am of opinion that the result will prove that I estimated correctly
their power of resistance; that we have spent in our armaments against
them three times as much as was necessary; and that, if we have
difficulties to encounter, they are likely to be due not to the
strength of the enemy, but to the cumbrous preparations of ourselves
and allies, and the loss of time and hazards of climate, and other
embarrassments which we are creating for ourselves. My last remark to
Lord Palmerston was, that I would rather march on Pekin with 5,000 men
than with 25,000.

_On board the 'Ferooz.'--July 5th_.--Four P.M._--We have passed out
of the Shanghae river into the Yangtze-kiang. It is delightfully cool,
and the wind which is now against us will be with us when we get out
to sea, and direct our course to the North. ... Frederick's conduct
has won for him, and most justly, general admiration. A hint was given
to me before I started, that an ambassador would meet me at the mouth
of the Peiho as soon as I arrived. If a proceeding of this nature on
the part of the Court of Pekin precedes our capture of the forts, it
will be a great embarrassment to me. The poor old 'Furious' was lying
at anchor at Shanghae. To see her brought back many feelings of 'auld
lang syne.' Shanghae altogether excited in my mind a good deal of a
home feeling. It was the place at which, during my first mission, I
tad enjoyed most repose. ... Frederick remains there until I have
completed my work in the North, and I think he is right in doing so,
although I should have been glad of his company and assistance.

_July 6th._--It does not do to be sanguine in this world, still I have
cause to hope that our business in the North will be speedily settled,
if we can only get the French to begin at once. What I have to
consider is how best to prevent my mission from impairing in any
degree Frederick's authority and prestige. As regards his own
countrymen there is little danger of this result; he already stands so
high in their esteem. With the Chinese there may be more fear of this
result; but it is so much in accordance with their notions that an
elder brother should take the part which I am now doing, that I do not
think the risk is great, and were it so, even, I should find some
means of counteracting the evil.

[Sidenote: Talie-Whan]

The place appointed for the assembling of the English forces was the bay of
Talien-Whan, near the southern extremity of a promontory named Regent's
Sword, which, running down from the north into the Yellow Sea, cuts off on
its western side a large gulf, of which the northern part is known by the
name of Leao-Tong, the southern by the name of Pecheli. The _rendezvous_ of
the French was at Chefoo, about eighty miles south of Talien-Whan, on the
opposite side of the strait which forms the entrance of the large gulf
already mentioned. Both places are about 200 miles distant from the mouth
of the Peiho, which is at the western extremity of the gulf.

It was on the 9th of July that Lord Elgin reached the shores where lay
already congregated the formidable force, for the employment of which, as
the secular arm of his diplomacy, he was henceforth to be responsible.

_July 9th.--Eight A.M._--It is a calm sea and scorching sun, very hot,
and it looks hotter still in that bay, protected by bare rocky
promontories and islets, and backed by hills, within which we discover
a fleet at anchor. What will this day bring forth? How much we are in
the hand of Providence 'rough-hew our ends as we may!' In little more
than an hour we shall probably be at our journey's close for the time.

[Sidenote: Country-people.]

I have just heard a story of the poor country-people here. A few days
ago, a party of drunken sailors went to a village, got into a row, and
killed a man by mistake. On the day following, three officers went to
the village armed with revolvers. The villagers surrounded them, took
from them the revolvers (whether the officers fired or not is
disputed), and then conducted them, without doing them any injury, to
their boat. An officer, with an interpreter, was then sent to the
village to ask for the revolvers. They were at once given up, the
villagers stating that they had no wish to take them, but that as one
of their number had been shot already, they objected to people coming
to them with arms.

_July 10th_.--What will the House of Commons say when the bill which
has to be paid for this war is presented? The expense is enormous: in
my opinion, utterly disproportionate to the objects to be effected.
The Admiral is doing things excellently well, if money be no object.

_July 12th_.-We are in a delightful climate. Troops and all in good
health. I shall not, however, dilate on these points, because I am
sure you will read all about it in the _Times_. 'Our Own
Correspondent' is in the next cabin to me, completing his letter. I
leave it to him to tell all the agreeable and amusing things that are
occurring around us. My letters to you are nothing but the record of
incidents that happen to affect me at the time; trifling things
sometimes; sometimes things that irritate; things that pass often and
leave no impression, as clouds reflected on a lake.

[Sidenote: Cavalry camp.]
[Sidenote: Sir Hope Grant.]

_Talien-Whan Bay.--July 14th_.--Yesterday, at an early hour, the
French Admiral and General arrived. It was agreed that they should go
over to the cavalry camp on the other side of the bay, some ten miles
off, and that I should accompany them. No doubt you will see in the
_Times_ a full account of all that took place on the occasion. Nothing
could be more perfect than the condition of the force, both men and
horses. The picturesqueness of the scene; the pleasant bay, with its
sandy margin and background of bleak hills, seamed by the lines of the
cavalry tents; the troops drawn up in the foreground in all their
variety of colour and costume, from the two squadrons of H.M.'s
Dragoon Guards on the right to the two squadrons of Fane's light-blue
Sikh Irregulars on the left; the experiments with the Armstrong
guns--from one of which a shell was fired which went over the hills
and vanished into space, no one knows whither--will all be described
by a more graphic pen than mine. The weather was excellent. Enough
covering over the sky to prevent the rays of the sun from striking us
too fiercely, and yet no rain. The proceedings of the day terminated
by some _tours de force_ of the Sikh cavalry and their officers;
wrenching tent-pegs from the ground with their lances, and cutting
oranges with their sabres when at full gallop. Everything went to
confirm the favourable opinion of the state of the army here which I
expressed in my last letter. Hope Grant seems very much liked. It can
hardly be otherwise, for there is a quiet simplicity and kindliness
about his manner which, in a man so highly placed, must be most
winning. I am particularly struck by the grin of delight with which
the men of a regiment of Sikhs (infantry) who were with him at
Lucknow, greet him whenever they meet him. I observed on this to him,
and he said: 'Oh, we were always good friends. I used to visit them
when they were sick, poor fellows. They are in many ways different
from the Mohammedans. Their wives used to come in numbers, and walk
over the house where Lady Grant and I lived.' The contrast with what I
saw when I was in China before, in regard to the treatment of the
natives, is most remarkable. There seems to be really no plundering or
bullying. In so far as I can see, we have here at present a truly
model army and navy: not however, I fear, a cheap one.

The Admiral told me last night he had written to the Admiralty to say
that, looking to the future, he believed there were two distinct
operations by which the Pekin Government could be coerced,--either by
a military force on a large scale such as this, or by a blockade of
the Gulf of Pecheli, undertaken early in the year, &c. I was glad to
hear him say this, because I recommended the latter course immediately
after we heard of the Peiho disaster, with a view to save all this
expenditure; and I still think that if the measures which I advised
had been adopted, including the sending up to the north of China two
or three regiments (enough, with the assistance of the fleet, to take
the Taku Forts), much of this outlay might have been spared.

_Sunday, July 15th._--I have been on board the Admiral's ship for
church. Afterwards I had some talk with him in regard to future
proceedings. ... The problem we have to solve here is a very difficult
one; for while we are up here for the purpose of bringing pressure to
bear on the Emperor, as a means of placing our relations with China on
a proper footing, we have news from the South which looks as if the
Government of the Empire was about to pass out of his feeble hands
into those of the Rebels, who have upon us the claim that they profess
a kind of Christianity.

[Sidenote: A birthday.]

_July 20th._[5]--I know that you will not forget this day, though it
can only remind you of the declining years and frequent wanderings of
one who ought to be your constant protector, and always at your side.
It is very sad that we should pass it apart, but I can say something
comforting upon it. The Admiral and General came here yesterday, and
agreed with the French authorities that the two fleets are to start
for the _rendezvous_ on the 26th. Ignatieff, the Russian, who made his
appearance here to-day, said, 'After your force lands, I give you six
days to finish everything.' If he says what he thinks, it is a
promising view of things. Six days before we start, six days to land
the troops, and six days to finish the war! Eighteen days from this,
and we may be talking of peace. Alas! what resemblance will the facts
bear to these anticipations?

[Sidenote: Chefoo.]
[Sidenote: Plans for landing.]

_Talien-Whan.--July 21st._--Now for a word about Chefoo. I had agreed
to dine with the General, Montauban, on the night of my arrival, so,
after visiting Gros, I went to his headquarters. I found him in a very
well-built, commodious Chinese house. I must tell you that, as we were
entering the bay, we descried a steamer a-head of us, and it turned
out to be a vessel sent by the French to examine the spot (south of
the Peiho Forts), which had been selected for the place of their
debarkation when the attack comes off. On the evening of our dinner,
the General did not enter into particulars, but gave me to understand
that the result of the exploration had been very unsatisfactory, and
that his scheme for landing was altogether upset. I heard this with
considerable dismay, as I feared that it might be employed as a reason
for delay. Before we parted that night, I agreed to land next morning,
to see his artillery, &c. He read me the unfavourable report of his
exploring party, which was headed by Colonel Schmid, a great friend of
the Emperor's, and the best man (so they say) they have got here. He
contends that all along the line of coast there is a band of hard
sand, at a considerable distance from low-water mark; that the water
upon it is very shallow; and that, beyond, there is an interval of
soft mud, over which cannon, &c., could not be carried. The French are
no doubt very much behind us in their preparations, but then it is
fair to say that they have not spent a tenth part of the money, and
with their small resources they have done a good deal. It was
wonderful how their little wild Japanese ponies had been trained in a
few days to draw their guns. After the review we took a ride to the
top of a hill, from whence we had a very fine prospect. It is a much
more fertile district than this, beautifully cultivated, and the
houses better than I have seen anywhere else in China. The people
seemed very comfortable, and their relations with the French are
satisfactory, as we may infer from the abundant supplies brought to
market. On the following morning the English Admiral and General
arrived. They had their interview with the French authorities, and
settled that on the 26th the fleets should sail from Talien-Whan and
Chefoo respectively to the _rendezvous_, somewhere opposite Taku. From
that point the Admirals and Generals are to proceed on a further
exploration, and to effect a disembarkation on the earliest possible
day. So the matter stands for the present. The state of Europe is very
awkward, and an additional reason for finishing this affair.[6] For if
Russia and France unite against us, not only will they have a pretty
large force here, but they will get news _viâ_ Russia sooner than we
do, which may be inconvenient.

_July 22nd, Sunday._--The thirteenth since we parted. It seems like as
many months or years. Some one said to-day at breakfast that it is the
last quiet one we are likely to have for a while. In one sense I hope
this may turn out to be true.... To-morrow our cavalry and artillery
are to be embarked. This takes place on the other side of this bay,
and I intend to go over to see the operation.

_July 26th.--Noon._--I am now starting (having witnessed the departure
of the fleet) for the scene of action in the Gulf of Pecheli. The
sight of this forenoon has been a very striking one, just enough
breeze to enable the vessels to spread their sails. We have about 180
miles to go to the point of _rendezvous_.... Meanwhile, one has as
usual one's crop of small troubles. The servants threatened to strike
yesterday, but they were soon brought to reason.

[Sidenote: The _rendezvous_.]
[Sidenote: Jesuit letters.]

_July 27th.--Ten A.M._--We have reached our destination after a most
smooth passage, during which we have followed close in the wake of the
Admiral.... I am reading the 'Lettres édifiantes et curieuses,' which
are the reports of the Jesuit missionaries who were established in
China at the commencement of the last century. They are very
interesting, and the writers seem to have been good and zealous
people. At the same time one cannot help being struck by their
puerility on many points. The doctrine of baptismal regeneration
pushed to its extreme logical conclusions, as it is by them, leads to
rather strange practical consequences. Starting from the principle
that all unbaptized children are certainly eternally lost, and all
baptized (if they die immediately) as certainly saved, they naturally
infer that they do more for the kingdom of heaven by baptizing dying
children than by any other work of conversion in which they can be
engaged. The sums which they expend in sending people about the
streets, to administer this sacrament to all the moribund children
they can find; the arts which they employ to perform this office
secretly on children in this state whom they are asked to treat
medically; and the glee with which they record the success of their
tricks, are certainly remarkable. From some passages I infer that, in
the Roman Catholic view of the case, the rite of baptism may be
administered even by an unbeliever.

[Sidenote: The Pey-tang.]

_Two P.M._--Hope Grant has teen on board. He tells me that the mouth
of the Pey-tang is not staked, and that the 'Actaeon's' boat went
three miles up the river. This river is seven or eight miles from the
Peiho, and the Chinese have had a year to prepare to resist us. It
appears that there is nothing to prevent the gunboats from going up
that river.

_July 28th--Eleven A.M._--The earlier part of last night was very hot,
... and I got feverish and could not sleep. Towards morning the good
luck of the leaders in this expedition came again into play; a breeze
sprang up from the right quarter, so that the whole of the sailing
ships have been helped marvellously on their way. When I went on deck
the whole line of the French fleet--it consists almost exclusively of
steamers--was coming gallantly on, Gros at the head. He is quite
cutting me out this time. The farther distance was filled by our
sailing transports scudding before the wind. They have been filing
past us ever since, dropping into their places, which are rather
difficult to find, as the Admiral has changed all his dispositions
since his arrival here. The captain of the 'Actaeon' dined here
yesterday. He told me he had gone a mile or two up the Pey-tang river,
been allowed to land, seen the fort, which is quite open behind, and
contains about a hundred men. Thirty thousand English (fleet and army)
and ten thousand French ought to be a match for so far-sighted an
enemy. However, I suppose we must not crow till we see what the Tartar
warriors are. _Three P.M._--The French Admiral has just been here. He
tells me that we are to move from the anchorage to a place nearer Pey-
tang on Monday, and that on Tuesday a _reconnaissance_ in force is to
be made on that place, with the intention, I presume, of taking it.


[1] Vide _supra_, p. 226.

[2] Colonel Crealock, military secretary to the Embassy.

[3] 'The absence of any panic was very creditable to the passengers. It,
however, was mainly  due to the conduct of the two Ambassadors, who,
during the whole time, remained quietly seated on the poop conversing
together, as if no danger 'impended.'--_Personal Narrative of
Occurrences during Lord Elgin's Second Embassy to China_, by H.B. Loch
Private Secretary.

[4] The Honourable T.J. Hovell Thurlow, attaché to the Embassy.

[5] His birthday.

[6] The reference apparently is to the uneasiness produced in Europe by the
annexation of Savoy to France.




CHAPTER XIII.

SECOND MISSION TO CHINA. PEKIN.

THE LANDING--CHINESE OVERTURES--TAKING OF THE FORTS--THE PEN TIENTSIN--
NEGOTIATIONS BROKEN OFF--NEW PLENIPOTENTIARIES--AGREEMENT MADE--AGREEMENT
BROKEN--TREACHEROUS SEIZURE OF MR. PARKES AND OTHERS--ADVANCE ON PEKIN-
-RETURN OF SOME OF THE CAPTIVES--FATE OF THE REST--BURNING OF THE SUMMER
PALACE--CONVENTION SIGNED--FUNERAL OF THE MURDERED CAPTIVES--IMPERIAL
PALACE--PRINCE KUNG--ARRIVAL OF MR. BRUCE--RESULTS OF THE MISSION.


[Sidenote: The landing.]

On the 1st of August the landing of the allied troops was effected in
perfect order, without the slightest opposition on the part of the
inhabitants, at the point already mentioned, viz. near the little town of
Pey-tang which is situated at the mouth of a river of the same name, about
eight miles north of the mouth of the Peiho. What Lord Elgin saw of the
operations is described in the following letter:--

_August 2nd._--There have been a few days' interval since I wrote, and
I now date from Pey-tang, and from the General's ship the 'Granada,' a
Peninsular and Oriental steamer; for I owe it to him that I am here. I
need hardly tell you the events that have occurred--public events I
mean--since the 28th, as they will all be recorded by 'Our Own.' We
moved on the 29th to a different anchorage, some five miles nearer
Pey-tang. ... All the evidence was to the effect that the Pey-tang
Forts were undefended, at least that there were no barricades in the
river, and therefore that the best way of taking them would be to pass
them in the gunboats as we did the Peiho Forts in 1858, and as we also
passed Nankin that year ... but it was resolved that we should land a
quantity of men in the mud about a mile and a half below them. This
was to have taken place on the 30th, and those of my gentlemen who
intended to leave me, as better fun was to be found elsewhere, kept up
a tremendous bustle and noise from about 4 A.M. However, at about 6,
they were informed that the orders for landing were countermanded, on
the plea that there was too much sea to admit of the horses being
transferred from the vessels to the gunboats. Next day, the 31st, it
was raining, and the sea seemed rougher in the morning. However, at
about 9, the gunboats began to move. The General had agreed that I
should have his ship, and that I should move either over the bar or as
near to it as I could manage. ... I anchored the 'Granada' outside the
bar, and as I did not choose to lose the sight of the landing, I got
into my row-boat ... going at last on board the 'Coromandel,' the
Admiral's ship. The landing went on merrily enough. It was a lovely,
rather calm evening. We were within a long-range shot of the Forts;
and if shot or shell had dropped among the boats and men who were
huddled up on the edge of the mud-bank, it would have been
inconvenient. Our enemy, however, had no notion of doing anything so
ungenerous; so the landing went on uninterruptedly, the French
carrying almost all they wanted on their backs, our men employing
coolies, &c., for that purpose. We saw nothing of the enemy except the
movements of a few Tartar horsemen out of and into the town, galloping
along the narrow causeway on which our troops were to march. At
midnight eight gunboats--six English and two French--steamed past the
Forts. It was a moment of some excitement, because we did not know
whether or not they would be fired at. However, nothing of the kind
took place; and, about an hour after they had started, three rockets
that soared and burst over the village intimated that they had reached
the place appointed to them. Having witnessed this part of the
proceedings I lay down on the deck with my great-coat over me; but not
for long, for at half-past two, Captain Dew (my old friend)[1] arrived
with the announcement that, having been on an errand to the lines of
the troops, he had met a party of French soldiers who were obliging
some Chinese to carry a wooden gun which they had captured in the
fort, declaring that they had entered it, found it deserted, and
possessed of no defences but two wooden guns. It turned out that they
had not entered first, but that an English party, headed by Mr.
Parkes, had preceded them. This rather promised to diminish the
interest of the attack on the forts which had been fixed for half-past
four in the morning. But there was another fort on the opposite side
of the river, perhaps there might be some resistance there. Alas! vain
hope. Three shots were fired at it from the gunboats which had passed
through during the night, and some twenty labourers walked out of it
to seek a more secure field for their industry in some neighbouring
village. Afterwards our troops went in and found it empty as the
other; so ended the capture of Pey-tang.

We came over the bar in the evening, and I went to see Hope Grant at
the captured fort, where he has fixed his abode. While there we
discovered a strongish body of Tartar cavalry, at a distance of about
four miles along the causeway which leads from this to Tientsin and
Taku. I urged the General to send out a party to see what these gentry
were doing, lest they should be breaking up the causeway, or doing any
other mischief; and I heard from him this morning that he had arranged
with General Montauban to do so, and that a party of 2,000 men started
on that errand early. The Tartars seem to be in greater force than was
supposed. The officer in command (rightly or wrongly, I know not
which) resolved to consider the expedition merely a reconnaissance,
and to retire after staying on the ground a short time. Of course the
Tartars will consider this a victory, and will he elated by it; but
perhaps this is a good thing, as it may induce them to face us on the
open. The ground on which they were found is firm and fit for cavalry,
and is about four miles from the Peiho Forts. This is a very nasty
place. The country around is all under water, and it is impossible to
get through it except by moving along the one or two causeways that
intersect it. The military are, therefore, glad to find sound footing
at no great distance.

[Sidenote: Chinese overtures.]

Up to this time no communication of any kind had passed between the Special
Ambassadors and any Chinese officials. An _ultimatum_ had been presented by
Mr. Bruce in March, demanding an apology for the attack on our ships of
war, the immediate ratification of the Treaty, and prompt payment of the
indemnity of 4,000,000 taels, as therein stipulated. As these demands had
been formally refused by the Chinese Government, there was no room for
diplomacy. Even the bare announcement of his arrival Lord Elgin feared they
might interpret as an invitation to treat, and use as an excuse for
dilatory and evasive negotiations. The justice of this view was proved by
what took place on the 5th of August. Having occasion to station one of his
ships near the shore for the purpose of getting water, the Admiral sent a
flag of truce to warn some Tartar troops posted near the spot, that 'his
ship had not gone there with the view of making an attack, but that it
would fire on the Tartars if they approached too near it.' The Governor-
General at once took advantage of the opening this gave him. Affecting to
believe that the flag of truce came from Lord Elgin, he addressed to him a
despatch full of professions of amity, and saying that he 'had received
instructions to discuss and dispose of all questions with the British
Minister,' but containing no mention of the _ultimatum_. To this and
numerous similar missives, which came for a time in rapid succession, Lord
Elgin had but one reply--that he could discuss nothing until the demands
already made had been satisfied.

_August 9th._--My diplomacy began yesterday, for I received in the
morning a communication from the Governor-General of the province, not
frankly conceding our demands, but making tolerably plausible
proposals for the sake of occasioning delay. I have refused to stay
the march of the military on such overtures; but the great slowness of
our operations is likely to lead me into diplomatic difficulties. The
Chinese authorities, if they become frightened, are clever enough to
advance propositions which it may be impossible to accede to without
compromising the main objects of this costly expedition, and by
refusing which I shall, nevertheless, expose myself to great
animadversion. There was a reconnaissance again this morning, and I
hope from the report of Crealock (who accompanied it, and who is doing
very well) that the enemy will prove quite as little formidable as I
have always expected. The serious advance was positively to have taken
place to-morrow, but I almost fear there will be another delay. I am
anxious to conclude peace as soon as possible after the capture of the
Peiho Forts, because, from what I have seen of the conduct of the
French here, I am sure that they will commit all manner of atrocities,
and make foreigners detested in every town and village they enter. Of
course their presence makes it very difficult to maintain discipline
among our own people.

[Sidenote: Taking of the forts.]

The 'serious advance' took place on the 12th, and was completely
successful. On that day the Allies took possession of the little town of
Sinho: two days later they occupied Tangkow. The forts, however, which
guarded the entrance of the Peiho--the Taku Forts, from which the British
forces had been so disastrously repulsed the year before--remained untaken.
Opinions were divided as to the plan of operations. The French were for
attacking first the great fortifications on the right or southern bank of
the river; but Sir Robert Napier urged that the real key to the enemy's
position was the most northerly of the forts, on the left or northern bank.
Happily his counsels prevailed. On the 21st this fort was taken by assault,
with but little loss of life; and the soundness of the judgment which
selected the point of attack was proved by the immediate surrender of all
the remaining defensible positions on both sides of the river.

During the greater part of this time Lord Elgin was on board the 'Granada,'
moored off Pey-tang, suffering all the anxieties of an active spirit
condemned to inactivity in the midst of action: responsible generally for
the fate of the expedition, yet without power to control any detail of its
operations; fretting especially at the delays which are, perhaps,
necessarily incident to a divided and subdivided command. Writing after the
surrender of the Taku Forts he said:--

I have torn up the earlier part of this letter, because it is needless
to place on record the anxieties I felt at that time. To revert to the
portion of my history which was included in the part of my letter that
I have destroyed, I must tell you that it was on the 12th that the
troops first moved out of Pey-tang. I saw them defile past, and in the
afternoon rode out to the camp, but was turned back by a large body of
Tartar cavalry, who menaced my flank, and as some of my people had
just discovered, in the apartment of the Tartar General at Sinho, a
letter stating that they were determined to capture the 'big barbarian
himself' this time, I thought it better to retrace my steps. The
second action took place on the 14th, and on the 15th I rode out to
see the General, and had a conference with him. On the 17th I went to
the gulf to see Gros. I have had dozens of letters from the Chinese
authorities, and I have answered some of them, not in a way to give
them much pleasure. All these details were given at full length in my
annihilated letter, but already they seem out of date.

_Tangkow.--August 23rd._--Grant has been marvellously favoured by the
weather, for the rain, which arrests all movements here, stopped the
day before he moved out of Pey-tang, and began again about an hour
after he had taken the Taku Fort, which led to the surrender of the
whole. I must also say that the result entirely justified the
selection which he made of his point of attack, and, as this was
against the written opinion of the French General, it is a feather in
Grant's cap. The Chinese are just the same as they were when I knew
them formerly. They fired the cannons with quite as little accuracy,
but there was one point of difference in their proceedings. On
previous occasions we have always found their forts open on one side;
so that, when they were turned, the troops left them and escaped. In
this instance they were enclosed with ditches, palisades, stakes, &c.,
so that the poor fellows had nothing for it but to remain in them till
they were pushed out by bayonets. Almost all our casualties occurred
during the escalade. I went through the hospitals yesterday, and found
very few who had been struck by round shot. A very small portion of
the force was engaged, so that my opinion of its unnecessary magnitude
is not shaken. I need not describe the action for you, as you will no
doubt see elsewhere a detailed account of it. My own personal history
will not be indifferent to you. I left the 'Granada' at about 5.30
P.M. on the 20th (Monday). Found some dinner and a tent at the camp at
Sinho. Started next morning at about 5.30 A.M.; rode into Tangkow,
where I now am, and mounted to the top of the Head-quarters' House,
whence I had a very good view of the operations. I was dislodged after
a while, because a battery opened fire at about fifteen hundred yards
from us, and some of the balls fell so near, that we began to think
they were perhaps firing at me. On being dislodged from my Belvidere,
I took some breakfast to console myself; and soon after, seeing the
British flag on the fort which we had been attacking, I rode over to
it. We met a good many of our own wounded, and all round the fort were
numbers of the poor Chinamen, staked and massacred in all sorts of
ways. I found the two Generals there, and soon after the Admiral came
up from his ship under a flag of truce. Two letters came to me from
the Chinese; but, true to my policy of letting the fighting men have
all the prestige of taking the Forts, I would not have anything to say
to them. The messengers were told that they must give up the forts to
the Commanders-in-Chief before I would listen to them; and that, in
the meantime, the army would proceed with its operations. They moved
on accordingly, and I returned to my post of observation at Tangkow. I
had hardly reached it when the rain began, and in about an hour the
roads had become absolutely impassable for artillery, and nearly so
for everything else. The troops met with no resistance at the second
fort, and the indefatigable Parkes having gone over to the unfortunate
Governor-General, extorted from him a surrender of the whole, which he
brought to the Commanders-in-Chief on the morning of the 22nd, having,
I believe, dictated its terms. Of course, Grant's triumph is complete,
and deservedly so. ... The system of our army involves such an
enormous transportation of provisions, &c., that we make, however, but
slow progress. I have, therefore, urged the Admiral, who has got
through the barriers at the mouth of the Peiho (and who is not
unwilling to go ahead), to proceed up the river with his gunboats: if
he meets with any obstructions which are serious, he can stop his
progress, and await the arrival of troops. If he meets none, he will
soon reach Tientsin.

_August 24th._--This morning, at about four, Grant awoke me with a
letter from the Admiral, saying that he had experienced in going up
the river exactly what we did in 1858--the poor people coming down in
crowds to offer submission and provisions, and no opposition of any
kind. He wrote from ten miles below Tientsin, which place he was going
to occupy with his small gunboat force. The General has agreed to
despatch a body of infantry in gunboats, and to make his cavalry march
by land; and I am only awaiting the return of the Admiral to move on.
So all is going on well. Grant has also agreed to send a regiment to
Shanghae in case there should be trouble there. ... It really looks
now as if my absence would not be protracted much beyond the time we
used to speak of before I started. ... At the same time, I do not like
to be too confident.

[Sidenote: The Peiho.]

_August 25th.--Noon._--High and dry at about fifteen miles below
Tientsin. This must remind you of some of my letters from the Yangtze,
two years ago. We started this morning at 6.30 in the 'Granada:' the
General and I, with both our staffs. We had gone on famously to this
point, scraping through the mud occasionally with success. In rounding
a corner, however, at which a French gunboat had already stuck before
us, we have run upon a bank. It is very strange to me to be going up
the Peiho river again. The fertility of the plain through which it
runs strikes me more than it did formerly. The harvest is at hand, and
the crops clothe it luxuriantly. The poor people in the villages do
not appear to fear us much. We treated them well before, and they
expect similar treatment again. The Admiral did his work of occupying
Tientsin well.... He has great qualities.

[Sidenote: Tientsin.]

_Tientsin.--Sunday, August 26th._--We reached this place about
midnight. It was about the most nervous operation at which I ever
assisted, going round the sharp turns with this long ship by
moonlight. I had a moment of painful _saisissement_ when I felt almost
certain that we should run into my dear colleague Gros, who had
grounded in a little gunboat at one of the worst bends of the river.
We only saved him by dropping an anchor from the stern, and going
backwards full speed. The Yangtze was bad enough, but we never used to
go on at night, and there was no danger of collisions. This ship looks
also as if she would go head over heels much more easily than the
'Furious.' I am waiting for Parkes and the General before I decide as
to landing, &c. Is it not strange to be here? Immediately ahead of us
is the yamun where Gros and I spent the eventful weeks in 1858, which
preceded the signature of the treaties of Tientsin! _Two P.M._--We are
to have the yamun in which Reed and Putiatine were lodged in 1858; a
much better quarter than our old one; and the General, Gros, and I are
all to lodge in it together.

[Sidenote: Chinese yamun.]

_Tientsin.--August 27th._--I had a very bad headache after I had sent
off the mail yesterday. ... Our ship had, moreover, got aground, and
was lying over so much on one side that it seemed possible that she
might topple over altogether. Under these circumstances, and having
the prospect of a very noisy night on board, I determined to land and
sleep in my yamun. The portion of it dedicated to me consists of a
regular Chinese garden, with rockwork and bridges, and ponds full of
lotus leaves, and flowerpots of all dimensions with shrubs and flowers
in them, surrounded on two sides by wooden buildings, containing rooms
with carved woodwork and other Chinese neatnesses. It is the only
house of a Chinese gentleman I have ever inhabited, for when I was
here before I dwelt in a temple. The mosquitoes were a little
troublesome at first, but I got my net up, and slept tolerably, better
than I should have done here; for the iron ships get so heated by the
sun during the day that they are never cool, however fresh the night
air may be.

[Sidenote: Negotiations.]

_August 29th._--I intended to have told you that I was sending a stiff
letter to my old friend Kweiliang; but, in fact, it has taken some
time and consultation with Gros to settle its terms, and it is only
now being translated. Yesterday afternoon the long-expected mail
arrived. ... Shall I really eat my Christmas dinner with you? Really
many things are more improbable than that. I hoped at one time that
this letter might be despatched from Pekin; but as we have to meet
Commissioners here, and to make a kind of supplementary treaty before
proceeding thither, it is doubtful whether we shall accomplish this. I
am not sure that I like my present domicile as well as I did my
domicile here in 1858, because, although it is a great deal more
_orné_, it is proportionably hotter, being surrounded by walls which
we cannot see over. It is a great place, with an infinite number of
courts and rooms of all sizes. I should think several families must
live in it, unless the establishment of a Chinese gentleman is very
large indeed. If Kweiliang and Co. come into our terms, my present
intention is to send at once to Frederick officially, and request him
to come on to Pekin. ... He has been having some very troublesome work
at Shanghae with the Rebels; indeed, there is at present work enough
for both of us in China.

_September 1st._--Kweiliang arrived last night, and sent me a hint
that he intended to call on me to-day. I sent one in return, to say
that I would not see him until he had answered my letter. I fear a
little more bullying will be necessary before we bring this stupid
Government up to the mark. Both yesterday and to-day I took a ride in
the morning with Grant. I rode a horse of his, a very nice one. The
sun becomes powerful very early, but it is a charming climate now. The
abundance of all things wonderful: beef and mutton at about threepence
a pound; peaches, grapes, and all sorts of vegetables in plenty; ice
in profusion. I daresay, however, that in six weeks' time it may be
very cold.

At one moment, on the 2nd of September, it really seemed as if the object
of the mission was achieved; for the Imperial Commissioners--one of whom
was the same Kweiliang who had conducted the negotiations in 1858--in a
formal despatch gave a positive assurance that the Treaty of Tientsin
should be faithfully observed, and that all the demands hitherto made
should be conceded in full. A draft of convention was accordingly prepared
on this basis; but, when it came to the point, Kweiliang and his colleagues
declared that they had no authority to sign it without referring to Pekin;
and it became obvious that he either did not possess, or did not at that
moment wish it to be supposed that he possessed, powers equal to those
which he held in 1858, although his previous language had been calculated
to convey the opposite impression.

[Sidenote: Broken off.]

Here was clearly a deliberate design to create delay, with the view of
dragging on negotiations into the winter. It was indispensable, Lord Elgin
thought, to check this policy by an act of vigour; and accordingly, with
the concurrence of Baron Gros, he intimated to the Imperial Commissioners
that, in consequence of the want of good faith exhibited by them in
assuming the title of Plenipotentiaries when they could not exercise the
authority which it implied, and of the delays which the alleged necessity
of constant reference to Pekin would occasion, he had determined to proceed
at once to Tung-chow, in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital, and to
enter into no further negotiations with them until he should have reached
that place.

_September 8th._--I am at war again! My idiotical Chinamen have taken
to playing tricks, which give me an excellent excuse for carrying the
army on to Pekin. It would be a long affair to tell you all the ins
and outs, but I am sure from what has come to pass during the last few
days, that we must get nearer Pekin before the Government there comes
to its senses. The blockheads have gone on negotiating with me just
long enough to enable Grant to bring all his army up to this point.
Here we are, then, with our base established in the heart of the
country, in a capital climate, with abundance around us, our army in
excellent health, and these stupid people give me a snub, which
obliges me to break with them. No one knows whether our progress is to
be a fight or an ovation, for in this country nothing can be foreseen.
I think it better that the olive-branch should advance with the sword.
I am afraid that this change in the programme--a hostile instead of a
peaceful march on Pekin--will keep me longer here, because I cannot
send for Frederick till peace is made; and I cannot, I suppose, leave
Pekin till he arrives there.

_Sunday, September 9th._--Kweiliang and Co. wanted very much to call
on me yesterday, but I would not receive them. The junior
Commissioner, who was at Canton with Parkes, and knows him well, told
him that, in fact, the people here had been urging them to make an
effort to prevent war, saying: 'If we were sure that the foreigners
would have the best of it, we should not care; but if they are worsted
they will fall back on us, and wreak their vengeance upon us.' This
does not seem a very formidable state of mind as far as we are
concerned. We have behaved well to the people, except at Peytang and
Sinho, and the consequence is that we can move through the country
with comparative ease. If the people tried to cut off our baggage, and
refused us supplies, we should find it very difficult to get on. ...
_Noon_.--I have just returned from a service on board the 'Granada,'
where the clergyman administered the sacrament to a small
congregation. At four we march to the wars; but as I go to bear the
olive, it is not so bad a Sunday's work. You may very likely hear
through Siberia of the result of our march before you receive this
letter announcing that it is to take place. I shall not, therefore,
speculate upon it.

_Yang-tsun, about twenty miles above Tientsin.--September 10th.--Two
P.M._--This morning we started at about five, and reached this
encampment soon after seven. A very nice ride, cool, and through a
succession of crops of millet; a stiff, reedy stem, some twelve or
fourteen feet high, with a tuft on the top, is the physiognomy of the
millet stalk. It would puzzle the Tartar cavalry to charge us through
this crop. As it is, we have seen no enemy; and Mr. Parkes has induced
the inhabitants to sell us a good many sheep and oxen. Our tents were
not pitched till near noon; so I sat during most of the forenoon under
the shade of a hedge. There has been thunder since, and a considerable
fall of rain. I hope it will not make the roads impassable; but if it
fills the river a little it will do us good, for we may then use it
for the transport of our supplies, and it is now too low. We do not
know much what is ahead of us, but we hear of Tartar troops farther