circuit to avoid the column, and reached Krugersdorp before it did.
From this it is clear that the Boers were collecting in considerable
numbers to meet the invading force, and were moving with much greater
rapidity than their enemies.

On Wednesday morning, at about 5.30, Messrs. Theron and Bouwer
(despatch riders), who had been sent by Sir Jacobus de Wet, British
Agent at Pretoria, at 1.30 p.m. on the previous day with a despatch
for Dr. Jameson, reached the column and delivered their letters, and
stated that they had been instructed to take back a reply as soon as
possible. Dr. Jameson said, 'All right; I'll give you a reply,' and
within a few minutes he handed to them the following letter:

_January 1._

DEAR SIR,

I am in receipt of the message you sent from His Excellency the High
Commissioner, and beg to reply, for His Excellency's information,
that I should, of course, desire to obey his instructions, but, as I
have a very large force of both men and horses to feed, and having
finished all my supplies in the rear, must perforce proceed to
Krugersdorp or Johannesburg this morning for this purpose. At the
same time I must acknowledge I am anxious to fulfil my promise on the
petition of the principal residents of the Rand, to come to the aid
of my fellow-men in their extremity. I have molested no one, and have
explained to all Dutchmen met that the above is my sole object, and
that I shall desire to return at once to the Protectorate. I am,
etc.,

(Signed) L.S. JAMESON.

At about 10.30 a.m. on the same day (January 1) two cyclists, Messrs.
Celliers and Rowland, carrying despatches from members of the Reform
Committee, met the column. The letters were received by Dr. Jameson,
and taken with him as far as Doornkop, where, upon surrender of the
force, they appear to have been torn up. With that good fortune which
seems to have followed the Boers throughout this business, these torn
fragments were picked up on the battle-field by a Boer official four
months later, having remained undisturbed during the severe rain and
wind storms of the wet season. Some portions were missing, but the
others were pieced together and produced in evidence against the
Reform prisoners. The letters are printed hereunder as they were
written, as testified by the writers, and, in the case of the first
one, by others who read it before it was despatched. The italics
represent the fragments of the letters which were never found:{26}

DEAR DR.

The rumour of massa_cre in_ Johannesburg that started yo_u to_ our
relief was not true. We a_re all_ right, feeling intense. We have
armed a lot of men. Shall be very glad to see you. _We are_ not in
possess_ion of the_ town. _I shall send out some_ men to
_You are a fine_ fellow. Yours ever

F.R.{27}

We will all drink a glass along _o_' you.

L.P.{28}

31st, 11.30. Kruger has asked for _some of us to_ go over and treat:
armistice for _24 hours agreed_ to. My view is that they are in a
funk at Pretoria, and they were wrong to agree from here.

F.R.{27}

DR. JAMESON.

[Illustration. Caption: The above are reproductions of photographs of
the documents now in possession of the Transvaal Government. For the
report of the expert, Mr. T.H. Gurrin, as submitted to the Select
Committee of the House of Commons, see Appendix L.]

It may be noted that the tone of this correspondence does not appear
to be in accord with the attitude taken up by the Reform
Committee. The letters however were written on Tuesday the 31st, when
there was a general belief that Dr. Jameson had started in good
faith, misled by some false reports. In the second letter Colonel
Rhodes expresses the opinion that it was wrong to agree to send in
a deputation to meet the Government. This was written before the
deputation had gone to Pretoria, and clearly implies that the moral
effect of treating would be bad. The phrasing also shows that the
so-called armistice was for the purpose of treating, and not the
treating for the purpose of securing an armistice: in other words,
that the armistice would expire, and not commence, with the treating.

From the evidence given by the cyclist Rowland, it appears that he
stated to Dr. Jameson that he could get 2,000{29} armed men to go out
to his assistance; and Rowland in evidence alleged further that there
was some offer of assistance in one of the despatches, and that Dr.
Jameson, in reply, said he did not need any assistance, but that if
2,000 men should come out probably the Boers would draw off. This
witness in his evidence at Bow Street also alleged that one of the
despatches expressed surprise at Dr. Jameson's movement. There is now
a complete record of these despatches. They make no allusions to
giving assistance, and the Johannesburg leaders are very clear on the
point that no promise or offer of assistance was ever made. The reply
which Dr. Jameson caused to be sent was concealed in one of the
bicycles, which were seized by the Boer authorities on the return
ride of the despatch-carriers, and was not brought to light until the
following March, when a mechanic who was repairing the broken bicycle
discovered it.

The much-debated question of whether assistance was ever promised or
expected should be finally disposed of by the publication of two
documents which have not heretofore appeared in print. They are _(a)_
the reply of Dr. Jameson to Colonel Rhodes' letters, and _(b)_ the
report of Mr. Celliers, the cyclist despatch-rider who took the
letter and received the reply, which report was taken down in
shorthand by the clerks in the Reform Committee room as it was
made verbally by him immediately on his return. Both these records
dispose of Mr. Rowland's statement about 2,000 men; and apart from
this it should be observed that Mr. Celliers was the messenger sent
by Colonel Rhodes and not Mr. Rowland; the latter having been later
on picked up 'for company,' was presumably less qualified to speak
about the instructions and messages than Celliers, from whom indeed
he learned all that he knew.

The letter was written by Col. H. F. White in the presence of the
cyclists, and partly at the dictation of Dr. Jameson. It was in the
form of a memorandum from Col. H. F. White to Col. Frank Rhodes, and
bore no signature; but the last line was in Dr. Jameson's
handwriting, and was initialed by him. It ran as follows:

As you may imagine, we are all well pleased by your letter. We have
had some fighting, and hope to reach Johannesburg to-night, but of
course it will depend on the amount of fighting we have. Of course we
shall be pleased to have 200 men meet us at Krugersdorp, as it will
greatly encourage the men, who are in great heart although a bit
tired. Love to Sam, Phillips, and rest,

L. S. J.

Mr. Celliers' report--after detailing the incidents of the ride
out--runs:

... I reached the column between 9 and 10 o'clock. I saw Dr. Jameson
personally. He received us very well, and was very glad with the news
I brought him. He read the despatch, and asked me for full details. I
told him the strength of the Boers and the dangers he was in. I told
him that they had no guns, and all that I saw and heard that they had
during my travels. I explained to him everything in detail. The
Doctor seemed to be very brave. He told me that he had two
scrimmages, and that no damage had been done. I said to him whether
it would not be well for him to halt until we got through and sent
him some help. The Doctor said he did not think there was anything to
fear, and at the same time he did not want to go to Johannesburg as a
pirate, and it would be well for them to send some men to meet him. I
also made inquiries as to whether I could return by any other road,
but found it was impossible, and that we had to come back the same
way. I got his despatch, shook hands with him, wished us well, and
set on our journey back.

The report, which is given above literally as transcribed from the
shorthand notes, concludes with an account of the return journey.
Mr. Celliers in a subsequent statement confirmed the above,
and added:

The impression which the Doctor gave me most certainly was that he
had never expected help and did not want it.{30}

The march continued on towards Krugersdorp. At one or two places a
few shots were fired by Boer pickets, and on one occasion the Maxims
of the invading force were turned on a party of some fifty Boers
ensconced in a good position. No casualties however occurred until
Krugersdorp was reached at 3 p.m. on Wednesday. A message was sent by
Sir John Willoughby to the authorities at Krugersdorp that if he
encountered any opposition he would shell the town, and he warned
them to have their women and children removed.

Shortly after mid-day positions were taken up on the hills pear
Krugersdorp, and at three o'clock severe fighting took place which
lasted well on into the night. An ambush at the crushing mill and
works of the Queen's Mine was shelled and an attempt was made to
storm it by a small party of the invaders. It was unsuccessful
however, and after nightfall Dr. Jameson's force was obliged to
retreat from its position and seek a more advantageous one on higher
ground.

They had suffered a reverse at the hands of a somewhat larger force
of Boers who had selected a very strong position. Firing did not
cease until 11 p.m. Here it is alleged the fatal military mistake of
the expedition was committed. No precautions had been taken to
ascertain the road. Instead of being well acquainted with the
direction to be taken the force was dependent upon a guide picked up
on the spot, a man who was never seen after the events of the
following day and is freely alleged to have been a Boer agent. It is
stated by competent judges that, had Dr. Jameson's force pushed on
during the night on the main road to Johannesburg, they would have
succeeded in reaching that town without difficulty. As it was however
they camped for the night in the direction of Randfontein and in the
early morning struck away south, attempting a big detour to avoid the
road which they had tried to force the previous night. There is but
little doubt that they were shepherded into the position in which
they were called upon to fight at Doornkop. The following description
of the Doornkop fight was written by Captain Frank Younghusband, the
correspondent of the London _Times_, who was an eye-witness:

Galloping over the rolling open grassy downs in search of Dr.
Jameson's force which was expected to arrive at Johannesburg at any
moment, my companion Heygate and myself saw between us two forces,
both stationary. Then one began to move away and from the regularity
of its movement we recognized that this must be Dr. Jameson's trying
to round the opposing Boer forces. We found a Boer guard holding the
only ford across the stream; so going up to the Commander we asked
for news. He, after questioning us, told us all that had occurred.

He was a field-cornet from Potchefstroom, and leader of one division
of the Boers. He said that yesterday, January 1, Dr. Jameson had
attacked the Boer force at the George and May Mine, two miles
north-west of Krugersdorp, a small mining township twenty-one miles
west of Johannesburg. Fighting took place from three in the afternoon
to eleven at night, Dr. Jameson making three principal attacks, and
doing great damage with his artillery, which the Boers, having then
no guns, were unable to reply to.

My informant, the Boer leader, said that both then and to-day Dr.
Jameson's men behaved with great gallantry, and he also said that
admirable arrangements had been made at Krugersdorp for nursing the
wounded on both sides.

This morning the Boers took up a position at Vlakfontein, eight miles
on the Johannesburg side of Krugersdorp, on a circuitous road to the
south by which Dr. Jameson was marching. The Boers in the night had
been reinforced by men and with artillery and Maxims. Their position
was an exceedingly strong one on an open slope, but along a ridge of
rocks cropping out of it. It was a right-angled position and Dr.
Jameson attacked them in the re-entering angle, thus having fire on
his front and flank.

To attack this position his men had to advance over a perfectly open
gently-sloping grassy down, while the Boers lay hid behind rocks and
fired with rifles, Maxims, and artillery upon their assailants. The
Boers numbered from 1,200 to 1,500, Dr. Jameson's force about 500,
and the position was practically unassailable.

Dr. Jameson, after making a desperate effort to get through,
surrendered, and as we stood we saw his brave little band riding
dejectedly back again to Krugersdorp without their arms and
surrounded by a Boer escort.

We were allowed to ride close up, but were refused permission to see
Dr. Jameson. It is therefore impossible to state his full reasons,
but it is known that he was made aware that it was impossible to send
assistance from here, and this may have influenced him in giving
up the contest when he found the enemy's position so strong that
in any case it would have been no disgrace to have been beaten by
superior numbers of such a brave foe as that Boer force which I
saw in the very position they had fought in. It was evident that
probably no one had ever started on a more desperate venture than
had this daring little force, and they gained by their gallantry the
adoration, not only of the Boer burghers who spoke to me, but of the
whole town of Johannesburg.

These Boers--rough, simple men, dressed in ordinary civilian clothes,
with merely a rifle slung over the shoulder to show they were
soldiers--spoke in feeling terms of the splendid bravery shown by
their assailants. They were perfectly calm and spoke without any
boastfulness in a self-reliant way. They said, pointing to the
ground, that the thing was impossible, and hence the present result.

The total loss of Dr. Jameson's force is about twenty. Major Grey
was, they said, the principal military officer, and they thought that
no officer was killed, and that the report that Sir John Willoughby
had been killed was unfounded. He and Dr. Jameson have been taken to
Pretoria.

At 9.15 o'clock the white flag was put up. Sir J. Willoughby, the
officer in command of the force, then sent the following note
addressed to the Commandant of the Transvaal Forces:

We surrender, provided that you guarantee us safe conduct out of the
country for every member of the force.

JOHN C. WILLOUGHBY.

A reply was sent within fifteen minutes, of which the following is a
literal translation:

OFFICER,--Please take note that I shall immediately assemble our
officers to decide upon your communication.

COMMANDANT.

Twenty or thirty minutes later a second note was received by the
surrendering force, addressed 'John C. Willoughby':

I acknowledge your letter. The answer is that, if you will undertake
to pay the expense which you have caused the South African Republic,
and if you will surrender with your arms, then I shall spare the
lives of you and yours. Please send me a reply to this within thirty
minutes.

P. A. CRONJÉ.
_Commandant, Potchefstroom._

Within fifteen minutes of the receipt of this letter, Sir J.
Willoughby replied, accepting the conditions in the following terms:

I accept the terms on the guarantee that the lives of all will be
spared. I now await your instructions as to how and where we are to
lay down our arms. At the same time I would ask you to remember that
my men have been without food for the last twenty-four hours.

'The flag sent with the first message (to quote the statement made on
behalf of Sir J. Willoughby by his solicitor, Mr. B.F. Hawksley) was
sent perhaps a little earlier than 9.15. Dr. Jameson's force ceased
firing as soon as the flag was hoisted, except on the extreme right.
Messengers were sent to stop that firing, and all firing ceased
within five minutes. The Boers continued to fire for some ten
minutes, and for some time after Jameson's force had ceased. After
Sir J. Willoughby had received the first answer the State Artillery
opened fire and continued firing for at least fifteen minutes. Sir J.
Willoughby sent Colonel the Hon. H. White and Captain Grenfell to the
Commandant with a note requesting to know the reason for firing on a
flag of truce, and requesting that it might cease. Sir J. Willoughby
has no copy of the letter he wrote accepting the conditions offered
by Cronjé, but it was to the effect above given. 'Besides Cronjé,
Commandant Malan was acquainted with the terms of surrender, for
_after Jameson's force had given up their arms_ Commandant Malan came
up and repudiated part of the terms, saying he would not guarantee
the lives of Jameson and the leaders, and that they would be handed
over to General Joubert, who would decide their fate.'

The decision having been announced to the forces, and many of the men
having stacked their arms and dropped off to sleep where they lay in
the veld, several other commandants joined Cronjé, and an altercation
took place in the presence of the surrendered officers, Commandant
Malan of Rustenburg violently proclaiming that Cronjé had no
right to spare the lives of the force, and that it lay with the
Commandant-General and Krijgsraad (or War Council) to decide what
should be done with the prisoners. Commandant Cronjé replied that
they had surrendered to him upon certain conditions, and those
conditions had been accepted by him. In the course of the discussion,
in which several other prominent Boers joined, disapproval was
generally expressed of Cronjé's acceptance of the terms and threats
were used to Dr. Jameson in person. Eye-witnesses on the Boer
side state that Dr. Jameson declined to discuss the matter further;
he merely bowed and walked away. It may be remarked that it is not by
any means unusual for the Boers to seek to stretch to their advantage
terms which they have previously agreed upon. There can now be no
question as to the conditions of the surrender. The officer in
command on the field agreed to spare the lives of the entire force,
and it was not competent for anyone to reverse that decision or to
reopen the question. The incident is instructive, and also important
since the lives of Dr. Jameson and his men were made to play a
considerable part in President Kruger's game of magnanimity later
on.{31}

The Johannesburg _Star_ correspondent, describing the surrender,
says:

There were upwards of 400 altogether, and the poor fellows made a
sorry sight--tired from their long march, their privations, and the
tremendous strain of continuous engagements for nearly twenty-four
hours. Some almost slept in their saddles as they were being
escorted; and when they arrived on Krugersdorp Market Square the
scene will not soon be forgotten.

The Boers freely mixed with them and talked with them. Provisions
were brought, and devoured with ravenous hunger. In many cases the
Boers gave from their own scant stock of provisions to the starving
men, for whom they expressed the utmost admiration for their
pluckiness and determination.

Dr. Jameson and his principal officers, including Sir John
Willoughby, were brought in separately from the main body of the
captured troops. Although the Boers treated most of the prisoners
with consideration, they jeered somewhat when Dr. Jameson was brought
forward; but this was promptly suppressed by the Commandants. Dr.
Jameson and the officers were temporarily housed in the Court-house,
together with the other officers captured previously.

A mule-waggon was brought up, fitted with mattresses. The chief
officers were despatched to Pretoria under a strong escort of Boers.
About half an hour later the rest of the prisoners were also escorted
out of the town to Pretoria, most of them on their own horses. Both
men and horses were extremely emaciated.

The burgher losses were reported to have been 4 killed and 5 wounded.
The losses of Dr. Jameson's force were 18 killed and about 40
wounded.

There were also taken: 400 magazine and Lee-Metford rifles, 8 Maxims
(one spiked, or with the breach-piece gone), 4 field-pieces, 33,000
rifle cartridges, 10 cases of Maxim cartridges, 10 cases of
projectiles, 2 sacks of projectiles, 300 cartridge-belts, 13
revolvers, 4 mule-waggons, 5 Scotch carts, 742 horses (in which were
included the 250 horses which were captured in charge of two troopers
near Blaaubank), a full-blooded stallion (the property of Dr.
Jameson), 400 saddles, bridles etc., 38 mules with harness, 1
telegraph instrument (probably to tap wires with), harness and other
accoutrements and instruments of war.

The prisoners were treated with every consideration by their captors,
with the exception perhaps of Dr. Jameson himself, who was threatened
by some of the unruly ones and freely hissed and hooted, but was
protected by the officers in charge. It must be said of the Boers
that they acted with admirable self-restraint and dignity in a
position such as very few are called upon to face. However politic
their actions may have been in their fear of provoking conflict with
Johannesburg and the Imperial Government, however the juggling with
Dr. Jameson's life afterwards and the spurious magnanimity so freely
advertized, may detract from what they did and may tend to bring
ridicule and suspicion upon them, one cannot review the broad facts
of the Jameson invasion, and realize a position which, if only for
the moment, gave the aggrieved party unlimited scope for revenge upon
an aggressor who had not the semblance of personal wrong or interest
nor the pretext of duty to justify his action, without allowing to
the Boers that they behaved in such a manner as, for a time, to
silence even that criticism which is logically justifiable and
ultimately imperative. In so far as the invading force are concerned,
the words of Mr. A. J. Balfour aptly sum up the position: 'President
Kruger has shown himself to possess a generosity which is not the
less to be admired because it is coincident with the highest
political wisdom.'

With reference to the surrender of the force, it is reasonable to
believe that the Transvaal Government, knowing how serious the
complications would be if civil war actually took place, and
believing as they undoubtedly did that Johannesburg contained upwards
of 20,000 armed men, were quite willing--indeed anxious--to secure
the surrender of Dr. Jameson's force on any terms, and that the
conditions made by Cronjé were quite in accordance with what the
highest Boer authorities would have accepted. It seems to be beyond
question also that the conditions of surrender were purposely
suppressed in order to enable the President to bargain with
Johannesburg; and, as has already been stated, such action
materially detracted from the credit due to the Transvaal Government.
This is their characteristic diplomacy--the fruit of generations of
sharpening wits against savages; and the same is called Kaffir
cunning, and is not understood at first by European people. But when
all such considerations are weighed, there is still a large balance
of credit due to the Boers for the manner in which they treated
Dr. Jameson and his invading force. It is difficult to conceive of
any people behaving better to a foe vanquished under such conditions;
indeed, it would be quite impossible.

The Boers when under control of their leaders have generally behaved
in an admirable manner. It is only when the individuals, unrestrained
by those in authority, are left to exercise their power at the
dictates of their own uncurbed passions, that the horrible scenes
have occurred which have undoubtedly blemished their reputation.

In connection with the Jameson raid there was one such incident--the
shooting of Trooper Black. The unfortunate man fell into the hands of
the Boers while out scouting and was taken as a prisoner to a
farmhouse near Blaaubank. There he was tied up and beaten, and it is
stated by a woman who gave him water when he was half mad with
thirst, that his face had been smashed by a blow from a rifle butt.
When unable to bear the treatment any longer Black stood up and,
tearing his shirt open, cried out, 'Don't shoot me in the back! Shoot
here! My heart's in the right place.' He was then untied and (as
alleged by Dutch witnesses) given an opportunity to escape. He
mounted his horse, but before he had gone far was shot dead. On the
appeal of Sir Jacobus de Wet the Government consented to investigate
the matter; but the Commandant in charge, Piet Grobler, when
questioned on the subject, merely replied, 'Oh, he [Black] was a very
insolent fellow. We could do nothing with him.' The man who fired the
shot despatching Black, a half-caste Boer named Graham, stated on his
return from Pretoria that he was asked no questions at the so-called
inquiry.

A somewhat similar incident took place, but fortunately with less
serious results, on the way from the battle of Krugersdorp. A
well-known resident of Johannesburg had ridden out to ascertain news
of Dr. Jameson, and, arriving as the surrender took place, thrust his
way among the Boers until he reached the Doctor, where he was
arrested by the Boer authorities as a spy. Being a burgher of the
State who had been resident in the Transvaal for some sixteen or
seventeen years, he was recognized and rather harshly treated. He was
attached by a leather thong to the saddle of one of the Boer
Commandants and made to run, keeping pace with the horse. After a
spell of this treatment he was released, and the Commandant in
question offered to make a bet with him that he would not be able to
race him on horseback to the ambulance waggons a few hundred yards
off, the prisoner to take a short cut across a swamp and the
Commandant to ride round by the road. The prisoner thereupon replied,
'No, thank you, Commandant. I was in the Boer War myself and saw
several men shot by that dodge, on the pretence that they were
escaping.' The worthy Commandant thereupon drew his stirrup from the
saddle, and thrashed his prisoner with the stirrup end. After some
ten days' imprisonment under exceptionally hard conditions the
gentleman in question was released without trial.

The complete success of the Boer forces against Dr. Jameson's band
has been accounted for in many ways, but undoubtedly the one reason,
if one can be selected, which enabled them to deal with the invaders,
was their ability to mobilize at short notice. And in this connection
arises the question: Did the Boers know beforehand of the intended
invasion, and were they waiting until Dr. Jameson should walk into
the trap? On behalf of the Boers it is strenuously maintained that
they had not the remotest notion of what was brewing, and that had
such an idea occurred to them they would of course have reported
matters to the High Commissioner. The President's unyielding mood
before he heard of Dr. Jameson's start, and his change afterwards,
the state of demoralization in Pretoria, the unpreparedness of the
State Artillery, and the vacillation of General Joubert, the
condition of alarm in which the President was during that night of
suspense before the surrender, when Chief Justice Kotzé sat with him
to aid and cheer, and when the old white horse stood saddled in the
stable in case Johannesburg should attack Pretoria; all point to the
conclusion that it was not all cut and dried. With a singular
unanimity, the Boers and their friends and the majority of the
Uitlanders in the Transvaal support this view; but there are on
record certain facts which are not to be ignored. Apart altogether
from the hearsay evidence of telegraphists and Boer officials in
different parts of the country, who state that they were under
orders from Government to remain at their posts day and night--that
is to say to sleep in their offices--a fortnight before the Jameson
raid took place, a significant piece of evidence is that supplied by
the Transvaal Consul in London, Mr. Montagu White, who in a letter to
the London Press stated that on December 16 he received information
as to the plot against the independence of the Republic, and that he
on that date cabled fully to President Kruger warning him of what was
in contemplation, and that the President took the necessary
precautions. Now, on December 14 it was announced in Pretoria that
the President, being greatly in need of a rest and change, was about
to undertake a tour through the country to visit his faithful
burghers. Perusal of the newspapers of the time shows that among the
Uitlanders no significance was attached to this visit. Indeed, the
Uitlander press agreed that it had become painfully evident that His
Honour required a change in order to restore his nervous system. As
nothing can better represent the opinions of the time than the
current comments of the Press, the following extracts from the
Johannesburg _Star_ are given:

In short, His Honour is developing an ungovernable irritability and a
tendency to choleric obsessions, when the word 'Uitlander' is barely
mentioned in his presence, that are causing the greatest concern to
those around him. Only on some such grounds are explicable the raging
exclamations he is reported to have permitted himself to lately use
towards Johannesburg and the cause of reform upon which it is so
earnestly engaged. That His Honour should have been generally
credited with indulging in unconventional vernacular terms concerning
the pronouncedly loyal and hearty reception accorded to him on his
visit to the Rand Agricultural Show, seems to argue a lapse into the
habits of his youngest days, which has a direct significance in the
case of ordinary individuals, and is known by a very familiar name.
That he should tragically declare that only across his bleeding
corpse will the Uitlander ever come into his own, is merely the
extravagant and regrettable melodrama of an overheated mind. The
general desire is quite averse to encountering any stepping-stones of
that kind, and most of all averse to Mr. Kruger's taking any such
place. Our quarrel is with principles and systems, and never yet has
a note of personal vengeance been sounded whilst we have endeavoured
to compass their destruction. It is quite obvious that a little
relaxation from the cares of State, or reversion to more primitive
conditions, a freer communion with Nature--viewed from an
ox-waggon--are eminently desirable to restore His Honour's shattered
nerves.--_December 14, 1895._


AT HIS POST.

His Honour the President has returned to the seat of Government. The
itinerary appears to have been somewhat prematurely cut short; but no
one is likely to so ridiculously underestimate the sterling qualities
of His Honour as to conceive the possibility of his absence when
difficulty and danger imperatively command his presence at the head
of public affairs. The conclusions which Mr. Kruger has derived from
converse with his faithful burghers are likely to remain buried in
his own breast. The outward and ostensible object of his recent tour
has been fulfilled in much the accustomed manner; that is to say, he
has discussed with apparent interest the necessity for a pont here or
a bridge there; the desirability of Government aid for tree-planting,
the trouble which the farmers experience in getting native labour,
and so forth, and so on; but we must not derive from all this
peripatetic fustian the erroneous impression that His Honour has been
vacuously fiddling on the eve of a conflagration. The real business
which took him to Lydenburg and Middelburg has no doubt been
satisfactorily accomplished. Boer sentiment has been tested in
secret, and the usual professions of fervid patriotism and of
readiness for target practice with the Uitlander as the mark have
been profusely evoked. This sub-official aspect of the itinerary has
been discreetly veiled in all the reports which have been permitted
to transpire, and the censorship thereof has been more than normally
exacting and severe; but we are from private sources left in no
manner of doubt that Mr. Kruger has been canvassing and stimulating
the Boers to be ready for any emergency, and has been metaphorically
planting a war-beacon on every hill. All scrutiny and inquiry fail to
discover that he has uttered one single word which can be described
as an emollient to the present critical situation. He has pandered
rather to the worst racial passions of the Boer, instead of using the
enormous responsibility resting upon him in the direction of
mediation. Old patriarchs--whom we cannot but respect and admire
whilst we deplore their immitigable and hopeless rancour against the
cause of the newcomer--have been permitted, apparently without
rebuke, to show their wounds to the younger and more malleable
generation in His Honour's presence, and to boast of their readiness
to receive as much more lead as they can conveniently find room for.
The tour, indeed, has been a _wapenschouwing_, with oratory of the
most dangerous and pernicious type for its accompaniment. His
Honour's contribution to this interesting display of martial ardour
has been couched, as usual, in the enigmatic form. He has spoken
another parable. A mind so fertile in image and in simile cannot have
lost much of its wonted vigour. The one he has chosen to employ on
this occasion is full of instruction, and is derived, as Mr. Kruger's
images frequently are, from the arena of natural history. When you
want to kill your tortoise, he must be artfully induced to
imprudently protrude his head beyond his thick and impregnable shell,
and then the task becomes a very easy one. This little parable was
considered good for use on more than one occasion, varied by the
addition that, if the tortoise be up to the trick, it is necessary to
sit down and wait until he does make the fatal mistake. The only
drawback to our profound intellectual delight in the parable is the
question, 'Who will be the tortoise?'--_December 27, 1895._

A perusal of the German White Book shows that

On December 24 the German Consul in Pretoria telegraphed to the
Foreign Office that 'news from Johannesburg points to the preparation
of disturbances by the English party there, and the Government is
taking precautionary measures.' Baron von Marschall communicated this
to Sir Frank Lascelles, and, after pointing out the possible
consequence of bloodshed, emphasized once again the necessity for
maintaining the _status quo_. In reply to the German Consul in
Pretoria, the Secretary of State telegraphed a similar statement,
adding: 'Impress energetically upon the Transvaal Government that it
must most scrupulously avoid any provocation if it wishes to retain
German sympathy.'

Another little light on the inside history is that afforded by Mr.
J.C. Bodenstein, Field-cornet of the Krugersdorp district, who in the
course of an interview accorded to the _Standard and Diggers' News_,
the Johannesburg Government organ, stated how he came to know of
Jameson's intended invasion. He heard that a certain young lady who
resided at Luipaardsvlei, near Krugersdorp, whose _fiancé_ occupied a
good position in the Bechuanaland Border Police, had received a
letter from him at Mafeking to the effect that he intended paying her
a visit about the New Year, and that he would not be alone, as the
whole force was coming to Johannesburg. The lady proved no exception
to the alleged rule concerning secrets, and Field-cornet Bodenstein
personally assured himself of the authenticity of the report he had
heard.

On Friday, December 27, a German gentleman from the Free State also
informed the Field-cornet that Dr. Jameson and his troopers might be
expected at any time. 'On hearing this confirmation of the letter,'
said Mr. Bodenstein, 'I went at once to Pretoria. I arrived there at
eleven o'clock at night, and early the next morning I saw the
President and informed him about the letter and what I had been told.
He remarked quietly: "Yes, I have heard all about it" The General
(Joubert) then said: "All right; I will send you the ammunition you
require."'

In the report of the Select Committee of the Cape House of Assembly
(Blue Book A 6 of 1896, page 76) there is the evidence of the Hon.
J.A. Faure, M.L.C., which shows that he and Sir Thomas Upington, the
Attorney-General of Cape Colony, were on a visit to Johannesburg on
December 27, and heard it publicly stated that Dr. Jameson with 800
men was on the border for the purpose of invading the Transvaal.
Mr. Faure testifies that he learned this from a very prominent Free
State Dutchman. Among others, one would suppose that the Transvaal
Government must also have heard something of it.

Dr. Veale, a well-known Pretoria doctor, states that at daybreak on
Thursday, January 2, Commandant Hendrik Schoeman called on him to
secure his professional attendance for a member of his family who was
very ill. The Commandant said that he had been sent out on Monday to
watch the invading force and to ascertain their numbers, and also
stated that he had been following the troop with others for a
considerable time and that he was sure Jameson had not 800 but
between 450 and 500, as he had repeatedly counted them; that the
force was being delayed by small parties drawing it into useless
fighting and so losing time; that he himself had been obliged to come
on ahead, having been recalled on account of his wife's serious
illness, but that it made little difference as there were others to
take his place, and they had arranged not to tackle Jameson until
they had drawn him among the kopjes at Doornkop, where it would be
quite impossible for him ever to get through. This statement it
should be noted was made in Pretoria some hours before the Jameson
force surrendered at Doornkop.

So certain do the Boers appear to have been, and so confident of
their ability to carry out their plans, that they stated to a
reporter of the Government newspaper that they intended to stop
Jameson at Rietspruit (Doornkop), and this statement was published in
a Johannesburg paper on the morning of January 1, but was of course
regarded as mere gossip of a piece with that which flooded the
newspapers at the time. It is only right to add that there were
numbers of other announcements at the same time which by no means
agreed with this one, and it is stated that the editor was as much
surprised as the public to find that he had been right.

In reviewing the whole of the circumstances of the raid, not the most
biased and most interested of persons can withhold a tribute of
admiration to the President's presence of mind, skill, and courage in
dealing with circumstances wholly without precedent; and in quiet
moments, when recalling all that has happened, if human at all, his
Honour must indulge in a chuckle now and then to think how completely
he jockeyed everybody.{32} Not the least amusing recollection must be
that of the 'great trek' (Banjailand Trek), which his burghers
threatened to make into Mashonaland viâ Rhodes' Drift when Sir John
Willoughby gained his first experience of Oom Paul. The military
commander of Dr. Jameson's force had called on the President to add
weight to the remonstrances which were being made against the action
of the burghers in invading the Chartered territory, and the
President, playing his cards for a favourable settlement of
Swaziland, had replied that he had done all that he could, and events
must take their course. 'Tell him,' said Sir John to Dr. Leyds who
was interpreting, 'that if the trek is not stopped of course the
result will be war!' 'If it must be, let it be,' the old gentleman
answered quietly. 'Then tell him,' Sir John replied, 'that in that
case he will have to reckon with the British Army.' 'And tell _him_',
said the President, pointing placidly at his interviewer with his big
pipe, 'that I have reckoned with the British Army once before.' If
the recollection occurred to both men on January 2, it must have been
with different emotions.

In dealing with President Kruger's personal attitude it is not
perhaps pertinent but, it is interesting, to recall an incident of
his earlier career--a parallel between the prisoner and the
President. Oddly enough President Kruger was a rebel and a filibuster
himself in the days of his hot youth, and one of his earliest
diplomatic successes was in securing the release and pardon of
men who, in 1857, stood in exactly the same position as the
Uitlanders whom he imprisoned.

The story of the Potchefstroom revolt is little known in England, but
it is told in Theal's 'Standard History of South Africa,' and very
instructive reading it is. Dr. Hillier, of Johannesburg, one of the