Chaldee, Arabic and Ethiopic. Her reputation became widespread; and, in
the latter part of her long life, many strangers went to Utrecht, where
she resided, to try to get a glimpse of so great a celebrity, which was
not easy owing to her aversion to such visits.

Turning to the domain of mathematical and physical science and of
scientific research and discovery, we find that here also the 17th
century Netherlanders attained the highest distinction. As
mathematicians Simon Stevin, the friend and instructor of Maurice of
Orange, and Francis van Schooten, the Leyden Professor, who numbered
among his pupils Christian Huyghens and John de Witt, did much excellent
work in the earlier years of the century. The published writings of De
Witt on "the properties of curves" and on "the theory of probabilities"
show that the greatest of Dutch statesmen might have become famous as a
mathematician had the cares of administration permitted him to pursue
the abstract studies that he loved. Of the scientific achievements of
Christian Huyghens (1629-95), the brilliant son of a brilliant father,
it is difficult to speak in adequate terms. There is scarcely any name
in the annals of science that stands higher than his. His abilities, as
a pure mathematician, place him in the front rank among mathematicians
of all time; and yet the services that he rendered to mathematical
science were surpassed by his extraordinary capacity for the combination
of theory with practice. His powers of invention, of broad
generalisation, of originality of thought were almost unbounded. Among
the mathematical problems with which he dealt successfully were the
theory of numbers, the squaring of the circle and the calculation of
chances. To him we owe the conception of the law of the conservation of
energy, of the motion of the centre of gravity, and of the undulatory
theory of light. He expounded the laws of the motion of the pendulum,
increased the power of the telescope, invented the micrometer,
discovered the rings and satellites of Saturn, constructed the first
pendulum clock, and a machine, called the gunpowder machine, in
principle the precursor of the steam engine. For sheer brain power and
inventive genius Christian Huyghens was a giant. He spent the later
years of his life in Paris, where he was one of the founders and
original members of the _Académie des Sciences_. Two other names of
scientists, who gained a European reputation for original research and
permanent additions to knowledge, must be mentioned; those of Antoni van
Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), and of Jan Swammerdam (1637-80). Leeuwenhoek
was a life-long observer of minute life. The microscope (the invention
of which was due to a Dutchman, Cornelius Drebbel) was the favourite
instrument of his patient investigations, and he was able greatly to
improve its mechanism and powers. Among the results of his labours was
the discovery of the infusoria, and the collection of a valuable mass of
information concerning the circulation of the blood and the structure of
the eye and brain. Swammerdam was a naturalist who devoted himself to
the study of the habits and the metamorphoses of insects, and he may be
regarded as the founder of this most important branch of scientific
enquiry. His work forms the basis on which all subsequent knowledge on
this subject has been built up.

To say that the school of Dutch painting attained its zenith in the
period of Frederick Henry and the decades which preceded and followed
it, is scarcely necessary. It was the age of Rembrandt. The works of
that great master and of his contemporaries, most of whom were
influenced and many dominated by his genius, are well known to every
lover of art, and are to be seen in every collection of pictures in
Europe. One has, however, to visit the Rijks Museum at Amsterdam and the
Mauritshuis at the Hague to appreciate what an extraordinary outburst of
artistic skill and talent had at this time its birth within the narrow
limits of the northern Netherlands. To the student of Dutch history
these two galleries are a revelation, for there we see 17th century
Holland portrayed before us in every phase of its busy and prosperous
public, social and domestic life. Particularly is this the case with the
portraits of individuals and of civic and gild groups by Rembrandt,
Frans Hals, Van der Helst and their followers, which form an inimitable
series that has rarely been equalled. To realise to what an extent in
the midst of war the fine arts flourished in Holland, a mere list of the
best-known painters of the period will suffice, it tells its own tale.
They are given in the order of their dates: Frans Hals (1584-1666),
Gerard Honthorst (1592-1662), Jan van Goyen (1596-1656), Jan Wyvants
(1600-87), Albert Cuyp (1606-72), Jan Lievens (1607-63), Rembrandt van
Rhyn (1608-69), Gerard Terburg (1608-81), Adrian Brouwer (1608-41),
Ferdinand Bol (1609-81), Salomon Koning (1609-74), Andreas Both
(1609-60), Jan Both (1610-62), Adrian van Ostade (1610-85), Bartolomaus
van der Helst (1613-70), Gerard Douw (1613-80), Gabriel Metzu (1615-58),
Govaert Flinck (1615-60), Isaac van Ostade (1617-71), Aart van der Neer
(1619-83), Pieter de Koningh (1619-89), Philip Wouvermans (1620-68),
Pieter van der Hoogh (?), Nicolas Berchem (1624-83), Paul Potter
(1625-54), Jacob Ruysdael (1625-81), Meindert Hobbema (?), Jan Steen
(1626-79), Samuel van Hoogstraeten (1627-78), Ludolf Backhuizen
(1631-1709), Jan van der Meer of Delft (1632-?), Nicholas Maes
(1632-93), William van der Velde (1633-1707), Frans van Mieris
(1635-81), Caspar Netscher (1639-84), Adrian van der Velde (1639-72).

It is strange that little is known of the lives of the great majority of
these men; they are scarcely more than names, but their memory survives
in their works. No better proof could be brought of the general
abundance of money and at the same time of the widespread culture of the
land than the fact that art found among all classes so many patrons. The
aristocratic burgher-magistrates and the rich merchants loved to adorn
their houses with portraits and a choice selection of pictures; it was a
favourite investment of capital, and there was a certain amount of
rivalry among the principal families in a town like Amsterdam in being
possessed of a fine collection. The "Six" collection still remains as an
example upon the walls of the 17th century house of Burgomaster Six,
where it was originally placed. The governing bodies of gilds and
boards, members of corporations, the officers of the town _schutterij_
or of archer companies delighted to have their portraits hung around
their council chambers or halls of assembly. In the well-to-do
farmer-homesteads and even in the dwellings of the poorer classes
pictures were to be found, as one may see in a large number of the
"interiors" which were the favourite subject of the _genre_ painters of
the day. But with all this demand the artists themselves do not seem to
have in any case been highly paid. The prices were low. Even Rembrandt
himself, whose gains were probably much larger than those of any of
his contemporaries, and whose first wife, Saskia Uilenburg, was a woman
of means, became bankrupt in 1656, and this at a time when he was still
in his prime, and his powers at their height. Some of his most famous
pictures were produced at a later date.

During the Thirty Years' War Holland became the centre of the publishing
and book-selling trade; and Leyden and Amsterdam were famed as the
foremost seats of printing in Europe. The devastation of Germany and
the freedom of the press in the United Provinces combined to bring about
this result. The books produced by the Elseviers at Leyden and by Van
Waesberg and Cloppenburch at Amsterdam are justly regarded as fine
specimens of the printer's art, while the maps of Willem Jansz Blaeu and
his Dutch contemporaries were quite unrivalled, and marked a great step
forward in cartography.

This chapter must not conclude without a reference to the part taken by
the Netherlanders in the development of modern music and the modern
stage. The love of music was widespread; and the musicians of the
Netherlands were famed alike as composers and executants. It was from
its earlier home in the Low Countries that the art of modern music
spread into Italy and Germany and indeed into all Europe. Similarly in
the late Middle Ages the people of the Netherlands were noted for their
delight in scenic representations and for the picturesque splendour with
which they were carried out. The literary gilds, named Chambers of
Rhetoric, never took such deep root elsewhere; and in the performance of
Mystery Plays and Moralities and of lighter comic pieces (_chuttementen_
and _cluyten_) many thousands of tradespeople and artisans took part. In
the 17th century all the Chambers of Rhetoric had disappeared with the
single exception of the famous "Old Chamber" at Amsterdam, known as _The
Blossoming Eglantine_, to which the leading spirits of the Golden Age of
Dutch Literature belonged and which presided over the birth of the Dutch
Stage. From the first the stage was popular and well-supported; and the
new theatre of Amsterdam, the Schouburg (completed in 1637), became
speedily renowned for the completeness of its arrangements and the
ability of its actors. Such indeed was their reputation that travelling
companies of Dutch players visited the chief cities of Germany, Austria
and Denmark, finding everywhere a ready welcome and reaping a rich
reward, whilst at Stockholm for a time a permanent Dutch theatre was
established.

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XIII

THE STADHOLDERATE OF WILLIAM II.

THE GREAT ASSEMBLY


Upon the death of Frederick Henry of Orange (March, 1647), his only son
succeeded to his titles and estates and also by virtue of the Act of
Survivance to the offices of Stadholder in six provinces and to the
Captain-Generalship and Admiral-Generalship of the Union. William was
but twenty-one years of age and, having been excluded during Frederick
Henry's lifetime from taking any active part in affairs of state, he had
turned his energies into the pursuit of pleasure, and had been leading a
gay and dissolute life. His accession to power was, however, speedily to
prove that he was possessed of great abilities, a masterful will and a
keen and eager ambition. He had strongly disapproved of the trend of the
peace negotiations at Münster, and would have preferred with the help of
the French to have attempted to drive the Spaniards out of the southern
Netherlands. The preliminaries were, however, already settled in the
spring of 1647; and the determination of the province of Holland and
especially of the town of Amsterdam to conclude an advantageous peace
with Spain and to throw over France rendered the opposition of the young
Stadholder unavailing. But William, though he had perforce to acquiesce
in the treaty of Münster, was nevertheless resolved at the earliest
opportunity to undo it. Thus from the outset he found himself in a
pronounced antagonism with the province of Holland, which could only
issue in a struggle for supremacy similar to that with which his uncle
Maurice was confronted in the years that followed the truce of 1609,
and, to a less degree, his father after 1640.

Commerce was the predominant interest of the burgher-aristocracies who
held undisputed sway in the towns of Holland; and they, under the
powerful leadership of Amsterdam, were anxious that the peace they had
secured should not be disturbed. They looked forward to lightening
considerably the heavy load of taxation which burdened them, by reducing
the number of troops and of ships of war maintained by the States. To
this policy the young prince was resolutely opposed, and he had on his
side the prestige of his name and a vast body of popular support even
in Holland itself, among that great majority of the inhabitants, both of
town and country, who were excluded from all share in government and
administration and were generally Orangist in sympathy. He had also with
him the officers of the army and navy and the preachers. His chief
advisers were his cousin William Frederick, Stadholder of Friesland, and
Cornelis van Aerssens (son of Francis) lord of Sommelsdijk. By the
agency of Sommelsdijk he put himself in secret communication with Count
d'Estrades, formerly French ambassador at the Hague, now Governor of
Dunkirk, and through him with Mazarin, with the view of concluding an
alliance with France for the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, and
for sending a joint expedition to England to overthrow the Parliamentary
forces and establish the Stewarts on the throne. Mazarin was at this
time, however, far too much occupied by his struggle with the Fronde to
listen to the overtures of a young man who had as yet given no proof of
being in a position to give effect to his ambitious proposals.
Nevertheless the prince was in stern earnest. In April, 1648, his
brother-in-law, James, Duke of York, had taken refuge at the Hague, and
was followed in July by the Prince of Wales. William received them with
open arms and, urged on by his wife, the Princess Royal, and by her aunt
the exiled Queen of Bohemia, who with her family was still residing at
the Hague, he became even more eager to assist in effecting a Stewart
restoration than in renewing the war with Spain. The difficulties in his
way were great. In 1648 public opinion in the States on the whole
favoured the Parliamentary cause. But, when the Parliament sent over Dr
Doreslaer and Walter Strickland as envoys to complain of royal ships
being allowed to use Dutch harbours, the States-General, through the
influence of the prince, refused them an audience. The Estates of
Holland on this gave a signal mark of their independence and antagonism
by receiving Doreslaer and forbidding the royal squadron to remain in
any of the waters of the Province.

The news of the trial of King Charles for high-treason brought about a
complete revulsion of feeling. The Prince of Wales himself in person
begged the States-General to intervene on his father's behalf; and the
proposal met with universal approval. It was at once agreed that Adrian
Pauw, the now aged leader of the anti-Orange party in Holland, should go
to London to intercede for the king's life. He was courteously received
on January 26 o.s., and was granted an audience by the House of Commons,
but the decision had already been taken and his efforts were
unavailing. The execution of the king caused a wave of horror to sweep
over the Netherlands, and an address of condolence was offered by the
States-General to the Prince of Wales; but, to meet the wishes of the
delegates of Holland, he was addressed not as King of Great Britain, but
simply as King Charles II, and it was agreed that Joachimi, the resident
ambassador in London, should not be recalled at present. The new English
Government on their part sent over once more Dr Doreslaer with friendly
proposals for drawing the two republics into closer union. Doreslaer,
who had taken part in the trial of Charles I, was specially obnoxious to
the royalist exiles, who had sought refuge in Holland. He landed on May
9. Three days later he was assassinated as he was dining at his hotel.
The murderers, five or six in number, managed to make their escape and
were never apprehended.

Although highly incensed by this outrage, the English Government did not
feel itself strong enough to take decided action. The Estates of Holland
expressed through Joachimi their abhorrence at what had occurred; and
the Parliament instructed Strickland to approach the States-General
again with friendly advances. The States-General refused to grant him an
audience, while receiving the envoy despatched by Charles II from
Scotland to announce his accession. The English Council of State had no
alternative but to regard this as a deliberate insult. Strickland was
recalled and left Holland, July 22. On September 26 Joachimi was ordered
to leave London. The breach between the two countries seemed to be
complete, but the Estates of Holland, who for the sake of their commerce
dreaded the thought of a naval war, did all in their power to work for
an accommodation. They received Strickland in a public audience before
his departure, and they ventured to send a special envoy to Whitehall,
Gerard Schaep, January 22, to treat with the Parliament. By this action
the Provincial Estates flouted the authority of the States-General and
entered into negotiations on their own account, as if they were an
independent State. The Hollanders were anxious to avoid war almost at
any price, but circumstances proved too strong for them.

In order to carry out this pacifist policy the Estates of Holland now
resolved to effect a large reduction of expenditure by disbanding a
portion of the troops and ships. When the peace of Münster was signed
the States possessed an army of 60,000 men, and all parties were agreed
that this large force might safely be reduced. In July 1648, a drastic
reduction was carried out, twenty-five thousand men being disbanded. The
Estates of Holland, however, demanded a further retrenchment of military
charges, but met with the strong opposition of the Prince and his cousin
William Frederick, who declared that an army of at least 30,000 was
absolutely necessary for garrisoning the frontier fortresses and
safeguarding the country against hostile attack. Their views had the
support of all the other provinces, but Holland was obdurate. In Holland
commerce reigned supreme; and the burgher-regents and merchants were
suspicious of the prince's warlike designs and were determined to thwart
them. Finding that the States-General refused to disband at their
dictation some fifty-five companies of the excellent foreign troops who
formed the kernel of the States' army, the Provincial Estates proceeded
to take matters into their own hands, and discharged a body of 600
foreign troops which were paid by the Province. In doing this they were
acting illegally. The old question of the sovereign rights of the
Provinces, which had been settled in 1619 by the sword of Maurice, was
once more raised. The States-General claimed to exercise the sole
authority in military matters. There were not seven armies in the Union,
but one army under the supreme command of the captain-general appointed
by the States-General. The captain-general was now but a young and
inexperienced man, but he had none of the hesitation and indecision
shown by his uncle Maurice in the troubles of 1618-19, and did not
shrink from the conflict with the dominant province to which he was
challenged.

For some time, indeed, wrangling went on. There was a strong minority in
the Estates of Holland opposed to extreme measures; and the
council-pensionary, Jacob Cats, was a moderate man friendly to the House
of Orange. An accommodation was reached on the subject of the disbanding
of the 600 foreign troops, but the conflict was renewed, and in the
middle of 1650 it assumed grave proportions. The heart and soul of the
opposition to the prince was Amsterdam. William had for some time been
urged by his Friesland cousin to take action, since the attitude of
Amsterdam threatened the dissolution of the Union. The prince was at
this time engaged in negotiating with France, but nothing had as yet
been settled, and his projects were not ripe for execution. Nevertheless
it was absolutely necessary for their realisation that the military
forces should not be excessively reduced. Under his influence the
States-General decided that, though the number of troops in the several
regiments should be decreased, the _cadres_ of all regiments with their
full quota of officers should be retained. To this the Estates of
Holland dissented, and finding that they could not prevail, they
determined on a daring step. Orders were sent (June 1, 1650) to the
colonels of the regiments on the Provincial war-sheet to disband their
regiments on pain of stoppage of pay. The colonels refused to take any
orders save from the Council of State and the captain-general. The
prince accordingly, with William Frederick and the Council of State,
appeared in the States-General and appealed to them to uphold the
colonels in their refusal. There could be no question that the Estates
of Holland were hopelessly in the wrong, for their representatives in
the States-General had in 1623,1626,1630 and 1642 voted for the
enforcement on recalcitrant provinces of the full quota at which they
were assessed for the payment of the army of the Union. The
States-General, June 5, therefore determined to send a "notable
deputation" to the towns of Holland. The prince was asked to head the
deputation, the members of which were to be chosen by him; and he was
invested with practically dictatorial powers to take measures for the
keeping of the peace and the maintenance of the Union. In doing this the
Generality were themselves acting _ultra vires_. The States-General was
an assembly consisting of the representatives of the Provincial Estates.
It could deal or treat therefore only with the Estates of the several
provinces, not with the individual towns within a province. In resisting
the interference of the Estates of Holland with matters that concerned
the Union as a whole, they were themselves infringing, by the commission
given to the "notable deputation," the jurisdiction of the Provincial
Estates over their own members.

The prince set out on June 8, and visited all the "privileged" towns.
The result was more than disappointing. The Council of the premier
municipality, Dordrecht, set the example by declaring that they were
answerable only to the Estates of the Province. Schiedam, Alkmaar, Edam
and Monnikendam gave the same reply. Delft and Haarlem were willing to
receive the prince as stadholder, but not the deputation. Amsterdam,
under the influence of the brothers Andries and Cornelis Bicker, went
even further and after some parleying declined to admit either the
deputation or the prince. On June 25 William returned to the Hague
bitterly chagrined by his reception and determined to crush resistance
by force.

The stroke he planned was to seize the representatives of six towns
which had been specially obstinate in their opposition, and at the same
time to occupy Amsterdam with an armed force. His preparations were
quickly made. On July 30 an invitation was sent to Jacob de Witt,
ex-burgomaster of Dordrecht, and five other prominent members of the
Estates of Holland, to visit the prince. On their arrival they were
arrested by the stadholder's guard, and carried off as prisoners to the
Castle of Loevestein. William had meanwhile left the execution of the
_coup-de-main_ against Amsterdam to his cousin William Frederick. The
arrangements for gathering together secretly a large force from various
garrisons were skilfully made, and it was intended at early dawn to
seize unexpectedly one of the gates, and then to march in and get
possession of the town without opposition. The plan, however,
accidentally miscarried. Some of the troops in the night having lost
their way, attracted the notice of a postal messenger on his way to
Amsterdam, who reported their presence to the burgomaster, Cornelis
Bicker. Bicker at once took action. The gates were closed, the council
summoned, and vigorous measures of defence taken. William Frederick
therefore contented himself with surrounding the city, so as to prevent
ingress or egress from the gates. On the next morning, July 31, William,
having learnt that the surprise attack had failed, set out for
Amsterdam, determined to compel its surrender. The council, fearing the
serious injury a siege would cause to its commerce, opened negotiations
(August 1). The prince, however, insisting on unconditional submission,
no other course was open. Amsterdam undertook to offer no further
opposition to the proposals of the States-General, and was compelled to
agree to the humiliating demand of the stadholder that the brothers
Bicker should not only resign their posts in the municipal government,
but should be declared ineligible for any official position in the
future.

The Prince of Orange had now secured the object at which he had aimed.
His authority henceforth rested on a firm basis. His opponents had been
overthrown and humiliated. The Estates of six provinces thanked him for
the success of his efforts, and he on his part met the general wish for
economy by agreeing to a reduction of the foreign troops in the pay of
the States on the distinct understanding that only the States-General
had the right to disband any portion of the forces, not the provincial
paymasters. In the flush of triumph William at the end of August left
the Hague for his country seat at Dieren, nominally for hunting and for
rest, in reality to carry on secret negotiations with France for the
furtherance of his warlike designs. The complete defeat of Charles II at
the battle of Worcester, September 3, must have been a severe blow to
his hopes for the restoration of the Stuarts, but it did not deter him
from pursuing his end. With d'Estrades, now Governor of Dunkirk, the
prince secretly corresponded, and through him matters were fully
discussed with the French Government. In a letter written from the Hague
on October 2, William expressed a strong wish that d'Estrades should
come in person to visit him; and it was the intention of d'Estrades to
accept this invitation as soon as he had received from Paris the copy of
a draft-treaty, which was being prepared. This draft-treaty, which was
probably drawn up by Mazarin, reached d'Estrades in the course of
October, but circumstantial evidence proves that it was never seen by
William. Its provisions were as follows. Both Powers were to declare war
on Spain and attack Flanders and Antwerp. The Dutch were to besiege
Antwerp, which city, if taken, was to become the personal appanage of
the Prince, of Orange. When the Spanish power in the southern
Netherlands had been overthrown, then France and the United Provinces
were to send a joint expedition to England to place Charles II on the
throne. Whether the prince would have approved these proposals we know
not; in all probability he would have declined to commit himself to a
plan of such a far-reaching and daring character, for he was aware of
the limitations of his power, and knew that even his great influence
would have been insufficient to obtain the consent of the States-General
to an immediate renewal of war. Speculation however is useless, for an
inexorable fate raised other issues.

On October 8 the stadholder returned to Dieren, on the 27th he fell ill
with an attack of small-pox. He was at once taken back to the Hague and
for some days he progressed favourably, but the illness suddenly took a
turn for the worse and he expired on November 6. The news of the
prince's death fell like a shock upon the country. Men could scarcely
believe their ears. William was only 24 years old; and, though his wife
gave birth to a son a week later, he left no heir capable of succeeding
to the high offices that he had held. The event was the more tragic,
following, as it did, so swiftly upon the _coup d'état_ of the previous
summer, and because of the youth and high promise of the deceased
prince. William II was undoubtedly endowed with high and brilliant
qualities of leadership, and he had proved his capacity for action with
unusual decision and energy. Had his life not been cut short, the course
of European politics might have been profoundly changed.

As was to be expected, the burgher-regents of Holland, when once the
first shock was over, lost no time in taking advantage of the
disappearance of the man who had so recently shown that he possessed the
power of the sword and meant to be their master. The States-General at
once met and requested the Provincial Estates to take steps to deal with
the situation. The Estates of Holland proposed that an extraordinary
assembly should be summoned. This was agreed to by the States-General;
and "the Great Assembly" met on January 11, 1651. In the meantime the
Holland regents had been acting. The Estates of that province were
resolved to abolish the stadholderates and to press the States-General
to suspend the offices of Captain-and Admiral-General of the Union.
Utrecht, Gelderland, Overyssel and Zeeland were induced to follow their
example. Groningen, however, elected William Frederick of Friesland to
be stadholder in the place of his cousin.

The "States party" in Holland had for their leaders the aged Adrian
Pauw, who had for so many years been the moving spirit of the opposition
in powerful Amsterdam to Frederick Henry's authority, and Jacob de Witt,
the imprisoned ex-burgomaster of Dordrecht. The "Orange party" was for
the moment practically impotent. Stunned by the death of their youthful
chief, they were hopelessly weakened and disorganised by the
dissensions and rivalries which surrounded the cradle of the infant
Prince of Orange. The princess royal quarrelled with her mother-in-law,
Amalia von Solms, over the guardianship of the child. Mary asserted her
right to be sole guardian; the dowager-princess wished to have her
son-in-law, the Elector of Brandenburg, associated with her as
co-guardian. After much bickering the question was at last referred to
the Council of State, who appointed the princess royal, the
dowager-princess and the elector jointly to the office. This decision
however was far from effecting a reconciliation between the mother and
the grandmother. Mary did not spare the Princess Amalia the humiliation
of knowing that she regarded her as inferior in rank and social standing
to the eldest daughter of a King of England. There was rivalry also
between the male relatives William Frederick, Stadholder of Friesland,
and Joan Maurice, the "Brazilian," both of them being ambitious of
filling the post of captain-general, either in succession to the dead
prince, or as lieutenant in the name of his son. In these circumstances
a large number of the more moderate Orangists were ready to assist the
"States party" in preventing any breach of the peace and securing that
the government of the republic should be carried on, if not in the
manner they would have wished, at least on stable and sound lines, so
far as possible in accordance with precedent.

The Great Assembly met on January 11,1651, in the Count's Hall in the
Binnenhof at the Hague. The sittings lasted until September, for there
were many important matters to be settled on which the representatives
of the seven provinces were far from being in entire agreement. The
chief controversies centred around the interpretation of the Utrecht Act
of Union, the Dordrecht principles, and military affairs. The last-named
proved the most thorny. The general result was decentralisation, and the
strengthening of the Provincial Estates at the expense of the
States-General. It was agreed that the established religion should be
that formulated at Dordrecht, that the sects should be kept in order,
and the placards against Roman Catholicism enforced. In accordance with
the proposal of Holland there was to be no captain-or admiral-general.
Brederode, with the rank of field-marshal, was placed at the head of the
army. The Provincial Estates were entrusted with considerable powers
over the troops in their pay. The effect of this, and of the decision
of five provinces to dispense with a stadholder and to transfer his
power and prerogatives to the Estates, was virtually the establishment
in permanent authority of a number of close municipal corporations. It
meant the supersession alike of monarchy and popular government, both of
which were to a certain extent represented by the authority vested in,
and the influence exerted by, the stadholder princes of Orange, in
favour of a narrow oligarchic rule. Moreover, in this confederation of
seven semi-sovereign provinces, Holland, which contributed to the
strength, the finances and the commerce of the Union more than all the
other provinces added together, obtained now, in the absence of an
"eminent head," that position of predominance, during the stadholderless
period which now follows, for which its statesmen had so long striven.
When the amiable Jacob Cats, the Council-Pensionary of Holland, closed
the Great Assembly in a flowery speech describing the great work that it
had accomplished, a new chapter in the history of the republic may be
said to have begun.

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XIV

THE RISE OF JOHN DE WITT.

THE FIRST ENGLISH WAR


Before the sittings of the Great Assembly had come to an end, a young
statesman, destined to play the leading part in the government of the
Dutch republic during two decades, had already made his mark. After the
death of William II Jacob de Witt was not only reinstated in his former
position at Dordrecht but on December 21, 1650, John, his younger son,
at the age of 25 years was appointed pensionary of that town. In this
capacity he was _ex officio_ spokesman of the deputation sent to
represent Dordrecht in the Great Assembly. His knowledge, his readiness
and persuasiveness of speech, his industry and his gifts at once of
swift insight and orderly thoroughness, quickly secured for him a
foremost place both in the deliberations of the Assembly and in the
conduct of the negotiations with the English Parliament, which at this
time required very delicate handling.

The many disputes, which had arisen between England and the United
Provinces during the period between the accession of James I and the
battle of the Downs in 1639, had never been settled. The minds of
Englishmen were occupied with other and more pressing matters while the
Civil War lasted. But the old sores remained open. Moreover the refusal
of the States-General to receive the Parliamentary envoys, the murder of
Doreslaer, and the protection afforded to royalist refugees, had been
additional causes of resentment; but the English Council had not felt
strong enough to take action. The death of the Prince of Orange,
following so quickly upon the complete overthrow of Charles II at
Worcester, appeared at first to open out a prospect of friendlier
relations between the two neighbouring republics. In January, 1651, the
Great Assembly formally recognised the Commonwealth and determined to
send back to his old post in London the veteran ambassador, Joachimi,
who had been recalled. The English government on their part anticipated
his return by despatching, in March, Oliver St John and Walter
Strickland on a special embassy to the Hague. They reached that city
on March 27, 1651, and presented their credentials to the Great Assembly
two days later. Their reception in the streets was anything but
favourable. The feeling among the populace was predominantly Orangist
and Stewart; and St John and Strickland, greeted with loud cries of
"regicides" and many abusive epithets, remembering the fate of
Doreslaer, were in fear of their lives.

On April 4 a conference was opened between the envoys and six
commissioners appointed by the States to consider the proposals of the
English Government for "a more strict and intimate alliance and union"
between the two states. The Dutch quickly perceived that what the
English really wanted was nothing less than such a binding alliance or
rather coalition as would practically merge the lesser state in the
greater. But the very idea of such a loss of the independence that they
had only just won was to the Netherlanders unthinkable. The negotiations
came to a deadlock. Meanwhile St John and Strickland continued to have
insults hurled at them by Orangists and royalist refugees, foremost
amongst them Prince Edward, son of the Queen of Bohemia. The Parliament
threatened to recall the envoys, but consented that they should remain,
on the undertaking of the Estates of Holland to protect them from
further attacks, and to punish the offenders. New proposals were
accordingly made for an offensive and defensive alliance (without any
suggestion of a union), coupled with the condition that both States
should bind themselves not to allow the presence within their boundaries
of avowed enemies of the other--in other words the expulsion of the
members and adherents of the house of Stewart, including the princess
royal and the Queen of Bohemia with their children. In the face of the
strong popular affection for the infant Prince of Orange and his mother,
even the Estates of Holland dared not consider such terms, and the
States-General would have angrily rejected them. After some further
parleying therefore about fisheries and trade restrictions, it was felt
that no agreement could be reached; and St John and Strickland returned
to England on July 31, 1651.

Their failure created a very bad impression upon the Parliament. All the
old complaints against the Dutch were revived; and, as they had refused
the offer of friendship that had been made to them, it was resolved that
strong measures should be taken to obtain redress for past grievances
and for the protection of English trade interests.

At the instance of St John, the famous Navigation Act was passed by the
Parliament, October 9, 1651. This Act struck a mortal blow at the Dutch
carrying trade by forbidding the importation of foreign goods into
English ports except in English bottoms, or in those of the countries
which had produced the goods. Scarcely less injurious was the
prohibition to aliens to fish in British waters, and the withdrawal of
the rights based on the _Magnus Intercursus_, for the maintenance of
which Dutch statesmen had so long and strenuously fought. There was
consternation in Holland, and the States-General determined to send a
special embassy to London. At the same time the Estates of Holland
replaced Jacob Cats by appointing the aged Adrian Pauw, a man in whose
ripe judgment they had confidence, to the office of council-pensionary.
The chosen envoys were Jacob Cats and Gerard Schaep from Holland, Paulus
van der Perre from Zeeland, all three representative of the two maritime
and trading provinces. They arrived in England on December 27, 1651.
Their instructions were to secure the withdrawal of the Navigation Act
and to try to negotiate a new treaty of commerce on the basis of the
_Magnus Intercursus_. They were also to protest strongly against the
action of English privateers, who, having been given letters of marque
to prey upon French commerce, had been stopping and searching Dutch
merchantmen on the ground that they might be carrying French goods. The
English government, however, met the Dutch complaints by raking up the
long list of grievances that had stirred up a bitter feeling of popular
hatred against the United Provinces in England, and by demanding
reparation. They further demanded that Dutch commanders should
acknowledge England's sovereignty by striking flag and sail and by
firing a salute, whenever any of their squadrons met English ships "in
the narrow seas."

It was these last two questions, the right of search and the striking of
the flag, that were to be the real causes of the outbreak of a war that
was desired by neither of the two governments. But popular feeling and
the course of events was too strong for them. The news of the seizure of
their vessels, not merely by privateers, but by an English squadron
under Ayscue in the West Indies, had caused intense indignation and
alarm in Holland, and especially in Amsterdam. Pressure was brought to
bear on the States-General and the Admiralties, who in pursuance of
economy had reduced the fleet to seventy-five ships. It was resolved
therefore, on February 22, to fit out an additional 150 vessels. The
Council of State, on hearing of this, began also to make ready for
eventualities. Negotiations were still proceeding between the two
countries, when Martin Tromp, the victor of the battle of the Downs, now
lieutenant-admiral of Holland, was sent to sea with fifty ships and
instructions to protect Dutch merchantmen from interference, and to see
that the States suffered no affront. Nothing was actually said about the
striking of the flag.

The situation was such that an armed collision was almost certain to
happen with such an admiral as Tromp in command. It came suddenly
through a misunderstanding. The Dutch admiral while cruising past Dover
met, on May 29, fifteen English ships under Blake. The latter fired a
warning shot across the bows of Tromp's ship to signify that the flag
should be struck. Tromp declared that he had given orders to strike the
flag, but that Blake again fired before there was time to carry them
out. Be this as it may, the two fleets were soon engaged in a regular
fight, and, the English being reinforced, Tromp withdrew at nightfall to
the French coast, having lost two ships. Great was the anger aroused in
England, where the Dutch were universally regarded as the aggressors. In
the Netherlands, where the peace party was strong, many were disposed to
blame Tromp despite his protests. Adrian Pauw himself left hastily for
London, John de Witt being appointed to act as his deputy during his
absence. Pauw's strenuous efforts however to maintain peace were all in
vain, despite the strong leanings of Cromwell towards a peaceful
solution. But popular feeling on both sides was now aroused. The
States-General, fearing that the Orangists would stir up a revolt, if
humiliating terms were submitted to, stiffened their attitude. The
result was that the envoys left London on June 30, 1652; and war was
declared.

The Dutch statesmen who sought to avoid hostilities were right. All the
advantages were on the side of their enemies. The Dutch merchant-fleets
covered the seas, and the welfare of the land depended on commerce. The
English had little to lose commercially. Their war-fleet too, though
inferior in the number of ships, was superior in almost all other
respects. The Stuarts had devoted great attention to the fleet and would
have done more but for lack of means. Charles' much abused ship-money
was employed by him for the creation of the first English professional
navy. It had been largely increased by the Parliament after 1648; and
its "generals," Blake, Penn and Ayscue, had already acquired much
valuable experience in their encounters with the royalist squadron under
Prince Rupert, and in long cruises to the West Indies for the purpose of
forcing the English colonies to acknowledge parliamentary rule. The
crews therefore were well trained, and the ships were larger, stronger
and better armed than those of the Dutch. The position of England, lying
as it did athwart the routes by which the Dutch merchant-fleets must
sail, was a great advantage. Even more important was the advantage of
having a central control, whereas in the Netherlands there were five
distinct Boards of Admiralty, to some extent jealous of each other, and
now lacking the supreme direction of an admiral-general.

The war began by a series of English successes and of Dutch misfortunes.
Early in July, 1652, Blake at the head of sixty ships set sail for the
north to intercept the Dutch Baltic commerce, and to destroy their
fishing fleet off the north of Scotland. He left Ayscue with a small
squadron to guard the mouth of the Thames. Tromp meanwhile had put to
sea at the head of nearly a hundred ships. Ayscue succeeded in
intercepting a fleet of Dutch merchantmen near Calais, all of them being
captured or burnt, while Blake with the main force off the north coast
of Scotland destroyed the Dutch fishing fleet and their convoy. After
these first blows against the enemy's commerce good fortune continued to
attend the English. Tromp was prevented from following Blake by strong
northerly winds. He then turned upon Ayscue, whose small force he must
have overwhelmed, but for a sudden change to a southerly gale. The Dutch
admiral now sailed northwards and (July 25) found the English fleet off
the Shetlands. A violent storm arose, from the force of which Blake was
protected, while the Dutch vessels were scattered far and wide. On the
following day, out of ninety-nine ships Tromp could only collect
thirty-five, and had no alternative but to return home to refit.

Before Tromp's return another Dutch fleet under Michael de Ruyter had
put to sea to escort a number of outward-bound merchantmen through the
Channel, and to meet and convoy back the home-coming ships. He had
twenty-three warships and three fireships under his command. Ayscue had
previously sailed up Channel with forty men-of-war and five fireships
for a similar purpose. The two fleets met on August 16, and despite his
inferiority of force De Ruyter forced Ayscue to withdraw into Plymouth,
and was able to bring his convoy home to safety.

The ill-success of Tromp, though he was in no way to blame for it,
caused considerable alarm and discontent in Holland. His enemies of the
States party in that province took advantage of it to suspend the
gallant old seaman from his command. He was an Orangist; and, as the
Orange partisans were everywhere clamorously active, the admiral was
suspect. In his place Cornelisz Witte de With was appointed, a capable
sailor, but disliked in the fleet as much as Tromp was beloved. De With
effected a junction with De Ruyter and with joint forces they attacked
Blake on October 8, near the shoal known as the Kentish Knock. The
English fleet was considerably more powerful than the Dutch, and the
desertion of De With by some twenty ships decided the issue. The Dutch
had to return home with some loss. The English were elated with their
victory and thought that they would be safe from further attack until
the spring. Blake accordingly was ordered to send a squadron of twenty
sail to the Mediterranean, where the Dutch admiral Jan van Galen held
the command of the sea. But they were deceived in thinking that the
struggle in the Channel was over for the winter. The deserters at the
Kentish Knock were punished, but the unpopularity of De With left the
authorities with no alternative but to offer the command-in-chief once
more to Martin Tromp. Full of resentment though he was at the bad
treatment he had received, Tromp was too good a patriot to refuse. At
the end of November the old admiral at the head of 100 warships put to
sea for the purpose of convoying some 450 merchantmen through the
Straits. Stormy weather compelled him to send the convoy with an escort
into shelter, but he himself with sixty ships set out to seek the
English fleet, which lay in the Downs. After some manoeuvring the two
fleets met on December 10, off Dungeness. A stubborn fight took place,
but this time it was some of the English ships that were defaulters.
The result was the complete victory of the Dutch; and Blake's fleet,
severely damaged, retreated under cover of the night into Dover roads.
Tromp was now for a time master of the Channel and commerce to and from
the ports of Holland and Zeeland went on unimpeded, while many English
prizes were captured.

This state of things was however not to last long. Towards the end of
February, 1653, Blake put to sea with nearly eighty ships, and on the
25th off Portland met Tromp at the head of a force nearly equal to his
own in number. But the Dutch admiral was convoying more than 150
merchantmen and he had moreover been at sea without replenishment of
stores ever since the fight at Dungeness, while the English had come
straight from port. The fight, which on the part of the Dutch consisted
of strong rear-guard actions, had lasted for two whole days, when Tromp
found that his powder had run out and that on the third day more than
half his fleet were unable to continue the struggle. But, inspiring his
subordinates De Ruyter, Evertsen and Floriszoon with his own indomitable
courage, Tromp succeeded by expert seamanship in holding off the enemy
and conducting his convoy with small loss into safety. Four Dutch
men-of-war were taken and five sunk; the English only lost two ships.