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Sentences of imprisonment for life were passed upon De Groot and
Hoogerbeets. They were confined in the castle of Loevestein. The
conditions of captivity were so far relaxed that the famous jurist was
allowed to receive books for the continuance of his studies. Through the
ingenuity and daring of his wife De Groot contrived to escape in 1621 by
concealing himself in a trunk supposed to be filled with heavy tomes.
The trunk was conveyed by water to Rotterdam, from whence the prisoner
managed to make his way safely to France.
Concurrently with the political trials the National Synod had been
pursuing its labours at Dordrecht. On November 13 rather more than one
hundred delegates assembled under the presidency of Johannes Bogerman of
Leeuwarden. Fifty-eight of the delegates were preachers, professors and
elders elected by the provincial synods, fifteen were commissioners
appointed by the States-General, twenty-eight were members of foreign
Reformed churches. English and Scottish representatives took an active
part in the proceedings. The Synod decided to summon the Remonstrants to
send a deputation to make their defence. On December 6 accordingly, a
body of twelve leading Remonstrants with Simon Episcopius at their head
took their seats at a table facing the assembly. Episcopius made a
long harangue in Latin occupying nine sessions. His eloquence was,
however, wasted on a court that had already prejudged the cause for
which he pleaded. After much wrangling and many recriminations Bogerman
ordered the Remonstrants to withdraw. They did so only to meet in an
"anti-synod" at Rotterdam at which the authority of the Dordrecht
assembly to pronounce decisions on matters of faith was denied.
Meanwhile the Contra-Remonstrant divines at Dordrecht during many weary
sessions proceeded to draw up a series of canons defining the true
Reformed doctrine and condemning utterly, as false and heretical, the
five points set forth in the Remonstrance. On May 1 the Netherland
confession and the Heidelberg catechism were unanimously adopted, as
being in conformity with Holy Scripture, and as fixing the standard of
orthodox teaching. The Synod was dissolved eight days later. The final
session was the 154th; and this great assembly of delegates from many
lands, the nearest approach to a general council of the Protestant
churches that has ever been held, came to a close amidst much festivity
and no small congratulation. No time was lost in taking action by the
dominant party against their opponents. Two hundred Remonstrant
preachers were driven into exile; and the congregations were treated
with the same spirit of intolerance as had hitherto been the lot of the
Catholics, and were forbidden the exercise of public worship.
After the Advocate's death, except for the persecution directed against
the Remonstrant party, the course of public affairs went on smoothly.
Maurice, who by the death of his brother, Philip William, had in
February, 1618, become Prince of Orange, was virtually sovereign in the
United Provinces. His name appeared in treaties with eastern potentates
and in diplomatic despatches, just as if he were a reigning monarch; and
the people of the Netherlands were even at times spoken of as his
subjects. But Maurice never cared to trouble himself about the details
of politics, and he now left the management of affairs in the hands of a
few men that he could trust, notably in those of Francis van Aerssens
(henceforth generally known as lord of Sommelsdijk) and Reinier Pauw,
the influential burgomaster of Amsterdam. Aerssens had shown himself
spiteful and vindictive in his conduct towards his earlier patron,
Oldenbarneveldt, but being a clever diplomatist and gifted with
considerable powers of statesmanship, he became henceforth for many
years the trusted adviser and confidant not only of Maurice, but of his
successor Frederick Henry.
The year 1620 was marked by the sudden death in June of William Lewis,
the Stadholder of Friesland. His loss was much deplored by Maurice, who
had for years been accustomed to rely upon the tried experience and
sound judgment of his cousin both in peace and war. A few months earlier
(March) Louise de Coligny had died at Fontainebleau. She too had been
from his youth the wise adviser of her step-son, but she was deeply
grieved at the fate of Oldenbarneveldt, and after his execution left the
Netherlands to take up her residence in her native country. By the death
of William Lewis the two stadholderates of Groningen with Drente and of
Friesland became vacant. Maurice succeeded to that of Groningen, but the
Frieslanders remained faithful to the house of Nassau-Siegen and elected
Ernest Casimir, the younger brother of William Lewis, as their
stadholder.
* * * * *
CHAPTER X
FROM THE END OF THE TWELVE YEARS' TRUCE TO THE PEACE OF MUENSTER
(1621-48). THE STADHOLDERATE OF FREDERICK HENRY OF ORANGE
Civil disturbances and religious persecutions were not the only causes
of anxiety to the political leaders in the United Provinces during the
crisis of 1618-19; foreign affairs were also assuming a menacing aspect.
The year 1618 saw the opening in Germany of the Thirty Years' War. The
acceptance of the Crown of Bohemia by Frederick, Elector Palatine, meant
that the long-delayed struggle for supremacy between Catholics and
Protestants was to be fought out; and it was a struggle which neither
Spain nor the Netherlands could watch with indifference. Maurice was
fully alive to the necessity of strengthening the defences of the
eastern frontier; and subsidies were granted by the States-General to
Frederick and also to some of the smaller German princes. This support
would have been larger, but the unexpected refusal of James I to give
aid to his son-in-law made the Dutch doubtful in their attitude. The
States, though friendly, were unwilling to commit themselves. In the
spring of 1620, however, by James' permission, the English regiments in
the Dutch service under the command of Sir Horace Vere were sent to
oppose Spinola's invasion of the Rhineland. Accompanied by a Dutch force
under Frederick Henry, they reached the Palatinate, but it was too late.
The fate of the King of Bohemia was soon to be decided elsewhere than in
his hereditary dominions. Completely defeated at the battle of Prague,
Frederick with his wife and family fled to Holland to seek the
protection of their cousin, the Prince of Orange. They met with the most
generous treatment at his hands, and they were for many years to make
the Hague the home of their exile.
As the date at which the Twelve Years' Truce came to an end drew near,
some efforts were made to avert war. There were advocates of peace in
the United Provinces, especially in Gelderland and Overyssel, the two
provinces most exposed to invasion.
The archdukes had no desire to re-open hostilities; and Pecquinius, the
Chancellor of Brabant, was sent to the Hague to confer with Maurice, and
was authorised to name certain conditions for the conclusion of a peace.
These conditions proved, however, to be wholly unacceptable, and the
early summer of 1621 saw Maurice and Spinola once more in the field at
the head of rival armies. The operations were, however, dilatory and
inconclusive. The stadholder now, and throughout his last campaigns, was
no longer physically the same man as in the days when his skilful
generalship had saved the Dutch republic from overthrow; he had lost the
brilliant energy of youth. The deaths in the course of this same year,
1621, of both the Archduke Albert and Philip III of Spain, were also
hindrances to the vigorous prosecution of the war. In 1622 there was
much marching and counter-marching, and Maurice was successful in
compelling Spinola to raise the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, the last
success he was destined to achieve. In the course of this year the
prince's life was in serious danger. A plot was laid to assassinate him
on his way to Ryswyck, the leading conspirator being William van
Stoutenberg, the younger son of Oldenbarneveldt. Stoutenberg had, in
1619, been deprived of his posts and his property confiscated, and he
wished to avenge his father's death and his own injuries. The plot was
discovered, but Stoutenberg managed to escape and took service under the
Archduchess Isabel. Unfortunately he had implicated his elder brother,
Regnier, lord of Groeneveldt, in the scheme. Groeneveldt was seized and
brought to the scaffold.
From this time nothing but misfortune dogged the steps of Maurice, whose
health began to give way under the fatigues of campaigning. In 1623 a
carefully planned expedition against Antwerp, which he confidently
expected to succeed, was frustrated by a long continuance of stormy
weather. Spinola in the following year laid siege to Breda. This
strongly fortified town, an ancestral domain of the Princes of Orange,
had a garrison of 7000 men. The Spanish commander rapidly advancing
completely invested it. Maurice, who had been conducting operations on
the eastern frontier, now hastened to Breda, and did his utmost by
cutting off Spinola's own supplies to compel him to raise the blockade.
All his efforts however failed, and after holding out for many months
Breda surrendered. In the spring of 1625 the prince became so
seriously ill that he asked the States-General to appoint his brother
commander-in-chief in his stead. Feeling his end drawing near, Maurice's
chief wish was to see Frederick Henry married before his death.
Frederick Henry, like Maurice himself, had never shown any inclination
for wedlock and there was no heir to the family. He had, however, been
attracted by the Countess Amalia von Solms, a lady of the suite of
Elizabeth of Bohemia. Under pressure from the dying man the
preliminaries were speedily arranged, and the wedding was quietly
celebrated on April 4. Though thus hastily concluded, the marriage
proved to be in every way a thoroughly happy one. Amalia was throughout
his life to be the wise adviser of her husband and to exercise no small
influence in the conduct of public affairs. Maurice died on April 23, in
the fifty-eighth year of his age. His forty years of continuous and
strenuous service to the State had made him prematurely old; and there
can be but little doubt that the terrible anxieties of the crisis of
1618-19 told upon him. Above all a feeling of remorse for his share in
the tragedy of Oldenbarneveldt's death preyed upon his mind.
The new Prince of Orange succeeded to a difficult position, but he was
endowed with all the qualities of a real leader of men. Forty-one years
old and brought up from boyhood in camps under the eye of his brother,
Frederick Henry was now to show that he was one of the most accomplished
masters of the military art, and especially siege-craft, in an age of
famous generals, for Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, Torstenson, Turenne,
Charles Gustavus and the Great Elector were all trained in his school.
He was, however, much more than an experienced and resourceful commander
in the field. He inherited much of his father's wary and tactful
statesmanship and skill in diplomacy. He was, moreover, deservedly
popular. He was a Hollander born and bred, and his handsome face,
chivalrous bearing, and conciliatory genial temper, won for him an
influence, which for some years was to give him almost undisputed
predominance in the State. To quote the words of a contemporary, Van der
Capellen, "the prince in truth disposed of everything as he liked;
everything gave way to his word."
The offices and dignities held by Maurice were at once conferred on
Frederick Henry. He was elected Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht,
Gelderland and Overyssel, and was appointed Captain-General and
Admiral-General of the Union and head of the Council of State. During
practically the whole of his life the prince spent a considerable part
of the year in camp, but he was able all the time to keep in touch with
home affairs, and to exercise a constant supervision and control of the
foreign policy of the State by the help of his wife, and through the
services of Francis van Aerssens. The Court of the Princess of Orange,
graced as it was by the presence of the exiled King and Queen of
Bohemia, was brilliant and sumptuous, and gave to the reality of power
possessed by the stadholder more than a semblance of sovereign pomp.
During her husband's absence she spared no pains to keep him
well-acquainted with all the currents and under-currents of action and
opinion at the Hague, and was not only able to give sound advice, but
was quite ready, when necessity called, to meet intrigue with intrigue
and render abortive any movements or schemes adverse to the prince's
policy or authority. The obligations of Frederick Henry to Aerssens were
even greater. The stadholder was at first suspicious of the man, whom he
disliked for the leading part he had taken against Oldenbarneveldt. But
he did not allow personal prejudice to prevent him from employing a
diplomatist of Aerssens' experience and capacity, and, with
acquaintance, he learned to regard him, not merely as a clever and wise
councillor, but as a confidential friend.
The right conduct of foreign affairs was of peculiar importance at the
moment, when Frederick Henry became stadholder, for a change of
_régime_ took place almost simultaneously both in France and England. In
Paris Cardinal Richelieu had just laid firm hands upon the reins of
power, and the timorous and feeble James I died in the autumn of 1625.
Richelieu and Charles I were both hostile to Spain, and the republic had
reason to hope for something more than friendly neutrality in the coming
years of struggle with the united forces of the two Habsburg monarchies.
One of the chief difficulties which confronted the new stadholder was
the religious question. The prince himself, as was well known, was
inclined to Remonstrant opinions. He was, however, anxious not to stir
up the smouldering embers of sectarian strife, and he made no effort to
withdraw the placards against the Remonstrants, but confined himself to
moderate in practice their severity. He recalled from exile Van der
Myle, Oldenbarneveldt's son-in-law; made Nicholas van Reigersberg, De
Groot's brother-in-law, a member of the council; and released
Hoogerbeets from his captivity at Loevestein. When, however, De Groot
himself, presuming on the stadholder's goodwill, ventured to return to
Holland without permission, the prince refused to receive him and he was
ordered to leave the country once more.
The year 1626 was marked by no events of military importance; both sides
were in lack of funds and no offensive operations were undertaken. Much
rejoicing, however, attended the birth of a son and heir to the Prince
of Orange, May 27. The child received the name of William. Early in the
following year Sir Dudley Carleton, as envoy-extraordinary of King
Charles I, invested Frederick Henry at the Hague with the Order of the
Garter. This high distinction was not, however, a mark of really
friendlier relations between the two countries. The long-standing
disputes as to fishing rights in the narrow seas and at Spitsbergen, and
as to trading spheres in the East Indian Archipelago, remained
unsettled; and in the unfortunate and ill-considered war, which broke
out at this time between England and France, the sympathies of the
States were with the latter. Already those close relations between the
French and the Dutch, which for the next decade were to be one of the
dominating factors in determining the final issue of the Thirty Years'
War, were by the diplomatic efforts of Richelieu and of Aerssens being
firmly established. France advanced to the States a large subsidy by the
aid of which the stadholder was enabled to take the field at the head
of a really fine army and to give to the world a brilliant display of
his military abilities. Throughout his stadholderate the persistent aim
which Frederick Henry held before himself was never aggression with a
view to conquest, but the creation of a scientific frontier, covered by
strong fortresses, within which the flat lands behind the defensive
lines of the great rivers could feel reasonably secure against sudden
attack. It was with this object that in 1629 he determined to lay siege
to the town of Hertogenbosch. A force of 24,000 infantry and 4000
cavalry were gathered together for the enterprise. It was composed of
many nationalities, like all the armies commanded by Maurice and
Frederick Henry, but was admirably disciplined and devoted to its
commander. Four English, three Scottish and four French regiments, all
choice troops, raised by permission of their sovereigns for the service
of the States, formed the backbone of the force. On April 30 the town
was invested.
Hertogenbosch, or Bois-le-duc, was strongly fortified, and so surrounded
by marshy ground, intersected by a number of small streams, that the
only way of approach for a besieging force was a single causeway
defended by the forts of St Isabella and St Anthony. The garrison
consisted of 8000 men, and the governor, Grobendonc, was an experienced
and resolute soldier.
The stadholder began by surrounding the town with a double line of
circumvallation. The marshes were crossed by dykes, and two streams were
dammed so as to fill a broad deep moat round the lines and flood the
country outside. Other lines, three miles long, connected the investing
lines with the village of Crčvecceur on the Meuse, Frederick Henry's
base of supplies, which were brought by water from Holland. These works
completed, approaches were at once opened against the forts of St
Anthony and St Isabella, the task being entrusted to the English and
French troops. The court of Brussels now began to take serious measures
for relieving the town. At first regarding _Bolduc la pucelle_ as
impregnable, they had been pleased to hear that the prince had committed
himself to an enterprise certain to be a dismal failure. Then came the
news of the circumvallation, and with it alarm. The Count de Berg was
therefore ordered (June 17) at the head of an army of 30,000 foot and
7000 horse to advance into North Brabant and raise the siege. But the
stadholder was prepared and ceaselessly on his guard; and the Spanish
general, after several vain attempts, found the Dutch lines
unassailable. With the view of compelling Frederick Henry to follow him,
Berg now marched into the heart of the United Provinces, devastating as
he went with fire and sword, took Amersfoort and threatened Amsterdam.
But the prince confined himself to despatching a small detached force of
observation; and meanwhile a happy stroke, by which a certain Colonel
Dieden surprised and captured the important frontier fortress of Wesel,
forced the Spaniards to retreat, for Wesel was Berg's depot of supplies
and munitions.
While all this was going on the Prince of Orange had been pushing
forward the siege operations. On July 17 the forts of St Isabella and St
Anthony were stormed. The attack against the main defences, in which the
English regiments specially distinguished themselves, was now pressed
with redoubled vigour. The resistance at every step was desperate, but
at last the moat was crossed and a lodgment effected within the walls.
On September 14 Hertogenbosch surrendered; and the virgin fortress
henceforth became the bulwark of the United Provinces against Spanish
attack on this side. The consummate engineering skill, with which the
investment had been carried out, attracted the attention of all Europe
to this famous siege. It was a signal triumph and added greatly to the
stadholder's popularity and influence in the republic.
It was needed. The Estates of Holland were at this time once more
refractory. The interests of this great commercial and maritime province
differed from those of the other provinces of the Union; and it bore a
financial burden greater than that of all the others put together. The
Estates, then under the leadership of Adrian Pauw, the influential
pensionary of Amsterdam, declined to raise the quota of taxation
assigned to the province for military needs and proceeded to disband a
number of troops that were in their pay. Inconsistently with this action
they declined to consider certain proposals for peace put forward by the
Infanta Isabel, for they would yield nothing on the questions of liberty
of worship or of freedom to trade in the Indies. Their neglect to
furnish the requisite supplies for the war, however, prevented the
prince from undertaking any serious military operations in 1630.
Fortunately the other side were in no better case financially, while the
death of Spinola and the withdrawal of the Count de Berg from the
Spanish service deprived them of their only two competent generals. This
attitude of Holland, though it thwarted the stadholder's plans and was
maintained in opposition to his wishes, by no means however implied any
distrust of him or lack of confidence in his leadership. This was
conclusively proved by the passing, at the instigation of Holland, of
the _Acte de Survivance_ (April 19,1631). This Act declared all the
various offices held by the prince hereditary in the person of his
five-year-old son. He thus became, in all but name, a constitutional
sovereign.
An expedition planned for the capture of Dunkirk at this time, spring
1631, proved too hazardous and was abandoned, but later in the year the
Dutch sailors gave a signal proof of their superiority at sea.
Encouraged by the failure of the attempted attack on Dunkirk the
government at Brussels determined on a counter-stroke. A flotilla of 35
frigates, accompanied by a large number of smaller vessels to carry
supplies and munitions and having on board a body of 6000 soldiers,
set sail from Antwerp under the command of Count John of Nassau (a
cousin of the stadholder) and in the presence of Isabel herself to
effect the conquest of some of the Zeeland islands. As soon as the
news reached Frederick Henry, detachments of troops were at once
despatched to various points; and about a dozen vessels were rapidly
equipped and ordered to follow the enemy and if possible bring him to
action. A landing at Terscholen was foiled by Colonel Morgan, who, at
the head of 2000 English troops, waded across a shallow estuary in
time to prevent a descent. At last (September 12) the Dutch ships
managed to come up with their adversaries in the Slaak near the island
of Tholen. They at once attacked and though so inferior in numbers
gained a complete victory. Count John of Nassau just contrived to
escape, but his fleet was destroyed and 5000 prisoners were taken.
The year 1632 witnessed a renewal of military activity and was memorable
for the famous siege and capture of Maestricht. This fortress held the
same commanding position on the eastern frontier as Hertogenbosch on the
southern; and, though its natural position was not so strong as the
capital of North Brabant, Maestricht, lying as it did on both sides of
the broad Meuse, and being strongly fortified and garrisoned, was very
difficult to invest. The stadholder, at the head of a force of 17,000
infantry and 4000 horse, first made himself master of Venloo and
Roeremonde and then advanced upon Maestricht. Unfortunately before
Roeremonde, Ernest Casimir, the brave stadholder of Friesland and
Groningen, was killed. He was succeeded in his offices by his son, Henry
Casimir. Arriving (June 10) before Maestricht, Frederick Henry proceeded
to erect strongly entrenched lines of circumvallation round the town
connecting them above and below the town by bridges. Supplies reached
him plentifully by the river. To the English and French regiments were
once more assigned the place of honour in the attack. All went well
until July 2, when Don Gonzales de Cordova led a superior Spanish force
from Germany, consisting of 18,000 foot and 6000 horse, to raise the
siege, and encamped close to the Dutch lines on the south side of the
river. Finding however no vulnerable spot, he awaited the arrival at the
beginning of August of an Imperialist army of 12,000 foot and 4000
horse, under the renowned Pappenheim. This impetuous leader determined
upon an assault, and the Dutch entrenchments were attacked suddenly with
great vigour at a moment when the prince was laid up with the gout. He
rose, however, from his bed, personally visited all the points of
danger, and after desperate fighting the assailants were at last driven
off with heavy loss. The Spaniards and Imperialists, finding that the
stadholder's lines could not be forced, instituted a blockade, so that
the besiegers were themselves besieged. But Frederick Henry had laid up
such ample stores of munitions and provisions that he paid no heed to
the cutting of his communications, and pushed on his approaches with the
utmost rapidity. All difficulties were overcome by the engineering skill
of the scientific commander; and finally two tunnels sixty feet deep
were driven under the broad dry moat before the town walls. The English
regiments during these operations bore the brunt of the fighting and
lost heavily, Colonels Harwood and the Earl of Oxford being killed and
Colonel Morgan dangerously wounded. After exploding a mine, a forlorn
hope of fifty English troops rushed out from one of the tunnels and made
good their footing upon the ramparts. Others followed, and the garrison,
fearing that further resistance might entail the sacking of the town,
surrendered (August 23) with honours of war.
One result of the fall of Maestricht was a renewal on the part of the
Archduchess Isabel of negotiations for peace or a long truce. On the
authority of Frederick Henry's memoirs the terms first offered to him in
camp were favourable and might have been accepted. When, however, the
discussion was shifted to the Hague, the attitude of the Belgic
representatives had stiffened. The cause was not far to seek, for on
November 6, 1632 the ever-victorious Gustavus Adolphus had fallen in the
hour of triumph in the fatal battle of Lützen. The death of the Swedish
hero was a great blow to the Protestant cause and gave fresh heart to
the despondent Catholic alliance. The negotiations dragged however their
slow length along, the chief point of controversy being the old dispute
about freedom to trade in the Indies. On this point agreement was
impossible. Spain would yield nothing of her pretensions; and the
Hollanders would hear of no concessions that threatened the prosperity
of the East and West India Companies in which so many merchants and
investors were deeply interested. Any admission of a Spanish monopoly or
right of exclusion would have spelt ruin to thousands. The diplomatic
discussions, however, went on for many months in a desultory and
somewhat futile manner; and meanwhile though hostilities did not
actually cease, the campaign of 1633 was conducted in a half-hearted
fashion. The death of Isabel on November 29, 1633, shattered finally any
hopes that the peace party in the Provinces (for there was a strong
peace party) might have had of arriving at any satisfactory agreement.
By the decease of the arch-duchess, who had been a wise and beneficent
ruler and had commanded the respect and regard not only of her own
subjects but of many northerners also, the Belgic provinces reverted to
the crown of Spain and passed under the direct rule of Philip IV. The
Cardinal Infante Ferdinand, fresh from his crushing victory over the
Swedes at Nördlingen, came as governor to Brussels in 1634, at the head
of considerable Spanish forces, and an active renewal of the war in 1635
was clearly imminent.
In these circumstances Frederick Henry determined to enter into
negotiations with France for the conclusion of an offensive and
defensive alliance against Spain, the common enemy. He had many
difficulties to encounter. The Estates of Holland, though opposed to the
terms actually offered by the Brussels government, were also averse to
taking any step which shut the door upon hopes of peace. Richelieu on
his side, though ready, as before, to grant subsidies and to permit the
enrolment of French regiments for the Dutch service, shrank from
committing France to an open espousal of the Protestant side against the
Catholic powers. The stadholder, however, was not deterred by the
obstacles in his way; and the diplomatic skill and adroitness of
Aerssens, aided by his own tact and firmness of will, overcame the
scruples of Richelieu. The opposition of the Estates of Holland, without
whose consent no treaty could be ratified, was likewise surmounted.
Adrian Pauw, their leader, was despatched on a special embassy to Paris,
and in his absence his influence was undermined, and Jacob Cats was
appointed Council-Pensionary in his stead. In the spring of 1635 a firm
alliance was concluded between France and the United Provinces, by which
it was agreed that neither power should make peace without the consent
of the other, each meanwhile maintaining a field force of 25,000 foot
and 5000 horse and dividing conquests in the Southern Netherlands
between them. This treaty was made with the concurrence and strong
approval of the Swedish Chancellor, Oxenstierna, and was probably
decisive in its effect upon the final issue of the Thirty Years' War.
In the early spring of 1635, therefore, a French force entered the
Netherlands and, after defeating Prince Thomas of Savoy at Namur, joined
the Dutch army at Maestricht. Louis XIII had given instructions to the
French commanders, Châtillon and de Brézé, to place themselves under the
orders of the Prince of Orange; and Frederick Henry at the head of
32,000 foot and 9000 horse now entered the enemy's territory and
advanced to the neighbourhood of Louvain. Here however, owing to the
outbreak of disease among his troops, to lack of supplies and to
differences of opinion with his French colleagues, the prince determined
to retreat. His action was attended by serious results. His adversary,
the Cardinal Infante Ferdinand, was a wary and skilful general. He now
seized his opportunity, rapidly made himself master of Diest, Gennep,
Goch and Limburg, and took by surprise the important fort of Schenck at
the junction of the Waal and the Rhine. Vexed at the loss of a
stronghold which guarded two of the main waterways of the land, the
stadholder at once laid siege to Schenck. But the Spanish garrison held
out obstinately all through the winter and did not surrender until April
26,1636. The Dutch army had suffered much from exposure and sickness
during this long investment and was compelled to abstain for some months
from active operations. Ferdinand thereupon, as soon as he saw that
there was no immediate danger of an attack from the north, resolved to
avenge himself upon the French for the part they had taken in the
preceding year's campaign. Reinforced by a body of Imperialist troops
under Piccolomini he entered France and laid the country waste almost to
the gates of Paris. This bold stroke completely frustrated any plans
that the allies may have formed for combined action in the late summer.
The following year the States determined, somewhat against the wishes of
Frederick Henry, to send an expedition into Flanders for the capture of
Dunkirk. This was done at the instance of the French ambassador,
Charnacé, acting on the instructions of Richelieu, who promised the
assistance of 5000 French troops and undertook, should the town be
taken, to leave it in the possession of the Dutch. The stadholder
accordingly assembled (May 7) an army of 14,000 foot and a considerable
body of horse at Rammekens, where a fleet lay ready for their transport
to Flanders. Contrary winds, however, continued steadily to blow for
many weeks without affording any opportunity for putting to sea. At
last, wearied out with the long inaction and its attendant sickness
the prince (July 20) suddenly broke up his camp and marched upon Breda.
Spinola, after capturing Breda in 1625, had greatly strengthened its
defences; and now, with a garrison of 4000 men under a resolute
commander, it was held to be secure against any attack. The siege was a
repetition of those of Hertogenbosch and Maestricht. In vain did the
Cardinal Infante with a powerful force try to break through the lines of
circumvallation, which the prince had constructed with his usual skill.
Called away by a French invasion on the south, he had to leave Breda to
its fate. The town surrendered on October 10.
During the years 1637 and 1638 the ever-recurring dissensions between
the province of Holland and the Generality became acute once more. The
Provincial Estates insisted on their sovereign rights and refused to
acknowledge the authority of the States-General to impose taxes upon
them. This opposition of Holland was a great hindrance to the prince in
the conduct of the war, and caused him constant anxiety and worry. It
was impossible to plan or to carry out a campaign without adequate
provision being made for the payment and maintenance of the military and
naval forces, and this depended upon Holland's contribution. Amsterdam
was the chief offender. On one occasion a deputation sent to Amsterdam
from the States-General was simply flouted. The burgomaster refused to
summon the council together, and the members of the deputation had to
return without an audience. All the prince's efforts to induce the
contumacious city to consider his proposals in a reasonable and
patriotic spirit were of no avail; they were rejected insultingly. In
his indignation Frederick Henry is reported to have exclaimed, "I have
no greater enemy, but if only I could take Antwerp, it would bring them
to their senses."
The immense and growing prosperity of Amsterdam at this time was indeed
mainly due to the fall of Antwerp from its high estate. To reconquer
Antwerp had indeed long been a favourite project of Frederick Henry. In
1638 he made careful and ample preparations for its realisation. But it
was not to be. Misfortune this year was to dog his steps. The advance
was made in two bodies. The larger under the prince was to march
straight to Antwerp. The second, of 6000 men, commanded by Count William
of Nassau, was instructed to seize some outlying defences on the Scheldt
before joining the main force before the town. Count William began
well, but, hearing a false rumour that a fleet was sailing up the
Scheldt to intercept his communications, he hastily retreated. While his
ranks were in disorder he was surprised by a Spanish attack, and
practically his entire force was cut to pieces. On hearing of this
disaster the stadholder had no alternative but to abandon the siege.
Constant campaigning and exposure to the hardships of camp life year
after year began at this time seriously to affect the health of the
stadholder. He was much troubled by attacks of gout, which frequently
prevented him from taking his place in the field. In 1639 there were no
military events of importance; nevertheless this year was a memorable
one in the annals of the Dutch republic.
It was the year of the battle of the Downs. A great effort was made by
Spain to re-establish her naval supremacy in the narrow seas, and the
finest fleet that had left the harbours of the peninsula since 1588
arrived in the Channel in September, 1639. It consisted of seventy-seven
vessels carrying 24,000 men, sailors and soldiers, and was under the
command of an experienced and capable seaman, Admiral Oquendo. His
orders were to drive the Dutch fleet from the Channel and to land 10,000
men at Dunkirk as a reinforcement for the Cardinal Infante. Admiral
Tromp had been cruising up and down the Channel for some weeks on the
look-out for the Spaniards, and on September 16 he sighted the armada.
He had only thirteen vessels with him, the larger part of his fleet
having been detached to keep watch and ward over Dunkirk. With a
boldness, however, that might have been accounted temerity, Tromp at
once attacked the enemy and with such fury that the Spanish fleet sought
refuge under the lee of the Downs and anchored at the side of an English
squadron under Vice-Admiral Pennington. Rejoined by seventeen ships from
before Dunkirk, the Dutch admiral now contented himself with a vigilant
blockade, until further reinforcements could reach him. Such was the
respect with which he had inspired the Spaniards, that no attempt was
made to break the blockade; and in the meantime Tromp had sent urgent
messages to Holland asking the Prince of Orange and the admiralties to
strain every nerve to give him as many additional ships as possible. The
request met with a ready and enthusiastic response. In all the dockyards
work went on with relays of men night and day. In less than a month
Tromp found himself at the head of 105 sail with twelve fire-ships. They
were smaller ships than those of his adversary, but they were more
than enough to ensure victory. On October 21, after detaching
Vice-Admiral Witte de with 30 ships to watch Pennington's squadron,
Tromp bore down straight upon the Spanish fleet though they were lying
in English waters. Rarely has there been a naval triumph more complete.
Under cover of a fog Oquendo himself with seven vessels escaped to
Dunkirk; all the rest were sunk, burnt, or captured. It is said that
15,000 Spaniards perished. On the side of the Dutch only 100 men were
killed and wounded. The Spanish power at sea had suffered a blow from
which it never recovered.
Charles I was very angry on learning that English ships had been obliged
to watch the fleet of a friendly power destroyed in English waters
before their eyes. The king had inherited from his father a long series
of grievances against the Dutch; and, had he not been involved in
serious domestic difficulties, there would probably have been a
declaration of war. But Charles' finances did not permit him to take a
bold course, and he was also secretly irritated with the Spaniards for
having sought the hospitality of English waters (as written evidence
shows) without his knowledge and permission. Aerssens was sent to London
to smooth over the matter. He had no easy task, but by skill and
patience he contrived, in spite of many adverse influences at the
court, so to allay the bitter feelings that had been aroused by "the
scandal of the Downs" that Charles and his queen were willing, in the
early months of 1640, to discuss seriously the project of a marriage
between the stadholder's only son and one of the English princesses. In
January a special envoy, Jan van der Kerkoven, lord of Heenvlict, joined
Aerssens with a formal proposal for the hand of the princess royal; and
after somewhat difficult negotiations the marriage was at length
satisfactorily arranged. The ceremony took place in London, May 12,
1641. As William was but fifteen years of age and Mary, the princess
royal, only nine, the bridegroom returned to Holland alone, leaving the
child-bride for a time at Whitehall with her parents. The wedding took
place at an ominous time. Ten days after it was celebrated Strafford was
executed; and the dark shadow of the Great Rebellion was already hanging
over the ill-fated Charles. In the tragic story of the House of Stewart
that fills the next two decades there is perhaps no more pathetic figure
than that of Mary, the mother of William III. At the time this alliance
gave added lustre to the position of the Prince of Orange, both at
home and abroad, by uniting his family in close bonds of relationship
with the royal houses both of England and France.
In 1640, as the Spaniards remained on the defensive, the stadholder
entered Flanders and by a forced march attempted to seize Bruges. His
effort, however, was foiled, as was a later attempt to capture Hulst,
when Frederick Henry and the States sustained a great loss in the death
of the gallant Henry Casimir of Nassau, who was killed in a chance
skirmish at the age of 29 years. This regrettable event caused a vacancy
in the stadholderates of Friesland and Groningen with Drente. A number
of zealous adherents of the House of Orange were now anxious that
Frederick Henry should fill the vacant posts to the exclusion of his
cousin, William Frederick, younger brother of Henry Casimir. They urged
upon the prince, who was himself unwilling to supplant his relative,
that it was for the good of the State that there should be a unification
of authority in his person; and at last he expressed himself ready to
accept the offices, if elected. The result of the somewhat mean
intrigues that followed, in which Frederick Henry himself took no part,
gave a curious illustration of the extreme jealousy of the provinces
towards anything that they regarded as outside intrusion into their
affairs. The States-General ventured to recommend the Estates of
Friesland to appoint the Prince of Orange; the recommendation was
resented, and William Frederick became stadholder. The Frieslanders on
their part sent a deputation to Groningen in favour of William
Frederick, and Groningen-Drente elected the Prince of Orange. This
dispute caused an estrangement for a time between the two branches of
the House of Nassau, which was afterwards healed by the marriage of the
Friesland stadholder with Albertine Agnes, a daughter of Frederick
Henry. From this union the present royal family of Holland trace their
descent.
The military operations of the years 1641, 1642 and 1643 were dilatory
and featureless. Both sides were sick of the war and were content to
remain on the defensive. This was no doubt largely due to the fact that
in rapid succession death removed from the stage many of those who had
long played leading parts in the political history of the times.
Aerssens died shortly after his return from his successful mission to
England in the autumn of 1641; and almost at the same time the Cardinal
Infante Ferdinand, who during his tenure of the governor-generalship
had shown great capacity and prudence both as a statesman and as a
commander, expired. In 1642, after eighteen years of almost autocratic
rule, Richelieu passed away, his death (December 4, 1642) coming almost
half-way between those of his enemy, the intriguing Marie de' Medici
(July 3,1642), and that of her son, Louis XIII (May 18, 1643). Anne of
Austria, the sister of the King of Spain, became regent in France; but
this did not imply any change of policy with regard to the United
Provinces, for Cardinal Mazarin, who, through his influence over the
regent succeeded to the power of Richelieu, was a pupil in the school of
that great statesman and followed in his steps. Moreover, during this
same period the outbreak of civil war in England had for the time being
caused that country to be wholly absorbed in its own domestic concerns,
and it ceased to have any weight in the councils of western Europe. Thus
it came to pass that there was a kind of lull in the external affairs of
the United Provinces; and her statesmen were compelled to take fresh
stock of their position in the changed situation that had been created.
Not that this meant that these years were a time of less pressure and
anxiety to the Prince of Orange. His new relations with the English
royal family were a source of difficulty to him. Henrietta Maria (March,
1642) came to Holland, bringing with her the princess royal, and for a
whole year took up her residence at the Hague. She was received with
kindliness and courtesy not only by the stadholder and his family, but
by the people of Holland generally. Her presence, together with that of
the Queen of Bohemia, at the Princess of Orange's court gave to it quite
a regal dignity and splendour, which was particularly gratifying to
Amalia von Solms. But the English queen had other objects in view than
those of courtesy. She hoped not merely to enlist the sympathies of
Frederick Henry for the royal cause in the English civil war, but to
obtain through his help supplies of arms and munitions from Holland for
King Charles. But in this she did not succeed. The Parliament had sent
an envoy, William Strickland, to counteract the influence of Henrietta
Maria, and to represent to the States-General that it was fighting in
defence of the same principles which had led to the revolt against
Spain. The prince was far too prudent to allow his personal inclinations
to override his political judgment as a practical statesman. He knew
that public opinion in the United Provinces would never sanction in
any form active support of King Charles against his parliament, and he
did not attempt it. Intervention was confined to the despatch of an
embassy to England with instructions to mediate between the two
parties. When the unfortunate queen found that all her efforts on
behalf of King Charles were in vain, she determined to leave the safe
refuge where she had been so hospitably entertained and to return to
her husband's side. She sailed from Scheveningen on March 9, 1643, and
reached the royal camp at York in safety.
In the autumn of this year, 1643, two special envoys were sent by
Cardinal Mazarin to the Hague; and one of the results of their visit was
a renewal of the treaty of 1635 by which France and the United Provinces
had entered upon an offensive and defensive alliance and had agreed to
conclude no peace but by mutual consent. Nevertheless Frederick Henry,
whom long experience had made wary and far-sighted, had been growing for
some little time suspicious of the advantage to the republic of
furthering French aggrandisement in the southern Netherlands. He saw
that France was a waxing, Spain a waning power, and he had no desire to
see France in possession of territory bordering on the United Provinces.
This feeling on his part was possibly the cause of the somewhat
dilatory character of his military operations in 1641 and 1642. The
revolt of Portugal from Spain in December, 1640, had at first been
welcomed by the Dutch, but not for long. The great and successful
operations of the East and West India Companies had been chiefly carried
on at the expense of the Portuguese, not of the Spaniards. The great
obstacle to peace with Spain had been the concession of the right to
trade in the Indies. It was Portugal, rather than Spain, which now stood
in the way of the Dutch merchants obtaining that right, for the Spanish
government, in its eagerness to stamp out a rebellion which had spread
from the Peninsula to all the Portuguese colonies, was quite ready to
sacrifice these to secure Dutch neutrality in Europe. The dazzling
victory of the French under the young Duke of Enghien over a veteran
Spanish army at Rocroi (May, 1643) also had its effect upon the mind of
the prince. With prophetic foresight, he rightly dreaded a France too
decisively victorious. In the negotiations for a general peace between
all the contending powers in the Thirty Years' War, which dragged on
their slow length from 1643 to 1648, the stadholder became more and
more convinced that it was in the interest of the Dutch to maintain
Spain as a counterpoise to the growing power of France, and to secure
the favourable terms, which, in her extremity, Spain would be ready to
offer.
At first, however, there was no breach in the close relations with
France; and Frederick Henry, though hampered by ill-health, showed in
his last campaigns all his old skill in siege-craft. By the successive
captures of Hertogenbosch, Maestricht and Breda he had secured the
frontiers of the republic in the south and south-east. He now turned to
the north-west corner of Flanders. In 1644 he took the strongly
fortified post of Sas-van-Gent, situated on the Ley, the canalised river
connecting Ghent with the Scheldt. In 1645 he laid siege to and captured
the town of Hulst, and thus gained complete possession of the strip of
territory south of the Scheldt, known as the Land of Waes, which had
been protected by these two strongholds, and which has since been called
Dutch Flanders.
Very shortly after the capitulation of Hulst, the ambassadors
plenipotentiary of the United Provinces set out (November, 1645) to take
their places at the Congress of Münster on equal terms with the
representatives of the Emperor and of the Kings of France and Spain.
The position acquired by the Dutch republic among the powers of Europe
was thus officially recognised _de facto_ even before its independence
had been _de jure_ ratified by treaty. The parleyings at Münster made
slow headway, as so many thorny questions had to be settled. Meanwhile,
with the full approval of the prince, negotiations were being secretly
carried on between Madrid and the Hague with the view of arriving at a
separate understanding, in spite of the explicit terms of the treaty of
1635. As soon as the French became aware of what was going on, they
naturally protested and did their utmost to raise every difficulty to
prevent a treaty being concluded behind their backs. The old questions
which had proved such serious obstacles in the negotiations of 1607-9
were still sufficiently formidable. But the situation was very different
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