is cooler than when I left, but I fear we have not done with the heat
yet. All agree that September is about the worst month in the year
here.

_Calcutta.--September 8th._--I do not think that Dr. M. is
particularly proud of the way in which I am bearing up against this
oppressive and depressing season.... I wish that we were going to the
Neilgherries instead of to Simla. The climate is, I believe, better,
and the place more agreeable, but it is entirely out of the way of
business for me now, whereas Simla is a natural stage to the most
important part of my government.

_September 17th._--... I have given up my morning walks. It is now
always sultry before sunrise, and the dullness of pacing up and down my
garden at that hour is intolerable. So I walk till daylight in my
verandah....

_September 23rd._--... It seems strange to think that this is one of
the last letters which you will receive from me in England, but yet it
is still a long time before I can hope to see you here. The poor boys!
You will be preparing to part from them, and all will be sad. Give
them my love and blessing.

[Sidenote: Business revived.]

In the month of November the sittings of the Legislative Council, which had
been suspended during the hot weather, were resumed, and the monotonous
routine of the autumn was exchanged for more active, though hardly more
laborious, work in maturing legislative measures. As President of this
Council Lord Elgin threw himself with his usual zeal and assiduity into the
discussion of the various administrative questions which demanded solution.

As the cold weather came on, he suffered much from the transition. Writing
on the 4th of November to Sir C. Wood, he says: 'At the commencement of the
cool season, on which we are now entering, we suffer from all manner of
minor ailments; so I hope you will excuse a short letter.' And again on the
9th: 'I am half blind and rather shaky from fever still, so that again I
shall be brief in my epistle to you.' Soon, however, these ailments
disappeared, and in the cooler temperature he regained to a great extent
his usual health.

[Sidenote: Arrival of Lady Elgin.]

A few weeks later the long dreary months of separation from all that he
most loved were happily ended by the arrival of Lady Elgin, who with his
youngest daughter, Lady Louisa Bruce,  reached Calcutta on the 8th of
January 1863.

[Sidenote: State of India.]

In passing from the personal narrative of these months, to their public
history, it is necessary to bear in mind what was the state of the Indian
Empire at the moment when Lord Elgin undertook its government.

[Sidenote: Peace.]

'India,' to use his own words, 'was at peace; at peace in a sense of
the term more emphatic and comprehensive than it had ever before borne
in India. The occurrences which had taken place during the period of
Lord Dalhousie's government had established the prestige of the
British arms as against external foes. Lord Canning's Vice-royalty had
taught the same lesson to domestic enemies.  No military operations of
magnitude were in progress, to call for prompt and vigorous action on
the part of the ruling authority, or to furnish matter for narrations
of thrilling interest. On the contrary, a hearty acquiescence in the
belief that no such opportunities existed, and that it was incumbent
upon him, by all practicable means, to prevent their recurrence, was
the first duty which the situation of affairs prescribed to a new
Governor-General.'

[Sidenote: Questions to be solved.]

There were indeed grave questions awaiting solution; questions of great
perplexity and embarrassment, though of a domestic and peaceful character;
some of them the more perplexing because they bore upon 'those jealousies
of race which are the sources of almost all our difficulties in India.' But
as regards such questions his habitual caution, as well as the philosophic
turn of his mind, led him to study very carefully all the conditions of
each problem before attempting to propound any solution of his own; and in
the meantime he felt that his duty was to employ any personal influence
which he could acquire in smoothing the course of such measures as had been
set in operation by the authority of others. 'The first virtue,' he said to
one of his colleagues, 'which you and I have to practise here at present is
Self-denial. We must, for a time at least, walk in paths traced out by
others.'

But though, for the reasons above stated, it would be a mistake to look in
the records of the time for any great measures, executive or
administrative, on which he had set his mark, his various speeches and
letters, more especially the full and frank communications which he
addressed from time to time to the Secretary of State for India, Sir
Charles Wood, show with what keenness of interest, as well as with what
sagacity, he approached the study of Indian questions. A few extracts from
his correspondence are here given to illustrate this; and as affording some
indication of the unremitting industry with which he laboured at this
period, searching into and maturing his views upon one difficult subject
after another, as well as the whole plan of Indian government.

_To Sir Charles Wood._

Calcutta, April 9th, 1862.

[Sidenote: The Army.]

Now for the Army. I must observe, in the first place, that in the
reasoning employed here in favour of the maintenance of a large army,
native and European, there is a good deal that is circular, and
puzzling to a beginner.

When I ask why so considerable a native army is required, I am told
that the native must bear a certain proportion to the European force;
that Europeans cannot undertake cantonment duties, or, speaking
generally, any of the duties which the military may from time to time
be called to render in support of the civil power, during peace; that
in war, again, they are admirable on the battle-field, but that they
cannot turn their victories to account by following up a discomfited
foe, unless they have the aid of native troops, nor perform many other
services which are not less indispensable than great battles to
success against an enemy who knows the ground and is inured to the
climate.

This line of argument very naturally raises the question, wherefore
then is the maintenance of so large a European army necessary?
Rebellion has been crushed, and European troops are not suited for the
repression of such local disturbances as occasionally occur. There is
little present prospect of war from without, though Persia is moving
towards Herat, and apparently preparing for Dost Mohammed's death. The
answer which I invariably receive is this--'You cannot tell what will
happen in India. Heretofore you have held the Sikhs in subjection by
the aid of the Sepoys, and the Sepoys by means of the Sikhs. But see
what is happening now. The Sikh soldiers are quartered all over India.
They are fraternising with the natives of the South--adopting their
customs and even their faith. Half the soldiers in a regiment lately
stationed at Benares were converted to Hindooism before they left that
holy place. Beware, or you will shortly have to cope in India with a
hostile combination more formidable than any of those which you have
encountered before.' If you draw from all this the inference that what
you really dread is your native army, you get into the vicious circle
again.

Do not suppose that I am tempted by these logical paradoxes to run to
hasty conclusions. I am aware that for many reasons we must now
entertain, and probably shall long find it necessary to entertain, a
large army, native and European, in India. Practically, what we have
to do is to endeavour, by a judicious system of recruiting,
organisation, and distribution, to render our army as serviceable and
as little a source of peril as may be. But I do think that they go far
to prove that, notwithstanding our vast physical superiority to
anything which can be brought against us, we should find it a
difficult task to maintain our authority in India by the sword alone;
and that they justify a very jealous scrutiny of all schemes of
expenditure for military objects which render necessary the imposition
or maintenance of taxes which occasion general discontent, or deprive
the Government of the funds requisite for carrying on works of
improvement that have the double advantage of stimulating the growth
of wealth in the country, and increasing the efficiency of the means
of self-defence which we possess.

*       *       *       *       *

_To a Friend in Scotland, interested in the Cultivation of Cotton._

Calcutta, May 21st, 1862.

[Sidenote: Cultivation of cotton.]

I beg to assure you that I do not yield to yourself in my desire to
promote the extension of cotton cultivation in India, and, above all,
improvement in the quality of the staple. I consider that the
interests of India are involved in this improvement to a greater
degree even than those of Great Britain; for, no doubt, if the quality
of the Indian product were so far raised as to admit of its competing
on terms approaching to equality with that of America, it would obtain
a permanent footing in the great market to which it has access now
only at moments of extraordinary dearth.

Moreover, I do not scruple to confess to you that I am not so bigoted
in my adhesion to the dogmas of political economy, as to be unwilling,
at a season of crisis like the present, to entertain proposals for
accelerating this result, merely because they contravene the
principles of that science. On the contrary, I receive thankfully
suggestions for accomplishing an object which I have so much at heart,
more especially when they emanate from persons deeply interested and
thoroughly conversant with the subject, like yourself--even when they
fall within the category of what you style 'extraordinary measures.'

But you will surely allow that the _onus probandi_ lies very heavily
on a Government which adopts measures of this class; and that if, by
abnormal interference, it checks the natural and healthy operation of
the laws of demand on capitalists and cultivators, it incurs a weighty
responsibility.

Even as regards the specific recommendation which you have made, and
which has much to justify it in my eyes--because I would go great
lengths in the direction of aiding the Ryots to improve their staple,
if I could see my way to effect this object without doing more harm
than good--I must observe that there are questions which have to be
very gravely and carefully examined before it can be acted upon.

In the first place, it is right that I should tell you that the
opinion which obtains here respecting the result of recent operations
in Dharwar, in so far as the case furnishes a precedent for the
interference of Government officers in such matters, differs widely
from that entertained by you.

But, setting this point aside, and assuming for the sake of argument
that the interposition at Dharwar was attended by unmixed benefit to
all concerned, does it follow that corresponding success would
accompany the mission of fifty military officers to the cotton
districts of India for the purpose of inducing the Ryots to substitute
exotic for native cotton in their cultivation?

In order to do this exotic cotton justice, it must be treated with
some care, especially at the time of its introduction into districts
where it has been previously unknown. Conditions of climate as well as
of soil must be taken into consideration in determining the time and
method of cultivation. The climate of Dharwar, where the monsoons
meet, differs widely from that of many parts of India, where the
seasons are divided between a deluge of rain and a period of baking
heat. Am I likely to find fifty young military officers who would be
competent to advise the Ryots on points of so much delicacy? And if
the Ryots, following their counsels, were disappointed in the
expectations which they had been led to form, what would be the effect
on the prospects of cotton cultivation in India?

I do not say all this in condemnation of your scheme, but in order to
point out to you how much has to be thought of before it can be acted
upon.

Meanwhile there are measures for promoting the interests of cotton
cultivation in India, which the Government can adopt without
abandoning its proper sphere of action; not only without danger, but
with a high probability, perhaps I might say a certainty, of benefit
to the great cause which we have in hand.

We can facilitate the establishment in India of European cultivators
and landholders, who are the natural and legitimate advisers of the
native peasantry on such questions as those to which I have been
referring.

We can improve communication so as to render the transport of the raw
material to the ports of shipment more cheap and rapid.

To these and similar measures the attention of the Government of India
is earnestly directed; with every disposition to take such further
means of stimulating production as prudence may justify.

I have written at some length, but the importance of the subject and
my respect for your opinion are my excuse.

*       *       *       *       *

_To Sir Charles Wood._

Calcutta, May 9th, 1862.

[Sidenote: Orientals not satisfied with show of power.]

I know that it is customary with certain people whose opinions are
entitled to respect, to act on the assumption that all Orientals are
children, amused and gratified by external trappings and ceremonies
and titles, and ready to put up with the loss of real dignity and
power if they are only permitted to enjoy the semblance of it. I am
disposed to question the correctness of this assumption. I believe, on
the contrary, that the Eastern imagination is singularly prone to
invest outward things with a symbolic character; and that relaxations
on points of form are valued by them, chiefly because they are held
necessarily to imply concessions on substantial matters.

*       *       *       *       *

_To Sir Charles Wood._

Calcutta, June 21st, 1862.

[Sidenote: Imprudence of a missionary.]

You may be interested by reading a letter (of which I enclose a copy)
written by the officer commanding the cavalry at Delhi on the subject
of an alleged assault by a native trooper on a missionary. I should
think that the cause of Christian truth and charity would be as well
served by preaching in a church or a building of some sort, as by
holding forth in the streets in a city full of fanatical unbelievers.
If I am told that the Apostles pursued the latter course, I would
observe that they had the authorities as well as the mob against them,
and took not only the thrashings of the latter, but also the judicial
penalties inflicted by the former, like men. It is a very different
matter when you have a powerful Government to fall back upon, and to
quell any riots which you may raise. However, these are burning
questions, and one must handle them cautiously.

*       *       *       *       *

_To Mr. Edmonstone, Lieut.-Governor of the N.W. Provinces._

Calcutta, May 27th, 1862.

[Sidenote: Rumours of disaffection.]

I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 19th inst., and I beg
that you will make a habit of writing to me whenever anything occurs
respecting which you may desire to communicate with me confidentially.

I do not, I confess, attach any great importance to such incidents as
the circulation of the prophecy which you have enclosed to me. It is
quite as probable that it may be the act of some mischievous person
who desires to keep alive excitement in the popular mind, as the
indication of an excitement already existing.

It must, moreover, be observed that the English press throughout India
has taken advantage of the advance of Sooltan Jan on Furrah to
descant, at great length and with much fervour, on all perils, present
and prospective, to which British rule in India is, or may be,
exposed. That the Mahommedan mind, thus stimulated and encouraged,
should altogether eschew such speculations, could hardly be expected.

It is impossible, however, to be too vigilant in watching these
manifestations of opinion; and I trust that you will not fail to put
me in possession of all the symptoms of disquietude which may reach
you, however trivial they may seem to be.

I need hardly point out to you how important it is that your inquiries
should be so conducted as to give no countenance to the impression
that they are prompted by any nervous anxiety, or that we should be
much discomposed even if the 12th Imaum himself were to make his
appearance.

For my own part, I am firmly resolved to put down with promptitude and
severity any attempt at disturbance which may be made in any part of
India, and I do not care how generally my determination on this point
is known. I shall pursue this policy, not because I fear for the
stability of our empire in the East, but because tranquillity is
essential to the progress of the country, and because lenity to the
guilty originators of such machinations leads invariably to the
severest punishment and suffering of misguided followers.

*       *       *       *       *

_To Sir Charles Wood._

Calcutta, June 17th, 1862.

[Sidenote: Groundless alarms at Delhi.]

The follies which are committed by the military panicmongers in the
North-west are very vexatious, and pregnant with mischief of all
kinds.... I made up my mind yesterday to set off in person and go
straight to Delhi, if the thing goes on. As a rising of troops against
us in places where the Europeans have all the artillery, and at least
equal the native forces in number, is rather too strong a dose even
for the weakest nerves, the stock in trade now is the  existence of
designs for the  assassination of Europeans.... These topics are
probably the conversation at every mess-table, indulged in before the
native servants, who would be the agents in such plots if they were to
be carried out. It is a remarkable fact that, although secret murder
by poison and otherwise is not unknown among natives between
themselves, as directed against Europeans, it is, I believe, almost
entirely unexampled. It is not impossible, however, that constant
discussions on the subject may familiarise the native mind with the
idea.

But talking is not all. The commanding officer at Agra has acted on
these suspicions, and, in the face of the native population, taken
extraordinary precautions on the assumption that the wells are
poisoned. We have no report as yet on the subject. All we know is from
the newspapers; but of the fact, I fear, there can be little doubt. If
there be disaffected persons in that locality (and no doubt there are
many such), it will be strange indeed if they do not profit by so
broad a hint. Then again, this panic beginning with the officers
spreads to the men. Some cases of terrorism have occurred at Delhi
which are a disgrace to our race. And of course we know what follows.
Cowardice and cruelty being twins, the man who runs terror-stricken
into his barrack to-night because he mistook the chirp of a cricket
for the click of a pistol, indemnifies himself to-morrow by beating
his bearer to within an inch of his life.

All this is very bad, and very difficult to control. After the lesson
of 1857 it will not do for me to adopt the happy-go-lucky tone, and to
pooh-pooh what professes to be information. To preach common sense
from a safe distance is equally futile. It therefore occurred to me
that the only thing practically to do, would be to go to the head-
quarters of the panic, surround myself by native troops, and put a
stop to the nonsense by example.

If I had been anywhere else except in India, I should have acted upon
this determination at once; but here there are such enormous physical
difficulties in the way, that one is obliged to think twice before
setting out on such an expedition. However, I have not abandoned the
intention, and shall certainly carry it out, if this sort of thing
goes on. We cannot afford to have the progress of the country arrested
by such _misères_. The alarmists succeeded in bringing down the price
of our stocks a few days ago.

By the bye, last night was fixed upon by my anonymous correspondents
for my own assassination.

*       *       *       *       *

_To Sir Charles Wood._

Calcutta, June 22nd, 1862.

[Sidenote: The murder of a native.]

I have had, this week, a very painful matter to deal with. A man of
the name of Budd, a soldier who had obtained his discharge in order to
accompany an officer of the name of ---- to Australia, killed a native
in the Punjâb some months ago under the following circumstances. He
was desired by ---- to procure a sheep for him. He went to a native,
from whom he appears to have procured sheep before, and took one. The
native protested against his taking this particular sheep, because it
was with lamb, but said he might take any other from the flock. Budd
paid no heed to this remonstrance, put the sheep on the back of
another native, and marched off. The owner followed, complaining and
protesting. On tins Budd first fired two barrels over his head, then
threw stones at him, and finally went into the house, brought out
another gun, fired at him, and killed him on the spot. Besides
imploring that his sheep might be restored to him, it does not appear
that the native did anything at all to provoke this proceeding.

The perpetrator of this outrage being a European, the case could not
be tried on the spot. It was accordingly transferred to Calcutta;
witnesses, &c., being sent 1,000 miles at the public expense. Before
it came on, however, the counsel for the defence requested a
postponement in order to obtain further evidence. The request was
granted, and the trial deferred till another term.

[Sidenote: Punished by death.]

The trial came on a few days ago, and the jury, much to their honour,
found the prisoner guilty. On this an agitation was got up to obtain a
commutation of the sentence of death which had been passed by the
judge. A petition, with a great number of signatures, was presented in
the first instance to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal; but he was
advised that, the crime having been committed in the Punjab, he had
nothing to do with the case. It was then transmitted to me. There was
quite enough doubt as to my power of acting, to have justified me in
referring the case to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjâb. But I
felt that the delay, and, above all, the appearance of a desire to
shrink from the responsibility of passing a decision on the case,
which this step would involve, would be so mischievous, that, having
obtained from the Advocate-General an opinion that I had the requisite
authority, I determined to take the matter into my own hands. The
verdict was clearly borne out by the evidence. The sentence was in
accordance with the law, and the judge, to whom I referred, saw no
reason to question it. The decision of the Governor-General in Council
was, that the law must take its course.

[Sidenote: Little value put on native life.]

It is true that this murder was not committed with previous
preparation and deliberation. It had not, therefore, this special
quality of aggravation. But it was marked by an aggravation of its
own, not less culpable, and unfortunately only too frequently
characteristic of the homicides perpetrated by Europeans on natives in
this country. It was committed in wanton recklessness, almost without
provocation, under an impulse which would have been resisted if the
life of the victim had been estimated at the value of that of a dog.
Any action on my part which would have seemed to sanction this
estimate of the value of native life, would have been attended by the
most pernicious consequences.

It is bad enough as it is. The other day a station-master, somewhere
up country, kicked a native who was, as he says, milking a goat
belonging to the former. The native fell dead, and the local paper,
without a word of commiseration for the victim or his family,
complains of the hardship of compelling the station-master to go to
Calcutta, in this warm weather, to have the case inquired into. Other
instances in which the natives have died from the effect of personal
chastisement administered by Europeans have occurred since I have been
here.

I have gone at some length into this case, both because you may hear
of it, and also because it exemplifies what is really our greatest
source of embarrassment in this country--the extreme difficulty of
administering equal justice between natives and Europeans.

*       *       *       *       *

_To Sir Charles Wood._

July 16th, 1862.

[Sidenote: Against interference in Afghanistan.]

I am very much averse to any interference on our part in the quarrel
which is now on foot in Afghanistan; and, indeed, I do not very well
see my way as to how any such interference can be managed without
entailing responsibilities which we may regret at a later period. You
are doubtless aware that we have no agent with the Dost. He
particularly requested that no one should be sent to his court in that
capacity, and we assented to his views on this point. All we know of
what is going on there is derived from the reports of a native vakeel,
who reports more or less faithfully what he hears and sees, but who is
not, and I apprehend, could not be employed to speak on our behalf to
the Ameer. In order, therefore, to communicate with him, we must
either send a special agent, or write. Now it must be observed that in
this affair the Dost has not been the aggressor. The Herat chief
attacked him without any provocation. We offered him no assistance,
made no remonstrance, and left him to take care of himself. He has
asked us for nothing, and we have given him nothing. It is now
proposed that we should inform the Dost that if he goes beyond a
certain point, and Persia comes into the field to support Herat, he
must not expect any assistance from us. If we had an agent there it
would be easy to instruct him to make such an intimation; and if the
Dost were to ask us for any support, an answer which would convey this
hint might be given. But situated as we are, we must move cautiously
in this matter. If the Dost stops on our suggestion, and if (as is
frequently the case with Orientals), the enemy, ascribing his
moderation to weakness, presses him with increased vigour, what are we
to do then? Are we to stand by and laugh at our dupe, telling him that
though our advice got him into the scrape, he must find his own way
out of it? or are we to set to work to check his opponents? and if we
undertake the latter task, how far will it lead us?

It is quite impossible in these affairs, and with people of this
description, to say what an hour may bring forth. A shower of rain may
convert a victorious army into a baffled one, and an advance into a
retreat. The death of a man of eighty years of age will probably throw
all Afghanistan into confusion, convert friends into foes and _vice
versâ_. Instructions framed in Calcutta to meet one set of
circumstances may arrive in Afghanistan when the whole scene has
changed. I own that I am strongly of opinion that our true policy is
to leave these kinds of neighbours as much as possible alone; to mix
ourselves up as little as may be in their miserable intrigues, which
generally entail obligations which bind us and not them, and not
unfrequently lead to most unexpected issues. We should only speak when
we have a case of self-interest so clear that we can speak with
determination, and follow up our talk if necessary with a blow.

*       *       *       *       *

_To Sir Charles Wood._

August 9th, 1862.

[Sidenote: Withdrawal of vakeel.]

After a good deal of consideration as to how I can, with least risk of
getting this Government into trouble, put a spoke into the Dost's
wheel in his progress towards Herat, I have despatched to Sir R.
Montgomery the telegram of which I enclose a copy. The order sent to
our vakeel, desiring him to leave the Ameer's camp, and return to
India, if the Dost proceeds to extremities against Herat, will
sufficiently show that we discountenance any such proceeding; while at
the same time the measure commits us to nothing, gives the Dost no
such claim upon us as he would naturally have if we tendered advice to
him, and induced him to abandon his own projects in order to follow
it, and leaves us free to shape our policy as the shifting current of
events may prescribe. I pointed out to you in my letter of July 16,
that we are awkwardly situated for interfering with the Ameer. He is
our friend, and we said nothing when he was attacked. He has set to
work to redress his own injuries, asking us for no aid, and paying his
own way. We are quite entitled to say, 'Your hostile advance on Herat
has not our approval, and we must show that you are making it without
our sanction.' This we do in the most emphatic manner, by withdrawing
the only British official who is with him. But I do not like to go
farther in the direction of interference. It is impossible to say how
matters may terminate in Afghanistan. It is possible that the Ameer
may get the whole country into his hands. It is possible that he may
come to an understanding with Sultan Jan, who is his connection by
marriage. It is very desirable that we should be free to accept the
_status in quo_, whatever it may be.

*       *       *       *       *

_To Sir Charles Wood._

Calcutta, September 9th, 1862.

[Sidenote: Lord Canning's policy.]

A doubt naturally suggests itself as to whether the received notion
respecting the relations which Canning sought to establish between the
native chiefs and the British Government in India be altogether
correct, or, (as it perhaps would be more accurate to say) altogether
complete--whether, in short, that portion of it which was a policy of
circumstance has been duly distinguished from that which was a policy
of principle: a doubt by no means unimportant, now that this policy,
whatever it be, is crowned by the double aureole of success and death;
so that while, on the one hand, it is naturally set up as an example
for imitation, on the other, we have not the author to refer to when
difficulties arise respecting its application.

[Sidenote: (1) Clemency.]

In approaching the consideration of this very momentous question we
must, in the first place, be careful lest we suffer ourselves to draw
erroneous conclusions from the warm expressions of gratitude and
affection lavished upon Canning by the natives generally. If I were to
venture to compare great things with small, I should say that their
feelings towards him were due to causes somewhat similar to those
which earned for me the good will and confidence of the French
Canadians in Canada. Both he and I adopted on some important points
views more favourable to the subject races than those which had been
entertained by our respective predecessors. So far we established
legitimate and substantial claims on their regard. But it was not so
much the intrinsic merit of those views, still less was it the extent
to which we acted upon them, which won for us the favour of those
races; we owed that mainly to the uncompromising hostility, the bitter
denunciations, and the unmeasured violence which the promulgation of
those views provoked from those who were regarded by them as their
oppressors. I used often to say to my Scotch friends in Lower Canada,
when they were heaping every indignity upon me, and even resorting to
open violence (for there they did not hold their hands off), 'You are
playing my game. I want to win the confidence of the French Canadians;
but I know the nature of that people: they are touchy and suspicious
as races who feel that they are inferior, and believe that they are
oppressed; invariably are. By measures of simple justice towards them
(and beyond that line I do not intend to proceed an inch), I despair
of being able to effect my object; but if you continue for a year to
act as you are now acting, denouncing me as your enemy and their
friend, and proving the sincerity of your belief by outrage and
violence, you will end by convincing them that I am to be trusted, and
I shall win the day.'--The result proved the accuracy of this
prediction.

The feeling of the natives of India towards Canning was in some
measure due to a similar cause. The clamour for blood and
indiscriminate vengeance which raged around him, and the abuse poured
upon him because he would not listen to it, imparted in their eyes to
acts which carried justice to the verge of severity the grace of
clemency.

[Sidenote: (2) Consideration for native chiefs.]

I could give you plenty of proofs of this.... The following sentences
occur in a letter written from Delhi during our recent panic, by an
officer.... 'The native force here is much too small to be a source of
anxiety, and unless they take the initiative it is my opinion that
there can be no important rising. The Mussulmans of Delhi are a
contemptible race. Fanatics are very rare on this side of the Sutlej.
The terrors of that period when every man who had two enemies was sure
to swing are not forgotten. The people declare that the work of Nadir
Shah was as nothing to it. His executions were completed in twelve
hours. But for months after the last fall of Delhi, no one was sure of
his own life or of that of the being dearest to him for an hour.' The
natives not unnaturally looked with gratitude to the man who alone had
the will and power to put an arrest on this course of proceeding, and
to prevent its extension all over the land. No doubt, as I have said,
Canning earned a substantial claim to the gratitude of the native
chiefs by adopting a more liberal and considerate policy towards them
than that pursued by his predecessor. It was perhaps not surprising
that he should have done so. Situated as we are in this country--a
small minority ruling a vast population that differs from us in blood,
civilisation, colour and religion, monopolising in our own territories
all positions of high dignity and emolument, and exercising even over
States ostensibly independent a paramount authority--it is manifest
that the question of how we ought to treat that class of natives who
consider that they have a natural right to be leaders of men and to
occupy the first places in India, must always be one of special
difficulty. If you attempt to crush all superiorities, you unite the
native populations in a homogeneous mass against you. If you foster
pride of rank and position, you encourage pretensions which you cannot
gratify, partly because you dare not abdicate your own functions as a
paramount power, and, partly, because you cannot control the arrogance
of your subjects of the dominant race. Scindiah and Holkar are
faithful to us just in proportion as they are weak, and conscious that
they require our aid to support them against their own subjects or
neighbours: and among the bitterest of our foes during the Mutiny were
natives who had been courted in England.... Canning saw the evils
which the crushing policy of his predecessor was entailing, and he
reversed it. It was a happily timed change of policy. The rebellion
broke out while it was yet recent; and no doubt, the hopes and
gratification inspired by it had their effect in inducing a certain
number of chiefs to pause and to require more conclusive proof that
the British Raj was to kick the beam, before they cast their weight
into the opposite scale of the balance.

After the rebellion was suppressed, the inducement to persevere in
this line of policy was still more stringent. To grant to native
Potentates who were trembling in their shoes, and ready to receive the
boon on any terms which you might prescribe, the reversion of States
which had become vacant because you had, of your own authority and
mere motion, hanged their chiefs, and declared them to be escheated,
was a wise, a graceful, and under the circumstances a perfectly safe
policy. The same may be said of the measures taken to put the
talookdars of Oude on their legs, and which were preceded by the
confiscation of all their properties. I believe that this policy, like
the policy of Clemency, was sound and right in principle; but in
forming a just estimate of its success and of its applicability to all
seasons and emergencies, it is necessary to take into account the
specialities of the time to which I have referred.

[Sidenote: (3) Assertion of British sovereignty.]

What then was the scope and extent of application which Canning in
action was prepared to give to this policy? Here is the important
question, and it is not altogether an easy one to answer. For like
most wise administrators, Canning dealt with the concrete rather than
the abstract, and it would not be difficult to cull from his decisions
sentiments and sentences which seem to clash. When you meet with an
individual ruling which appears not to tally with what you have
assumed to be his general principles, you say it is 'unnatural.' This
is one way out of the difficulty. But is it the right way? My own
opinion is, that Canning never intended to let the chiefs get the bit