Holland and Zeeland on which the enemy had not set foot had been crushed
beneath heavy taxes and the loss of commerce.

The position of the three provinces, Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel,
which had been overrun by the French at the opening of hostilities and
held by them ever since, had to be re-settled. They had, during this
period, paid no taxes, and had no representation in the States-General.
Holland was in favour of reducing them to the status of Generality-lands
until they had paid their arrears. The prince was opposed to any
harshness of treatment, and his will prevailed. The three provinces were
re-admitted into the Union, but with shorn privileges; and William was
elected stadholder by each of them with largely increased powers. The
nomination, or the choice out of a certain number of nominees, of the
members of the Town-Corporations, of the Courts of Justice and of the
delegates to the States-General, was granted to him. The Dutch Republic
was full of anomalies. In Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel we have the
curious spectacle in the days of William III of the stadholder, who was
nominally a servant of the Sovereign Estates, himself appointing his
masters. As a matter of fact, the voice of these provinces was his
voice; and, as he likewise controlled the Estates in Zeeland, he could
always count upon a majority vote in the States-General in support of
his foreign policy. Nor was this all.

Holland itself, in gratitude for its deliverance, had become
enthusiastically Orangist. It declared the stadholdership hereditary in
the male-line, and its example was followed by Zeeland, Utrecht,
Gelderland and Overyssel, while the States-General in their turn made
the captain-and admiral-generalship of the Union hereditary offices. Nor
was gratitude confined to the conferring of powers and dignities which
gave the prince in all but name monarchical authority. At the proposal
of Amsterdam, the city which so often had been and was yet to be the
stubborn opponent of the Princes of Orange, William II's debt of
2,000,000 fl. was taken over by the province of Holland; Zeeland
presented him with 30,000 fl.; and the East India Company with a grant
of 1/33 of its dividends.

From the very first William had kept steadily in view a scheme of
forming a great coalition to curb the ambitious designs of Louis XIV;
and for effecting this object an alliance between England and the United
Provinces was essential. The first step was to conclude peace. This was
not a difficult task. The English Parliament, and still more the English
people, had throughout been averse from fighting on the side of the
French against the Dutch. Charles II, with the help of French money, had
been carrying on the war in opposition to the wishes of his subjects,
who saw their fleets but feebly supported by their French allies, their
trade seriously injured, and but little chance of gaining any
advantageous return for the heavy cost. Charles himself had a strong
affection for his nephew, and began to turn a favourable ear to his
proposals for negotiations, more especially as his heroic efforts to
stem the tide of French invasion had met with so much success. In these
circumstances everything was favourable to an understanding; and peace
was concluded at Westminster on February 19,1674. The terms differed
little from those of Breda, except that the Republic undertook to pay a
war indemnity of 2,000,000 fl. within three years. The striking of the
flag was conceded. Surinam remained in Dutch hands. New York, which had
been retaken by a squadron under Cornelis Evertsen, August, 1673, was
given back to the English crown. Negotiations were likewise opened with
Münster and Cologne; and peace was concluded with Münster (April 22) and
with Cologne (May 11) on the basis of the evacuation of all conquered
territory. France was isolated and opposed now by a strong coalition,
the Republic having secured the help of Austria, Spain, Brandenburg and
Denmark. The campaign of the summer of 1674 thus opened under favouring
circumstances, but nothing of importance occurred until August 11, when
William at the head of an allied force of some 70,000 men encountered
Condé at Seneff in Hainault. The battle was fought out with great
obstinacy and there were heavy losses on both sides. The French,
however, though inferior in numbers had the advantage in being a more
compact force than that of the allies; and William, poorly supported by
the Imperialist contingents, had to retire from the field. He was never
a great strategist, but he now conducted a retreat which extracted
admiration from his opponents. His talents for command always showed
themselves most conspicuously in adverse circumstances. His coolness and
courage in moments of peril and difficulty never deserted him, and,
though a strict disciplinarian, he always retained the confidence and
affection of his soldiers. On October 27 Grave was captured, leaving
only one of the Dutch fortresses, Maestricht, in the hands of the
French.

The war on land dragged on without any decisive results during 1675. The
stadholder was badly supported by his allies and reduced to the
defensive; but, though tentative efforts were made by the English
government to set on foot negotiations for peace, and a growing party in
Holland were beginning to clamour for the cessation of a war which was
crippling their trade and draining the resources of the country, the
prince was resolutely opposed to the English offer of mediation, which
he regarded as insincere and premature. He was well aware that there was
in England a very strong and widespread opposition to the succession of
James Duke of York, who made no secret of his devoted attachment to the
Roman Catholic faith. So strong was the feeling that he had been
compelled to resign his post of Lord-High-Admiral. The dislike and
distrust he aroused had been accentuated by his second marriage to Mary
of Modena, a zealous Catholic. William was the son of the eldest
daughter of Charles I, and to him the eyes of a large party in England
were turning. The prince was keenly alive to the political advantages of
his position. He kept himself well informed of the intrigues of the
court and of the state of public opinion by secret agents, and entered
into clandestine correspondence with prominent statesmen. Charles II
himself, though he had not the smallest sympathy with his nephew's
political views, was as kindly disposed to him as his selfish and
unprincipled nature would allow, and he even went so far as to encourage
in 1674 an alliance between him and his cousin Mary, the elder daughter
of the Duke of York. But William had at that time no inclination for
marriage. He was preoccupied with other things, and the age of Mary--she
was only twelve--rendered it easy for him to postpone his final
decision.

Events were to force his hand. In 1676 the French king, fearing the
power of the coalition that was growing in strength, endeavoured to
detach the republic by offering to make a separate peace on generous
terms. Despite the opposition of the stadholder, Dutch and French
representatives met at Nijmwegen; but William by his obdurate attitude
rendered any settlement of the points in dispute impossible. In 1677,
however, the capture of Valenciennes by the French and their decisive
defeat of the allied army under William's command at Mont-Cassel (April
11) made it more difficult for him to resist the growing impatience of
the burgher-class in Holland and especially of the merchants of
Amsterdam at his opposition to peace. He was accused of wishing to
continue the war from motives of personal ambition and the desire of
military glory. In February of this year, however, Charles II after a
period of personal rule was through lack of resources compelled to
summon parliament. It no sooner met than it showed its strong sympathy
with the Netherlands; and the king speedily saw that he could no longer
pursue a policy opposed to the wishes of his people. When, therefore,
William sent over his most trusted friend and counsellor, Bentinck, to
London on a secret mission in the summer, he met with a most favourable
reception; and the prince himself received an invitation to visit his
uncle with the special object of renewing the proposal for his marriage
with the Princess Mary. William accordingly arrived in London on October
19; and, the assent of the king and the Duke of York being obtained, the
wedding was celebrated with almost indecent haste. It was a purely
political union; and when, early in December, the Prince and Princess of
Orange set sail for Holland, the young girl wept bitterly at having to
leave her home for a strange land at the side of a cold, unsympathetic
husband. The weeks he spent in England had been utilised by the prince
to good purpose. He persuaded Charles to promise his support by land
and sea to the Netherlands in case the terms of peace offered by the
allies were rejected by the French. A treaty between the States and
Great Britain giving effect to this promise was actually signed on
January 29, 1678. The results, however, did not answer William's
expectations. The English Parliament and the States alike had no trust
in King Charles, nor was the English match at first popular in Holland.
A strong opposition arose against the prince's war policy. The
commercial classes had been hard hit by the French invasion, and they
were now suffering heavy losses at sea through the Dunkirk privateers
led by the daring Jean Bart. The peace party included such tried and
trusted statesmen as Van Beverningh, Van Beuningen and the
Council-Pensionary Fagel, all of them loyal counsellors of the
stadholder. So resolute was the attitude of Amsterdam that the leaders
of both municipal parties, Valckenier and Hooft, were agreed in
demanding that the French offers of a separate peace should be accepted.
On the same side was found Henry Casimir, Stadholder of Friesland, who
was jealous of his cousin's autocratic exercise of authority.

The _pourparlers_ at Nijmwegen were still going on, but made no progress
in face of William's refusal to treat except in concert with his allies.
Louis XIV, however, fully informed of the state of public opinion and of
the internal dissensions both in the United Provinces and in England,
was not slow to take advantage of the situation. A powerful French army
invaded Flanders and made themselves masters of Ypres and Ghent and
proceeded to besiege Mons. William, despite the arrival of an English
auxiliary force under Monmouth, could do little to check the enemy's
superior forces. Meanwhile French diplomacy was busy at Amsterdam and
elsewhere in the States, working against the war parties; and by the
offer of favourable terms the States-General were induced to ask for a
truce of six weeks. It was granted, and the Dutch and Spanish
representatives at Nijmwegen (those of the emperor, of Brandenburg and
of Denmark refusing to accede) speedily agreed to conclude peace on the
following terms: the French to restore Maestricht and to evacuate all
occupied Dutch territory, and to make a commercial treaty. Spain to
surrender an important slice of southern Flanders, but to be left in
possession of a belt of fortresses to cover their Netherland possessions
against further French attack. But, though these conditions were
accepted, the French raised various pretexts to delay the signature of
the treaty, hoping that meanwhile Mons, which was closely beleaguered
by Luxemburg, might fall into their hands, and thus become an asset
which they could exchange for some other possession. The States and the
Spanish Government were both anxious to avoid this; and the Prince of
Orange, who steadily opposed the treaty, returned towards the end of
July to his camp to watch the siege of Mons and prevent its falling into
the hands of the enemy. At the same time (July 26) King Charles, who had
been working through Sir William Temple for the conclusion of peace, now
declared that, unless the treaty was signed before August 11, he would
assist the allies to enforce it. The French diplomatists at Nijmwegen
had hitherto declared that their troops would not evacuate Maestricht
and the other places which they had agreed to restore to the States,
until Brandenburg and Denmark had evacuated the territory they had
conquered from Sweden. On August 10, just before time for resuming
hostilities had been reached, they tactfully conceded this point and
promised immediate evacuation, if the treaty were at once concluded. Van
Beverningh and his colleagues accordingly, acting on their instructions,
affixed their signatures just before midnight.

They fell into the trap laid for them, for the treaty between France and
Spain was not yet signed, and it was the intention of the French to make
further pretexts for delay in the hope that Mons meanwhile would fall.
The report of the conclusion of peace reached the stadholder in his camp
on August 13, but unofficially. On the morning of August 14 D'Estrades
came personally to bring the news to Luxemburg; and the French marshal
was on the point of forwarding the message to the Dutch camp, when he
heard that Orange was advancing with his army to attack him, and he felt
that honour compelled him to accept the challenge. A sanguinary fight
took place at St Denis, a short distance from Mons. William exposed his
life freely, and though the result was nominally a drawn battle, he
achieved his purpose. Luxemburg raised the siege of Mons, and the
negotiations with Spain were pressed forward. The treaty was signed on
September 17, 1678. The peace of Nijmwegen thus brought hostilities to
an end, leaving the United Provinces in possession of all their
territory. It lasted ten years, but it was only an armed truce. Louis
XIV desired a breathing space in which to prepare for fresh aggressions;
and his tireless opponent, the Prince of Orange, henceforth made it the
one object of his life to form a Grand Alliance to curb French
ambition and uphold in Europe what was henceforth known as "the Balance
of Power."

In setting about this task William was confronted with almost
insuperable difficulties. The Dutch people generally had suffered
terribly in the late invasions and were heartily sick of war. The
interest of the Hollanders and especially of the Amsterdammers was
absorbed in the peaceful pursuits of commerce. The far-reaching plans
and international combinations, upon which William concentrated his
whole mind and energies, had no attraction for them, even had they
understood their purpose and motive. The consequence was that the prince
encountered strong opposition, and this not merely in Holland and
Amsterdam, but from his cousin Henry Casimir and the two provinces of
which he was stadholder. In Amsterdam the old "States" party revived
under the leadership of Valckenier and Hooft; and in his latter days Van
Beuningen was ready to resist to the utmost any considerable outlay on
the army or navy or any entangling alliances. They held that it was the
business of the Republic to attend to its own affairs and to leave Louis
to pursue his aggressive policy at the expense of other countries, so
long as he left them alone. The ideal which William III had set before
him was the exact reverse of this; and, unfortunately for his own
country, throughout his life he often subordinated its particular
interests to the wider European interests which occupied his attention.

The work of building up afresh a coalition to withstand the ever-growing
menace of the formidable French power could scarcely have been more
unpromising than it now appeared. Spain was utterly exhausted and
feeble. Brandenburg and Denmark had been alienated by the States
concluding a separate peace at Nijmwegen and leaving them in the lurch.
The attention of the emperor was fully occupied in defending Hungary and
Vienna itself against the Turks. England under Charles II was
untrustworthy and vacillating, almost a negligible quantity. A visit
made by William to London convinced him that nothing was at present to
be hoped for from that quarter. At the same time the very able French
ambassador at the Hague, D'Avaux, did his utmost to foment the divisions
and factions in the Provinces. He always insisted that he was accredited
to the States-General and not to the Prince of Orange, and carried on
correspondence and intrigues with the party in Amsterdam opposed to
the stadholder's anti-French policy. The cumbrous and complicated system
of government enabled him thus to do much to thwart the prince and to
throw obstacles in his way. The curious thing is, that William was so
intent on his larger projects that he was content to use the powers he
had without making any serious attempt, as he might have done, to make
the machine of government more workable by reforms in the direction of
centralisation. Immersed in foreign affairs, he left the internal
administration in the hands of subordinates chosen rather for their
subservience than for their ability and probity; and against several of
them, notably against his relative Odijk, serious charges were made.
Odijk, representing the prince as first noble in Zeeland, had a large
patronage; and he shamelessly enriched himself by his venal traffic in
the disposal of offices without a word of rebuke from William, in whose
name he acted. On the contrary, he continued to enjoy his favour.
Corruption was scarcely less rife in Holland, though no one practised it
quite on the same scale as Odijk in Zeeland. William indeed cared little
about the domestic politics of the Republic, except in so far as they
affected his diplomatic activities; and in this domain he knew how to
employ able and devoted men. He had Waldeck at his side not merely as a
military adviser, but as a skilful diplomatist well versed in the
intricate politics of the smaller German states; Everhard van Weede,
lord of Dijkveld, and Godard van Rheede, lord of Amerongen, proved
worthy successors of Van Beverningh and Van Beuningen. Through the
Council-Pensionary Fagel he was able to retain the support of the
majority in the Estates of Holland, despite the strong opposition he
encountered at Amsterdam and some other towns, where the interests of
commerce reigned supreme. The death of Gillis Valckenier, the ablest of
the leaders of the opposition in Amsterdam, in 1680 left the control of
affairs in that city in the hands of Nicolaes Witsen and Johan Hudde,
but these were men of less vigour and determination than Valckenier.

Louis XIV meanwhile had been actively pushing forward his schemes of
aggrandisement. Strasburg was seized in August, 1681; Luxemburg was
occupied; claims were made under the treaty of Nijmwegen to certain
portions of Flanders and Brabant, and troops were despatched to take
possession of them. There was general alarm; and, with the help of
Waldeck, William was able to secure the support of a number of the
small German states in the Rhenish circle, most of them always ready to
hire out their armed forces for a subsidy. Sweden also offered
assistance. But both England and Brandenburg were in secret collusion
with France, and the emperor would not move owing to the Turkish menace.

In these circumstances Spain was compelled (1684) by the entry of the
armies of Louis into the southern Netherlands to declare war upon
France, and called upon the States for their military aid of 8000 men in
accordance with the terms of the treaty of Nijmwegen. Orange at once
referred the matter to the Council of State, and himself proposed that
16,000 should be sent. As this, however, could only mean a renewal of
the war with France, the proposal met with strong opposition in many
quarters, and especially in Amsterdam. Prosperity was just beginning to
revive, and a remembrance of past experiences filled the hearts of many
with dread at the thought of the French armies once more invading their
land. The Amsterdam regents even went so far as to enter into secret
negotiations with D'Avaux; and they were supported by Henry Casimir, who
was always ready to thwart his cousin's policy. William was checkmated
and at first, in his anger, inclined to follow his father's example and
crush the opposition of Amsterdam by force. He possessed however, which
William II had not, the support of a majority in the Estates of Holland.
He used this with effect. The raising of the troops was sanctioned by
the Estates (January 31, 1684), an intercepted cipher-letter from
D'Avaux being skilfully used to discredit the Amsterdam leaders, who
were accused of traitorous correspondence with a foreign power.
Nevertheless the prince, although he was able to override any active
opposition at home, did not venture, so long as England and Brandenburg
were on friendly relations with France, to put pressure upon the
States-General. The French troops, to the prince's chagrin, overran
Flanders; and he had no alternative but to concur in the truce for
twenty years concluded at Ratisbon, August 15, 1684, which left the
French king in possession of all his conquests.

No more conclusive proof of the inflexible resolve of William III can be
found than the patience he now exhibited. His faith in himself was never
shaken, and his patience in awaiting the favourable moment was
inexhaustible. To him far more appropriately than to his
great-grandfather might the name of William the Silent have been
given. He had no confidants, except Waldeck and William Bentinck; and
few could even guess at the hidden workings of that scheming mind or at
the burning fires of energy and will-power beneath the proud and frigid
reserve of a man so frail in body and always ailing. Very rarely could a
born leader of men have been more unamiable or less anxious to win
popular applause, but his whole demeanour inspired confidence and,
ignoring the many difficulties and oppositions which thwarted him, he
steadfastly bided his time and opportunity. It now came quickly, for the
year 1685 was marked by two events--the accession of James II to the
throne of England, and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes--which were
to have far-reaching consequences.

The new King of England was not merely a strong but a bigoted Roman
Catholic. Had he been a wise and patriotic prince, he would have tried
by a studiously moderate policy to win the loyal allegiance of his
subjects, but he was stubborn, wrong-headed and fanatical, and from the
first he aimed at the impossible. His attempts to establish absolute
rule, to bring back the English nation to the fold of the Catholic
Church and, as a means to that end, to make himself independent of
Parliament by accepting subsidies from the French king, were bound to
end in catastrophe. This was more especially the case as Louis XIV had,
at the very time of King James' accession, after having for a number of
years persecuted the Huguenots in defiance of the Edict of Nantes, taken
the step of revoking that great instrument of religious toleration on
November 17, 1685. The exile of numerous families, who had already been
driven out by the _dragonnades_, was now followed by the expulsion of
the entire Huguenot body, of all at least who refused to conform to the
Catholic faith. How many hundreds of thousands left their homes to find
refuge in foreign lands it is impossible to say, but amongst them were
great numbers of industrious and skilled artisans and handicraftsmen,
who sought asylum in the Dutch Republic and there found a ready and
sympathetic welcome. The arrival of these unhappy immigrants had the
effect of arousing a strong feeling of indignation in Holland, and
indeed throughout the provinces, against the government of Louis XIV.
They began to see that the policy of the French king was not merely one
of territorial aggression, but was a crusade against Protestantism. The
governing classes in Holland, Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen were
stirred up by the preachers to enforce more strictly the laws against
the Catholics in those provinces, for genuine alarm was felt at the
French menace to the religion for which their fathers had fought and
suffered. The cause of Protestantism was one with which the Princes of
Orange had identified themselves; but none of his ancestors was so keen
an upholder of that cause as was William III. The presence in their
midst of the Huguenot refugees had the effect of influencing public
opinion powerfully in the States in favour of their stadholder's warlike
policy. Nor was the Dutch Republic the only State which was deeply moved
by the ruthless treatment of his Protestant subjects by the French king.
The Elector of Brandenburg, as head of the principal Protestant State in
Germany, had also offered an asylum to the French exiles and now
reverted once more to his natural alliance with the United Provinces. He
sent his trusted councillor, Paul Fuchs, in May, 1685, to offer to his
nephew, the Prince of Orange, his friendly co-operation in the formation
of a powerful coalition against France. Fuchs was a skilled diplomatist,
and by his mediation an understanding was arrived at between the
stadholder and his opponents in Amsterdam. At the same time strong
family influence was brought to bear upon Henry Casimir of Friesland,
and a reconciliation between the two stadholders was effected. William
thus found himself, before the year 1685 came to an end, able to pursue
his policy without serious let or hindrance. He was quite ready to seize
his opportunity, and by tactful diplomacy he succeeded by August, 1686,
in forming an alliance between the United Provinces, Brandenburg,
Sweden, Austria, Spain and a number of the smaller Rhenish states, to
uphold the treaties of Westphalia and Nijmwegen against the
encroachments of French military aggression. But the design of William
was still incomplete. The naval power and financial resources of England
were needed to enable the coalition to grapple successfully with the
mighty centralised power of Louis XIV.

In England the attempt of James II to bring about a Catholic reaction
by the arbitrary use of the royal prerogative was rapidly alienating the
loyalty of all classes, including many men of high position, and even
some of his own ministers. William watched keenly all that was going on
and kept himself in close correspondence with several of the principal
malcontents. He was well aware that all eyes were turning to him (and he
accepted the position) as the natural defender, should the need
arise, of England's civil and religious liberties. The need arose and
the call came in the summer of 1688, and it found William prepared. The
climax of the conflict between King James and his people was reached
with the acquittal of the Seven Bishops in May, 1688, amidst public
rejoicings, speedily followed on June 10 by the birth of a Prince of
Wales. The report was spread that the child was supposititious and it
was accepted as true by large numbers of persons, including the Princess
Anne, and also, on the strength of her testimony, by the Prince and
Princess of Orange.

The secret relations of William with the leaders of opposition had for
some time been carried on through his trusted confidants, Dijkveld, the
State's envoy at the English Court, and William of Nassau, lord of
Zuilestein. A bold step was now taken. Several Englishmen of note signed
an invitation to the prince to land in England with an armed force in
defence of the religion and liberties of the country; and it was brought
to him by Admiral Russell, one of the signatories. After some hesitation
William, with the consent and approval of the princess, decided to
accept it. No man ever had a more loyal and devoted wife than William
III of Orange, and he did not deserve it. For some years after his
marriage he treated Mary with coldness and neglect. He confessed on one
occasion to Bishop Burnet that his churlishness was partly due to
jealousy; he could not bear the thought that Mary might succeed to the
English throne and he would in that country be inferior in rank to his
wife. The bishop informed the princess, who at once warmly declared
that she would never accept the crown unless her husband received not
merely the title of king, but the prerogatives of a reigning sovereign.
From that time forward a complete reconciliation took place between
them, and the affection and respect of William for this loyal,
warm-hearted and self-sacrificing woman deepened as the years went on.
Mary's character, as it is revealed in her private diaries, which have
been preserved, deserves those epithets. Profoundly religious and a
convinced Protestant, Mary with prayers for guidance and not without
many tears felt that the resolve of her husband to hazard all on armed
intervention in England was fully justified; and at this critical
juncture she had no hesitation in allowing her sense of duty to her
husband and her country to override that of a daughter to her father.
Already in July vigorous preparations in all secrecy began to be made
for the expedition. The naval yards were working at full pressure with
the ostensible object of sending out a fleet to suppress piracy in the
Mediterranean. The stadholder felt that he was able to rely upon the
willing co-operation of the States in his project. His difficulty now,
as always, was to secure the assent of Amsterdam. But the opposition of
that city proved less formidable than was anticipated. The peril to
Protestantism should England under James II be leagued with France, was
evident, and scarcely less the security of the commerce on which
Amsterdam depended for its prosperity. The support of Amsterdam secured
that of the Estates of Holland; and finally, after thus surmounting
successfully the elements of opposition in the town and the province,
where the anti-Orange party was most strongly represented, the prince
had little difficulty in obtaining, on October 8, the unanimous approval
of the States-General, assembled in secret session, to the proposed
expedition. By that time an army of 14,000 men had been gathered
together and was encamped at Mook. Of these the six English and Scottish
regiments, who now, as throughout the War of Independence, were
maintained in the Dutch service, formed the nucleus. The force also
comprised the prince's Dutch guards and other picked Dutch troops, and
also some German levies. Marshal Schomberg was in command. The pretext
assigned was the necessity of protecting the eastern frontier of the
Republic against an attack from Cologne, where Cardinal Fürstenberg, the
nominee and ally of Louis XIV, had been elected to the archiepiscopal
throne.

Meanwhile diplomacy was active. D'Avaux was far too clear-sighted not to
have discerned the real object of the naval and military preparations,
and he warned both Louis XIV and James II. James, however, was obdurate
and took no heed, while Louis played his enemy's game by declaring war
on the Emperor and the Pope, and by invading the Palatinate instead of
the Republic. For William had been doing his utmost to win over to his
side, by the agency of Waldeck and Bentinck, the Protestant Princes of
Germany, with the result that Brandenburg, Hanover, Saxony, Brunswick
and Hesse had undertaken to give him active support against a French
attack; while the constant threat against her possessions in the Belgic
Netherlands compelled Spain to join the anti-French league which the
stadholder had so long been striving to bring into existence. To
these were now added the Emperor and the Pope, who, being actually at
war with France, were ready to look favourably upon an expedition which
would weaken the common enemy. The Grand Alliance of William's dreams
had thus (should his expedition to England prove successful) come within
the range of practical politics; and with his base secured Orange now
determined to delay no longer, but to stake everything upon the issue of
the English venture.

The prince bade farewell to the States-General on October 26, and four
days later he set sail from Helvoetsluis, but was driven back by a heavy
storm, which severely damaged the fleet. A fresh start was made on
November 11. Admiral Herbert was in command of the naval force, which
convoyed safely through the Channel without opposition the long lines of
transports. Over the prince's vessel floated his flag with the words
_Pro Religione et Libertate_ inscribed above the motto of the House of
Orange, _Je maintiendray_. Without mishap a landing was effected at
Torbay, November 14 (5 o.s.), which was William's birthday, and a rapid
march was made to Exeter. He met with no armed resistance. James'
troops, his courtiers, his younger daughter the Princess Anne, all
deserted him; and finally, after sending away his wife and infant son to
France, the king himself left his palace at Whitehall by night and fled
down the river to Sheerness. Here he was recognised and brought back to
London. It was thought, however, best to connive at his escape, and he
landed on the coast of France at Christmas. The expedition had achieved
its object and William, greeted as a deliverer, entered the capital at
the head of his army.

On February 13,1689, a convention, specially summoned for the
purpose, declared that James by his flight had vacated the throne;
and the crown was offered to William and Mary jointly, the
executive power being placed in the hands of the prince.

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XIX

THE KING-STADHOLDER, 1688-1702


The accession of William III to the throne of England was an event
fraught with important consequences to European politics and to the
United Provinces. The king was enabled at last to realise the formation
of that Grand Alliance for which he had so long been working. The treaty
of Vienna, signed on May 12, 1689, encircled France with a ring of
enemies, and saw the Emperor and Spain united with the Protestant
powers, England, the States and many of the German princes in a bond of
alliance for the maintenance of the treaties of Westphalia and the
Pyrenees. It was not without some difficulty that William succeeded in
inducing the States to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance
with England. A special embassy consisting of Witsen, Odijk, Dijkveld
and others was sent to London early in 1689 to endeavour to bring about
some mutually advantageous arrangement of the various conflicting
maritime and commercial interests of the two countries. But they could
effect nothing. The English government refused either to repeal or
modify the Navigation Act or to reduce the toll for fishing privileges;
and it required all the personal influence of William to secure the
signing of a treaty (September 3), which many leading Hollanders
considered to be a subordinating of Dutch to English interests. And
they were right; from this time began that decline of Dutch commercial
supremacy which was to become more and more marked as the 18th century
progressed. The policy of William III, as Frederick the Great remarked
most justly, placed Holland in the position of a sloop towed behind the
English ship-of-the-line.

The carrying trade of the world was still, however, in the reign of
William III practically in the hands of the Dutch, despite the losses
that had been sustained during the English wars and the French invasion.
The only competitor was England under the shelter of the Navigation Act.
The English had, under favourable conditions, their staple at Dordrecht,
the Scots their staple at Veere; and the volume of trade under the
new conditions of close alliance was very considerable. But the imports
largely exceeded the exports; and both exports and imports had to be
carried in English bottoms. The Baltic (or Eastern) trade remained a
Dutch monopoly, as did the trade with Russia through Archangel. Almost
all the ships that passed through the Sound were Dutch; and they
frequented all the Baltic ports, whether Russian, Scandinavian or
German, bringing the commodities of the South and returning laden with
hemp, tallow, wood, copper, iron, corn, wax, hides and other raw
products for distribution in other lands. The English had a small number
of vessels in the Mediterranean and the Levant, and frequented the
Spanish and Portuguese harbours, but as yet they hardly interfered with
the Dutch carrying-trade in those waters. The whole trade of Spain with
her vast American dominions was by law restricted to the one port of
Cadiz; but no sooner did the galleons bringing the rich products of
Mexico and Peru reach Cadiz than the bulk of their merchandise was
quickly transhipped into Dutch vessels, which here, as elsewhere, were
the medium through which the exchange of commodities between one country
and another was effected. It was a profitable business, and the
merchants of Amsterdam and of the other Dutch commercial centres grew
rich and prospered.

The position of the Dutch in the East Indies at the close of the 17th
century is one of the marvels of history. The East India Company, with
its flourishing capital at Batavia, outdistanced all competitors. It was
supreme in the Indian archipelago and along all the shores washed by the
Indian Ocean. The governor-general was invested with great powers and,
owing to his distance from the home authority, was able to make
unfettered use of them during his term of office. He made treaties and
conducted wars and was looked upon by the princes and petty rulers of
the Orient as a mighty potentate. The conquest of Macassar in 1669, the
occupation of Japara and Cheribon in 1680, of Bantam in 1682, of
Pondicherry in 1693, together with the possession of Malacca and of the
entire coast of Ceylon, of the Moluccas, and of the Cape of Good Hope,
gave to the Dutch the control of all the chief avenues of trade
throughout those regions. By treaties of alliance and commerce with the
Great Mogul and other smaller sovereigns and chieftains factories were
established at Hooghly on the Ganges, at Coelim, Surat, Bender Abbas,
Palembang and many other places. In the Moluccas they had the entire
spice trade in their hands. Thus a very large part of the products of
the Orient found its way to Europe by way of Amsterdam, which had become
increasingly the commercial emporium and centre of exchange for the
world.

The West India Company, on the other hand, had been ruined by the loss
of its Brazilian dominion followed by the English wars. Its charter came
to an end in 1674, but it was replaced by a new Company on a more
moderate scale. Its colonies on the Guiana coast, Surinam, Berbice and
Essequibo were at the end of the 17th century in an impoverished
condition, but already beginning to develop the sugar plantations which
were shortly to become a lucrative industry; and the island of Curaçoa
had the unenviable distinction of being for some years one of the chief
centres of the negro slave trade.

In the United Provinces themselves one of the features of this period
was the growth of many new industries and manufactures, largely due to
the influx of Huguenot refugees, many of whom were skilled artisans. Not
only did the manufacturers of cloth and silk employ a large number of
hands, but also those of hats, gloves, ribbons, trimmings, laces, clocks
and other articles, which had hitherto been chiefly produced in France.
One of the consequences of the rapid increase of wealth was a change in
the simple habits, manners and dress, which hitherto travellers had
noted as one of the most remarkable characteristics of the Hollanders.
Greater luxury began to be displayed, French fashions and ways of life
to be imitated, and the French language to be used as the medium of
intercourse among the well-to-do classes. Another sign of the times was
the spread of the spirit of speculation and of gambling in stocks and
shares, showing that men were no longer content to amass wealth by the
slow process of ordinary trade and commerce. This state of prosperity,
which was largely due to the security which the close alliance with
England brought to the Republic, explains in no small measure the
acquiescence of the Dutch in a state of things which made the smaller
country almost a dependency of the larger. They were proud that their
stadholder should reign as king in Britain; and his prolonged absences
did not diminish their strong attachment to him or lessen his authority
among them. So much greater indeed was the power exercised by William in
the Republic than that which, as a strictly constitutional sovereign, he
possessed in the kingdom, that it was wittily said that the Prince of
Orange was stadholder in England and king in Holland.

It must not be supposed, however, that William in his capacity as
stadholder was free from worries and trials. He had many; and, as usual,
Amsterdam was the chief centre of unrest. After the expedition set sail
for Torbay, William was continuously absent for no less than two and a
half years. It is no wonder therefore that during so long a period, when
the attention of the king was absorbed by other pressing matters,
difficulties should have arisen in his administration of the affairs of
the Republic. It was very unfortunate that his most able and trusted
friend and adviser, the Council-Pensionary Fagel, should have died, in
December, 1688, just when William's enterprise in England had reached
its most critical stage. Fagel was succeeded, after a brief interval, in
his most important and influential office by Antony Heinsius. Heinsius,
who had been for some years Pensionary of Delft, was a modest, quiet
man, already forty-five years of age, capable, experienced and
business-like. His tact and statesmanlike qualities were of the greatest
service to William and scarcely less to his country, at a time when
urgent duties in England made it so difficult for the stadholder to give
personal attention to the internal affairs of the Republic. No other
Prince of Orange had ever so favourable an opportunity as William III
for effecting such changes in the system of government and
administration in the Dutch Republic as would simplify and co-ordinate
its many rival and conflicting authorities, and weld its seven
sovereign provinces into a coherent State with himself (under whatever
title) as its "eminent head." At the height of his power his will could
have over-ridden local or partisan opposition, for he had behind him the
prestige of his name and deeds and the overwhelming support of popular
opinion. But William had little or no interest in these constitutional
questions. Being childless, he had no dynastic ambitions. The nearest
male representative of his house was Henry Casimir, the stadholder of
Friesland, with whom his relations had been far from friendly. In his
mind, everything else was subordinate to the one and overruling purpose
of his life, the overthrow of the power of Louis XIV and of French
ascendancy in Europe.

The great coalition which had been formed in 1689 by the treaty of
Vienna was, in the first years of the war which then broke out,
attended with but mediocre success. The French armies laid waste the
Palatinate with great barbarity, and then turned their attentions to the
southern Netherlands. The attempted invasion was, however, checked by an
allied force (August 25) in a sharp encounter near Charleroi. The next
year, 1690, was particularly unfortunate for the allies. William was
still absent, having been obliged to conduct an expedition to Ireland.
He had placed the aged Marshal Waldeck in command of the Coalition
forces. Waldeck had the redoubtable Luxemburg opposed to him and on July
1 the two armies met at Fleurus, when, after a hard-fought contest, the
allies suffered a bloody defeat. An even greater set-back was the
victory gained by Admiral Tourville over the combined Anglo-Dutch fleet
off Beachy Head (July 10). The Dutch squadron under Cornelis Evertsen
bore the brunt of the fight and suffered heavily. They received little
help from the English contingent; and the English Admiral Torrington was
accused of having wilfully sacrificed his allies. The effect was
serious, for the French enjoyed for a while the rare satisfaction of
holding the command of the Channel. The complete triumph of King William
at the battle of the Boyne (July 12) relieved somewhat the consternation
felt at this naval disaster, and set him free to devote his whole
attention to the Continental war. His return to the Hague early in 1691
caused general rejoicing, and he was there able to concert with his
allies the placing of a large force in the field for the ensuing
campaign. The operations were, however, barren of any satisfactory
results. Luxemburg advanced before the allies were ready, and burnt and
plundered a large tract of country. William, acting on the defensive,
contented himself with covering the capital and the rest of Flanders and
Brabant from attack; and no pitched battle took place.

Great preparations were made by Louis XIV in the spring of 1692 for the
invasion of England. Troops were collected on the coast, and the
squadron under D'Estrées at Toulon was ordered to join the main fleet of
Tourville at Brest. Contrary winds delayed the junction; and Tourville
rashly sailed out and engaged off La Hogue a greatly superior allied
fleet on May 29. The conflict this time chiefly fell upon the English,
and after a fierce fight the French were defeated and fled for refuge
into the shoal waters. Here they were followed by the lighter vessels
and fire-ships of the allies; and the greater part of the French
fleet was either burnt or driven upon the rocks (June 1). The maritime
power of France was for the time being destroyed, and all fears of
invasion dissipated. On land ill-success continued to dog the footsteps
of the allies. The strong fortress of Namur was taken by the French;
and, after a hotly contested battle at Steinkirk, William was compelled
by his old adversary Luxemburg to retreat. William, though he was rarely
victorious on the field of battle, had great qualities as a leader. His
courage and coolness won the confidence of his troops, and he was never
greater than in the conduct of a retreat. This was shown conspicuously
in the following year (1693), when, after a disastrous defeat at
Neerwinden (July 29), again at the hands of Luxemburg, he succeeded at
imminent personal risk in withdrawing his army in good order in face of
the superior forces of the victorious enemy.

In 1694 the allies confined themselves to defensive operations. Both
sides were growing weary of war; and there were strong parties in favour
of negotiating for peace both in the Netherlands and in England. Some of
the burgher-regents of Amsterdam, Dordrecht and other towns even went so
far as to make secret overtures to the French government, and they had
the support of the Frisian Stadholder; but William was resolutely
opposed to accepting such conditions as France was willing to offer,
and his strong will prevailed.

The position of the king in England was made more difficult by the
lamented death of Queen Mary on January 2,1695. William had become
deeply attached to his wife during these last years, and for a time he
was prostrated by grief. But a strong sense of public duty roused him
from his depression; and the campaign of 1695 was signalised by the most
brilliant military exploit of his life, the recapture of Namur. That
town, strong by its natural position, had been fortified by Vauban with
all the resources of engineering skill, and was defended by a powerful
garrison commanded by Marshal Boufflers. But William had with him the
famous Coehoorn, in scientific siege-warfare the equal of Vauban
himself. At the end of a month the town of Namur was taken, but
Boufflers withdrew to the citadel. Villeroy, at the head of an army of
90,000 men, did his utmost to compel the king to raise the siege by
threatening Brussels; but a strong allied force watched his movements
and successfully barred his approach to Namur. At last, on September 5,
Boufflers capitulated after a gallant defence on the condition that
he and his troops should march out with all the honours of war.

The campaign of 1696 was marked by no event of importance; indeed both
sides were thoroughly tired out by the protracted and inconclusive
contest. Moreover the failing health of Charles II of Spain threatened
to open out at any moment the vital question of the succession to the
Spanish throne. Louis XIV, William III and the emperor were all keenly
alive to the importance of the issue, and wished to have their hands
free in order to prepare for a settlement, either by diplomatic means or
by a fresh appeal to arms. But peace was the immediate need, and
overtures were privately made by the French king to each of the allied
powers in 1696. At last it was agreed that plenipotentiaries from all
the belligerents should meet in congress at Ryswyck near the Hague with
the Swedish Count Lilienrot as mediator. The congress was opened on May
9, 1697, but many weeks elapsed before the representatives of the
various powers settled down to business. Heinsius and Dijkveld were the
two chief Dutch negotiators. The emperor, when the other powers had
come to terms, refused to accede; and finally England, Spain and the
United Provinces determined to conclude a separate peace. It was signed
on September 20 and was based upon the treaties of Nijmwegen and
Münster. France, having ulterior motives, had been conciliatory.
Strasburg was retained, but most of the French conquests were given up.
William was recognised as King of England, and the Principality of
Orange was restored to him. With the Dutch a commercial treaty was
concluded for twenty-five years on favourable terms.