the people any idea of the real power of Government_.
It is not possible to pen a more severe and pregnant comment on the
after-policy of England than that suggested by the italicized lines,
written as they were by England's Plenipotentiary--an idea reported
to headquarters, not as a feeler, but as a suggestion so absurd that
it called for no expression of opinion. But he lived to find that it
was not too absurd to be realized; and perhaps, after all, it was
written as a warning, and the wise and cool-headed old statesman in
his inmost soul had a premonition of what eventually occurred.

Sir Bartle Frere met the Boers in their camp, and discussed with them
their grievances. He informed them that he had no power to revoke the
annexation, nor would he recommend it, as, in his judgment, such a
course would be a reversion to chaos and ruin. The Boers pressed
steadily for nothing less than repeal. Sir Bartle Frere reported
the historical meeting at Erasmus Farm to Sir M. Hicks Beach:

_April 14, 1879._

They were evidently much disappointed.... Our meeting separated with
no more definite decision than that they must report to the 'people,'
and be guided by their decision as to what was to be done.

If I may judge from the gentlemen composing the deputation, and
others of their class, whom I have had the honour of meeting since
coming to the Transvaal, the leaders are, with few exceptions, men
who deserve respect and regard for many valuable and amiable
qualities as citizens and subjects....

Of the results of our meeting it is impossible at present to say more
than that it must have cleared away misconceptions on all sides If
they have learnt anything as to the finality of the act of
annexation--that I have no power to undo it, and do not believe that
it will ever be undone, in the only sense in which they will ask
it--I have, on the other hand, been shown the stubbornness of a
determination to be content with nothing else, for which I was not
prepared by the general testimony of officials who had been longer in
the country, and who professed to believe that the opposition of the
Boers was mere bluster, and that they had not the courage of their
professed opinions.... I feel assured that the majority of the
Committee felt very deeply what they believed to be a great national
wrong.... But my conviction is that the real malcontents are far from
being a majority of the whole white population, or even of their own
class of Boer farmers.

I have no doubt whatever that if the Executive were in a position to
assert the supremacy of the law, to put an effectual stop to the
reign of terrorism which exists at present, the discontented minority
would cease to agitate, and would soon cease to feel grievances which
a very brief discussion shows to be in the main sentimental; not the
less keenly felt on that account, but not likely to survive
the prosperity and good government, with a fair measure of
self-government in its train, which are within their reach under
British rule.

And, again, he wrote to Lady Frere:

PRETORIA, _April 20, 1879._

My last letter had not been gone many hours by the mail express when
Lanyon ran into my room, to tell me that the Boer camp was actually
broken up and the Boers dispersing.

I need not tell you how thankful I was. The one thing I dreaded was
civil war and bloodshed, and had a single malcontent been shot, I
should have considered it a greater misfortune than the death of a
dozen Piet Retiefs, or Uys, dying like heroes in the field of battle
for their country and brethren. So you may imagine how thankful I
felt to the Giver of all good, who has guided and protected us
through life.

I am to see a deputation from the Boers' Committee again to-morrow,
and then I hope we shall have done with meetings and grievances--for
the present a phrase which they carefully put into all references to
their breaking up, and which they evidently mean. _It was clear to me
that it was not the annexation, so much as the neglect to fulfil the
promises and the expectations held out by Shepstone when he took
over the Government, that has stirred up the great mass of the
Boers, and given a handle to agitators._{02}

There it is in a single sentence! It was not the annexation which
caused the war; for nine men in every ten admitted that it was
welcomed and justified by considerations of general South African
policy, or else simply inevitable. No! It was the failure to fulfil
the conditions of annexation!

In 'A Narrative of the Boer War,' Mr. Thomas Fortescue Carter has
given with admirable skill and impartiality a full account of the
causes which led to the outbreak. His history is, indeed, so
determinedly just as to have met with considerable disapproval in
quarters where feelings are hot on either side, and where plain
truths are not palatable. Mr. Carter resided in the country for years
before the annexation, and went through the war as correspondent of a
well-known London daily, and this is his opinion:

Anyone who knows the acquaintance Sir T. Shepstone had with the Boers
of the Transvaal, years prior to the annexation, cannot doubt that,
regarded as a friend and almost as one of themselves, no one better
than he could have been selected for the task of ascertaining the
desires of the people; and no one who knows Sir T. Shepstone will
believe that he did not take sufficient evidence to prove to any man
that the Boers were anxious to be extricated from the dilemma they
were in, and really willing at that time that their country should be
annexed. Men who during the late war were our foes were at the time
of the annexation clamouring for it, welcoming Sir Theophilus
Shepstone as the deliverer and saviour of the country. I mention
Swart Dirk Uys, an eminent Boer, who fought against the English in
1880-81, as one amongst the hundreds and thousands who went out to
meet Sir Theophilus Shepstone with palm branches in their hands.

The natural aversion of the people to English rule was overcome for
the moment by their greater aversion to being wiped off the face of
the Transvaal by the blacks; that was a contingency staring them in
the face, and yet not even that imminent common danger availed to
secure unity amongst them, or would rouse men individually to take
upon their shoulders the responsibility which rests upon every member
of a State.

The Boer Volksraad, after promising to appeal to their constituents
on the subject of the new constitution proposed, almost immediately
passed a measure, which was familiarly styled by the people the 'Hou
jou smoel law.' The literal translation of this term is 'Hold your
to discuss the question of either confederation or annexation.

I come to the conclusion, then, that the cause of the annexation was
England's historical greed of territory, especially rich territory;
and that, however unworthy the motive on the part of the visiting
power, the Boers did not at that time receive the visitor with other
feelings than those of satisfaction, and practically surrendered
their country voluntarily and gladly to the ruler of a greater power,
under the impression that Sir Theophilus Shepstone would be permitted
to carry out, and that he therefore would carry out, the promises he
made them. As the programme was open before them, they had everything
to gain and nothing to lose, except the loss entailed by nominal
government by the British. No man, whether Boer or Britisher, who was
living in the Transvaal, or knew the feelings of the Boers at the
time of annexation, would in 1877 have given any other account of the
feeling of the nation; and if I have formed too low an opinion of the
motives of English statesmen at that time, and am not justified in
attributing the annexation to greed instead of to the purer and
nobler desire to protect England's colonies, or even the Transvaal
itself, from the inroads of savages, then my excuse must be that the
failure of England to send out at that time a force equal to the task
of restraining those savages and maintaining peace, has helped
materially to lead me to the unwarrantable conclusion.{03}

And so came the war. The history of it is written that all may read;
and it is not necessary here to refer at length to the details of it.
The utterly unjust treatment of Bezuidenhout at Potchefstroom was the
immediate cause of the outbreak. The armed interference of the
Potchefstroom burghers with the Imperial officials followed on
December 16, to be in turn succeeded by the battle of Bronkhorst
Spruit on the 20th.

The following account of the affair is taken from Mr. Carter's book:

All went well on this day till about 2.30 p.m., when the following
was about the order of march: One mounted infantryman in advance of
the main body next the band; of F company, forty men; of A company,
forty men; then followed the quarter-guard, thirteen men; and
provost-escort and prisoners, twenty-three men. The remainder of the
force was posted along the string of waggons, with the exception of
the rear-guard of about twenty men, which were some distance behind.
Colonel Anstruther, Captains Nairne and Elliott, Lieutenant Hume,
and Adjutant Harrison were riding just in front of the band, when
suddenly Boers appeared all round. The locality that the regiment had
reached at the time was one where stood several farms, and the trees
surrounding these homesteads afforded cover under which a hostile
force could assemble without being perceived from a distance. On the
right was a ravine with wood in it, and amongst that the Boers were
lying in ambush. How unexpected was the appearance of a force of
Boers to the English may be judged from the fact that the band
of the regiment was playing at the time. Colonel Anstruther,
immediately he caught sight of the enemy on the crest of a slight
rise to the front, called a halt, and the order was passed to the
rear for the waggons to close up. Before this could be done a
messenger from the enemy, carrying a white flag, came forward and
handed the Colonel a note signed by Piet Joubert, and countersigned
by other Boer leaders, desiring him to halt where he was until a
reply had been received from Sir Owen Lanyon to the ultimatum the
Boers had addressed to him. The message also contained the warning
that if the soldiers advanced beyond a small stream in front of
them, it would be taken as a declaration of war. Colonel Anstruther,
with Conductor Egerton, had ridden out in front of the advanced
guard to meet this flag of truce; after he had read the message, the
bearer of it informed him verbally that two minutes were allowed for
his decision. Colonel Anstruther verbally replied that he should
march on to Pretoria, and, to use his own words, as published in his
despatch written just before he died, the Boer messenger 'said that
he would take my message to the Commandant-General; and I asked him
to let me know the result, to which he nodded assent. Almost
immediately, however, the enemy's line advanced.'

Whilst this short parley was going on, every effort was being made in
the rear to get the waggons up, but without much good result, because
when the Boers opened fire the rear-guard would be at least half a
mile behind the head of the column. Even those who were guarding the
waggons had not time to join the main body. When Colonel Anstruther
saw the Boers advancing, he gave the order to his men to extend in
skirmishing order, but before they could open out to more than loose
files they were met with a murderous volley, and at the same time
Boers on the right and left flank and in the rear, who had previously
measured and marked off the distances, picked off every man within
sight. Our men returned the fire as best they could, but in less than
ten minutes 120 were either killed or wounded, besides a large
proportion of the oxen in the waggons shot. The officers who exposed
themselves were picked off almost immediately by the Boer marksmen.
Captain Nairne, Lieutenant M'Sweeney, Lieutenant and Adjutant
Harrison, Lieutenant Hume, Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General
Barter, Conductor Egerton, Surgeon Ward, were all wounded, besides
Colonel Anstruther himself, who was shot in two or three places.

It was useless to contend against such odds, and the 'cease fire' was
sounded, and handkerchiefs waved to denote submission. During this
unequal struggle, Mrs. Smith, the widow of the bandmaster of the
regiment, who, with the wife of Sergeant-Major Fox and some children,
were riding in one of the foremost waggons, came fearlessly up to
where the wounded lay, and, tearing strips from her clothing, helped
the surgeon to bandage the wounds. The sergeant-major's wife was
severely wounded, as was also Fox himself. There was no lack of
heroism during those awful ten minutes, whilst men were being shot
down like dogs. Lieutenant Harrison was shot through the head while
cheering on his men; Lieutenant Hume was equally conspicuous
for his coolness. An orderly-room clerk named Maistre and the
Sergeant-Master-Tailor Pears quietly concealed the regimental colours
in a waggon-box when they saw the danger of them falling into the
hands of the enemy; and their work was not in vain, as Conductor
Egerton managed subsequently to wrap them round his body under his
tunic, and having obtained permission after the fight was over to walk
to Pretoria for medical assistance, he carried them safely to the
capital, as well as the disastrous news of the engagement. Forty-two
miles traversed by a wounded man on foot in eleven hours is in itself
a feat worth mentioning, and one the value of which can only be
really estimated by those who know what South African roads are in
the rainy seasons.

As soon as our force surrendered, Franz Joubert, who had been in
command of the Boers, and who, it is said, fired the first shot, with
the exclamation, 'What is the use of waiting?' came forward with some
of his men, and on finding poor Colonel Anstruther severely wounded
expressed sorrow.

Whether the affair of Bronkhorst Spruit can be called an act of
treachery on the part of the Boers is rather a nice question. Colonel
Anstruther's words--the words of a dying man--rather go to prove that
he was unfairly treated, though he does not say so directly. He was
given to understand by the messenger who came with the flag of truce
that another communication would be made to him as soon as his reply
to the request to halt had been reported to the Boer Commandant. The
only reply given him was 'a murderous volley.' The Boers cannot lay
claim to much bravery or superiority (except in numbers) over our
soldiers in this fight. Theirs was a deliberately-planned ambush to
entrap men who had no idea that they were marching in an enemy's
country. Bronkhorst Spruit engagement is the one during the whole of
the war which does not redound to the credit of the Dutch, even if it
does not reflect great discredit upon them. If a reasonable time had
been allowed Colonel Anstruther to give his reply, the 94th could not
then say, as they do say and will say, that they were treacherously
surprised. 'Two minutes' looks, under the circumstances, very much
like an idle pretence of fair dealing to cover an intentional act of
cowardice which subsequent conduct could hardly palliate. The Boers
say that they had not more men than were marching with the 94th on
that occasion; that statement is worth very little, considering the
evidence of our officers, and, above all, the harsh evidence of the
facts that the 94th was from advance-guard to rear-guard practically
surrounded and outnumbered in every direction.

The preparedness of the Boers and the precision of their fire may be
gathered from the testimony of Dr. Crow, of Pretoria, who attended
the wounded, and vouched for an average of five wounds per man. Dr.
Crow also wrote:

But as disastrous as the late war in the Transvaal had been to
British prestige, thank God those at Bronkhorst Spruit did their duty
and died like men, a noble example to any army. If any stain has been
cast on the British flag in the Transvaal, the gallant 94th did all
that was possible by their deeds at Bronkhorst Spruit to obliterate
it.

The news of this affair was received with horror, and the feelings
roused by the details of it have never been allayed. Race-hatred may
have its origin in a hundred little incidents, but in the Transvaal
there were two which undoubtedly, whether justly or otherwise, gave
a character to the Boers that has embittered feeling against them
more than any which had occurred in generations previous. The
second affair followed very closely on the Bronkhorst Spruit
engagement--_i.e.,_ the infamous murder of Captain Elliott, the only
surviving unwounded officer from Bronkhorst Spruit. Captains Elliott
and Lambert were taken prisoners, and were offered the choice of
two alternatives--either to remain prisoners of war during the
hostilities in the Transvaal, or to be released on _parole
d'honneur_ on condition that they should leave the Transvaal at
once, cross into the Free State under escort, and not bear arms
against the Republican Government during the war. The second
alternative was chosen. They received an escort and free pass from
Commandant-General Piet Joubert. The following is extracted from
Captain Lambert's Report to Sir George Colley on January 5:

We started about 1 p.m. from the Boer camp, passing through the town
of Heidelberg. After going about six to eight miles, I noticed we
were not going the right road, and mentioned the fact to the escort,
who said it was all right. Having been 'look-out' officer in the
Transvaal, I knew the district well. I was certain we were going
wrong, but we had to obey orders. At nightfall we found ourselves
nowhere near the river drift, and were ordered to outspan for the
night, and next morning the escort told us they would look for the
drift. Inspanning at daybreak, we again started, but after driving
about for some hours across country, I told the escort we would stop
where we were while they went to search for the drift. Shortly after
they returned and said they had found it, and we must come, which we
did, eventually arriving at the junction of two rivers (Vaal and
Klip), where we found the Vaal impassable, but a small punt, capable
of holding only two passengers at most, by which they said we must
cross. I pointed out that it was impossible to get my carriage or
horses over by it, and that it was not the punt the General said we
were to cross. The escort replied it was Pretorius's punt that the
General told them to take us, and we must cross; that we must leave
the carriage behind and swim the horses, which we refused to do, as
we then should have had no means of getting on. I asked them to show
me their written instructions, which they did (written in Dutch), and
I pointed out that the name of Pretorius was not in it. I then told
them they must either take us back to the Boer camp again or on to
the proper drift. We turned back, and after going a few miles the
escort disappeared. Not knowing where we were, I proposed to Captain
Elliott we should go to the banks of the Vaal, and follow the river
till we came to the proper punt. After travelling all Monday,
Tuesday, and up till Wednesday about 1 p.m., when we found ourselves
four hours, or twenty-five miles, from Spencer's punt, we were
suddenly stopped by two armed Boers, who handed us an official
letter, which was opened, and found to be from the Secretary to the
Republican Government, stating that the members were surprised that,
as officers and gentlemen, we had broken our _parole d'honneur_, and
refused to leave the Transvaal; that if we did not do so immediately
by the nearest drift, which the bearers would show us, we must
return as prisoners of war; that as through our ignorance of the
language of the country there might be some misunderstanding, they
were loth to think we had willingly broken our promise. We explained
that we should reply to the letter, and request them to take it to
their Government, and were prepared to go with them at once. They
took us back to a farmhouse, where we were told to wait until they
fetched their commandant, who arrived about 6 p.m., and repeated to
us the same that was contained in our letter of that day. We told
him we were ready to explain matters, and requested him to take our
answer back to camp. He then ordered us to start at once for the
drift. I asked him, as it was then getting dark, if we could start
early next morning, but he refused. So we started, he having said we
should cross at Spencer's, being closest. As we left the farmhouse,
I pointed out to him that we were going in the wrong direction; but
he said, 'Never mind; come on across a drift close at hand.' When we
got opposite it, he kept straight on; I called to him, and said that
this was where we were to cross. His reply was, 'Come on!' I then
said to Captain Elliott, 'They intend taking us back to Pretoria,'
distant some forty miles. Suddenly the escort (which had all at once
increased from two to eight men, which Captain Elliott pointed out
to me; and I replied, 'I suppose they are determined we shall not
escape, which they need not be afraid of, as we are too keen to get
over the border') wheeled sharp down to the river, stopped, and,
pointing to the banks, said, 'There is the drift--cross!' I drove my
horses into the river, when they immediately fell; lifted them, and
drove on about five or six yards, when we fell into a hole. Got them
out with difficulty, and advanced another yard, when we got stuck
against a rock. The current was now so strong and drift deep, my
cart was turned over on to its side, and water rushed over the seat.
I called out to the commandant on the bank that we were stuck and to
send assistance, or might we return, to which he replied, 'If you
do, we will shoot you.' I then tried, but failed, to get the horses
to move. Turning to Captain Elliott, who was sitting beside me, I
said, 'We must swim for it'; and asked could he swim, to which he
replied, 'Yes.' I said, 'If you can't, I will stick to you, for I
can.' While we were holding this conversation, a volley from the
bank, ten or fifteen yards off, was fired into us, the bullets
passing through the tent of my cart, one of which must have mortally
wounded poor Elliott, who only uttered the single word 'Oh!' and
fell headlong into the river from the carriage. I immediately sprang
in after him, but was swept down the river under the current some
yards. On gaining the surface of the water, I could see nothing of
Elliott, but I called out his name twice, but received no reply.
Immediately another volley was fired at me, making the water hiss
around where the bullets struck. I now struck out for the opposite
bank, which I reached with difficulty in about ten minutes; but as
it was deep, black mud, on landing I stuck fast, but eventually
reached the top of the bank, and ran for about two hundred yards
under a heavy fire the whole while.

The Boers then invaded Natal and took up a position on Laing's Nek,
four miles inside the Natal border, from which, on January 28, Sir
George Colley endeavoured to oust them with a mounted force of 70 men
and some 500 men of the 58th Regiment. The position is one difficult
enough to climb unencumbered by military accoutrements, but the
disposition of the little mounted force covered the approach. By some
unexplained mistake, however, half of the mounted infantry charged
and carried the Boer position before the 58th had climbed the hill,
but were too weak to hold it and retired, leaving the 58th uncovered
in a terrible ascent. But few of the exhausted men reached the top of
the hill, and those, led by Colonel Deane, only to be shot down. Of
the mounted men, 17 were killed and wounded; of the 58th, 73 were
killed and 100 wounded. The result was absolute defeat of the British
forces. The number of Boers engaged is not known, but the force
behind the Nek consisted of several thousands, and no doubt a fair
proportion engaged in the fight.

On February 8 General Colley made a demonstration in force on the
Ingogo Heights. The force consisted of under 300 men, with 4 guns and
38 mounted men. On the Boer side there were about 1,000 men, and the
fight lasted from morning until after dark. It was a drawn fight, in
which both parties left the battlefield at night. There cannot be any
doubt, however, that the balance of advantage was with the Boers,
since the loss on the British side was very severe: 76 men were
killed and 69 wounded.

On February 27 came Majuba, when Sir George Colley designed to
retrieve his fortunes and strike an effective blow without the aid of
his second-in-command, Sir Evelyn Wood, whom he had sent to hurry up
reinforcements. The scaling of the mountain at night was a fine
performance. The neglect to take the rocket apparatus or mountain
guns, or to fortify the position in any way, or even to acquaint the
members of the force with the nature of the position which they had
taken up in the dark, and the failure to use the bayonets, were the
principal causes of disaster. The Boers attacked in force a position
which should have been absolutely impregnable, held as it was by a
force of 554 soldiers. The Boer force is not known, but probably
consisted of upwards of 1,000 men, since Christian Joubert after the
fight offered to take a portion of the men, numbering, as he said,
some 500, to attack a small British laager on one of the spurs of
the mountain. The splendid feat of taking the hill-top, however, was
accomplished by a small storming party of less than 200 men, the
balance of the Boer forces covering the approach of their comrades
by an accurate and incessant long-range fire. The result, as is
known, was terrible disaster: 92 killed and 134 wounded, and a
number taken prisoners, represented the British loss, whilst the
Boers lost 1 killed and 5 wounded. No attempt had been made to
occupy positions below the crown of the hill which commanded the
approaches, and the Boers were able to creep up under good cover
from place to place by the exercise of their admirable tactics. It
is impossible to detract from the performance of the Boers, and a
glance at the position leaves one more astonished than ever that a
successful attack could ever have been made upon it. The Boers
displayed on this day the finest fighting qualities. The generalship
of their fighting Commandant, Nikolas Smit, was of the highest
order. The cleverness of the attack, and the personal bravery and
audacity of the storming party are beyond praise.

By the time Sir Evelyn Wood had ranged his forces for an effective
and extended attack on the Boers, and by the time Sir Frederick
Roberts with the command of about 10,000 men had reached South
Africa, the administration of Mr. Gladstone had awakened to the fact
that the war was an unjust--not to say costly--one. An armistice was
arranged and peace made without another blow.

The terms of the settlement proposed by the Liberal Government fitly
illustrate the generosity of their motives. They proposed doing
'simple justice' to the Boers, but at the same time retaining the
districts of Lydenburg, Middelburg, Wakkerstroom, and Utrecht, not to
mention handing back Zoutpansberg to the original native occupants.
So anxious were the Boer leaders to effect a peaceful settlement, so
fearful were they of the actions of their followers, that when they
arranged the long armistice they did not announce to their party the
intentions of the British Government regarding the above districts.
General Joubert did not communicate to his army the terms of peace,
but simply stated that a Royal Commission was to settle everything.
A month later, when some inkling of the terms reached the Boers, a
solemn protest and warning was issued, and when the Royal Commission
actually sat, the British representatives were informed that any
such curtailment of the territories would be followed by a
resumption of hostilities. Needless to say the proposals were
abandoned and the Boers got their way. So ended the war.

Ingogo has been called a drawn battle. Bronkhorst Spruit was--such as
it was. At Laing's Nek and Majuba the Boers beat us, as Mr. Carter
fairly puts it, 'when they were on the top of the hill and we were at
the bottom, and when we were on the top of the hill and they were at
the bottom.' The narrative of these events is about as humiliating a
one as an Englishman can read. Here and there it is redeemed by the
heroic conduct of individuals in the midst of general disaster. In
the smaller affairs, such as the particularly gallant defences of
Standerton, Potchefstroom, and Rustenberg, where little garrisons
held their own with conspicuous ability and courage, there is
something to cheer the disheartened reader. The defence of
Potchefstroom by Colonel Winslow should be read in full for several
reasons. The siege of Standerton witnessed several acts of valour,
but, above all, that of Hall the volunteer, who single handed
deliberately engaged a force of over 300 Boers, drawing their fire on
himself in order to warn his comrades of the danger of being cut off
and to give them a chance of escape--a noble act in which the gallant
fellow achieved his object but lost his life. It was in Rustenberg
where Captain Auchinleck, with about seventy men armed only with
rifles, held his laager against hundreds of the enemy, fighting day
and night for weeks; and eventually drove off the Boers who were
trenching towards his position by charging at night with from nine to
fourteen of his men and clearing the enemy out of the trenches with
the bayonet. This performance he repeated three times, himself badly
wounded on each occasion. The impression created on the enemy by
these tactics was such that they overcame their desire to get at
close quarters with him, and left him severely alone.

It is not necessary to refer in great detail to the settlement In
effect it was that the Boers gained nearly all that they required,
but not until the haggling and threatening had robbed concessions of
all appearance of grace and justice. The natives were referred to in
the conventional spirit. The unfortunate loyalists were left to take
care of themselves. The men who had entered the Transvaal, and
invested their capital and expended their energies there upon the
most positive and sacred assurances of the British Government that
the Queen's authority would never be withdrawn,--assurances given in
public by the Conservative Government and confirmed by Mr.
Gladstone's Government, assurances published by Sir Bartle Frere and
Sir Garnet Wolseley, who said that 'as long as the sun would shine
the British flag would fly over the Transvaal,'--were heartlessly
abandoned, their protests were unheeded, the compensation allotted to
them, namely, £1,400,000, was amended by the elimination of the
million, their representations to Mr. Gladstone's Government were
finally left unanswered--unless it be that the sneering reference
made by that right honourable gentleman in the House of Commons to
'interested contractors and landjobbers' may be considered an
adequate answer to a protest as moderate, as able, as truthful, and
as necessary as Mr. Gladstone's remark was the reverse. In very
truth, the position in which the British Premier had placed himself
through his intemperate speeches in the Midlothian campaign, and his
subsequent 'explaining away,' was an extremely unpleasant one. In
Opposition Mr. Gladstone had denounced the annexation and demanded a
repeal. On accession to power he adopted the policy of his
predecessors, and affirmed that the annexation could never be
revoked. On June 8, 1880, he had written to this effect to Messrs.
Kruger and Joubert, the Transvaal deputation. Later on, in answer to
an appeal that he should allay the apprehensions of the loyalists,
who feared the results of the Boer agitation, he referred them to
this very letter as a final expression of opinion, and authorized the
publication of this message. When, however, peace had been concluded,
and the loyalists, amazed and heartbroken at their threatened
desertion, reminded him of his pledges and implored him to respect
them, he answered them in a letter which is surely without parallel
in the record of self-respecting Governments. The wriggling, the
equivocation, the distortion of phrases, the shameless 'explaining
away,' are of a character that would again justify the remark of
Lord Salisbury (then Lord Robert Cecil) in another matter many years
before, that they were 'tactics worthy of a pettifogging attorney,'
and even the subsequent apology--to the attorney. But what answer
could be made to a protest which reminded the right honourable
gentlemen of the following deliberate and official expression of his
Government's policy?--

In your letter to me (wrote Mr. White for the loyalists) you claim
that the language of your letter does not justify the description
given. With the greatest respect I submit that it does, and I will
quote the words on which I and also my colleagues base the opinion
that it does unequivocally pledge the Government to the
non-relinquishment of the Transvaal.

The actual words of your letter are:

'Looking at all the circumstances, both of the Transvaal and the rest
of South Africa, and to the necessity of preventing a renewal of the
disorders, which might lead to disastrous consequences, not only to
the Transvaal, but to the whole of South Africa, _our judgment is
that the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish the Transvaal_; but,
consistently with the maintenance of that sovereignty, we desire that
the white inhabitants of the Transvaal should, without prejudice to
the rest of the population, enjoy the fullest liberty to manage their
local affairs.'

But your letter of the 8th of June not only contained this final and
absolute announcement of the policy of England, but it gave the
reasons for arriving at it in words which so aptly express the case
of the loyalists that I quote them _in extenso_. They are as follows:

'It is undoubtedly matter for much regret that it should, since the
annexation, have appeared that so large a number of the population of
Dutch origin in the Transvaal are opposed to the annexation of that
territory, _but it is impossible now to consider that question as if
it were presented for the first time_. We have to do with a state of
things which has existed for a considerable period, _during which
obligations have been contracted_, especially, though not
exclusively, towards the native population, _which cannot be set
aside_.'

In your speech in the House of Commons, on the debate on Mr. Peter
Rylands' motion condemning the annexation of the country and the
enforcement of British supremacy in it, which was defeated by a
majority of ninety-six, on the 21st of January in the current year,
you used words of similar import. You are reported in the _Times_ of
the 22nd of January as saying:

'To disapprove the annexation of a country is one thing; to abandon
that annexation is another. Whatever we do, we must not blind
ourselves to the legitimate consequences of facts. By the annexation
obligations entailed by the annexation, and if in my opinion, and in
the opinion of many on this side of the House, wrong was done by the
annexation itself, _that would not warrant us in doing fresh,
distinct, and separate wrong by a disregard of the obligation which
that annexation entailed_. These obligations have been referred to in
this debate, and have been mentioned in the compass of a single
sentence. First, there was the obligation entailed towards the
English and other settlers in the Transvaal, perhaps including a
minority, though a very small minority, of the Dutch Boers
themselves; secondly, there was the obligation to the native races;
and thirdly, there was the obligation we entailed upon ourselves in
respect of the responsibility which was already incumbent upon us,
and which we, by the annexation, largely extended, for the future
peace and tranquillity of South Africa.'

Nor was this all. The loyalists proceeded to remind him that Lord
Kimberley, his Secretary of State for the Colonies, had telegraphed
in May, 1880, 'Under no circumstances can the Queen's authority in
the Transvaal be relinquished,' and had confirmed the telegram in a
despatch following; and that his lordship had also stated in the
House of Lords on May 24 that '... after a careful consideration of
the position, we have come to the conclusion that we could not
relinquish the Transvaal. Nothing could be more unfortunate than
uncertainty in respect to such a matter.' (Hansard, cclii., p. 208.)

The effects of the settlement, and the exposures in connection with
it, and the attitude of the Imperial Government were most deplorable.
No credit was given by the Boers to a Government which was clearly
moved by the meanest considerations. No feeling but contempt,
disgust, and even hatred, could be entertained by the loyalists for
the Government which had so shamelessly deserted them. The settlement
has left its indelible mark upon the sentiment of South Africa. The
war, it will generally be admitted, was a most unfortunate
occurrence. Only one thing could have been more unfortunate, and that
was such a settlement as actually was effected--a settlement which
satisfied no one, which outraged all, which threw South Africa into a
state of boiling discontent. In some quarters the defeats of Majuba
and Laing's Nek rankled deeply; yet they were fair fights, and Time
can be trusted to allay the feelings of those who are worsted in a
fair fight; but there were other matters which roused a spirit in
the English-speaking people of South Africa that had never been
known before.

The former records of the Boers, favourable and unfavourable, are
consistent with the records established in the War of Independence.
None dare belittle the spirit which moved them to take up arms
against the greatest Power in the world. Their ignorance may have
been great, but not so great as to blind them to the fact that they
were undertaking an unequal contest. It is not possible to say, with
due regard to their records, that they are not a courageous people.
Individual bravery, of the kind which takes no heed of personal risk,
reckless heroic dash, they have not, nor do they pretend to have.
Their system is entirely otherwise. They do not seek fighting for
fighting's sake. They do not like exposing themselves to risk and
danger. Their caution and their care for personal safety are such
that, judged by the standard of other people's conduct in similar
positions, they are frequently considered to be wanting in personal
courage. It seems a hard thing to say of a people who have produced
men like the first Bezuidenhout, who fought and died single-handed
against the British troops; men like Piet Retief, as gallant a man as
ever walked; men like Piet Uys, an example to all men for all time,
and only one of many generations in one family of equally gallant
Dutchmen; but it would truly seem that such examples do not occur
with such frequency among the Boers as among nations with whom they
have been compared. Where they have been able to choose their own
positions, or where they have been stimulated by previous successes,
they have done all that could possibly be asked of them; but their
particular military system does not conduce to success under
circumstances where men are suddenly and unexpectedly called upon to
exhibit the virtues of discipline, to make what to the individual may
appear a useless sacrifice of life, or, in cold blood and in the face
of previous defeat, to attempt to retrieve a lost position.

The Boer military power has been called the biggest unpricked bubble
in the world. Whether this be so or not--whether the early conflicts
between the British troops and the Boers in the Cape Colony and Natal
justify the view that the Boers cannot take a beating and come up
again--is a matter for those to decide who will give their impartial
attention to the records.

Whilst conspicuous personal daring among the Boers may not be
proverbial, it must be remembered to their everlasting credit that
they, as did the Southerners in the American Civil War, robbed the
cradle and the grave to defend their country. Boys who were mere
children bore rifles very nearly as long as themselves; old men, who
had surely earned by a life of hardship and exposure an immunity from
such calls, jumped on their horses and rode without hesitation and
without provision to fight for their independence.

There were, however, unfortunately, matters connected with the war
which gave birth to a bitter and aching desire for revenge.
Bronkhorst Spruit and the murder of Captain Elliott were among the
earliest. Another was the shooting of Dr. Barbour (who was killed
instantly) and Mr. Walter Dyas (wounded) by their escort under
circumstances similar to those of the Elliott murder, with the
exception that in this case the prisoners had been released on foot
and in daylight, and were then shot down.

But there were others too. There was the murder of Green in
Lydenburg, who was called to the Boer camp, where he went unarmed and
in good faith, only to have his brains blown out by the Boer with
whom he was conversing; there was the public flogging of another
Englishman by the notorious Abel Erasmus because he was an Englishman
and had British sympathies; and there were the various white flag
incidents. At Ingogo the Boers raised the white flag, and when in
response to this General Colley ordered the hoisting of a similar
flag to indicate that it was seen, a perfect hail of lead was poured
on the position where the General stood; and it was obvious that the
hoisting of the flag was merely a ruse to ascertain where the General
and his staff were. There was the ambulance affair on Majuba, when
the Boers came upon an unarmed party bearing the wounded with the red
cross flying over them, and after asking who they were and getting a
reply, fired a volley into the group, killing Surgeon-Major Cornish.
under Commandant Cronjé were guilty of actions contrary to the usages
of civilized warfare. They are matters of history, and can easily be
verified. Reference is made to them elsewhere in this volume in
connection with Commandant Cronjé's action on another occasion.

And so the war left the country, as wars will, divided into two
parties, with feelings towards each other that are deplorable enough
in themselves, and not easily allayed. The curtain was rung down, and
the scene was lost to the view of the world, but the play went on all
the same behind the curtain. And this is what the new Government said
to the world on August 8, 1881, when they took over the
administration of the country:

To all inhabitants, without exception, we promise the protection of
the law, and all the privileges attendant thereon.

To inhabitants who are not burghers, and do not wish to become such,
we notify that they have the right to report themselves to the
Resident as British subjects, according to Article 28 of the now
settled Convention. But be it known to all, that all ordinary rights
of property, trade, and usages will still be accorded to everyone,
burgher or not.

We repeat solemnly that our motto is, 'Unity and reconciliation.'


Footnotes for Chapter I

{01} Written in 1896.

{02} Several of the letters and despatches given in this volume are
quoted from Mr. Martineau's excellent 'Life of Sir Bartle Frere,' a
portion of which book was lately published in cheaper form, under
the title of 'The Transvaal Trouble and How it Arose.'

{03} It is only fair to state that _at that time_ the Home Government
believed the prestige of the Imperial authority to be sufficient for
all purposes.




CHAPTER II