had articles apologising to Lafontaine for having so unfairly judged him
beforehand. 'From, these and other indications (wrote Lord Elgin) I begin
to hope that there may be some return to common sense in Montreal.'

[Removal of Government from Montreal.]

My advisers, however (he proceeds), now protest that it will be
impossible to maintain the seat of Government here. We had a long
discussion on this point yesterday. All seem to be agreed, that if a
removal from this town takes place, it must be on the condition
prescribed in the address of the Assembly presented to me last
Session, viz. that there shall henceforward be Parliaments held
alternately in the Upper and Lower Provinces. A removal from this to
any other fixed point would be the certain ruin of the party making
it. Therefore removal from Montreal implies the adoption of the system
(which, although it has a good deal to recommend it, is certainly open
to great objections) of alternating Parliaments. But this is not the
only difficulty. The French members of the Administration ... are
willing to go to Toronto for four years at the close of the present
Parliament, but they give many reasons, which appear to have in a
great measure satisfied their Upper Canada colleagues, for insisting
on Quebec as the first point to be made. Now I have great objection to
going to Quebec at present. I fear it would be considered, both here
and in England, as an admission that the Government is under French-
Canadian influence, and that it cannot maintain itself in Upper
Canada. I, therefore, concluded in favour of a few days more being
given in order to see whether or not the movement now in progress in
Montreal may be so directed as to render it possible to retain the
seat of Government there.

This hope was disappointed, and he was obliged to admit the necessity of
removal. On September 3 he wrote again:--

We have had, since I last wrote, a week of unusual tranquillity....
but I regret to say that I discover as yet nothing to warrant the
belief that the seat of Government can properly remain at Montreal.

The existence of a perfect understanding between the more outrageous
and the more respectable fractions of the Tory party in the town, is
rendered even more manifest by the readiness with which the former,
through their organs, have yielded to the latter when they preached
moderation in good earnest. Additional proof is thus furnished of the
extent to which the blame of the disgraceful transactions of the past
four months falls on all. All attempts, and several have been made, to
induce the Conservatives to unite in an address, inviting me to return
to the town, have failed; which is the more significant, because it is
well known that the removal of the seat of Government is under
consideration, and that I have deprecated the abandonment of Montreal.

The existence of a party, animated by such sentiments, powerful in
numbers and organisation, and in the station of some who more or less
openly join it--owning a qualified allegiance to the constitution of
the province--professing to regard the Parliament and the Government
as nuisances to be tolerated within certain limits only--raising
itself whenever the fancy seizes it, or the crisis in its judgment
demands it, into an '_imperium in imperio_,'--renders it, I fear,
extremely doubtful whether the functions of Legislation or of
Government can be carried on to advantage in this city. 'Show vigour
and put it down,' say some. You _may_ and _must_ put down
those who resist the law when overt acts are committed. But the party
is unfortunately a national as well as a political one; after each
defeat it resumes its attitude of defiance; and, whenever it comes
into collision with the authorities, there is the risk of a frightful
race feud being provoked. All these dangers are vastly increased by
Montreal's being the seat of Government.

There were other arguments also of no little force. He was assured that
some Members had declared that nothing would induce them to come again to
Montreal; and he himself felt that it must do great mischief to the members
from other parts of the Province, to pass some months of each year in that
'hot-bed of prejudice and disaffection.' Moreover, so long as Montreal
retained the prestige of being the Metropolis, it was impossible to prevent
its press from enjoying a factitious importance, not only within the
province, but also in England and in the States, where it would be looked
upon as the exponent of the sentiments of the community at large.

Ultimately, on November 18, Lord Elgin reported to the Home Government,
that after full and anxious deliberation he had resolved, on the advice of
his Council, to act on the recommendation of the Assembly that the
Legislature should sit alternately at Toronto and Quebec, and with that
view to summon the Provincial Parliament for the next session at Toronto.
This step, 'decided upon in this deliberate and unimpassioned manner,' gave
a useful lesson, which was not lost either upon Montreal or the rest of the
Province. Nor was this its only good effect. 'The arrangement,' wrote Lord
Grey in 1852, 'by which the seat of Government and the sittings of the
Legislature were fixed alternately at Toronto and Quebec, has contributed
not a little towards removing the feelings of alienation from each other of
the inhabitants of French and of British descent. The French Canadians have
thus been brought into closer communication than formerly with the
inhabitants of the Western division of the province, and an increase of
mutual esteem and respect, with the removal of many prejudices by which
they were formerly divided, have been the result of the two classes
becoming better acquainted with  each other.'[11]

[Sidenote: Visit to Upper Canada.]

While these arrangements were under discussion, in the autumn following the
stormy events above described, in spite of the threats thrown out by the
extreme party, Lord Elgin, after a progress in Upper Canada in which he was
accompanied by his family, made a short tour in the Western districts, the
stronghold of British feeling, attended only by one aide-de-camp and a
servant, 'so as to contradict the allegation that he required protection.'
Everywhere he was received with the utmost cordiality; the few indications
of a different feeling, on the part of Orangemen and others, having only
the effect of heightening the enthusiasm with which he was greeted by the
majority of the population.

[Sidenote: Continued animosities.]

From this time we hear no more of such disgraceful scenes as it has been
necessary to record; but it was long before the old 'Family-Compact' party
forgave the Governor who had dared to be impartial. By many kinds of
detraction they sought to weaken his influence and damage his popularity;
detractions probably repeated in all sincerity by many who were honestly
incapable of understanding his real motives for forbearance. And as the
members of this party, though they had lost their monopoly of political
power, still remained the dominant class in society, the disparaging tone
which they set was taken up not only in the colony itself, but also by
travellers who visited it, and by them carried back to infect opinion in
England. The result was that persons at home, who had the highest
appreciation of Lord Elgin's capacity as a statesman, sincerely believed
him to be deficient in nerve and vigour; and as the misapprehension was one
which he could not have corrected, even if he had been aware how widely it
was spread, it continued to exist in many quarters until dispelled by the
singular energy and boldness, amounting almost to rashness, which he
displayed in China.

[Sidenote: Forbearance of Lord Elgin.]

The more we remember the vehemence with which these injurious reports were
circulated, the more remarkable appears the resolution not to yield to the
provocation they involved, and the determination to accept the whole
responsibility of the situation at whatever personal cost.

The following letters are among those which disclose the motives of his
resolute forbearance. The last of them, written to an intimate friend
nearly two years later, and summing up the feelings with which he looked
back on the struggles of 1849, may close the personal records of this
troubled year.

[Sidenote: Its motives.]

I do not at all wonder that you should be disposed to question the
wisdom of my course in respect to Montreal; I think it was the best I
could have taken under the circumstances; but I do not presume to say
that it may not be criticised--justly criticised. My choice was not
between a clearly right and a clearly wrong course: how easy is it to
deal with such cases, and how rare are they in life! But between
several difficulties, I think I chose the least. I think, too, that I
am beginning to reap the reward of my policy. I do not believe that
such enthusiasm was ever manifested towards anyone in my situation in
Canada, as has been exhibited during my recent tour. But more than
this. I do not believe that the function of the Governor-General under
constitutional government as the moderator between parties, the
representative of interests which are common to all the inhabitants of
the country, as distinct from those which divide them into parties,
was ever so fully and so frankly recognised. Now, I do not believe
that I could have achieved this if I had had blood upon my hands. I
might have been quite as popular, perhaps more so; for there are many,
especially in Lower Canada, who would gladly have seen the severities
of the law practised upon those from whom they believe that they have
often suffered much, unjustly. But my business is to humanize--not to
harden. At that task I must labour, through obloquy and
misrepresentation if needs be. At the same time I admit that I must,
not for the miserable purpose of self-glorification, but with a view
to the maintenance and establishment of my moral influence, recover
the prestige of personal courage of which some here sought to deprive
me. Before I have travelled unattended through the towns and villages
of Upper Canada, and met 'the bhoys' as they are called, in all of
them on their own ground, I think I shall have effected this object,
in so far as the province is concerned. To right myself in England
will be more difficult; but doubtless, if I live, the opportunity of
so doing, even there, will sooner or later present itself. Hitherto
any impertinences which have reached me from the other side have been
anonymous.

*       *       *       *       *

[Sidenote: Afterthoughts.]

I believe that the sentiments expressed in the newspaper extract of
which you acknowledge the receipt in your last, with respect to the
merits of the policy of forbearance adopted by me at the great crisis,
are beginning to obtain very generally among the few who trace results
to their causes. But none can know what that crisis was, and what that
decision cost. At the time I took it, I stood literally _alone_.
I alienated from me the adherents of the Government, who felt, or
imagined (having been generally, in times past, on the anti-Government
side), that if the tables had been turned--if _they_ and not
_their adversaries_ had been resisting the law of the land, and
threatening the life of the Queen's representative--a very different
course of repressive policy would have been adopted. At the same time
I gained nothing on the other side, who only advanced in audacity; and
added the charge of personal cowardice to their other outrages. At
home, too, I forfeited much moral support; for although the Government
sustained me with that honourable confidence which entitles a
Government to be well served, they were puzzled. The logic of the case
was against me. Lord Grey and Lord J. Russell both felt that either I
was right or I was wrong. If the latter, I ought to be recalled; if
the former, I ought to make the law respected. And, lastly, I lost any
chance of moral support from the opinion of our neighbours in the
States; for, like all primitive constitutionalists, the ideas of
government they hold in that quarter are very simple. I have been told
by Americans, 'We thought you were quite right; but we could not
understand why you did not _shoot them down!_'

I do not, as you may suppose, often speak of these matters; but the
subject was alluded to the other day by a person (now out of politics,
but who knew what was going on at the time, one of our ablest men),
and he said to me, 'Yes; I see it all now. You were right--a thousand
times right--though I thought otherwise then. I own that I would
have reduced Montreal to ashes before I would have endured half what
you did; and,' he added, 'I should have been justified, too.' 'Yes,' I
answered, 'you would have been justified, because your course would
have been perfectly defensible; but it would not have been the _best
course_. Mine was a _better one_.' And shall I tell you
what was the deep conviction on my mind, which, apart from the
reluctance which I naturally felt to shed blood (particularly in a
cause in which many who opposed the Government were actuated by
motives which, though much alloyed with baser metal, had claims on my
sympathy), confirmed me in that course?   I perceived that the mind of
the British population of the province, in Upper Canada especially,
was at that time the prey of opposing impulses. On the one hand, as a
question of blood and sensibility, they were inclined to go with the
anti-French party of Lower Canada; on the other, as a question of
constitutional principle, they felt that I was right, and that I
deserved support. Depend upon it, if we had looked to bayonets instead
of to reason for a triumph, the _sensibilities_ of the great body
of which I speak would soon have carried the day against their
_judgment_.

And what is the result? 700,000 French reconciled to England--not
because they are getting _rebel money_--I believe, indeed, that
no _rebels_ will get a farthing; but because they believe that
the British Governor is just. 'Yes;' but you may say 'this is
purchased by the alienation of the British.' Far from it; I took the
whole blame upon myself; and I will venture to affirm that the
Canadian British never were so loyal as they are at this hour; and,
what is more remarkable still, and more directly traceable to this
policy of forbearance, never, since Canada existed, has party-spirit
been more moderate, and the British and French races on better terms
than they are now; and this, in spite of the withdrawal of protection,
and of the proposal to throw on the colony many charges which the
Imperial Government has hitherto borne.

Pardon me for saying so much on this point; but _'magna est
veritas.'_


[1] _I.e._ one of the rebels of 1837, who had been banished to Bermuda
by Lord Durham.

[2] One of the Conservative papers of the day wrote:--'Bad as the payment
of the rebellion losses is, we do not know that it would not be better
to submit to pay twenty rebellion losses than have what is nominally a
free Constitution fettered and restrained each time a measure
distasteful to the minority is passed.'

[3] 'I confess,' he wrote in a private letter of the same date, 'I did not
before know how thin is the crust of order which covers the anarchical
elements that boil and toss beneath our feet.'

[4] 'When he entered the Government House he took a two-pound stone with
him which he had picked up in his carriage, as evidence of the most
unusual and sorrowful treatment Her Majesty's representative had
received.'--Mac Mullen, p. 511.

[5] 'Cabs, caleches, and everything that would run were at once launched in
pursuit, and crossing his route, the Governor-General's carriage was
bitterly assailed in the main street of the St. Lawrence suburbs. The
good and rapid driving of his postilions enabled him to clear the
desperate mob, but not till the head of his brother, Colonel Bruce,
had been cut, injuries inflicted on the chief of police. Colonel
Ermatanger, and on Captain Jones, commanding the escort, and every
panel of the carriage driven in.'--Mac Mullen, p. 511.

[6] In the midst of this time of anxiety and even of danger to himself and
his family, his eldest son was born at Monklands, on May 16. Her
Majesty was graciously pleased to become godmother to the child, who
was christened Victor Alexander.

[7] The motives, he afterwards said, which induced him to abstain from
forcing his way into Montreal, might be correctly stated in the words
of the Duke of Wellington, who, when asked why he did not go to the
city in 1830, is reported to have answered, 'I would have gone if the
law had been equal to protect me, but that was not the case. Fifty
dragoons would have done it, but that was a military force. If firing
had begun, who could tell when it would end? one guilty person would
fall and ten innocent be destroyed. Would this have been wise or
humane for a little bravado, or that the country might not be alarmed
for a day or two?'

[8] His valued Secretary, to whose personal recollections most of these
details are due.

[9] Some years afterwards, in the 'Address' already quoted, Mr. Gladstone
made something of an _amende_ for this attack; but he does not
appear to have been fully informed, even then, either as to the
intention with which the Act was framed, or as to the manner in which
it had been carried out.

[10] 'This,' observes Lord Grey, 'owing to the extreme forbearance of Lord
Elgin and his advisers, was the only life lost throughout these
unhappy disturbances.'

[11] Lord Grey's Colonial Policy, &c. i. 234. In 1858, however, this
'perambulating system' having proved expensive and inconvenient, the
Queen was asked to designate a permanent abode for the Legislature.
Her Majesty was graciously pleased to name Ottawa, the present capital
of the Dominion; and the selection of this central spot, with, its
singular facilities of communication, has greatly aided in the
consolidation of the province.




CHAPTER V.

ANNEXATION MOVEMENT--REMEDIAL MEASURES--REPEAL OF THE NAVIGATION LAWS--
RECIPROCITY WITH THE UNITED STATES--HISTORY OF THE TWO MEASURES--DUTY OF
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY--VIEWS ON COLONIAL GOVERNMENT--COLONIAL INTERESTS THE
SPORT OF HOME PARTIES--NO SEPARATION!--SELF-GOVERNMENT NOT NECESSARILY
REPUBLICAN--VALUE OF THE MONARCHICAL PRINCIPLE--DEFENCES OF THE COLONY.


[Sidenote: Annexation movement]

The disturbances which followed the passing of the 'Rebellion Losses Bill'
have been described in the preceding chapter chiefly as they affected the
person of the Governor. But it may be truly said that this was the aspect
of them that gave him least concern. He felt, indeed, deeply the
indignities offered to the Crown of England through its representative. But
there was some satisfaction in the reflection that, by taking on himself
the whole responsibility of sanctioning the obnoxious Bill, he had drawn
down upon his own head the chief violence of a storm which might otherwise
have exploded in a manner very dangerous to the Empire. 'I think I might
say,' he writes, 'with less poetry but with more truth, what Lamartine said
when they accused him of coquetting with the _Rouges_ under the
Provisional Government: "_Oui, j'ai conspire! J'ai conspire comme le
paratonnerre conspire avec le nuage pour desarmer la foudre._"' But the
thunder-cloud was not entirely disarmed; and it burst in a direction which
popular passion in Canada has always been too apt to take, threats of
throwing off England and joining the American States. As far back as March
14, 1849, we find Lord Elgin drawing Lord Grey's attention to this subject.

There has been (he writes) a vast deal of talk about 'annexation,' as
is unfortunately always the case here when there is anything to
agitate the public mind. If half the talk on this subject were
sincere, I should consider an attempt to keep up the connection with
Great Britain as Utopian in the extreme. For, no matter what the
subject of complaint, or what the party complaining; whether it be
alleged that the French are oppressing the British, or the British the
French--that Upper Canada debt presses on Lower Canada, or Lower
Canada claims on Upper; whether merchants be bankrupt, stocks
depreciated, roads bad, or seasons unfavourable, annexation is invoked
as the remedy for all ills, imaginary or real. A great deal of this
talk is, however, bravado, and a great deal the mere product of
thoughtlessness. Undoubtedly it is in some quarters the utterance of
very sincere convictions; and if England will not make the sacrifices
which are absolutely necessary to put the colonists here in as good a
position commercially as the citizens of the States--in order to which
_free navigation and reciprocal trade with the States are
indispensable_--if not only the organs of the league but those of
the Government and of the Peel party are always writing as if it were
an admitted fact that colonies, and more especially Canada, are a
burden, to be endured only because they cannot be got rid of, the end
may be nearer at hand than we wot of.

In these sentences we have the germs of views and feelings which time only
made clearer and stronger;--indignation at that tendency, so common in all
minorities, to look abroad for aid against the power of the majority; faith
in the idea of Colonial Government, if based on principles of justice and
freedom; and, as regards the particular case of Canada, the conviction that
nothing was wanted to secure her loyalty but a removal of the commercial
restrictions which placed her at a disadvantage in competing with her
neighbours of the Union. To understand the scope of his policy during the
next few years, it will be necessary to dwell at some length on each of
these points; but for the present we must return to the circumstances which
gave occasion to the letter which we have quoted.

[Sidenote: Manifesto.]

While ready, as that letter shows, to make every allowance for the
utterances of thoughtless folly, or of well-founded discontent on the part
of the people, Lord Elgin felt the necessity of checking at once such
demonstrations on the part of paid servants of the Crown. Accordingly, when
an elaborate manifesto appeared in favour of 'annexation,' bearing the
signatures of several persons--magistrates, Queen's counsel, militia
officers, and others--holding commissions at the pleasure of the Crown, he
caused a circular to be addressed to all such persons with the view of
ascertaining whether their names had been attached with their own consent.
Some of these letters were answered in the negative, some in the
affirmative, and others by denying the right of the Government to put the
question, and declining to reply to it. Lord Elgin resolved, with the
advice of his executive council, to remove from such offices as are held
during the pleasure of the Crown, the gentlemen who admitted the
genuineness of their signatures, and those who refused to disavow them.

[Sidenote: Remedial measures.]

'In this course, says Lord Grey,[1] 'we thought it right to support him;
and a despatch was addressed to him signifying the Queen's approval of his
having dismissed from Her service those who had signed the address, and Her
Majesty's commands to resist to the utmost any attempt that might be made
to bring about a separation of Canada from the British dominions,' But the
necessity for such acts of severity only increased Lord Elgin's desire to
remove every reasonable ground of complaint and discontent; to shut out, as
he said, the advocates of annexation from every plea which could grace or
dignify rebellion. He felt, indeed, an assured confidence that, by carrying
out fearlessly the principle of self-government, he had 'cast an acorn into
time,' which could not fail to bring forth the fruit of political
contentment. But, in the meantime, for the immediate security of the
connection between the colony and the mother-country he thought, as we have
already seen, that two measures were indispensable, viz. the removal of the
existing restrictions on navigation, and the establishment of reciprocal
free trade with the United States.

Judging after the event we may, perhaps, be inclined to think that the
importance which he attached to the latter of these measures was
exaggerated; especially as the annexation movement had died away, and
content, commercial as well as political, had returned to the Province long
before it was carried. But we cannot form a correct view of his policy
without giving some prominence to a subject which occupied, for many years,
so large a share of his thoughts and of his energies.

Writing to Lord Grey on November 8, 1849, he says:--

[Sidenote: 'Reciprocity.']

The fact is, that although both the States and Canada export to the
same neutral market, prices on the Canada side of the line are lower
than on the American, by the amount of the duty which the Americans
levy. So long as this state of things continues there will be
discontent in this country; deep, growing discontent You will not, I
trust, accuse me of having deceived you on this point. I have always
said that I am prepared to assume the responsibility of keeping Canada
quiet, with a much smaller garrison than we have now, and without any
tax on the British consumer in the shape of protection to Canadian
products, if you put our trade on as good a footing as that of our
American neighbours; but if things remain on their present footing in
this respect, there is nothing before us but violent agitation, ending
in convulsion or annexation. It is better that I should worry you with
my importunity, than that I should be chargeable with having neglected
to give you due warning. You have a great opportunity before you--
obtain reciprocity for us, and I venture to predict that you will be
able shortly to point to this hitherto turbulent colony with
satisfaction, in illustration of the tendency of self-government and
freedom of trade, to beget contentment and material progress. Canada
will remain attached to England, though tied to her neither by the
golden links of protection, nor by the meshes of old-fashioned
colonial office jobbing and chicane. But if you allow the Americans to
withhold the boon which you have the means of extorting if you will, I
much fear that the closing period of the connection between Great
Britain and Canada will be marked by incidents which will damp the
ardour of those who desire to promote human happiness by striking
shackles either off commerce or off men.

Even when tendering to the Premier, Lord John Russell, his formal thanks on
being raised to the British peerage--an honour which, coming at that
moment, he prized most highly as a proof to the world that the Queen's
Government approved his policy--he could not forego the opportunity of
insisting on a topic which seemed to him so momentous.

It is (he writes) of such vital importance that your Lordship should
rightly apprehend the nature of these difficulties, and the state of
public opinion in Canada at this conjuncture, that I venture, at the
hazard of committing an indiscretion, to add a single observation on
this head. Let me then assure your Lordship, and I speak advisedly in
offering this assurance, that the disaffection now existing in Canada,
whatever be the forms with which it may clothe itself, is due mainly
to commercial causes. I do not say that there is no discontent on
political grounds. Powerful individuals and even classes of men are, I
am well aware, dissatisfied with the conduct of affairs. But I make
bold to affirm that so general is the belief that, under the present
circumstances of our commercial condition, the colonists pay a heavy
pecuniary fine for their fidelity to Great Britain, that nothing but
the existence to an unwonted degree of political contentment among the
masses has prevented the cry for annexation from spreading, like
wildfire, through the Province. This, as your Lordship will perceive,
is a new feature in Canadian politics. The plea of self-interest, the
most powerful weapon, perhaps, which the friends of British connection
have wielded in times past, has not only been wrested from my hands,
but transferred since 1846 to those of the adversary. I take the
liberty of mentioning a fact, which seems better to illustrate the
actual condition of affairs in these respects than many arguments. I
have lately spent several weeks in the district of Niagara. Canadian
Niagara is separated from the state of New York by a narrow stream,
spanned by a bridge, which it takes a foot passenger about three
minutes to cross. The inhabitants are for the most part U.E.
loyalists,[2] and differ little in habits or modes of thought and
expression from their neighbours. Wheat is their staple product--the
article which they exchange for foreign comforts and luxuries. Now it
is the fact that a bushel of wheat, grown on the Canadian side of the
line, has fetched this year in the market, on an average, from
9_d_. to 1_s_. less than the same quantity and quality of
the same article grown on the other. Through their district council, a
body elected under a system of very extended suffrage, these same
inhabitants of Niagara have protested against the Montreal annexation
movement. They have done so (and many other district councils in Upper
Canada have done the same) under the impression that it would be base
to declare against England at a moment when England has given a signal
proof of her determination to concede constitutional Government in all
its plenitude to Canada. I am confident, however, that the large
majority of the persons who have thus protested, firmly believe that
their annexation to the United States would add one-fourth to the
value of the produce of their farms.

I need say no more than this to convince your Lordship, that while
this state of things subsists (and I much fear that no measure but the
establishment of reciprocal trade between Canada and the States, or
the imposition of a duty on the produce of the States when imported
into England, will remove it), arguments will not be wanting to those
who seek to seduce Canadians from their allegiance.

Shortly afterwards he writes to Lord Grey:--

It is not for me to dispute the point with free-traders, when they
allege that all parts of the Empire are suffering from the effects of
free-trade, and that Canadians must take their chance with others. But
I must be permitted to remark, that the Canadian case differs from
others, both as respects the immediate cause of the suffering, and
still more as respects the means which the sufferers possess of
finding for themselves a way of escape. As to the former point I have
only to say that, however severe the pressure in other cases attendant
on the transition from protection to free-trade, there is none which
presents so peculiar a specimen of legislative legerdemain as the
Canadian, where an interest was created in 1843 by a Parliament in
which the parties affected had no voice, only to be knocked down by
the same Parliament in 1846. But it is the latter consideration which
constitutes the specialty of the Canadian case. What in point of fact
_can_ the other suffering interests, of which the _Times_
writes, do? There may be a great deal of grumbling, and a gradual
move towards republicanism, or even communism; but this is an operose
and empirical process, the parties engaged in it are full of
misgivings, and their ranks at every step in advance are thinned by
desertion. Not so with the Canadians. The remedy offered to them, such
as it is, is perfectly definite and intelligible. They are invited to
form a part of a community, which is neither suffering nor free-
trading, which never makes a bargain without getting at least twice as
much as it gives; a community, the members of which have been within
the last few weeks pouring into their multifarious places of worship,
to thank God that they are exempt from the ills which afflict other
men, from those more especially which afflict their despised
neighbours, the inhabitants of North America, who have remained
faithful to the country which planted them.

Now, I believe, that if these facts be ignored, it is quite impossible
to understand rightly the present state of opinion in Canada, or to
determine wisely the course which the British Government and
Parliament ought to pursue. It may suit the policy of the English
free-trade press to represent the difficulties of Canada as the
consequence of having a fool for a Governor-General; but, if it be
permitted me to express an opinion on a matter of so much delicacy, I
venture to doubt whether it would be safe to act on this hypothesis.
My conviction on the contrary is, that motives of self-interest of a
very gross and palpable description are suggesting treasonable courses
to the Canadian mind at present, and that it is a political sentiment,
a feeling of gratitude for what has been done and suffered this year
in the cause of Canadian self-government, which is neutralising these
suggestions.

Again, on December 29,1849, he writes as follows:--

[Sidenote: Free navigation.]

I believe that the operation of the free navigation system will be
what you anticipate, to a great extent at least, and that it will tend
materially to equalise prices on the two sides of the line. At the
same time I do think, that there are circumstances in this country
which falsify, in some degree, the deductions at which one arrives
from reasoning founded on the abstract principles of political
economy. One of these circumstances is the power which the farmers in
the Western States, having no rents to pay, have of holding back their
grain when prices do not suit them. You must have observed what hoards
they poured forth when they were tempted by the famine prices of 1847;
and I cannot but think that this power of hoarding, coupled with an
indifferent harvest, must account for the great disparity of price,
which has obtained during the course of the present year in the New
York market for bonded grain, and grain for the home consumption. I
fully expect, however, to see the price of Canadian grain, bonded at
New York, rise, now that it can be exported to Liverpool in the New
York liners, which will carry it for ballast. Nevertheless, I think
that Sir Robert Peel's _dictum_ with respect to the Repeal of the
Corn Laws, on the day on which he retired last from office, when he
observed that thenceforward, even when the poor suffered from the high
price of bread, they would not ascribe that suffering to the fact of
their bread being taxed, applies with at least equal force to the
reciprocity question as affecting the Canadian farmers. For sure am I
that, so long as there is a duty on their produce when it enters the
States, and none on the introduction of United States produce into
England, they will ascribe to this cause alone the differences of
price that may occasionally rule to their disadvantage.

The history of the two measures which Lord Elgin so ardently desired, and
which in the foregoing and many similar letters he so urgently pressed, was
eminently characteristic of the two Legislatures, through which they had
respectively to be carried.

[Sidenote: Repeal of Navigation Laws.]

In England, the repeal of restrictive Navigation Laws was contended for by
thoughtful statesmen on grounds of public policy. The protective and
conservative instincts of the old country, fortified by the never-absent
spirit of party, resisted the change. When fairly beaten by force of
argument in the House of Commons, they entrenched themselves ha the House
of Lords; and it was only after a hot struggle that the Act was passed in
June 1849, of which one effect was, by lowering freights, to increase the
profits of the Canadian trade in wheat and timber, and thus to advance, in
a very important degree, the commercial prosperity of the colony.

[Sidenote: Reciprocity Treaty.]

The delays which retarded the settlement of the Reciprocity Treaty were due
to causes of another kind. The difficulty was to induce the American
Congress to pay any attention at all to the subject. In the vast
multiplicity of matters with which that Assembly has to deal, it is said
that no cause which does not appeal strongly to a national sentiment, or at
least to some party feeling, has a chance of obtaining a hearing, unless it
is taken up systematically by 'organizers' outside the House. The
Reciprocity Bill was not a measure about which any national or even party
feeling could be aroused. It was one which required much study to
understand its bearings, and which would affect different interests in the
country in different ways. It stood, therefore, especially in need of the
aid of professional organizers; a kind of aid of which it was of course
impossible that either the British or the Canadian Government should avail
itself. Session after session the Bill was proposed, scarcely debated, and
set aside. At last, in 1854, after the negotiations had dragged on wearily
for more than six years, Lord Elgin himself was sent to Washington in the
hope--'a forlorn hope,' as it seemed to those who sent him--of bringing the
matter to a successful issue. It was his first essay in diplomacy, but made
under circumstances unusually favourable. He was personally popular with
the Americans, towards whom he had always entertained and shown a most
friendly feeling. They appreciated, moreover, better perhaps than it was
appreciated at home, the consummate ability, as well as the rare strength
of character, which he had displayed in the government of Canada; and the
prestige thus attaching to his name, joined to the influence of his
presence, and his courtesy and _bonhomie_, enabled him in a few days
to smooth all difficulties, and change apathy into enthusiasm. Within a few
weeks from the time of his landing he had agreed with Mr. Marcy upon the
terms of a Treaty of Reciprocity, which soon afterwards received the
sanction of all the Governments concerned.

The main concessions made by the Provinces to the United States in this
treaty were, (1) the removal of duties on the introduction, for consumption
in the Provinces, of certain products of the States; (2) the admission of
citizens of that country to the enjoyment of the in-shore sea-fishery; (3)
the opening-up to their vessels of the St. Lawrence and canals pertaining
thereto.

A good deal of misconception prevailed at the time as to the amount of the
concession made under the second head. The popular impression on this point
was, that a gigantic monopoly was about to be surrendered; but this was far
from being the case. The citizens of the United States had already, under
the Convention of 1818, access to the most important cod-fisheries on the
British coasts. The new treaty maintained in favour of British subjects the
monopoly of the river and freshwater fisheries; and the concession which it
made to the citizens of the United States amounted in substance to this,
that it admitted them to a legal participation in the mackerel and herring
fisheries, from illegal encroachments on which it had been found, after the
experience of many years, practically impossible to exclude them.[3]

The duration of the Treaty was limited to ten years, and has not been
extended; but it is not too much to hope that it has had some effect in
engendering feelings of friendliness, and of community of interest, which
may long outlast itself.

[Sidenote: Views of Government.]

It has been already noticed that the 'annexation movement' of 1849 died
away without serious consequences; and extracts which have been given above
sufficiently show to what cause Lord Elgin attributed its extinction. The
powerful attraction of the great neighbouring republic had been
counteracted and overcome by the more powerful attraction of self-
government at home. The centrifugal force was no longer equal to the
centripetal. To create this state of feeling had been his most cherished
desire; to feel that he had succeeded in creating it was, throughout much
obloquy and misunderstanding, his greatest support.

[Sidenote: Duty of supporting authority,]

From the earliest period of his entrance into political life he had always
had the strongest sense of the duty incumbent on every public man of
supporting, even in opposition, the authority of Government. The bitterest
reproach which he cast upon the Whigs, in his first Tory 'Letter to the
Electors of Great Britain' in 1835, was that when they found they could not
carry on the government themselves, they tried to make it impossible for
any other party to do so. Nor was he less severe, on another occasion, in
his reprehension of 'a certain high Tory clique who are always cavilling at
royalty when it is constitutional; circulating the most miserable gossip
about royal persons and royal entertainments,' &c.; busily 'engaged in
undermining the foundations on which respect for human institutions rests.'
Writing, in May 1850, to Mr. Gumming Bruce, a Tory and Protectionist, he
said--

I shall not despair for England whether Free-traders or Protectionists
be in the ascendant, unless I see that the faction out of power abet
the endeavours of those who would make the Government of the country
contemptible. Read Montalembert's speeches. They are very eloquent and
instructive. He had as full a faith in his religion, and what he
considered due to his religion, as you can have in your Corn Laws. Yet
observe how bitterly he now repents having aided those who have
undermined in the French public all respect for authority and the
powers that be.

If all that your Protectionist friends want to do is to put
themselves, or persons in whom they have greater confidence than the
present Ministry, in office, their object is, I confess, a perfectly
legitimate one. What I complain of is the system of what is termed
damaging the Government, when resorted to by those who have no such
purpose in view; or at least no honest intention of assuming
responsibilities which they are endeavouring to render intolerable to
those who are charged with them.

[Sidenote: especially in Colonies.]

But if this 'political profligacy' was, in his judgment, the bane of party
government at home, a still stronger but, perhaps, more excusable tendency
to it threatened to defeat the object of responsible government in Canada.
Accustomed to look abroad for the source and centre of power, a beaten
minority in the Colonial Parliament, instead of loyally accepting its
position, was never without a hope of wresting the victory from its
opponents, either by an appeal to opinion in the mother-country, always