CHAPTER X.

THREE YEARS' GRACE.


Very seldom has any community been in a position so unsatisfactory as
that in which the people of Johannesburg found themselves in the year
1896. Judgments passed in the heat of the moment upon matters which
had not been properly explained, and which in many cases were
completely obscured by deliberate misrepresentation, had incurred for
the community dislike contempt and mistrust which were wholly
undeserved. Those who knew the facts and who were able and willing to
speak, the Reformers themselves, were bonded to abstain from politics
for three years under penalty of banishment. Betrayed, deserted,
muzzled, helpless, hopeless, and divided, no community could have
been in a more unsatisfactory condition. It was abundantly clear that
the time had been allowed to pass when the Imperial Government might
have insisted upon reforms and the fulfilment of the President's
promises--not in the spirit in which they had been made, but in the
spirit in which the President himself had intended the world to
construe them. The impact of the revelations was too great to permit
of public judgment quickly recovering its balance. It was realized
that Mr. Kruger's effects had been admirably stage-managed and that
for the time being, and possibly for a very considerable time, the
Uitlanders were completely out of court. There were a few--but how
few!--whose faith was great and whose conviction that the truth must
prevail was abiding, who realized that there was nothing for it but
to begin all over again--to begin and to persevere upon sound lines;
and they took heart of such signs as there were and started afresh.

It has been an article of faith with them that Mr. Kruger missed
his supreme chance at the time of the trial of the Reformers, and
that from the date of the death-sentence his judgment and his luck
have failed him. He abused his good fortune and the luck turned, so
they say; and the events of the last three years go to support that
impression. To his most faithful ally amongst the Uitlanders the
President, in the latter days of 1896, commented adversely upon the
ingratitude of those Reformers who had not called to thank him for
his magnanimity; and this man replied: 'You must stop talking about
that, President, because people are laughing at you. You made a
bargain with them and they paid the price you asked, so now they owe
you nothing.' But his Honour angrily repudiated that construction:
nothing will convert him to that view.

It has been said that Dr. Jameson is the best friend Paul Kruger ever
had, and with equal truth it may be said that, in 1896, President
Kruger proved himself to be the best friend of the Reformers. Not
even the most sanguine of his enemies could have expected to witness
the impolitic and unjust acts by which the President revealed
himself, vindicated the Reformers, and undermined a position of
unparalleled strength in an incredibly short time. The bargaining and
the bad grace which marked the release of the Reformers had prepared
the world to view Mr. Kruger's action and attitude a little more
critically than it had hitherto been disposed to do. The real
conditions of Dr. Jameson's surrender had also become known, and
although the action of the Boer leaders was regarded as far too
trifling a matter to be seriously considered as against the Raid
itself, nevertheless a residuum of impression was left which helped
to form opinion at a later stage. There followed, too, an irritating
correspondence between the Transvaal and Imperial Governments, in the
course of which Dr. Leyds successfully established his skill as a
smart letter writer and his limitations as a statesman. The
Municipal Law, the first product of the 'forget and forgive'
proclamation--which proclamation, by-the-bye, had already begun to
prove itself an awkward weapon placed in the hands of his enemies by
President Kruger himself--had been exposed and denounced as farcical,
and it now required but little to convince the once admiring world of
the President's real character and intentions. That little was
forthcoming in a touch of ridicule more potent than all arguments.

The Transvaal Government formulated their demand for damages for the
Raid in a form which made everyone smile--£677,938 3s. 3d. for actual
outlay, and £1,000,000 for 'Moral and Intellectual Damages.' What
with the fines of the Reformers, and the seizure of the provisions of
all sorts acquired by them for the purposes of the Reform movement,
which latter must have exceeded £50,000 in value, the Boer Government
had already received upwards of a quarter of a million, and had, in
fact, made a profit on the Raid; so that this demand came as a
surprise even to the Uitlanders, as much perhaps due to the
extraordinary phrasing of the demand as to the amount claimed.

It may be wondered why, under provocation so great as that of
complete abandonment by the country whose representative had placed
them in their then hopeless position, no distinct movement took
place--no tendency even developed itself--among the Uitlanders
generally to unite with the Boers in favour of a Republican movement
throughout South Africa, to the exclusion of the Imperial power. In
answer to this it must be said that such an idea undoubtedly did take
strong hold of the non-British portion of the Uitlander population,
as witness the manner in which the Cape Colony Dutchmen, Hollanders,
Germans, and individuals of other European nationalities associated
themselves with the Boer party, almost invariably by open
declaration, and in many cases even by naturalization, thus
forfeiting their own national rights and obtaining nothing but vague
promises and the liability to military service in return. But the
Republican movement made no further headway than this because British
subjects formed the large majority of the Uitlanders. They had, it is
true, a great grievance against the Imperial Government; but against
the Transvaal Government they had one greater still; and it would
take a great deal to kill the passionate loyalty of the British South
African. It would be idle to discuss what might have happened had Mr.
Kruger seized his opportunity and let in a considerable section of
the then unenfranchised to strengthen the ranks of the Republican
party; that can only be a matter of individual conjecture. What is
certain, however, is that he did not do so and never intended to do
so; wherein his lack of statesmanship is again made manifest.

Mr. Kruger has carried out in its fullest (its best or its worst) the
characteristic principle of his people already referred to, that of
giving too little and asking too much. It is doing only bare justice
to the determination with which he adheres to the policy of his life
to say that he gives nothing to anybody. From the most distant to the
nearest he deals alike with all. With the people of Europe, he has
taxed their investments, disregarded their interests, and flouted
their advice; but nevertheless he has for years commanded their moral
support. In his dealings with the British Government, pushed as they
have been some half a dozen times to the very verge of war, he has
invariably come off with something for nothing. In his dealings with
the Uitlanders he has bartered promises and in return--_circumspice_!
In the matter of the events of 1895-6 he came out with a quarter of a
million in cash, a claim for £1,677,938 3s. 3d. odd (including Moral
and Intellectual Damages), and a balance of injured innocence which
may not be expressed in figures. In his dealings with Cape Colony he
has taxed the products of their land and industry, he went to the
verge of war to destroy their trade in the case of the closing of the
Vaal River drifts, he has permitted the Netherlands Railway to so
arrange its tariffs as to divert traffic from them to other parts, he
has refused to their people (his own flesh and blood, among whom he
was born) the most elementary rights when they settle in his country!
And yet in his need he calls upon them, and they come! His treatment
of the Orange Free State has been exactly the same. Their grievance
against him is incomparably worse, because of their liability to
become involved in the consequences of a policy which they are not
allowed to influence. But President Kruger is, above all things,
practical. Everything is gauged by the measure of the advantage which
it can bring to him; and his treatment of the Free State is
determined by their utility to him and his power over them, and is
not influenced by their moral claims upon his good will. Natal and
Portugal have their experience of broken agreements and strained
interpretations, of intrigues with native subjects and neighbours
for the extension of rights or boundaries, all designed to benefit
the Transvaal and to undermine them. All, all with the same result!
Something for nothing! Within the borders of the Transvaal the policy
is the same. Moral rights and the claims of justice are unrecognized.
For services rendered there may be some return; a privilege, a
contract, an appointment. But this cannot be properly regarded as a
neglect of principle upon Mr. Kruger's part, for after all the reward
is at the expense of the Uitlanders. It is usually the least price at
which the service could be secured; and it is generally in such
form as to give the recipient a profit in which the members of the
Government party largely share, but it never confers a power to
which the President himself is not superior; indeed, it is almost
invariably hedged about by such conditions as to make its continuance
dependent upon the President's good will. If any one should
think this description of conditions in the Transvaal and of the
President's policy to be unduly harsh, let him satisfy himself by an
investigation of those matters which appear on merely superficial
examination to support opinions contrary to those expressed by the
writer. Let him examine the terms of the closer union with the Free
State, the circumstances leading to the closing of the Vaal River
drifts, the condition of the Dutch subjects of Cape Colony and of the
Orange Free State in the Transvaal, the Netherlands Railway tariffs
as they operate against Cape Colony and the Free State, the Railway
Agreement with Natal, the disputes with Portugal, the attempts to
acquire native territory on the East Coast, the terms of the
Netherlands Railway Concession, Selati Railway Concession, Dynamite
Concession--in fact, all other concessions, monopolies, contracts,
privileges, appointments, and rights, made, granted, or entered
into by President Kruger to or with his friends. Let him recall the
treatment and the fate of some of those to whom ampler reference
will be made later on; for instance, Chief Justice Kotzé and
Judge Ameshof, who in the dealings with the Reformers rendered
valuable--but perhaps injudicious and unjudicial--service, as already
sufficiently described; the treatment of Dr. Coster, the State
Attorney, who also deserved better of the President; the public
repudiation of Mr. J.B. Robinson, whose friendship for President
Kruger had been frequently and amply evidenced to the grave
dissatisfaction of the Uitlander population; the public and insulting
repudiation of Sir Henry de Villiers, the Chief Justice of Cape
Colony, after he had served his purpose! The result of any such
inquiry must confirm the conclusion that 'something for nothing' is
the President's policy and achievement.

A policy or a movement which is to involve the cooperation of
thousands of intelligent men cannot be carried out upon such terms,
and this may be regarded as the main reason why the spirit of
Republicanism did not generally itself develop under circumstances
apparently so favourable to it. The President's policy may be
considered astute or unwise according to the point of view from which
it is regarded. Viewed from the standpoint of the State itself,
undoubtedly it fails lamentably in statesmanship. In the interests of
the Boer party, however, or of the man Paul Kruger, it may well be
doubted whether the policy may not be a token of remarkable sagacity.
He knows his own limitations and the limitations of his people. He
knows that to freely admit to a share in the Government a number of
intelligent people, would make a continuance of himself or his party
in absolute power for any length of time a matter of utter
impossibility. In these circumstances the problem which President
Kruger had set himself was a remarkably difficult one. To
republicanize South Africa, to secure the support of the majority of
the white inhabitants, and yet to yield no whit of power to those by
whose aid he would achieve his object, would indeed be carrying to
sublime heights the policy of 'something for nothing.'

Many years before the Raid Mr. Kruger had a well-defined policy to
republicanize South Africa, and the Uitlanders of the Transvaal were
quite alive to it, as may be gathered by reference to their
newspapers. But the voice was as a voice crying in the wilderness in
those days, and, as has been said, it required the Jameson Raid to
advertize the conditions in the Transvaal and to direct attention to
what had been proclaimed unheeded for many years. Immediately prior
to the Raid Mr. Kruger was floundering in a morass of difficulties.
The policy of 'something for nothing' had been exposed, and it was
seen through by all the Dutchmen in South Africa and was resented by
all save his own little party in the Transvaal; but the Jameson Raid
gave the President a jumping-off place on solid ground, and he was
not slow to take advantage of it.

It is not too much to say that the vast majority of people in Europe
and America are indebted to Dr. Jameson for any knowledge which they
may have acquired of the Transvaal and its Uitlander problem. Theirs
is a disordered knowledge, and perhaps it is not unnatural that they
should in a manner share the illusion of the worthy sailor who, after
attending divine service, assaulted the first Israelite he met
because he had only just heard of the Crucifixion. A number of worthy
people are still disposed to excuse many things in the Transvaal
because of the extreme provocation given by the Jameson Raid. The
restrictions upon English education are considered to be 'not
unnatural when one remembers the violent attempt to swamp the Dutch.'
The excessive armaments are held to be 'entirely justifiable
considering what has happened.' The building of forts is 'an ordinary
precaution.' The prohibiting of public meetings is 'quite wrong, of
course, but can you wonder at it?' Many of these worthy people will,
no doubt, learn with pained surprise that all these things were among
the causes which led to the Reform movement of 1895-6, and are not
the consequences of that movement as they erroneously suppose. The
Press Law and Public Meetings Act had been passed; arms had been
imported and ordered in tens of thousands; machine guns and
quantities of ammunition also; forts were being built;{42} the
suppression of all private schools had been advocated by Dr.
Mansvelt--all long, long before the Jameson Raid. So also had the
republican propaganda been at work, but it had not caught on outside
the two Republics.

Difficult as his task might appear, Mr. Kruger had now command of the
two great persuasive forces--money and sentiment. With the money he
pushed on the forts, and imported immense quantities of big guns,
small arms, and ammunition--far in excess of what could possibly be
used by the whole of the Boer population of the Transvaal after
making every allowance for spare arms in reserve; and such an
extraordinary supply was not unnaturally believed to be designed for
the use of others outside the Transvaal. More than this, an army of
emissaries, agents, and spies in the pay of the Transvaal Government
were spread about the Free State, Cape Colony, and Natal. Newspapers
were supported in different parts of South Africa and a considerable
amount of money was spent upon the Press in France and Germany.

It would be absurd to suggest and it would be unjust to let it be
inferred that all those who were drawn into sympathy with the Boers
supported or were even cognizant of President Kruger's ultimate aim.
It is an everyday experience that the scope of work and ambition
expands as one progresses. Whether the strong man really sees his
ultimate goal and tackles with magnificent courage the innumerable
and seemingly insurmountable obstacles which lie between him and it,
or whether in the wisdom and mercy of Providence there is such an
adjustment of courage and foresight as prevents him from seeing more
than he is able to face, who can say? But what is beyond all doubt is
that, given the one strong man who does know his mind, he will lead
as the Pied Piper led, and there is no thought in his following to
ask the whither and the why.

Given the sympathy and the means, the difficulty of President
Kruger's self-imposed task was not so great as at first appeared. To
some it was advisable to do no more than point to the Jameson Raid
and say: 'We only wish to live in peace and to be left alone.' To
some again that act is construed as a sign that the British people
wish to upset the two Republics, therefore they must strengthen and
be prepared. To others the appeal is made: 'We Dutch are the settlers
and owners of the country, we wish for peace, of course, but we must
dominate--you under your form of government, we under ours.'
To others again it is further advanced: 'Let us negotiate the
elimination of the Imperial power; we do not suggest fight, but if we
present a united front they must retire peacefully and concede our
demands.' And lastly comes the appeal to those who are in sympathy
with the advanced republicans: 'Arm and prepare. Some day we shall
find England in a difficulty, divided by party or hampered by
external complications; it has often happened before and we have
always profited. That will be our time to drive them out.'

It would be very unjust to some of the most prominent men on the
Dutch side in Cape Colony to leave the slenderest grounds for the
inference that they are to be associated with the extreme and
actively disloyal aim. All that it is intended to do is to indicate
the fine gradations in arguments by which a number are drawn
together--under a leadership which they do not realize, and going
they know not where! The strongest of these arguments and appeals are
particularly popular with the younger generation of Dutch South
Africans who entertain a visionary scheme of independence suggested
by the history of the United States. But there is something more
serious in it than this, as may be deduced from the fact that in
December, 1896, the writer was approached by Mr. D.P. Graaff,
formerly a prominent member of the Cape Legislative Council and now
as always a prominent Afrikander Bondsman, with the suggestion that
all the South African born should combine in the effort to create the
United States of South Africa, 'upon friendly terms with England, but
confining the direct Imperial right in South Africa to a naval
base at Simonstown and possibly a position in Natal.' This
concession--from South Africa to England--would not, it was argued,
involve disadvantage to the former, because for a considerable time
it would be necessary to preserve friendly relations with England and
to have the protection of her fleet for the coast.

It is of course quite easy to attach too much importance to the
opinions of individual politicians of this class, who are as a rule
merely shouters with the biggest crowd; but the prominent association
of such an apostle of republicanism with the Bond, and the fact that
he should have gone so far with a Reformer of known strong British
sympathies seem to warrant the attaching of some importance to the
suggestion.{43} A similar suggestion was made to several of the
Reformers at the time of the judicial crisis by one of the judges of
the Transvaal High Court, when it was hoped to enlist the sympathies
of the Uitlanders with a movement to curtail President Kruger's power
and to establish republicanism on a firmer basis in South Africa. In
order to forestall an obvious comment, it may be said that discussion
was in both cases declined on the ground that it would be
participating in politics in the sense forbidden by President
Kruger's three years' ban.

The year 1896 was a very bad one for the whole of South Africa.
Besides the Raid and the suspense and disorganization entailed by the
prolonged trial, the terrible dynamite explosion in Johannesburg,{44}
the still more terrible rebellion and massacre in Rhodesia, and the
crushing visitation of the great cattle scourge, the Rinderpest,
helped to produce a deplorable state of affairs in the Transvaal.

Then there was another thing which rankled badly: Messrs. Sampson and
Davies were still in gaol.{45} The feeling throughout South Africa
was reflected in the monotonous announcement which appeared in the
_Cape Times_ week by week for thirteen months:--'To-day Messrs.
Sampson and Davies complete the--week of their imprisonment in
Pretoria gaol for the crime of not signing a petition.' It seemed
scarcely credible that the President should still harbour any
illusions about his magnanimity; nevertheless, for some weeks before
the celebration of the Queen's Record reign it was rumoured that the
two prisoners were to be released upon that occasion as a mark of his
Honour's sympathy. Opinion had not been unanimous upon the attitude
of either the President or the prisoners; but an ugly incident
silenced most of the President's apologists. Gold stealing and the
purchase of stolen gold were being carried on such a scale and with
such impunity that at last, in desperation, the directors and
officials of one of the big mining companies (the City and Suburban
G.M. Co.), at the risk of being shot by desperadoes, took upon
themselves the functions of the detectives and police. They caught
'red-handed' two notorious characters and delivered them over, with
the gold in their possession, to the authorities. The thieves
actually boasted then that nothing would happen to them as they had
'made it all right;' and a few days later one of them was allowed to
escape out of the Court-house buildings which stand in the middle of
a large square. The other was convicted and sentenced to six months'
imprisonment. He was a criminal of a bad and dangerous type, the head
of a gang known to be concerned in gold stealing and burglary as a
profession. The penalty was regarded by all parties as most
inadequate and the judge himself commented adversely upon the
drafting of the law which tended to screen the prisoner. Not one
mitigating circumstance was forthcoming! And yet, whilst ignoring a
fresh outburst of protest against the detention of Messrs. Sampson
and Davies, and whilst the Industrial Commission was exposing the
gold thefts and denouncing the complicity of the police, Mr. Kruger
decided to remit three-fourths of the sentence and to discharge
the thief unconditionally. Is it to be wondered that such ill-advised
action called to mind the prisoners' boast, and that it was
contrasted prominently with the treatment of the two Reformers?

Three events of importance marked the year 1897 in the history of the
Transvaal. The first was the High Court crisis in February; the
second, the appointment of the Industrial Commission of Inquiry; the
third, the Queen's Record Reign celebration.

The High Court crisis arose out of the case of Brown _v._ The State,
already referred to.{46} Brown had acted within his legal rights
according to the terms of a proclamation. That proclamation had been
illegally withdrawn, and the Government realizing that they would
have to stand the consequences of their action in the courts of the
country, introduced a law which was immediately passed by the
Volksraad, absolving them from all liability, and practically
non-suiting all claimants. Mr. Kotzé in his judgment declared this
law to be improper and in conflict with the Constitution, and gave
judgment in favour of Brown, but left the amount of damages to be
determined later after hearing further evidence.{47}

The first Volksraad was then in special session, and the President
promptly introduced a law known as Law 1 of 1897, which empowered him
to exact assurances from the judges that they would respect all
resolutions of the Volksraad as having the force of law and declare
themselves not entitled to test the validity of a law by its
agreement or conflict with the Constitution; and it further empowered
the President in the event of his not being satisfied with the
character of the replies to summarily dismiss the judges. The judges
protested in a body that they would not submit to such treatment. The
High Court was adjourned and all legal business was stopped.
Particularly emphatic was Mr. Justice Gregorowski. He stated that
no honourable man could possibly sit upon the Transvaal Bench as long
as Law 1 of 1897 remained upon the Statute Book. At this juncture Sir
Henry de Villiers, Chief Justice of Cape Colony, came to Pretoria for
the purpose of effecting a compromise and averting a crisis. The
compromise was practically an armistice. The judges promised not to
exercise the testing right pending the speedy introduction of a
measure safeguarding the independence of the courts. Mr. Kruger on
his side promised to refrain from enforcing the provisions of Law 1
of 1897, and undertook to introduce as speedily as possible the
required new law.

The position in which the President found himself was undoubtedly one
of some difficulty, but he chose a very bad way out of it.
High-handed arbitrary methods cannot effect a permanent and
satisfactory solution of a question of that character, but Mr. Kruger
was unwilling to go to the root of the evil and to admit what Mr.
Kotzé's judgment had brought home with perhaps too sudden force,
namely, that the laws and system of Government were in a condition of
complete chaos. The sequel can be told in a few words. In February,
1898, Mr. Kotzé considered that ample time had been allowed by him
for the fulfilment of President Kruger's promise. Sir Henry de
Villiers thought it proper to allow more time. The point of
difference between Mr. Kotzé and Sir Henry de Villiers was the
interpretation to be placed upon the expression 'this session,' which
had been used in the previous February when the President had said
that if he did not introduce the proposed measures this session, the
judges might consider that he had failed to keep his promise. Mr.
Kotzé contended that as the Raad was then in session it meant _that
Session_, and that in any case that session and another had passed,
and a third was in progress and there was still no sign of the
promised measures. Sir Henry de Villiers stated that in his opinion
the reasonable construction would be that Mr. Kruger meant the
following _ordinary_ session, and that only ordinary sessions could
be considered (for in each year there are one special and one
ordinary session), so that the President might be entitled to claim
the whole of the year 1898 within which to fulfil his promise, but
that this would be the extreme limit of forbearance, after which
failure could only be regarded as a breach of faith. Sir Henry de
Villiers in fact defended Mr. Kruger. Mr. Kotzé, however, held to his
opinion; he wrote to the President reminding him of the undertaking,
charged him with failure to keep his promise and withdrew the pledge
which he had given. The President promptly exercised his right under
Law 1 of 1897, and dismissed Mr. Kotzé, who had served the country as
judge and chief justice for over twenty years. Whatever the merits of
the particular case may be it appeared to be a shocking exhibition
of arbitrary power to dismiss without compensation, pension, or
provision of any sort, a man no longer young, whose services had been
given for nearly a quarter of a century, who in the extreme dilemma
of the Raid had stood by the President, and who, from some points of
view, must be admitted to have served him 'not wisely but too well.'

Mr. Kotzé was not at that time popular among the Uitlanders on
account of his action in the matter of the Reformers, and especially
because he had acted on behalf of the Government in securing the
services of Mr. Gregorowski for the Reform trial; but the
circumstances of his dismissal and the fact that he was known to be
dependent upon his salary as judge, taken in conjunction with the
courageous stand which he had made against the President's arbitrary
will, enlisted public sympathy on his behalf, and a purse amounting
in all to about £6,000 was presented to him as a mark of appreciation
for his past services. But then followed the 'most unkindest cut of
all.' Mr. Gregorowski, who had resigned a judgeship in order to fill
the post of State Attorney when Dr. Coster, in consequence of an
insulting reference of the President's to his countrymen,
relinquished it,--Mr. Gregorowski, who had been foremost to declare
that no honourable man could possibly accept the position of judge
while Law 1 of 1897 stood on the Statute Book, became Chief Justice
_vice_ Mr. Kotzé dismissed. And by way of finally disposing of the
subject, the President when questioned in the Raad as to the
explanation of his apologist, denied that he had ever made any
promise of any sort or description to Sir Henry de Villiers or
anybody else!

Mr. Justice Ameshof, who with Mr. Kotzé had made a stand against the
President in this matter, was also obliged to relinquish his
judgeship. Thus it will be seen that at one swoop Mr. Kruger disposed
of three reputable intermediaries whom he had used to great advantage
at one time or another. 'Something for nothing,' for Mr. Kruger!
Whether Mr. Kotzé acted in haste or whether Sir Henry de Villiers'
plea for more time was justified are questions which it is no longer
necessary to discuss, not alone because Mr. Kruger denied ever having
made the promise out of which the disagreement arose, but because
even up to the present time no measure safeguarding the High Court
has been introduced or foreshadowed in the legislature. And Law 1 of
1897, which according to Mr. Gregorowski made it impossible for any
honourable man to sit upon the Bench, is still upon the Statute Book
and Mr. Gregorowski sits as Chief Justice subject to its provisions.

No one disputes that the position of the High Court as determined by
Law 1 of 1897 is a very unsatisfactory one, but the apologists for
President Kruger frequently say that there has been no actual case of
hardship, and that the Uitlanders are crying out before they are
hurt. They maintain that it was a measure passed under great
provocation for a particular purpose, and that the power granted
under it, although very undesirable in principle, has never been
used. This is incorrect; the power has been used, and injustice has
been suffered. Two cases of actual hardship are those of Brown _v._
Government, the case out of which the whole matter arose, and the
case of the Pretoria Waterworks Company. But there are other cases
too which have never been brought into court having been either
compromised or abandoned because of the hopelessness of the position,
for it is obvious that there would be great reluctance on the part of
business men to make a fight merely for the purpose of showing that
they suffered under a disability when the result of such a fight
would inevitably be to antagonize the only tribunal to which they
could appeal.

The case of the Pretoria Waterworks Company is rather a bad one. The
Government in 1889 gave a contract for the water supply of Pretoria.
It was a permission, but not an exclusive right, to supply the
town from springs on Government ground. The President, finding that
the contractor was not in a position to undertake the work, requested
certain business houses to form a company to acquire this right and
to supply the town with water. After inquiry into the local
conditions and the probable costs, these people represented that
unless they received the exclusive right they would be unable to
undertake the work, as the cost of importing pipes and machinery
transported from Natal by bullock waggon and the then expensive
conditions of working would make the work so costly that at a later
period, after the introduction of railways, it would be possible for
competitors, such for instance as the projected Municipality of
Pretoria, to establish a system of water supply at probably half the
cost of the first one and thus compete to their disadvantage. For
these reasons the contractor and his friends declined to proceed with
the formation of the company. The President, however, was very
desirous of having a good water supply, and after some months of
negotiations the original contract was supplemented by a grant from
the Executive Council, who then held plenary powers from the
Volksraad, giving the proposed company the exclusive right.
Immediately after the receipt of this grant the company was formed,
the capital subscribed and the machinery and other material
purchased. In 1898, after nine years of work, during which
shareholders had received dividends averaging 2-2/3 per cent. per
annum, some differences occurred between the Company and the
consumers, and the latter combined and subscribed the necessary funds
to take action in the High Court, the object being to challenge the
exclusive right and to enable the town through its Municipality to
provide its own supply. At the same time the Government at the
instance of the townspeople opened negotiations with the Company with
a view to expropriation in accordance with the terms stipulated in
the original contract. While matters were in this position, however,
certain members of the Volksraad prominently concerned in the action
against the Company, introduced a measure in the Volksraad cancelling
the second or exclusive grant made by the Government nine years
before and recommending that the Government should either buy out
the Waterworks Company upon suitable terms or should give the
necessary facilities to the Town Council to introduce another system
of supply. The application of the Company to be allowed to state its
case was ignored, and after a short discussion the resolution was
passed and the measure became law. By the action of the Volksraad the
Company was deprived of that principal asset upon the security of
which the capital had been subscribed, and the Government were
rescued from an awkward position. The Government took no steps to
defend their action in granting the right or to protest against the
action of the Volksraad, and became, therefore, parties to an act of
piracy. The Company were thus placed entirely at the mercy of the
Government, for under the provisions of Law 1 of 1897, the Volksraad
resolution put them out of court both as to upholding their title and
claiming damages. All doubts as to the Government's complicity in
this action were removed when upon negotiations being opened for the
expropriation of the Company the Government refused to follow the
procedure prescribed in the contract on the ground that as the
Company had now lost the exclusive right they must accept a less sum
in compensation, otherwise the Government would authorise the rival
Municipal scheme. Under these circumstances the shareholders having
no other power to appeal to adopted the common-sense course of taking
what they could get. The result can only be expressed in figures. The
shares, which had been purchased at over 40s. at the time of the
Volksraad's action were worth less than 28s. in liquidation. The
inquiry into the Raid by the Select Committee of the House of
Commons, early in 1897, was productive of a result which is not
always traced to its real cause. The greatest dissatisfaction was
expressed in the Transvaal and among all the Boers in South Africa
with one feature of the Westminster inquiry, viz., the investigation
of the causes which made the Raid possible. Mr. Kruger and his
friends had enjoyed such a run of luck and so much indulgence, and
had been so successful in presenting their side of the case only,
that it seemed to them improper that anyone should wish to inquire
into all the circumstances. It would even appear from what
followed that the President had convinced himself that there were no
grievances, that he was an entirely innocent party deeply injured by
the Reformers and the British Government, and that the Westminster
inquiry had been authorized and conducted for the sole purpose of
exposing him and justifying the Reform movement.

As the months dragged on and no improvement in the conditions of the
Uitlanders took place, as indeed the complaints grew louder and the
state of affairs grew worse, the President again began to hear the
voices calling for reform. Timid whispers they were, perhaps, and far
between, for the great bulk of the Uitlanders were in a morose and
sullen mood. Having tried and failed on stronger lines they were
incapable as yet of returning with any heart to the old fruitless and
already rejected constitutional methods. The suggestions for reform,
consequently, came principally from those who were on friendly terms
with the Boer party and believed themselves to carry some weight.
They have by this time learned that nobody carries weight with
President Kruger unless he has power to back his suggestions. Many
years before, the late Mr. W.Y. Campbell as spokesman of a deputation
from Johannesburg, addressing President Kruger, stated in the course
of his remarks that the people of Johannesburg 'protested' against a
certain measure. The President jumped up in one of his characteristic
moods and said: 'Protest! Protest!! what is the good of protesting?
You have not got the guns! I have.' And Mr. Campbell, in reporting
this in Johannesburg, remarked: 'That man is sensible; he knows the
position. I claim to be sensible also, and I know he is right: you
can take my name off any other deputations, for we'll get nothing by
asking.'

It is stated, and the statement comes from one who claims to have
been the father of the suggestion, that the President was induced to
appoint a commission of inquiry by the argument that if, as he
believed, the wretched state of affairs in Johannesburg was due not
to the action of the Government but to the greed, machinations, and
mismanagement of the capitalists, nothing could suit the latter worse
than to be taken at their word and to have a commission appointed to
take evidence on oath and to publicly inquire into the state of
affairs; in fact to copy the Westminster inquiry. It is
conceivable that the resolute refusal to investigate matters or to
listen to complaints or explanations which the President had
throughout maintained may have been the means of preserving a
blissful faith in the strength of his own case and the rottenness of
the Uitlanders'; at any rate, it seems to be an undoubted fact that
the Industrial Commission of Inquiry, which was appointed by the
Executive at the request of the President, was appointed in the
confident belief that it would shift the burden of responsibility
from his shoulders to those of the capitalists. This construction of
his motives may appear to be severe and perhaps even unfair, but it
is entirely borne out by the manner in which he dealt with the report
of the Industrial Commission, fighting against its acceptance,
ignoring the recommendations of relief, and even imposing fresh
burdens. There is, nevertheless, one thing to be deduced which is in
a manner to Mr. Kruger's credit, and that is that he really must have
believed that the case would--from his point of view--bear inquiring
into.

The members of the Commission with power to vote were Messrs. Schalk
W. Burger, Member of the Executive Council (Chairman); J.S. Smit,
Government Railway Commissioner; Christiaan Joubert, Minister of
Mines; Schmitz-Dumont, Acting State Mining Engineer; and J.F. de
Beer, first special Judicial Commissioner, Johannesburg. Mr. Thos.
Hugo, the General Manager of the National Bank, was appointed
financial adviser, and certain advisory members were arbitrarily
selected by the Government. The complete exclusion of all those who
had had any direct or indirect association with the late Reform
movement or with those in any way connected with it strengthened the
conviction that the Government designed the Commission to be a
whitewashing one; but whatever the design may have been it would be
doing an injustice both to the Government officials and to the
advisory members to have it supposed that they were parties to such
an idea. They were not; they did their work admirably, and no inquiry
could have been conducted in a better spirit. This, however, was not
foreseen, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the Uitlanders
were induced to view the thing seriously and to realize that, no
matter how it had occurred, this was a supreme opportunity for
proving to the world the soundness of their case. The report and
proceedings are published by the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines in a
volume containing over 700 pages of printed matter and a number of
diagrams. The whole constitutes a damning indictment of the
Government, as the following extracts from the report of the
Commission testify:--

Your Commission are pleased to state that at present there exist all
the indications of an honest administration, and the State, as well
as the Mining Industry, must be congratulated upon the fact that most
of the mines are controlled and directed by financial and practical
men who devote their time, energy, and knowledge to the mining
industry, and who have not only introduced the most up-to-date
machinery and mining appliances, but also the greatest perfection of
method and process known to science. But for these a good many of the
mines now producing gold would not have reached that stage....

To avoid such a calamity (viz., the closing down of the mines) your
Commission are of opinion that it is the duty of the Government to
co-operate with the mining industry, and to devise means in order to
make it possible for lower-grade mines to work at a profit, and
generally to lighten the burdens of the mining industry. This and the
development and equipment of the new mines are a few examples among
others where it is desirable that the Government shall take an active
part, especially when the fact is taken into consideration that up
till now the mining industry must be held as the financial basis,
support, and mainstay of the State.

The question, therefore, becomes one of national economy, and it is
incumbent upon the Government, considering the rapid growth and
progress of the country, to so alter its fiscal laws and systems of
administration as to meet the requirements of its principal
industry....

Your Commission entirely disapprove of concessions, through which the
industrial prosperity of the country is hampered. Such might have
been expedient in the past, but the country has now arrived at a
state of development that will only admit of free competition
according to republican principles. This applies more especially to
the gold industry, which has to face its own economical problems
without being further burdened with concessions that are irksome and
injurious to the industry and will always remain a source of
irritation and dissatisfaction.

As to white labour:--

Your Commission are of opinion that wages are not excessive, regard
being had to the high cost of living at the mines. In fact, they are
only sufficient to satisfy daily wants, and, consequently, it cannot
be expected that white labourers will establish their permanent abode
in this Republic unless conditions are made by which their position
will be ameliorated....

Your Commission are of opinion that as long as the cost of living
cannot be considerably reduced it will be almost impossible to reduce
the wages of white labourers, and they would strongly recommend that,
as far as possible, necessaries of life should be imported free of
duty and conveyed to the mines as cheaply as possible.

As to the sale of liquor:--

It has been proved to your Commission that the Liquor Law is not
carried out properly, and that the mining industry has real
grievances in connection therewith, owing to the illicit sale of
strong drink to the natives at the mines, and they wish especially
and strongly to insist that the stipulations of article 16 of the law
shall be strictly enforced. The evidence given on this point proves
that a miserable state of affairs exists, and a much stronger
application of the law is required.

Following this there is a long criticism with recommendations in
detail.

As to import duties:--

With reference to this matter, your Commission can only recommend
that, if possible, foodstuffs ought to be entirely free from
taxation, as at the present moment it is impossible to supply the
population of the Republic from the products of local agriculture and
consequently importation is absolutely necessary.

As to explosives:--

Before entering on this subject, we wish to put on record our
disappointment with the evidence tendered on behalf of the South
African Explosives Company, Ltd. We expected, and we think not
unreasonably, that they would be able to give reliable information
for our guidance respecting the cost of importation, as well as of
local manufacture, of the principal explosives used for mining
purposes; but, though persistently questioned on these points, few
facts were elicited and we regret to say that they entirely failed to
satisfy us in this important respect....

That the principal explosives used here can be purchased in Europe,
and delivered here at a price far below the present cost to the
mines, has been proved to us by the evidence of many witnesses
competent to speak on the subject, and when we bear in mind that the
excess charge of 40s. to 45s. per case does not benefit the State,