ill-informed, and therefore credulous, in matters of colonial politics, or
else by raising a cry of 'separation' or 'annexation.'

The evil effects of this state of things need hardly be pointed out. On the
one hand the constant reference to opinion in England, not in the shape of
constitutional appeal but by ex-parte statements, produced a state of
chronic irritation against the mother-country. 'There is nothing,' wrote
Lord Elgin, 'which makes the colonial statesman so jealous as rescripts
from the Colonial Office, suggested by the representations of provincial
cliques or interests, who ought, as he contends, to bow before the
authorities of Government House, Montreal, rather than those of Downing
Street.' On the other hand it was not easy to know how to deal with
politicians who did not profess to own more than a qualified and
provisional allegiance to the constitution of the Province and the Crown of
England. The one hope in both cases was to foster a 'national and manly
tone' of political morals; to lead all parties alike to look to their own
Parliament, and neither to the London press nor the American hustings, for
the solution of all problems of Provincial government.

But while thus zealously defending, the fortress of British connection
committed to his care, Lord Elgin was dismayed to find that its walls were
crumbling round him? undermined by the operations of his own Mends; that
there had arisen at home a school of philosophic statesmen, strong in their
own ability, and strengthened by the support of the Radical economists,
according to whom it was to be expected and desired that every colony
enjoying constitutional government should aim at emancipating itself
entirely from allegiance to the mother-country, and forming itself into an
independent Republic. With such views he had no sympathy. The 'Sparta'
which had fallen to his lot was the position of a colonial governor, and
that position he felt it his duty to 'adorn' and to maintain. Moreover,
believing firmly in the vitality of the monarchical principle, as well as
in its value, he contended that it is an error to suppose that a
constitutional monarchy, in proportion as it becomes more liberal, tends
towards republicanism; and further, that if such tendency existed it would
be retrograde rather than progressive.

The views of Colonial Government, its objects and its difficulties, which
have been here briefly epitomised, are displayed in full in the following
letters, together with a variety of opinions on kindred topics. They are
given as characteristic of Lord Elgin; but they may, perhaps, have an
interest of their own, as bearing on important questions which still await
solution.

_To the Earl Grey._

November 16,1849.

[Sidenote: Maintenance of British connection.]

Very much, as respects the result of this annexation movement, depends
upon what you do at home. I cannot say what the effect may be if the
British Government and press are lukewarm on the subject. The
annexationists will take heart, but in a tenfold greater degree the
friends of the connection will be discouraged. If it be admitted that
separation _must_ take place, sooner or later, the argument in
favour of a present move seems to be almost irresistible. I am
prepared to contend that with responsible government, fairly worked
out with free-trade, there is no reason why the colonial relation
should not be indefinitely maintained. But look at my present
difficulty, which may be increased beyond calculation, if indiscreet
expressions be made use of during the present crisis. The English
Government thought it necessary, in order to give moral support to
their representative in Ireland, to assert in the most solemn manner
that the Crown never would consent to the severance of the Union;
although, according to the O'Connell doctrine, the allegiance to the
Crown of the Irish was to be unimpaired notwithstanding such
severance. But when I protest against Canadian projects for
dismembering the empire, I am always told 'the most eminent statesmen
in England have over and over again told us, that whenever we chose we
might separate. Why, then, blame us for discussing the subject?'

*       *       *       *       *

_To the Earl Grey._

January 14,1850.

[Sidenote: Colonial interests the sport of home parties.]

I am certainly less sanguine than I was as to the probability of
retaining the colonies under free-trade. I speak not now of the cost
of their retention, for I have no doubt but that, if all parties
concerned were honest, expenses might be gradually reduced. I am sure
also that when free-trade is fairly in operation it will be found that
more has been gained by removing the causes of irritation which were
furnished by the constant _tinkering_ incident to a protective
system, than has been lost by severing the bonds by which it tied the
mother-country and the colonies together. What I fear is, that when
the mystification in which certain questions of self-interest were
involved by protection is removed, factions both at home and in the
colonies will be more reckless than ever in hazarding for party
objects the loss of the colonies.[4] Our system depends a great deal
more on the discretion with which it is worked than the American,
where each power in the state goes habitually the full length of its
tether: Congress, the State legislatures, Presidents, Governors, all
legislating and _vetoing_, without stint or limit, till pulled up
short by a judgment of the Supreme Court. With us factions in the
colonies are clamorous and violent, with the hope of producing effect
on the Imperial Parliament and Government, just in proportion to their
powerlessness at home. The history of Canada during the past year
furnishes ample evidence of this truth. Why was there so much violence
on the part of the opposition here last summer, particularly against
the Governor-General? Because it felt itself to be weak in the
province, and looked for success to the effect it could produce in
England alone.

And how is this tendency to bring the Imperial and Local Parliaments
into antagonism, a tendency so dangerous to the permanence of our
system, to be counteracted? By one expedient as it appears to me only;
namely, by the Governor's acting with some assumption of
responsibility, so that the shafts of the enemy, which are intended
for the Imperial Government, may fall on him. If a line of demarcation
between the questions with which the Local Parliaments can deal and
those which are reserved for the Imperial authority could be drawn,
(as was recommended last session by the Radicals), it might be
different; but, as it is, I see nothing for it but that the Governors
should be responsible for the share which the Imperial Government may
have in the policy carried out in the responsible-government colonies,
with the liability to be recalled and disavowed whenever the Imperial
authorities think it expedient to repudiate such policy.

*       *       *       *       *

_To the Duke of Newcastle._

Quebec: February 18, 1853.

[Sidenote: Distribution of honours.]

Now that the bonds formed by commercial protection and the disposal of
local offices are severed, it is very desirable that the prerogative
of the Crown, as the fountain of honour, should be employed, in so far
as this can properly be done, as a means of attaching the outlying
parts of the empire to the throne. Of the soundness of this
proposition as a general principle no doubt can, I presume, be
entertained. It is not, indeed, always easy to apply it in these
communities, where fortunes are precarious, the social system so much
based on equality, and public services so generally mixed up with
party conflicts. But it should never, in my opinion, be lost sight of,
and advantage should be taken of all favourable opportunities to act
upon it.

There are two principles which ought, I think, as a general rule to be
attended to in the distribution of Imperial honours among colonists.
Firstly, they should appear to emanate directly from the Crown, on the
advice, if you will, of the Governors and Imperial Ministers, but not
on the recommendation of the local executives. And, secondly, they
should be conferred, as much as possible, on the eminent persons who
are no longer actively engaged in political life. If these principles
be neglected, such distinctions will, I fear, soon lose their value.

*       *       *       *       *

_To the Earl Grey._

Toronto: March 23,1850.

[Sidenote: Speech of Lord J. Russell.]
[Sidenote: Colonial existence not provisional.]

Lord John's speech on the colonies seems to have been eminently
successful at home. It is calculated too, I think, to do good in the
colonies; but for one sentence, the introduction of which I deeply
deplore--the sting in the tail. Alas for that sting in the tail! I
much fear that when the liberal and enlightened sentiments, the
enunciation of which by one so high in authority is so well calculated
to make the colonists sensible of the advantages which they derive
from their connection with Great Britain, shall have passed away from
their memories, there will not be wanting those who will remind them
that, on this solemn occasion, the Prime Minister of England, amid the
plaudits of a full senate, declared that he looked forward to the day
when the ties which he was endeavouring to render so easy and mutually
advantageous would be severed. And wherefore this foreboding? or,
perhaps, I ought not to use the term foreboding, for really to judge
by the comments of the press on this declaration of Lord John's, I
should be led to imagine that the prospect of these sucking
democracies, after they have drained their old mother's life-blood,
leaving her in the lurch, and setting up as rivals, just at the time
when their increasing strength might render them a support instead of
a burden, is one of the most cheering which has of late presented
itself to the English imagination. But wherefore then this
anticipation--if foreboding be not the correct term? Because Lord John
and the people of England persist in assuming that the Colonial
relation is incompatible with maturity and full development. And is
this really so incontestable a truth that it is a duty not only to
hold but to proclaim it? Consider for a moment what is the effect of
proclaiming it in our case. We have on this continent two great
empires in presence, or rather, I should say, two great Imperial
systems. In many respects there is much similarity between them. In so
far as powers of self-government are concerned it is certain that our
colonists in America have no reason to envy the citizens of any state
in the Union. The forms differ, but it may be shown that practically
the inhabitants of Canada have a greater power in controlling their
own destiny than those of Michigan or New York, who must tolerate a
tariff imposed by twenty other states, and pay the expenses of war
undertaken for objects which they profess to abhor. And yet there is a
difference between the two cases; a difference, in my humble judgment,
of sentiment rather than substance, which renders the one a system of
life and strength, and the other a system of death and decay. No
matter how raw and rude a territory may be when it is admitted as a
state into the Union of the United States, it is at once, by the
popular belief, invested with all the dignity of manhood, and
introduced into a system which, despite the combativeness of certain
ardent spirits from the South, every American believes and maintains
to be immortal. But how does the case stand with us? No matter how
great the advance of a British colony in wealth and civilisation; no
matter how absolute the powers of self-government conceded to it, it
is still taught to believe that it is in a condition of pupilage from
which it must pass before it can attain maturity. For one I have never
been able to comprehend why, elastic as our constitutional system is,
we should not be able, now more especially when we have ceased to
control the trade of our colonies, to render the links which bind them
to the British Crown at least as lasting as those which unite the
component parts of the Union.... One thing is, however, indispensable
to the success of this or any other system of Colonial Government. You
must renounce the habit of telling the Colonies that the Colonial is a
provisional existence. You must allow them to believe that, without
severing the bonds which unite them to Great Britain, they may attain
the degree of perfection, and of social and political development, to
which organised communities of free men have a right to aspire.

Since I began this letter I have, I regret to say, confirmatory
evidence of the justice of the anticipations I had formed of the
probable effect of Lord John's declaration. I enclose extracts from
two newspapers, an annexationist, the _Herald_ of Montreal, and a
_quasi_ annexationist, the _Mirror_ of Toronto. You will
note the use they make of it. I was more annoyed however, I confess,
by what occurred yesterday in council. We had to determine whether or
not to dismiss from his offices a gentleman who is both M.P.P., Q.C.,
and J.P., and who has issued a flaming manifesto in favour, not of
annexation, but of an immediate declaration of independence as a step
to it. I will not say anything of my own opinion on the case, but it
was generally contended by the members of the Board, that it would be
impossible to maintain that persons who had declared their intention
to throw off their allegiance to the Queen, with a view to annexation,
were unfit to retain offices granted during pleasure, if persons who
made a similar declaration with a view to independence were to be
differently dealt with. Baldwin had Lord John's speech in his hand. He
is a man of singularly placid demeanour, but he has been seriously
ill, so possibly his nerves are shaken--at any rate I never saw him so
much moved. 'Have you read the latter part of Lord J. Russell's
speech?' he said to me. I nodded assent. 'For myself,' he added, 'if
the anticipations therein expressed prove to be well founded, my
interest in public affairs is gone for ever. But is it not hard upon
us while we are labouring, through good and evil report, to thwart the
designs of those who would dismember the Empire, that our adversaries
should be informed that the difference between them and the Prime
Minister of England is only one of time? If the British Government has
really come to the conclusion that we are a burden to be cast off
whenever a favourable opportunity offers, surely we ought to be
warned.'

I replied that while I regretted as much as he could do the paragraph
to which he referred, I thought he somewhat mistook its import: that I
believed no man living was more opposed to the dismemberment of the
Empire than Lord J. Russell: that I did not conceive that he had any
intention of deserting the Colonies, or of inviting them to separate
from England; but that he had in the sentence in question given
utterance to a purely speculative, and in my judgment most fallacious,
opinion, which, was shared, I feared, by very many persons both in
England and the Colonies: that I held it to be a perfectly unsound and
most dangerous theory, that British Colonies could not attain maturity
without separation, and that my interest in labouring with them to
bring into full play the principles of Constitutional Government in
Canada would entirely cease if I could be persuaded to adopt it. I
said all this I must confess, however, not without misgiving, for I
could not but be sensible that, in spite of all my allegations to the
contrary, my audience was disposed to regard a prediction of this
nature, proceeding from a Prime Minister, less as a speculative
abstraction than as one of that class of prophecies which work their
own fulfilment. I left the Council Chamber disheartened, with the
feeling that Lord J. Russell's reference to the manhood of Colonies
was more likely to be followed by practical consequences than
Lamartine's famous '_quand l'heure aura sonné_' invocation to
oppressed nationalities. It is possible, indeed, that I exaggerate to
myself the probable effects of this declaration. Politicians of the
Baldwin stamp, with distinct views and aims, who having struggled to
obtain a Government on British principles, desire to preserve it, are
not, I fear, very numerous in Canada; the great mass move on with very
indefinite purposes, and not much inquiring whither they are going. Of
one thing, however, I am confident; there cannot be any peace,
contentment, progress, or credit in this colony while the idea obtains
that the connection with England is a millstone about its neck which
should be cast off, as soon as it can be conveniently managed. What
man in his senses would invest his money in the public securities of a
country where questions affecting the very foundations on which public
credit rests are in perpetual agitation; or would settle in it at all
if he could find for his foot a more stable resting-place elsewhere? I
may, perhaps, be expressing myself too unreservedly with reference to
opinions emanating from a source which I am no less disposed than
bound to respect. As I have the means, however, of feeling the pulse
of the colonists in this most feverish region, I consider it to be
always my duty to furnish you with as faithful a record as possible of
our diagnostics. And, after all, may I not with all submission ask, Is
not the question at issue a most momentous one? What is it indeed but
this: Is the Queen of England to be the Sovereign of an Empire,
growing, expanding, strengthening itself from age to age, striking its
roots deep into fresh earth and drawing new supplies of vitality from
virgin soils? Or is she to be for all essential purposes of might and
power, Monarch of Great Britain and Ireland merely--her place and that
of her line in the world's history determined by the productiveness of
12,000 square miles of a coal formation, which is being rapidly
exhausted, and the duration of the social and political organization
over which she presides dependent on the annual expatriation, with a
view to its eventual alienization, of the surplus swarms of her born
subjects? If Lord J. Russell, instead of concluding his excellent
speech with a declaration of opinion which, as I read it, and as I
fear others will read it, seems to make it a point of honour with the
Colonists to prepare for separation, had contented himself with
resuming the statements already made in its course, with showing that
neither the Government nor Parliament could have any object in view in
their Colonial policy but the good of the Colonies, and the
establishment of the relation between them and the mother-country on
the basis of mutual affection; that, as the idea of maintaining a
Colonial Empire for the purpose of exercising dominion or dispensing
patronage had been for some time abandoned, and that of regarding it
as a hot-bed for forcing commerce and manufactures more recently
renounced, a greater amount of free action and self-government might
be conceded to British Colonies without any breach of Imperial Unity,
or the violation of any principle of Imperial Policy, than had under
any scheme yet devised fallen to the lot of the component parts of any
Federal or imperial system; if he had left these great truths to work
their effect without hazarding a conjecture which will, I fear, be
received as a suggestion, with respect to the course which certain
wayward members of the Imperial family may be expected to take in a
contingency still confessedly remote, it would, I venture with great
deference to submit, in so far at least as public feeling in the
Colonies is concerned, have been safer and better.

[Sidenote: 'Separation' and 'annexation.']

You draw, I know, a distinction between separation with a view to
annexation and separation with a view to independence. You say the
former is an act of treason, the latter a natural and legitimate step
in progress. There is much plausibility doubtless in this position,
but, independently of the fact that no one advocates independence in
these Colonies except as a means to the end, annexation, is it really
tenable? If you take your stand on the hypothesis that the Colonial
existence is one with which the Colonists ought to rest satisfied,
then, I think, you are entitled to denounce, without reserve or
measure, those who propose for some secondary object to substitute the
Stars and Stripes for the Union Jack. But if, on the contrary, you
assume that it is a provisional state, which admits of but a stunted
and partial growth, and out of which all communities ought in the
course of nature to strive to pass, how can you refuse to permit your
Colonies here, when they have arrived at the proper stage in their
existence, to place themselves in a condition which is at once most
favourable to their security and to their perfect national
development? What reasons can you assign for the refusal, except such
as are founded on selfishness, and are, therefore, morally worthless?
If you say that your great lubberly boy is too big for the nursery,
and that you have no other room for him in your house, how can you
decline to allow him to lodge with his elder brethren over the way,
when the attempt to keep up an establishment for himself would
seriously embarrass him?

*       *       *       *       *

_To the Earl Grey._

Toronto: November 1, 1850.

Sir H. Bulwer spent four days with us, and for many reasons I am glad
that he has been here. He leaves us knowing more of Canada than he did
when he came. I think too that both he and Sir E. Head return to their
homes re-assured on many points of our internal policy, on which they
felt doubtful before, and much enlightened as to the real position of
men and things in this province.

[Sidenote: Self-government not republican.]

With one important truth 1 have laboured to impress them, and I hope
successfully. It is this: that the faithful carrying out of the
principles of Constitutional Government is a departure from the
American model, not an approximation to it, and, therefore, a
departure from republicanism in its only workable shape. Of the
soundness of this view of our case I entertain no doubt whatever; and
though I meet with few persons to whom it seems to have occurred (for
the common belief of superficial observers is that we are
republicanising the colonies), I seldom fail in bringing it borne to
the understanding of any intelligent person with whom I have occasion
to discuss it. The fact is, that the American system is our old
Colonial system with, in certain cases, the principle of popular
election substituted for that of nomination by the Crown. Mr. Filmore
stands to his Congress very much in the same relation in which I stood
to my Assembly in Jamaica. There is the same absence of effective
responsibility in the conduct of legislation, the same want of
concurrent action between the parts of the political machine. The
whole business of legislation in the American Congress, as well as in
the State Legislatures, is conducted in the manner in which railway
business was conducted in the House of Commons at a time when it is to
be feared that, notwithstanding the high standard of honour in the
British Parliament, there was a good deal of jobbing. For instance our
Reciprocity measure was pressed by us at Washington last session, just
as a Railway Bill in 1845 or 1846 would have been pressed in
Parliament. There was no Government to deal with. The interests of the
Union, as a whole and distinct from local and sectional interests, had
no organ in the representative bodies; it was all a question of
canvassing this member of Congress or the other. It is easy to
perceive that, under such a system, jobbing must become not the
exception but the rule.

Now I feel very strongly, that when a people have been once thoroughly
accustomed to the working of such a Parliamentary system as ours, they
never will consent to revert to this clumsy irresponsible mechanism.
Whether we shall be able to carry on the war here long enough to allow
the practice of Constitutional Government and the habits of mind which
it engenders to take root in these provinces, may be doubtful. But it
may be worth your while to consider whether these views do not throw
some light on affairs in Europe. If you part with constitutional
monarchies there, you may possibly get something much more democratic;
but you cannot, I am confident, get American republicanism. It is the
fashion to say, 'of course not; we cannot get their federal system;'
but this is not the only reason, there are others that lie deeper.
Look at France, where they are trying to jumble up the two things, a
head of the State responsible to the people who elect him, and a
ministry responsible to the Parliament.

*       *       *       *       *

_To the Duke of Newcastle._

March 26, 1853.

It is argued that, by the severance of the connection, British
statesmen would be relieved of an onerous responsibility for colonial
acts of which they cannot otherwise rid themselves. Is there not,
however, some fallacy in this? If by conceding absolute independence
the British Parliament can acquit itself of the obligation to impose
its will upon the Colonists, in the matter, for instance, of a Church
Establishment, can it not attain the same end by declaring that, as
respects such local questions, the Colonists are free to judge for
themselves? How can it be justifiable to adopt the former of these
expedients, and sacrilegious to act upon the latter?

The true policy, in my humble judgment, is to throw the whole weight
of responsibility on those who exercise the real power, for, after
all, the sense of responsibility is the best security against the
abuse of power; and, as respects the connection, to act and speak on
this hypothesis--that there is nothing in it to check the development
of healthy national life in these young communities. I believe that
this policy will be found to be not only the safest, but also (an
important consideration in these days) the most economical.

*       *       *       *       *

_To the Earl Grey._

Toronto: December 17, 1850.

Although, as you observe, it seems to be rather idle in us to
correspond on what may be termed speculative questions, when we have
so much pressing business on hand, I venture to say a few words in
reply to your letter of the 23rd ult., firstly, because I presume to
dissent from some of the opinions which you advance in it; and,
secondly, because I have a practical object of no small importance in
view in calling your attention to the contrasts which present
themselves in the working of our institutions, and those of our
neighbours in the States. My practical object is this: when you
concede to the Colonists Constitutional Government in its integrity,
you are reproached with leading them to Republicanism and the American
Union. The same reproach is hurled with anathemas against your humble
servant. Lord Stanley, if I rightly remember, in the debate on
Ryland's case last year, stated amid cheers, that if you were in the
habit of consulting the Ministers of the Crown in the Colony before
you placed persons on the colonial pension List, he had no hesitation
in saying you had already established a republic in Canada! Now I
believe, on the contrary, that it may be demonstrated that the
concession of Constitutional Government has a tendency to draw the
Colonists the other way; firstly, because it slakes that thirst for
self-government which seizes on all British communities when they
approach maturity; and, secondly, because it habituates the Colonists
to the working of a political mechanism, which is both intrinsically
superior to that of the Americans, and more unlike it than our old
Colonial system.

Adopting, however, the views with respect to the superiority of the
mechanism of our political system to that of our neighbours, which I
have ventured to urge, you proceed to argue that the remedy is in
their hands; that without abandoning their republicanism they and
their _confrères_ in France have nothing to do but to dismiss
their Presidents and to substitute our constitution without a King,
the body without the head, for their own, to get rid of the
inconveniences which they now experience; and you quote with
approbation, as an embodiment of this idea, the project submitted by
M. Grévy and the Red Republicans to the French Constituent Assembly.

[Sidenote: Value of the monarchical principle.]

Now here I confess I cannot go along with you, and the difference
between us is a very material one; for if the monarch be not an
indispensable element in our constitutional mechanism, and if we can
secure all the advantages of that mechanism without him, I have drawn
the wrong moral from the facts. You say that the system the Red
Republicans would have established in France would have been the
nearest possible approach to our own. It is possible, I think, that we
may be tending towards the like issues. It is possible, perhaps
probable, that as the House of Commons becomes more democratic in its
composition, and consequently more arrogant in its bearing, it may
cast off the shackles which the other powers of the State impose on
its self-will, and even utterly abolish them; but I venture to believe
that those who last till that day comes, will find that they are
living under a very different constitution from that which we now
enjoy; that they have traversed the interval which separates a
temperate and cautious administration of public affairs resting on the
balance of powers and interests, from a reckless and overbearing
tyranny based on the caprices and passions of an absolute and
irresponsible body. You talk somewhat lightly of the check of the
Crown, although you acknowledge its utility. But is it indeed so light
a matter, even as our constitution now works? Is it a light matter
that the Crown should have the power of dissolving Parliament; in
other words, of deposing the tyrant at will? Is it a light matter that
for several months in each year the House of Commons should be in
abeyance, during which period the nation looks on Ministers not as
slaves of Parliament but servants of the Crown? Is it a light matter
that there should still be such respect for the monarchical principle,
that the servants of that visible entity yclept the Crown are enabled
to carry on much of the details of internal and foreign administration
without consulting Parliament, and even without its cognisance? Or do
you suppose that the Red Republicans, when they advocated the
nomination of a Ministry of the House of Assembly with a revocable
_mandat_, intended to create a Frankenstein endowed with powers
in some cases paramount to, and in others running parallel with, the
authority of the omnipotent body to which it owed its existence? My
own impression is, that they meant a set of delegates to be appointed,
who should exercise certain functions of legislative initiation and
executive patronage so long as they reflected clearly, in the former
the passions, and in the latter the interests of the majority for the
time being, and no longer.

It appears to me, I must confess, that if you have a republican form
of government in a great country, with complicated internal and
external relations, you must either separate the executive and
legislative departments, as in the United States, or submit to a
tyranny of the majority, not the more tolerable because it is
capricious and wielded by a tyrant with many heads. Of the two evils I
prefer the former.

Consider, for a moment, how much more violent the proceedings of
majorities in the American Legislatures would be, how much more
reckless the appeals to popular passion, how much more frequently the
permanent interests of the nation and the rights of individuals and
classes would be sacrificed to the object of raising political capital
for present uses, if debates or discussions affected the tenure of
office. I have no idea that the executive and legislative departments
of the State can be made to work together with a sufficient degree of
harmony to give the maximum of strength and of mutual independence to
secure freedom and the rights of minorities, except under the
presidency of Monarchy, the moral influence of which, so long as a
nation is monarchical in its sentiments, cannot, of course, be
measured merely by its recognised power.

[Sidenote: Influence of a Governor, under responsible Government.]

Those who are most ready to concur in these views of Colonial Government,
and to admire the vigour with which they were defended, and the consistency
with which they were carried out, may still be inclined to ask whether the
maintenance of them did not involve a species of official suicide: whether
the theory of the responsibility of provincial Ministers to the provincial
Parliament, and of the consequent duty of the Governor to remain absolutely
neutral in the strife of political parties, had not a necessary tendency to
degrade his office into that of a mere _Roi fainéant_. He had in 1849,
as Sir C. Adderley expresses it, 'maintained the principle of responsible
Government at the risk of his life.' Was the result of his hard-won victory
only to empty himself of all but the mere outward show of power and
authority?

Such questions he was always ready to meet with an uncompromising negative.
'I have tried,' he said, both systems. In Jamaica there was no responsible
Government: but I had not half the power I have here with my constitutional
and changing Cabinet.' Even on the Vice-regal throne of India, he missed,
at first, at least, something of the authority and influence which had been
his, as Constitutional Governor, in Canada.[5] He was fully conscious,
however, of the difficult nature of the position, and that it was only
tenable on condition of being penetrated, or _possessed_, as he said,
with the idea of its tenability. In this strain he wrote to his intimate
friend. Mr. Cumming Bruce, in September 1852, with reference to a report
that he was to be recalled by the Ministry which had recently come into
power.

As respects the _matter_ of the report, I am disposed to believe
that, viewing the question with reference to personal interests
exclusively, my removal from hence would not be any disadvantage to
me. But, as to my work here--there is the rub. Is it to be all undone?
On this point I must speak frankly. I have been possessed (I use the
word advisedly, for I fear that most persons in England still consider
it a case of _possession_) with the idea that it is possible to
maintain on this soil of North America, and in the face of Republican
America, British connection and British institutions, if you give the
latter freely and trustingly. Faith, when it is sincere, is always
catching; and I have imparted this faith, more or less thoroughly, to
all Canadian statesmen with whom I have been in official relationship
since 1848, and to all intelligent Englishmen with whom I have come in
contact since 1850--as witness Lord Wharncliffe, Waldegrave,
Tremenheere, &c. &c. Now if the Governor ceases to possess this faith,
or to have the faculty of imparting it, I confess I fear that, ere
long, it will become extinct in other breasts likewise. I believe that
it is equally an error to imagine with one old-fashioned party, that
you can govern such dependencies as this on the antiquated
bureaucratic principle, by means of rescripts from Downing Street, in
defiance of the popular legislatures, and on the hypothesis that one
local faction monopolises all the loyalty of the Colony; and to
suppose with the Radicals that all is done when you have simply told
the colonists 'to go to the devil their own way.' I believe, on the
contrary, that there is more room for the exercise of influence on the
part of the Governor under my system than under any that ever was
before devised; an influence, however, wholly moral--an influence of
suasion, sympathy, and moderation, which softens the temper while it
elevates the aims of local polities. It is true that on certain
questions of public policy, especially with regard to Church matters,
views are propounded by my ministers which do not exactly square with
my pre-conceived opinions, and which I acquiesce in, so long as they
do not contravene the fundamental principles of morality, from a
conviction that they are in accordance with the general sentiments of
the community.

It is true that I do not seek the commendation bestowed on Sir F. Head
for bringing men into his councils from the liberal party, and telling
them that they should enjoy only a partial confidence; thereby
allowing them to retain their position as tribunes of the people in
conjunction with the _prestige_ of advisers of the Crown by
enabling them to shirk responsibility for any acts of government which
are unpopular. It is true that I have always said to my advisers,
'while you continue my advisers you shall enjoy nay unreserved
confidence; and _en revanche_ you shall be responsible for all
acts of government.'

But it is no less certain that there is not one of them who does not
know that no inducement on earth would prevail with me to bring me to
acquiesce in any measures which seemed to me repugnant to public
morals, or Imperial interests; and I must say that, far from finding
in my advisers a desire to entrap me into proceedings of which 1 might
disapprove, I find a tendency constantly increasing to attach the
utmost value to my opinion on all questions, local or generals that
arise.

The deep sense which he entertained of the importance of a correct
understanding on this point is shown by his devoting to it the closing
words of the last official despatch which he wrote from Quebec, on December
18, 1854.

I readily admit that the maintenance of the position and due influence
of the Governor is one of the most critical problems that have to be
solved in the adaptation of Parliamentary Government to the Colonial
system; and that it is difficult to over-estimate the importance which
attaches to its satisfactory solution. As the Imperial Government and
Parliament gradually withdraw from legislative interference, and from
the exercise of patronage in Colonial affairs, the office of Governor
tends to become, in the most emphatic sense of the term, the link
which connects the Mother-country and the Colony, and his influence
the means by which harmony of action between the local and imperial
authorities is to be preserved. It is not, however, in my humble
judgment, by evincing an anxious desire to stretch to the utmost
constitutional principles in his favour, but, on the contrary, by the
frank acceptance of the conditions of the Parliamentary system, that
this influence can be most surely extended and confirmed. Placed by
his position above the strife of parties--holding office by a tenure
less precarious than the ministers who surround him--having no
political interests to serve but that of the community whose affairs
he is appointed to administer--his opinion cannot fail, when all cause
for suspicion and jealousy is removed, to have great weight in the
Colonial Councils, while he is set at liberty to constitute himself in
an especial manner the patron of those larger and higher interests--
such interests, for example, as those of education, and of moral and
material progress in all its branches--which, unlike the contests of
party, unite instead of dividing the members of the body politic. The
mention of such influences as an appreciable force in the
administration of public affairs may provoke a sneer on the part of
persons who have no faith in any appeal which is not addressed to the
lowest motives of human conduct; but those who have juster views of
our common nature, and who have seen influences that are purely moral
wielded with judgment, will not be disposed to deny to them a high
degree of efficacy.

[Sidenote: Defence of the colony,]

Closely akin to the question of the maintenance of the connection between
the Colony and Great Britain, especially when viewed as affected by the
commercial and financial condition of the former, was the question of
throwing upon it the expense of defending itself; a problem which was then
only beginning to attract the attention of liberal statesmen. For though it
may be true that the practice of defending the Colonies with the troops and
at the cost of the mother-country was an innovation upon the earlier
Colonial system, introduced at the time of the great war, it is not the
less certain that to the generation of colonists that had grown up since
that time the abandonment of it had all the effect of novelty. It was a
question on which, as affecting Canada, Lord Elgin was in a peculiar degree
'between two fires;' exposed to pressure at once from the Government at
home and from his own Ministers, and seeing much to agree with in the views
of both.

[Sidenote: against internal disorder;]

In the first place, as regards the preservation of order within the
province, he thought it clear that, as a general rule, the cost of this
should fall on the Colony itself wherever it enjoyed self-government; but
there were peculiar circumstances in Canada which made him hesitate to
apply the doctrine unreservedly there. Owing to the contiguity of the
United States, the abettors of any mischief in the Colony might count on
help constantly at hand, not indeed from the Government of the Union, which
never acted disloyally,[6] but from the Unruly spirits that were apt to
infest the borders; and it seemed to him at least doubtful, whether both
justice and policy did not require that Great Britain should afford to the
supporters of order some material aid to counterbalance this. Again, the
peculiar social and political state of Lower Canada, arising mainly from
the conditions under which it had passed into the hands of England, and
from the manner in which England had fulfilled those conditions, created
special difficulties as to the maintenance of internal quiet. On the one
hand England's respect for treaty obligations had induced her to resist all
attempts to break down by fraud or violence those rights and usages of the
French population, which had tended to keep alive among them feelings of
distinctive nationality; while on the other hand the effect of the working
of the old system of colonial administration had been to confer upon
British or American settlers a disproportionate share in the government of
the province. It followed that the French-Canadian majority and the Anglo-
Saxon minority were dwelling side by side in that section of the Colony
without, to any sensible extent, intermingling, and under conditions of
equilibrium which could never have been established but for the presence on
the same scene of a directing and overruling power. In this state of
things, while confidently hoping that an impartial adherence to the
principles of constitutional government would by degrees obliterate all
national distinctions, he saw reason to fear that the sudden withdrawal of
Britain's moderating control, whether as the result of separation or of a
change of Imperial policy, would be followed at no distant period by a
serious collision between the races.

[Sidenote: against foreign attack.]

Similarly, as regards defence against foreign attack, while agreeing that a
self-governing colony should be self-dependent, Lord Elgin felt that the
peculiar position of Canada, having no foreign attack to apprehend except
hi quarrels of England's making, made her case somewhat exceptional. And
any wholesale withdrawal of British troops he strongly deprecated, as
likely to imperil her connection with the mother-country, if it took place
suddenly, before the old notion--the 'axiom affirmed again and again by
Secretaries of State and Governors, that England was bound to pay all
expenses connected with the defence of the Colony'--had lost its hold on