for the American public
insisted on regarding such denials as purely diplomatic. Something of a
storm against Carden arose in England itself, where it was believed that
his conception of his duties was estranging two friendly countries.
Probably the chief difficulty was that the British Foreign Office could
see no logical sequence in the Washington policy. Put Huerta out--yes,
by all means: but what then? Page's notes of his visit to Sir Edward
Grey a few days after the latest Carden interview confirm this:

*       *       *       *       *

I have just come from an hour's talk with Grey about Mexico. He showed
me his telegram to Carden, asking about Carden's reported interview
criticizing the United States, and Carden's flat denial. He showed me
another telegram to Carden about Huerta's reported boast that he would
have the backing of London, Paris, and Berlin against the United States,
in which Grey advised Carden that British policy should be to keep aloof
from Huerta's boasts and plans. Carden denied that Huerta made such a
boast in his statement to the Diplomatic Corps. Grey wishes the
President to know of these telegrams.

Talk then became personal and informal. I went over the whole subject
again, telling how the Press and people of the United States were
becoming critical of the British Government; that they regarded the
problem as wholly American; that they resented aid to Huerta, whom they
regarded as a mere tyrant; that they suspected British interests of
giving financial help to Huerta; that many newspapers and persons
refused to believe Carden's denial; that the President's policy was not
academic but was the only policy that would square with American ideals
and that it was unchangeable. I cited our treatment of Cuba. I explained
again that I was talking unofficially and giving him only my own
interpretation of the people's mood. He asked, if the British Government
should withdraw the recognition of Huerta, what would happen.

"In my opinion," I replied, "he would collapse."

"What would happen then--worse chaos?"

"That is impossible," I said. "There is no worse chaos than deputies in
jail, the dictatorial doubling of the tariff, the suppression of
opinion, and the practical banishment of independent men. If Huerta
should fall, there is hope that suppressed men and opinion will set up a
successful government."

"Suppose that fail," he asked--"what then?"

I replied that, in case of continued and utter failure, the United
States might feel obliged to repeat its dealings with Cuba and that the
continued excitement of opinion in the United States might precipitate
this.

Grey protested that he knew nothing of what British interests had done
or were doing, that he wished time to think the matter out and that he
was glad to await the President's communication. He thanked me cordially
for my frank statements and declared that he understood perfectly their
personal nature. I impressed him with the seriousness of American public
opinion.

*       *       *       *       *

The last thing that the British Government desired at this time was a
serious misunderstanding with the United States, on Mexico or any other
matter. Yet the Mexican situation, in early November, 1913, clearly
demanded a complete cleaning up. The occasion soon presented itself. Sir
William Tyrrell, the private secretary of Sir Edward Grey sailed, in
late October, for the United States. The purpose of his visit was not
diplomatic, but Page evidently believed that his presence in the United
States offered too good an opportunity to be lost.

To Edward M. House

Newton Hall, Newton, Cambridge.

Sunday, October 26, 1913.

DEAR HOUSE:

Sir William Tyrrell, the secretary of Sir Edward Grey--himself, I
think, an M.P.--has gone to the United States to visit his friend,
Sir Cecil Spring Rice. He sailed yesterday, going first to Dublin,
N.H., thence with the Ambassador to Washington. He has never before
been to the United States, and he went off in high glee, alone, to
see it. He's a good fellow, a thoroughly good fellow, and he's an
important man. He of course has Sir Edward's complete confidence,
but he's also a man on his own account. I have come to reckon it
worth while to get ideas that I want driven home into his head.
It's a good head and a good place to put good ideas.

The Lord knows you have far too much to do; but in this juncture I
should count it worth your while to pay him some attention. I want
him to get the President's ideas about Mexico, good and firm and
hard. They are so far from altruistic in their politics here that
it would be a good piece of work to get our ideas and aims into
this man's head. His going gives you and the President and
everybody a capital chance to help me keep our good
American-English understanding.

Whatever happen in Mexico, I'm afraid there will be a disturbance
of the very friendly feeling between the American people and the
English. I am delivering a series of well-thought-out discourses to
Sir Edward--with what effect, I don't know. If the American press
could be held in a little, that would be as good as it is
impossible.

I'm now giving the Foreign Office the chance to refrain from more
premature recognizing.

Very hastily yours,

WALTER H. PAGE.

Sir William Tyrrell, to whom Page refers so pleasantly, was one of the
most engaging men personally in the British Foreign Office, as well as
one of the most influential. Though he came to America on no official
mission to our Government, he was exceptionally qualified to discuss
Mexico and other pending questions with the Washington Administration.
He had an excellent background, and a keen insight into the human
aspects of all problems, but perhaps his most impressive physical trait
was a twinkling eye, as his most conspicuous mental quality was
certainly a sense of humour. Constant association with Sir Edward Grey
had given his mind a cast not dissimilar to that of his chief--a belief
in ordinary decency in international relations, an enthusiasm for the
better ordering of the world, a sincere admiration for the United States
and a desire to maintain British-American friendship. In his first
encounter with official Washington Sir William needed all that sense of
the ludicrous with which he is abundantly endowed. This took the form of
a long interview with Secretary Bryan on the foreign policy of Great
Britain. The Secretary harangued Sir William on the wickedness of the
British Empire, particularly in Egypt and India and in Mexico. The
British oil men, Mr. Bryan declared, was nothing but the "paymasters" of
the British Cabinet.

"You are wrong," replied the Englishman, who saw that the only thing to
do on an occasion of this kind was to refuse to take the Secretary
seriously. "Lord Cowdray hasn't money enough. Through a long experience
with corruption the Cabinet has grown so greedy that Cowdray hasn't the
money necessary to reach their price."

"Ah," said Mr. Bryan, triumphantly, accepting Sir William's bantering
answer as made in all seriousness. "Then you admit the charge."

From this he proceeded to denounce Great Britain in still more
unmeasured terms. The British, he declared, had only one interest in
Mexico, and that was oil. The Foreign Office had simply handed its
Mexican policy over to the "oil barons" for predatory purposes.

"That's just what the Standard Oil people told me in New York," the
British diplomat replied. "Mr. Secretary, you are talking just like a
Standard Oil man. The ideas that you hold are the ones which the
Standard Oil is disseminating. You are pursuing the policy which they
have decided on. Without knowing it you are promoting the interest of
Standard Oil."

Sir William saw that it was useless to discuss Mexico with Mr.
Bryan--that the Secretary was not a thinker but an emotionalist.
However, despite their differences, the two men liked each other and had
a good time. As Sir William was leaving, he bowed deferentially to the
Secretary of State and said:

"You have stripped me naked, Mr. Secretary, but I am unashamed."

With President Wilson, however, the Englishman had a more satisfactory
experience. He was delighted by the President's courtesy, charm,
intelligence, and conversational powers. The impression which Sir
William obtained of the American President on this occasion remained
with him for several years and was itself an important element in
British-American relations after the outbreak of the World War. And the
visit was a profitable one for Mr. Wilson, since he obtained a clear
understanding of the British policy toward Mexico. Sir William succeeded
in persuading the President that the so-called oil interests were not
dictating the policy of Sir Edward Grey. That British oil men were
active in Mexico was apparent; but they were not using a statesman of so
high a character as Sir Edward Grey for their purposes and would not be
able to do so. The British Government entertained no ambitions in Mexico
that meant unfriendliness to the United States. In no way was the policy
of Great Britain hostile to our own. In fact, the British recognized the
predominant character of the American interest in Mexico and were
willing to accept any policy in which Washington would take the lead.
All it asked was that British property and British lives be protected;
once these were safeguarded Great Britain was ready to stand aside and
let the United States deal with Mexico in its own way.

The one disappointment of this visit was that Sir William Tyrrell was
unable to obtain from President Wilson any satisfactory statement of his
Mexican policy.

"When I go back to England," said the Englishman, as the interview was
approaching an end, "I shall be asked to explain your Mexican policy.
Can you tell me what it is?"

President Wilson looked at him earnestly and said, in his most decisive
manner:

"I am going to teach the South American Republics to elect good men!"

This was excellent as a purpose, but it could hardly be regarded as a
programme.

"Yes," replied Sir William, "but, Mr. President, I shall have to explain
this to Englishmen, who, as you know, lack imagination. They cannot see
what is the difference between Huerta, Carranza, and Villa."

The only answer he could obtain was that Carranza was the best of the
three and that Villa was not so bad as he had been painted. But the
phrase that remained with the British diplomat was that one so
characteristically Wilsonian: "I propose to teach the South American
Republics to elect good men." In its attitude, its phrasing, it held the
key to much Wilson history.

Additional details of this historic interview are given in Colonel
House's letters:

From Edward M. House

145 East 35th Street,

New York City.

November 4, 1913.

DEAR PAGE:

Your cablegram, telling me of the arrival of Sir William Tyrrell on
the _Imperator_, was handed me on my way to the train as I left for
Washington.

The President talked with me about the Mexican situation and it
looks as if something positive will be done in a few days unless
Huerta abdicates.

It is to be the policy of this Administration henceforth not to
recognize any Central American government that is not formed along
constitutional lines. Anything else would be a makeshift policy. As
you know, revolutions and assassinations in order to obtain control
of governments are instituted almost wholly for the purpose of loot
and when it is found that these methods will not bring the desired
results, they will cease.

The President also feels strongly in regard to foreign financial
interests seeking to control those unstable governments through
concessions and otherwise. This, too, he is determined to
discourage as far as it is possible to do so.

This was a great opportunity for England and America to get
together. You know how strongly we both feel upon this subject and
I do not believe that the President differed greatly from us, but
the recent actions of the British Government have produced a
decided irritation, which to say the least is unfortunate.

Faithfully yours,

E.M. HOUSE.


145 East 35th Street,
New York City.
November 14, 1913.

DEAR PAGE:

Things have happened quickly since I last wrote to you. I went to
Washington Monday night as the guest of the Bryans. They have been
wanting me to come to them and I thought this a good opportunity.

I talked the Mexican situation out thoroughly with him and one of
your dispatches came while I was there. I found that he was
becoming prejudiced against the British Government, believing that
their Mexican policy was based purely upon commercialism, that they
were backing Huerta quietly at the instance of Lord Cowdray, and
that Cowdray had not only already obtained concessions from the
Huerta Government, but expected to obtain others. Sir Lionel Carden
was also all to the bad.

I saw the President and his views were not very different from
those of Mr. Bryan. I asked the President to permit me to see Sir
William Tyrrell and talk to him frankly and to attempt to
straighten the tangle out. He gave me a free hand.

I lunched with Sir William at the British Embassy although Sir
Cecil Spring Rice was not well enough to be present. I had a long
talk with Sir William after lunch and found that our suspicions
were unwarranted and that we could get together without any
difficulty whatever.

I told him very frankly what our purpose was in Mexico and that we
were determined to carry it through if it was within our power to
do so. That being so I suggested that he get his government to
cooeperate cordially with ours rather than to accept our policy
reluctantly.

I told him that you and I had dreamed of a sympathetic alliance
between the two countries and that it seemed to me that this dream
might come true very quickly because of the President and Sir
Edward Grey. He expressed a willingness to cooeperate freely and I
told him I would arrange an early meeting with the President. I
thought it better to bring the President into the game rather than
Mr. Bryan. I told him of the President's attitude upon the Panama
toll question but I touched upon that lightly and in confidence,
preferring for the President himself to make his own statement.

I left the Bryans in the morning of the luncheon with Sir William,
intending to take an afternoon train for New York, but the
President wanted me to stay with him at the White House over night
and meet Sir William with him at half past nine the following
morning. He was so tired that I did not have the heart to urge a
meeting that night.

From half past nine until half past ten the President and Sir
William repeated to each other what they had said separately to me,
and which I had given to each, and then the President elaborated
upon the toll question much to the satisfaction of Sir William.

He explained the matter in detail and assured him of his entire
sympathy and purpose to carry out our treaty obligations, both in
the letter and the spirit.

Sir William was very happy after the interview and when the
President left us he remained to talk to me and to express his
gratification. He cleared up in the President's mind all suspicion,
I think, in regard to concessions and as to the intentions and
purposes of the British Government. He assured the President that
his government would work cordially with ours and that they would
do all that they could to bring about joint pressure through
Germany and France for the elimination of Huerta.

We are going to give them a chance to see what they can do with
Huerta before moving any further. Sir William thinks that if we are
willing to let Huerta save his face he can be got out without force
of arms.

Sir William said that if foreign diplomats could have heard our
conversation they would have fallen in a faint; it was so frankly
indiscreet and undiplomatic. I did not tell him so, but I had it in
the back of my mind that where people wanted to do right and had
the power to carry out their intentions there was no need to cloak
their thoughts in diplomatic language.

All this makes me very happy for it looks as if we are in sight of
the promised land.

I am pleased to tell you of the compliments that have been thrown
at you by the President, Mr. Bryan, and Sir William. They were all
enthusiastic over your work in London and expressed the keenest
appreciation of the way in which you have handled matters. Sir
William told me that he did not remember an American Ambassador
that was your equal.

Faithfully yours,

E.M. HOUSE.