[Defile at lead-mines passed.]
From Malmani I pushed on as rapidly as possible in order to cross in
daylight the very dangerous defile at Lead Mines. This place, distant
71 miles from Pitsani, was passed at 5.30 p.m., December 30.

I was subsequently informed that a force of several hundred Boers,
sent from Lichtenburg to intercept the force at this point, missed
doing so by three hours only.

[Letter from Commandant-General.]

At our next 'off-saddle' Dr. Jameson received a letter from the
Commandant-General of the Transvaal demanding to know the reason of
our advance, and ordering us to return immediately. A reply was sent
to this, explaining Dr. Jameson's reasons in the same terms as those
used to the force at Pitsani.

[Letter from High Commissioner.]

At Doornport (91 miles from Pitsani), during an 'off-saddle' early on
Tuesday morning, December 31, a mounted messenger overtook us, and
presented a letter from the High Commissioner, which contained an
order to Dr. Jameson and myself to return at once to Mafeking and
Pitsani.

[Reasons for not retreating.]

A retreat by now was out of the question, and to comply with these
instructions an impossibility. In the first place, there was
absolutely no food for men or horses along the road which we had
recently followed; secondly, three days at least would be necessary
for our horses, jaded with forced marching, to return; on the road
ahead we were sure of finding, at all events, some food for man and
beast. Furthermore, we had by now traversed almost two-thirds of the
total distance; a large force of Boers was known to be intercepting
our retreat, and we were convinced that any retrograde movement would
bring on an attack of Boers from all sides.

It was felt, therefore, that to ensure the safety of our little
force, no alternative remained but to push on to Krugersdorp to our
friends, who we were confident would be awaiting our arrival there.

Apart from the above considerations, even had it been possible to
effect a retreat from Doornport, we knew that Johannesburg had risen,
and felt that by turning back we should be shamefully deserting those
coming to meet us.

[They could not possibly _know_ it, because the rising--_i.e._
the public arming and moving of men--only began at the very hour
they claim to have _known_ it, and because the first news from
Johannesburg only reached them 24 hours later by the two cyclists
'Oh what a tangled web we weave, when--']

Finally, it appeared to us impossible to turn back, in view of the
fact that we had been urgently called in to avert a massacre, which
we had been assured would be imminent in the event of a crisis such
as had now occurred.

[_Vide_ the telegrams and messages to stop! How noble!]

[Boer scouts.]

Near Boon's store, on the evening of the 31st, an advanced patrol
fell in with Lieutenant Eloff, of the Krugersdorp Volunteers. This
officer, in charge of a party of 15 scouts, had come out to gain
intelligence of our movements. He was detained whilst our intentions
were fully explained to him, and then released at Dr. Jameson's
request.

[First skirmish New Year's Eve.]

At midnight (New Year's Eve), while the advanced scouts were crossing
a rocky wooded ridge at right angles to and barring the line of
advance, they were fired on by a party of 40 Boers, who had posted
themselves in this position. The scouts, reinforced by the advanced
guard, under Inspector Straker, drove off their assailants after a
short skirmish, during which one trooper of the M.M.P. was wounded.

At Van Oudtshoorn's, early on the following morning (January 1), Dr.
Jameson received a second letter from the High Commissioner, to which
he replied in writing.

At 9.30 a.m. the march was resumed in the usual day formation. After
marching two miles, the column got clear of the hills and emerged
into open country.

[10.15 a.m.]

About this time Inspector Drury, in command of the rearguard, sent
word that a force of about 100 Boers was following him about one mile
in rear. I thereupon reinforced the rearguard, hitherto consisting of
a troop and one Maxim, by an additional half-troop and another Maxim.

[11 a.m.]

About 5 miles beyond Van Oudtshoorn's store the column was met by two
cyclists bearing letters from several leaders of the Johannesburg
Reform Committee. These letters expressed the liveliest approval and
delight at our speedy approach, and finally contained a renewal of
their promise to meet the column with a force at Krugersdorp.{55} The
messengers also reported that only 300 armed Boers were in the town.

This news was communicated to the troops, who received it with loud
cheers.

When within two miles of Hind's store, the column was delayed by
extensive wire-fencing, which ran for one and a half miles on either
side of the road, and practically constituted a defile.

While the column was halted and the wire being cut, the country for
some distance on both sides was carefully scouted.

By this means it was ascertained that there was a considerable force
of Boers (1) on the left front, (2) in the immediate front
(retreating hastily on Krugersdorp), (3) a third party on the right
flank.

The force which had been following the column from Van Oudtshoorn's
continued to hover in the rear.

Lieutenant-Colonel White, in command of the advanced guard, sent back
a request for guns to be pushed forward as a precaution in case of
an attack from the Boers in front. By the time these guns reached the
advanced guard, the Boers were still retreating some two miles off. A
few rounds were then fired in their direction. Had Colonel White, in
the first instance, opened fire with his Maxims on the Boers, whom he
surprised watering their horses close to Hind's store, considerable
loss would have been inflicted; but this was not our object, for with
the exception of the small skirmish on the previous night, the Boers
had not as yet molested the column, whose sole aim was to reach
Johannesburg if possible without fighting.

[1.30 p.m.]

At this hour Hind's store was reached.

Here the troops rested for one and a half hours.

Unfortunately, hardly any provisions for men and horses were
available.

[3 p.m.]

An officers' patrol, consisting of Major Villiers (Royal Horse
Guards) and Lieutenant Grenfell (1st Life Guards) and six men, moved
off for the purpose of reconnoitring the left flank of the Boer
position, while Captain Lindsell, with his permanent force of
advanced scouts, pushed on as usual to reconnoitre the approach by
the main road. At the same time I forwarded a note to the Commandant
of the forces in Krugersdorp to the effect that, in the event of my
friendly force meeting with opposition on its approach, I should be
forced to shell the town, and that therefore I gave him this warning
in order that the women and children might be moved out of danger.

[Friendly!]

To this note, which was despatched by a Boer who had been detained at
Van Oudtshoorn, I received no reply.

At Hind's store we were informed that the force in our front had
increased during the forenoon to about 800 men, of whom a large
number were entrenched on the hillside.

[4.30 p.m.]

Four miles beyond Hind's store, the column following the scouts,
which met with no opposition, ascended a steep rise of some 400 feet,
and came full in view of the Boer position on the opposite side of
a deep valley, traversed by a broad "sluit" or muddy water course.

Standing on the plateau or spur, on which our force was forming up
for action, the view to our front was as follows:

Passing through our position to the west ran the Hind's
store--Krugersdorp Road traversing the valley and the Boer position
almost at right angles to both lines.

Immediately to the north of this road, at the point where it
disappeared over the sky-line on the opposite slope, lay the Queen's
Battery House and earthworks, completely commanding the valley on all
sides and distant 1,900 yards from our standpoint.

Some 1,000 yards down the valley to the north stood a farmhouse,
surrounded by a dense plantation, which flanked the valley.

Half-way up the opposite slope, and adjacent to the road, stood an
iron house which commanded the drift where the road crossed the
above-mentioned watercourse.

On the south side of the road, and immediately opposite the
last-named iron house, an extensive rectangular stone wall enclosure
with high trees formed an excellent advanced central defensive
position. Further up the slope, some 500 yards to the south of this
enclosure, stretched a line of rifle-pits, which were again flanked
to the south by 'prospecting' trenches. On the sky-line numbers of
Boers were apparent to our front and right front.

Before reaching the plateau we had observed small parties of Boers
hurrying towards Krugersdorp, and immediately on reaching the high
ground the rearguard was attacked by the Boer force which had
followed the column during the whole morning.

I therefore had no further hesitation in opening fire on the
Krugersdorp position.

[4.30 p.m.]

The two seven-pounders and the 12-1/2 pounder opened on the Boer
line, making good practice under Captain Kincaid-Smith and Captain
Gosling at 1,900 yards.

[It must have been here that the waggon-loads of dead Boers
weren't found.]

[5 p.m.]

This fire was kept up until 5 p.m. The Boers made practically no
reply, but lay quiet in the trenches and battery.

Scouts having reported that most of the trenches were evacuated, the
first line consisting of the advanced guard (a troop of 100 men),
under Colonel White advanced. Two Maxims accompanied this force; a
strong troop with a Maxim formed the right and left supports on
either flank.

Lieutenant-Colonel Grey, with one troop B.B.P. and one Maxim, had
been previously detailed to move round and attack the Boers' left.

The remaining two troops, with three Maxims, formed the reserve and
rearguard.

The first line advance continued unopposed to within 200 yards of the
watercourse, when it was checked by an exceedingly heavy cross-fire
from all points of the defence.

Colonel White then pushed his skirmishers forward into and beyond the
watercourse.

The left support under Inspector Dykes then advanced to prolong the
first line to the left, but, diverging too much to his left this
officer experienced a very hot flanking fire from the farmhouse and
plantation, and was driven back with some loss.

Colonel Grey meanwhile had pushed round on the extreme right and come
into action.

[5.30 p.m.]

About this time Major Villiers' patrol returned and reported that the
country to our right was open, and that we could easily move round in
that direction.

It was now evident that the Boers were in great force, and intended
holding their position.

Without the arrival of the Johannesburg force in rear of the
Boers--an event which I had been momentarily expecting--I did not
feel justified in pushing a general attack, which would have
certainly entailed heavy losses on my small force.

[When Celliers and Rowlands left them at 11 a.m. they had not
expected anyone. _Vide_ Cellier's report and Colonel H.E. White's
letter.]

[6.15 p.m.]

I accordingly left Inspector Drury with one troop and one Maxim to
keep in check the Boers who were now lining the edge of the plateau
to our left, and placed Colonel Grey with two troops B.B.P., one
12-1/2 pounder, and one Maxim to cover our left flank and continue
firing on the battery and trenches south of the road.

I then made a general flank movement to the right with the remaining
troops.

Colonel Grey succeeded in shelling the Boers out of their advanced
position during the next half-hour, and blew up the battery house.

[Flank movement.]

Under this cover the column moved off as far as the first houses
of the Randfontein group of mines, the Boers making no attempt to
intercept the movement.

Night was now fast approaching, and still there were no signs of the
promised help from Johannesburg. I determined, therefore, to push
on with all speed in the direction of that town, trusting in the
darkness to slip through any intervening opposition.

Two guides were obtained, the column formed in the prescribed night
order of march, and we started off along a road leading direct to
Johannesburg.

At this moment heavy rifle and Maxim fire was suddenly heard from the
direction of Krugersdorp, which lay 1-1/2 miles to the left rear.

We at once concluded that this could only be the arrival of the
long-awaited reinforcements, for we knew that Johannesburg had
Maxims, and that the Staats'-Artillerie were not expected to arrive
until the following morning. To leave our supposed friends in the
lurch was out of the question. I determined at once to move to their
support.

[Long awaited! Why, this was only 6 hours since the cyclists left.]

Leaving the carts escorted by one troop on the road I advanced
rapidly across the plateau towards Krugersdorp in the direction of
the firing, in the formation shown in the accompanying sketch.

After advancing thus for nearly a mile the firing ceased, and we
perceived the Boers moving in great force to meet the column. The
flankers on the right reported another force threatening that flank.

Fearing that an attempt would be made to cut us off from the
ammunition carts, I ordered a retreat on them.

It was now clear that the firing, whatever might have been the cause
thereof, was not occasioned by the arrival of any force from
Johannesburg.

[This is really magnificent!]

Precious moments had been lost in the attempt to stand by our friends
at all costs, under the mistaken supposition that they could not fail
to carry out their repeated promises,{56} renewed to us by letter so
lately as 11 a.m. this same day. It was now very nearly dark. In
the dusk the Boers could be seen closing in on three sides--viz.,
north, east, and south. The road to Johannesburg appeared completely
barred, and the last opportunity of slipping through, which had
presented itself an hour ago when the renewed firing was heard, was
gone not to return.

[Bivouac, January 1.]

Nothing remained but to bivouac in the best position available.

But for the unfortunate circumstance of the firing, which we
afterwards heard was due to the exultation of the Boers at the
arrival of large reinforcements from Potchefstroom, the column would
have been by this time (7 p.m.) at least four or five miles further
on the road to Johannesburg, with an excellent chance of reaching
that town without further opposition.

I moved the column to the edge of a wide vley to the right of the
road, and formed the horses in quarter-column under cover of the
slope. The carts were formed up in rear and on both flanks, and five
Maxims were placed along the front so as to sweep the plateau.

The other three Maxims and the heavy guns were posted on the rear and
flank faces.

The men were then directed to lie down between the guns and on the
side; sentries and cossack posts were posted on each face.
Meantime the Boers had occupied the numerous prospecting trenches and
cuttings on the plateau at distances from 400 to 800 yards.

[9 p.m.]

At 9 p.m. a heavy fire was opened on the bivouac, and a storm of
bullets swept over and around us, apparently directed from all sides
except the south-west.

The troops were protected by their position on the slope below the
level of the plateau, so that the total loss from this fire, which
lasted about twenty minutes, was very inconsiderable.

The men behaved with admirable coolness, and were as cheery as
possible, although very tired and hungry and without water.

We were then left unmolested for two or three hours.

[Midnight.]

About midnight another shower of bullets was poured into the camp,
but the firing was not kept up for long.

Somewhat later a Maxim gun opened on the bivouac, but failed to get
our range.

[Thursday, January 2.]

At 3.30 a.m. patrols were pushed out on all sides, while the force as
silently and rapidly as possible was got ready to move off.

At 4 a.m. a heavy fire was opened by the Boers on the column, and the
patrols driven in from the north and east sides.

Under the direction of Major R. White (assisted by Lieutenant
Jesser-Coope) the column was formed under cover of the slope.

Soon after this the patrols which had been sent out to the south
returned, and reported that the ground was clear of the Boers in that
direction.

The growing light enabled us to ascertain that the Boers in force
were occupying pits to our left and lining the railway embankment
for a distance of one and a half miles right across the direct road
to Johannesburg.

I covered the movements of the main body with the B.B.P. and two
Maxims under Colonel Grey along the original left front of the
bivouac, and two troops M.M.P., under Major K. White on the right
front.

During all this time the firing was excessively heavy; however the
main body was partially sheltered by the slope.

Colonel White then led the advance for a mile across the vley without
casualty, but on reaching the opposite rise near the Oceanic Mine,
was subjected to a very heavy long-range fire. Colonel White hereupon
very judiciously threw out one troop to the left to cover the further
advance of the main body.

This was somewhat delayed, after crossing the rise, by the
disappearance of our volunteer guide of the previous night.

Some little time elapsed before another guide could be obtained.

In the meantime, Lieutenant-Colonel Grey withdrew his force and the
covering Maxims out of action under the protection of the M.M.P.
covering troops, and rejoined the main body.

[5 a.m.]

At this juncture Colonel Grey was shot in the foot, but most
gallantly insisted on carrying on his duties until the close of the
action.

Sub-Inspector Cazalet was also wounded here, but continued in action
until he was shot again in the chest at Doornkop.

While crossing the ridge the column was subjected to a very heavy
fire, and several men and horses were lost here.

I detailed a rearguard of one troop and two Maxims, under Major R.
White, to cover our rear and left flank, and move the remainder of
the troops in the ordinary day formation as rapidly forward as
possible.

In this formation a running rear and flank guard fight was kept up
for ten miles. Wherever the features of the ground admitted, a stand
was made by various small detachments of the rear and flank guard.
In this manner the Boers were successfully kept a distance of 500
yards, and repulsed in all their efforts to reach the rear and flank
of the main body.

In passing through the various mines and the village of Randfontein
we met with hearty expressions of goodwill from the mining
population, who professed a desire to help if only they had arms.

[8 a.m.]

Ten miles from the start I received intelligence from Colonel Grey,
at the head of the column, that Doornkop, a hill near the
Speitfontein mine, was held by 400 Boers, directly barring our line
of advance.

I repaired immediately to the front, Colonel White remaining with the
rear-guard.

On arriving at the head of the column, I found the guns shelling a
ridge which our guide stated was Doornkop.

The excellent dispositions for the attack made by Colonel Grey were
then carried out.

The B.B.P., under Major Coventry, who I regret to say was severely
wounded and lost several of his men, attacked and cleared the ridge
in most gallant style and pushed on beyond it.

About this time Inspector Barry received the wound which we have
learnt with grief has subsequently proved fatal.

Chief-Inspector Bodle at the same time, with two troops M.M.P.,
charged, and drove off the field a large force of Boers threatening
our left flank.

The guide had informed us that the road to the right of the hill was
impassable, and that there was open and easy country to the left.

This information was misleading. I afterwards ascertained that
without storming the Boer position there was no road open to
Johannesburg except by a wide detour of many miles to the right.

[8.30 a.m.]

At this moment Dr. Jameson received a letter from the High
Commissioner again ordering us to desist in our advance. Dr. Jameson
informed me at the same time of the most disheartening news, viz.,
that he had received a message stating that Johannesburg would not
or could not come to our assistance, and that we must fight our way
through unaided.

Thinking that the first ridge now in our hands was Doornkop, we again
pushed rapidly on, only to find that in rear of the ridge another
steep and stony kopje, some 400 feet in height, was held by hundreds
of Boers completely covered from our fire.

This kopje effectually flanked the road over which the column must
advance at a distance of 400 yards. Scouting showed that there was no
way of getting round this hill.

Surrounded on all sides by the Boers, men and horses wearied out,
outnumbered by at least six to one, our friends having failed to
keep their promises to meet us, and my force reduced numerically
by one-fourth, I no longer considered that I was justified in
sacrificing any more of the lives of the men under me.

[Wonderfully considerate! seeing how they deliberately risked the
lives of thousands in Johannesburg when they started.]

As previously explained, our object in coming had been to render
assistance, without bloodshed if possible, to the inhabitants of
Johannesburg. This object would in no way be furthered by a hopeless
attempt to cut our way through overwhelming numbers, an attempt,
moreover which must without any doubt have entailed heavy and useless
slaughter.

[9.15 a.m.]

With Dr. Jameson's permission, I therefore sent word to the
Commandant that we would surrender provided that he would give a
guarantee of safe conduct out of the country to every member of the
force.

To this Commandant Cronjé replied by a guarantee of the lives of all,
provided that we would lay down our arms and pay all expenses.

In spite of this guarantee of the lives of all, Commandant Malan
subsequently repudiated the guarantee in so far as to say that he
would not answer for the lives of the leaders, but this was not until
our arms had been given up and the force at the mercy of the Boers.

I attribute our failure to reach Johannesburg in a great measure to
loss of time from the following causes:

(1) The delay occasioned by the demonstration in front of
Krugersdorp, which had been assigned as the place of junction with
the Johannesburg force.

(2) The non-arrival of that force at Krugersdorp or of the guides to
the Krugersdorp-Johannesburg section of the road, as previously
promised by Johannesburg.

(3) The delay consequent on moving to the firing of the supposed
Johannesburg column just before dark on Wednesday evening.

[How is it that nothing was said of this to Celliers and Rowland;
nothing in the Letter of Colonel White and Dr. Jameson which they
wrote at 11 a.m. Wednesday; nothing in the message sent by Bugler
Vallé, who was despatched on Thursday before daybreak _after_ the
Krugersdorp light? How is it that if the forces were to meet at
Krugersdorp Dr. Jameson telegraphed to Dr. Wolff to meet him
_en route,_ so as to decide whether to turn off _20 miles before
reaching Krugersdorp_ and march direct on Pretoria or go into
Johannesburg first?]

I append (1) a sketch-map of the route from Pitsani to Krugersdorp,
marked A. This distance (154 miles) was covered in just under 70
hours, the horses having been off-saddled ten times. The 169 miles
between Pitsani and Doornkop occupied 86 hours, during 17 of which
the men were engaged with the Boers, and were practically without
food or water, having had their last meal at 8 a.m. on the morning of
the 1st January at Van Oudtshoorn's, 17 miles from Krugersdorp.

The average weight carried by each horse was 16 stone.

(2) List of officers engaged in the expedition and composition of the
force marked B. From this it will be seen that there was a total of
494 men and officers (exclusive of staff).

(3) Plans of engagements at Krugersdorp and Doornkop, and of the
bivouac on the night of January 1st.

I cannot close this narrative without testifying to the very great
gallantry and endurance of all officers, non-commissioned officers,
and troopers under my command in the field and on the march under
most trying circumstances.

COMPOSITION OF FORCE.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John Willoughby, Royal
Horse Guards                                 Commanding.
Major Hon. Robert White, Royal Welsh
Fusiliers                                    Senior Staff Officer.
Major C. Hyde Villiers, Royal Horse Guards       Staff Officer.
Captain Kincaid-Smith, Royal Artillery           Artillery Staff Officer.
Captain Kennedy, B.S.A.C.'s Service              Quartermaster.
Captain E. Holden, Derbyshire Yeomanry           Assistant Quarter-Master.
Surgeon Captain Farmer, B.S.A. Co. }
Surgeon Captain Seaton Hamilton, late 1st Life } Medical Officers.
Guards                                     }
Lieutenant Grenfell, 1st Life Guards             Remount Officer.
Lieutenant Jesser-Coope, B.S.A. Co. Transport Officer.
Captain Lindsell, late Royal Scots Fusiliers     In charge Scouts.
Major J.B. Stracey, Scots Guards               }
Major Heany, B.S.A. Co.                        } Officers temporarily
Captain Foley                                  }   attached to Staff.
Lieutenant Harry R. Holden, late Grenadier     }
Guards                                     }

OFFICERS OF MASHONALAND MOUNTED POLICE.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. H.F. White, Grenadier
Guards                                       Commanding.
Inspector Bodle (late 6th Dragoons)              2nd in command.
Inspector Straker, commanding A Troop.
Inspector Dykes, commanding B Troop.
Inspector Barry, commanding C Troop.
Inspector Drury, commanding D Troop.
Sub-Inspectors Scott and Cashel, A Troop.
Sub-Inspectors Tomlinson and Chawner, B Troop.
Sub-Inspectors Cazalet and Williams, C Troop.
Sub-Inspectors Murray and Constable, D Troop.
Artillery Troop--Inspector Bowden and Sub-Inspector Spain.
Regimental Sergeant--Major Abbott.

BECHUANALAND BORDER POLICE.

Lieutenant-Colonel Raleigh Grey, 6th Dragoons    Commanding.
Major Hon. Charles Coventry                      2nd in command.
Captain Gosling, commanding G Troop.
Sub-Lieutenants Hoare and Wood, commanding G Troop.
Captain Munroe, commanding K Troop.
Sub-Lieutenant McQueen, commanding K Troop.
Medical Officer Surgeon Garraway.
Veterinary Surgeon Lakie.
M.M. Police officers and men                        372  Pitsani
Staff                                                13    camp.
Colony boys (leading horses, etc.)                   65
Horses                                              480
Mules                                               128
One 12-1/2-pounder, 6 Maxims, 6 Scotch carts, 1 Cape cart,
2 grain waggons.
B.B. Police officers and men                        122  Mafeking
Staff                                                 1    column.
Drivers and leaders                                  10
Horses                                              160
Mules                                                30
Two 7-pounders, 2 Maxims, 2 Scotch carts, 2 Cape carts.

Officers and men        494  Totals.
Staff                    14
Drivers, leaders, etc.   75
Horses                  640
Mules                   158
M.H. Maxims               8
12-1/2-pounder            1