that has just been described, and the character of those offices, which
conferred upon their holders such wide-reaching influence and authority.

The Stadholder or governor was really, both in title and office, an
anomaly in a republic. Under the Burgundian and Habsburg rulers the
Stadholder exercised the local authority in civil and also in military
matters as representing the sovereign duke, count or lord in the
province to which he was appointed, and was by that fact clothed with
certain sovereign attributes during his tenure of office. William the
Silent was Stadholder of Holland and Zeeland at the outbreak of the
revolt, and, though deprived of his offices, he continued until the time
of the Union of Utrecht to exercise authority in those and other
provinces professedly in the name of the king. After his death one would
have expected that the office would have fallen into abeyance, but the
coming of Leicester into the Netherlands led to a revival of the
stadholderate. Holland and Zeeland, in their desire to exercise a check
upon the governor-general's arbitrary exercise of his powers, appointed
Maurice of Nassau to take his father's place; and at the same time
William Lewis of Nassau became Stadholder of Friesland, and stadholders
were also appointed in Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel. In 1609
Maurice was Stadholder in the five provinces of Holland, Zeeland,
Gelderland, Utrecht and Overyssel; his cousin William Lewis in Friesland
and Groningen with Drente. The powers of the stadholder were not the
same in the different provinces, but generally speaking he was the
executive officer of the Estates; and in Holland, where his authority
was the greatest, he had the supervision of the administration of
justice, the appointment of a large number of municipal magistrates,
and the prerogative of pardon, and he was charged with the military and
naval defence of the province. The stadholder received his commission
both from the Provincial Estates and from the States-General and took an
oath of allegiance to the latter. In so far, then, as he exercised
quasi-sovereign functions, he did it in the name of the States, whose
servant he nominally was. But when the stadholder, as was the case with
Maurice and the other Princes of Orange, was himself a sovereign-prince
and the heir of a great name, he was able to exercise an authority far
exceeding those of a mere official. The descendants of William the
Silent--Maurice, Frederick Henry, William II and William III--were,
moreover, all of them men of exceptional ability; and the stadholderate
became in their hands a position of almost semi-monarchical dignity and
influence, the stadholder being regarded both by foreign potentates and
by the people of the Netherlands generally as "the eminent head of the
State." Maurice, as stated above, was stadholder in five provinces;
Frederick Henry, William II and William III in six; the seventh
province, Friesland, remaining loyal, right through the 17th century, to
their cousins of the house of Nassau-Siegen, the ancestors of the
present Dutch royal family. That the authority of the States-General and
States-Provincial should from time to time come into conflict with that
of the stadholder was to be expected, for the relations between them
were anomalous in the extreme. The Stadholder of Holland for instance
appointed, directly or indirectly, the larger part of the municipal
magistrates; they in their turn the representatives who formed the
Estates of the Province. But, as the stadholder was the servant of the
Estates, he, in a sense, may be said to have had the power of appointing
his own masters. The stadholders of the house of Orange had also, in
addition to the prestige attaching to their name, the possession of
large property and considerable wealth, which with the emoluments they
received from the States-General, as Captain-General and
Admiral-General of the Union, and from the various provinces, where they
held the post of stadholder, enabled them in the days of Frederick Henry
and his successors to maintain the state and dignity of a court.

The office of Land's Advocate or Council-Pensionary was different
altogether in character from the stadholderate, but at times scarcely
less influential, when filled by a man of commanding talents. The
Advocate in the time of Oldenbarneveldt combined the duties of being
legal adviser to the Estates of Holland, and of presiding over and
conducting the business of the Estates at their meetings, and also those
of the Commissioned-Councillors. He was the leader and spokesman of the
Holland deputies in the States-General. He kept the minutes, introduced
the business and counted the votes at the provincial assemblies. It was
his duty to draw up and register the resolutions. What was perhaps
equally important, he carried on the correspondence with the ambassadors
of the republic at foreign courts, and received their despatches, and
conducted negotiations with the foreign ambassadors at the Hague. It is
easy to see how a man like Oldenbarneveldt, of great industry and
capacity for affairs, although nominally the paid servant of the
Estates, gradually acquired an almost complete control over every
department of administration and became, as it were, a Minister of State
of all affairs. In Oldenbarneveldt's time the post was held for life;
and, as Maurice did not for many years trouble himself about matters of
internal government and foreign diplomacy, the Advocate by the length of
his tenure of office had at the opening of the 17th century become the
virtual director and arbiter of the policy of the State. After his death
the title of advocate and the life-tenure ceased. His successors were
known as Council-Pensionaries, and they held office for five years only,
but with the possibility of re-election. The career of John de Witt
showed, however, that in the case of a supremely able man these
restrictions did not prevent a _Raad-Pensionarius_[4] from exercising
for eighteen years an authority and influence greater even than that of
Oldenbarneveldt.

An account of the multiplied subdivision of administrative control in
the United Provinces would not be complete without some mention of the
Admiralty Colleges in Holland. Holland with Zeeland furnished the fleets
on which the existence and well-being of the republic depended. Both
William the Silent and his son Maurice were, as stadholders, admirals of
Holland and of Zeeland, and both likewise were by the States-General
appointed Admirals-General of the Union. They thus wielded a double
authority over maritime affairs in the two provinces. In 1574 William
had at his side a Council of Admiralty erected by the Provincial
Estates, but Leicester in 1585 was annoyed by the immediate control of
naval matters being withdrawn from the governor-general and the
Council of State. He succeeded therefore in obtaining a division of the
Council of Admiralty into three Chambers, shortly afterwards increased
to five--Rotterdam, Hoorn with Enkhuizen, Veere, Amsterdam and Harlingen
with Dokkum. In 1597 it was determined that each Admiralty should
consist of seven members nominated by the States-General. The
Admiral-General presided over each College and over joint meetings of
the five Colleges. The Admiralties nominated the lieutenants of the
ships and proposed a list of captains to be finally chosen by the
States-General. The Lieutenant-Admiral and Vice-Admirals of Holland and
the Vice-Admiral of Zeeland were chosen by the Provincial Estates. The
States-General appointed the Commander-in-Chief. Such a system seemed to
be devised to prevent any prompt action or swift decision being taken at
times of emergency or sudden danger.

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER VIII

THE TWELVE YEARS' TRUCE


The first years of the truce were for the United Provinces, now
recognised as "free and independent States," a period of remarkable
energy and enterprise. The young republic started on its new career with
the buoyant hopefulness that comes from the proud consciousness of
suffering and dangers bravely met and overcome, and, under the wise and
experienced guidance of Oldenbarneveldt, acquired speedily a position
and a weight in the Councils of Europe out of all proportion to its
geographical area or the numbers of its population. The far-seeing
statecraft and practised diplomatic skill of the Advocate never rendered
greater services to his country than during these last years of his long
tenure of power. A difficult question as to the succession to the
Jülich-Cleves duchies arose at the very time of the signing of the
truce, which called for delicate and wary treatment.

In March, 1609, the Duke of Jülich and Cleves died without leaving a
male heir, and the succession to these important border territories on
the Lower Rhine became speedily a burning question. The two principal
claimants through the female line were the Elector of Brandenburg and
William, Count-Palatine of Neuburg. The Emperor Rudolph II, however,
under the pretext of appointing imperial commissioners to adjudicate
upon the rival claims, aroused the suspicions of Brandenburg and
Neuburg; and these two came to an agreement to enter into joint
possession of the duchies, and were styled "the possessors." The
Protestant Union at Heidelberg recognised "the possessors," for it was
all-important for the balance of power in Germany that these lands
should not pass into the hands of a Catholic ruler of the House of
Austria. For the same reason Brandenburg and Neuburg were recognised by
the States-General, who did not wish to see a partisan of Spain
established on their borders. The emperor on his part not only refused
to acknowledge "the possessors," but he also sent his cousin Archduke
Leopold, Bishop of Passau, to intervene by armed force. Leopold seized
the fortress of Jülich and proceeded to establish himself.

It was an awkward situation, for neither the United Provinces nor the
archdukes nor the King of Spain had the smallest desire to make the
Jülich succession the cause of a renewal of hostilities, immediately
after the conclusion of the truce. The eagerness of the French king to
precipitate hostilities with the Habsburg powers however forced their
hands. Henry IV had for some time been making preparations for war, and
he was at the moment irritated by the protection given by the archdukes
to the runaway Princess of Condé, who had fled to Brussels. He had
succeeded in persuading the States to send an auxiliary force into
Germany to assist the French army of invasion in the spring of 1610,
when just as the king was on the point of leaving Paris to go to the
front he was assassinated on May 14. This event put an end to the
expedition, for the regent, Marie de' Medici, was friendly to Austria.
The States nevertheless did not feel disposed to leave Leopold in
possession of Jülich. Maurice led an army into the duchy and laid siege
to the town. It capitulated on September 1. As might have been
anticipated, however, the joint rule of the "possessors" did not turn
out a success. They quarrelled, and Neuburg asked for Catholic help.
Maurice and Spinola in 1614 found themselves again face to face at the
head of rival forces, but actual hostilities were avoided; and by the
treaty of Nanten (November 12, 1614) it was arranged that the disputed
territory should be divided, Brandenburg ruling at Cleves, Neuburg at
Jülich. Thus, in the settlement of this thorny question, the influence
of Oldenbarneveldt worked for a temporary solution satisfactory to the
interests of the United Provinces; nor was his successful intervention
in the Jülich-Cleves affair an isolated instance of his diplomatic
activity. On the contrary it was almost ubiquitous.

The growth of the Dutch trade in the Baltic had for some years been
advancing by leaps and bounds, and now far exceeded that of their old
rivals, the Hanseatic league. Christian IV, the ambitious and warlike
King of Denmark, had been seriously interfering with this trade by
imposing such heavy dues for the passage of the Sound as on the one hand
to furnish him with a large revenue, and on the other hand to support
his claim to sovereign rights over all traffic with the inland sea. The
Hanse towns protested strongly and sought the support of the
States-General in actively opposing the Danish king. It was granted. A
force of 7000 men under Frederick Henry was sent into Germany to the
relief of Brunswick, which was besieged by Christian IV. The siege was
raised; and an alliance was concluded between the republic and the Hanse
towns for common action in the protection of their commercial interests.
Nor was this all. Oldenbarneveldt entered into diplomatic relations with
Charles IX of Sweden and with Russia. Cornelis Haga was sent to
Stockholm; and from this time forward a close intimacy was established
between Sweden and the States. The seaport of Gotheborg, just outside
the entrance to the Sound, was founded by a body of Dutch colonists
under a certain Abraham Cabelliau, an Amsterdam merchant, and continued
to be for years practically a Dutch town.

Scarcely less important was the enterprise shown in the establishment of
friendly relations with distant Russia. Balthazar de Moucheron
established a Dutch factory at Archangel so early as 1584; and a growing
trade sprang up with Russia by way of the White Sea, at first in rivalry
with the English Muscovy Company. But a Dutch merchant, by name Isaac
Massa, having succeeded in gaining the ear and confidence of the Tsar,
Russian commerce gradually became a Dutch monopoly. In 1614 a Muscovite
embassy conducted by Massa came to the Hague, and access to the interior
of Russia was opened to the traders of Holland and to them only.

In the Mediterranean no less foresight and dexterity was shown in
forwarding the interests of the States. The Advocate's son-in-law, Van
der Myle, went in 1609 as ambassador to Venice; and the following year
the first Venetian envoy, Tommaso Contarini, arrived in Holland. In 1612
Cornelis Haga, who had been in Sweden, was sent to Constantinople to
treat with the Turks about commercial privileges in the Levant and for
the suppression of piracy, and he remained in the East in charge of the
republic's interests for many years.

More difficult was the maintenance of friendly relations with England.
In 1604 James I had made peace with Spain; and the growing rivalry upon
the seas between the Dutch and English tended to alienate his sympathies
from the rising maritime power of the republic. He outwardly maintained
friendly relations; his ambassador had a seat on the Council of State;
he retained his garrisons in the cautionary towns; and after the signing
of the truce he bestowed the Garter upon Prince Maurice. But at this
very time, May, 1609, James took a step which was most hurtful to that
industry which had laid the foundation of the commercial prosperity of
Holland--this was the issuing of an edict imposing a tax on all
foreigners fishing in English waters. Though general in its form, this
edict was really directed against the right heretofore enjoyed by the
Netherlanders to fish on the English coast, a right conferred by a
series of treaties and never challenged since its confirmation by the
_Magnus Intercursus_ of 1496. Dutch public opinion was strongly aroused
and a special embassy was sent to London, April, 1610, to protest
against the edict and endeavour to procure its withdrawal or its
modification. This was by no means an easy matter. The fisheries, on
which a large part of the population of Holland and Zeeland depended for
their livelihood, were of vital importance to the States. On the other
hand their virtual monopoly by the Dutch caused keen resentment in
England. In the latter part of the reign of Elizabeth that adventurous
sea-faring spirit, which was destined eventually to plant the flag of
England on the shores of every ocean, had come to the birth, and
everywhere it found, during this early part of the 17th century, Dutch
rivals already in possession and Dutch ships on every trading route. The
Dutch mercantile marine in fact far exceeded the English in numbers and
efficiency. The publication of Hugo Grotius' famous pamphlet, _Mare
Liberum_, in March, 1609, was probably the final cause which decided
James to issue his Fisheries' proclamation. The purpose of Grotius was
to claim for every nation, as against the Portuguese, freedom of trade
in the Indian Ocean, but the arguments he used appeared to King James
and his advisers to challenge the _dominium maris_, which English kings
had always claimed in the "narrow seas." The embassy of 1610,
therefore, had to deal not merely with the fisheries, but with the whole
subject of the maritime relations of the two countries; and a crowd of
published pamphlets proves the intense interest that was aroused. But
the emergence of the dispute as to the Jülich-Cleves succession, and the
change in the policy of the French government owing to the assassination
of Henry IV, led both sides to desire an accommodation; and James
consented, not indeed to withdraw the edict, but to postpone its
execution for two years. It remained a dead letter until 1616, although
all the time the wranglings over the legal aspects of the questions in
dispute continued. The Republic, however, as an independent State, was
very much hampered by the awkward fact of the cautionary towns remaining
in English hands. The occupation of Flushing and Brill, commanding the
entrances to important waterways, seemed to imply that the Dutch
republic was to a certain extent a vassal state under the protection of
England. Oldenbarneveldt resolved therefore to take advantage of King
James' notorious financial embarrassments by offering to redeem the
towns by a ready-money payment. The nominal indebtedness of the United
Provinces for loans advanced by Elizabeth was £600,000; the Advocate
offered in settlement £100,000 in cash and £150,000 more in half-yearly
payments. James accepted the offer, and the towns were handed over, the
garrisons being allowed to pass into the Dutch service, June 1616. Sir
Dudley Carleton, however, who about this time succeeded Sir Ralph
Winwood as English envoy at the Hague, continued to have a seat in the
Council of State.

Oldenbarneveldt thus, at a time when his dominant position in the State
was already being undermined and his career drawing to an end, performed
a great service to his country, the more so as King James, in his
eagerness to negotiate a marriage between the Prince of Wales and a
Spanish infanta, was beginning to allow his policy to be more and more
controlled by the Count of Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador at
Whitehall. James' leaning towards Spain naturally led him to regard with
stronger disfavour the increasing predominance of the Dutch flag upon
the seas, and it was not long before he was sorry that he had
surrendered the cautionary towns. For the fishery rights and the
principle of the _dominium maris_ in the narrow seas were no longer the
only questions in dispute between England and the States. English
seamen and traders had other grievances to allege against the Hollanders
in other parts of the world. The exclusive right to fish for whales in
the waters of Spitsbergen and Greenland was claimed by the English on
the ground of Hugh Willoughby's alleged discovery of Spitsbergen in
1553. The Dutch would not admit any such claim, and asserted that
Heemskerk was the first to visit the archipelago, and that he planted in
1596 the Dutch flag on the shores of the island, to which he gave the
name of Spitsbergen. In 1613 James conferred the monopoly upon the
English Muscovy Company, who sent out a fishing fleet with orders to
drive off any interlopers; and certain Dutch vessels were attacked and
plundered. The reply of the States-General was the granting of a
charter, January 27, 1614, to a company, known as the Northern or
Greenland Company, with the monopoly of fishing between Davis' Straits
and Nova Zembla; and a fishing fleet was sent out accompanied by
warships. The result was a temporary agreement between the English and
Dutch companies for using separate parts of Spitsbergen as their bases,
all others being excluded. Meanwhile the dispute was kept open; and
despite conferences and negotiations neither side showed any disposition
to yield. Matters reached an acute stage in 1618. English and Dutch
fishing fleets of exceptional strength sailed into the northern waters
in the early summer of that year, and a fierce fight took place, which,
as two Dutch war vessels were present, resulted in the scattering of the
English vessels and considerable loss of life and property.

The rivalry and opposition between the Dutch and English traders in the
East-Indies was on a larger scale, but here there was no question of the
Dutch superiority in force, and it was used remorselessly. The Dutch
East India Company had thriven apace. In 1606 a dividend of 50 per cent,
had been paid; in 1609 one of 325 per cent. The chief factory was at
Bantam, but there were many others on the mainland of India, and at
Amboina, Banda, Ternate and Matsjan in the Moluccas; and from these
centres trade was carried on with Ceylon, with Borneo and even with
distant China and Japan. But the position of the company was precarious,
until the secret article of the treaty of 1609 conceded liberty of trade
during the truce. The chief need was to create a centre of
administration, from which a general control could be exercised over all
the officials at the various trading factories throughout the
East-Indian archipelago. It was resolved, therefore, by the Council of
Seventeen to appoint a director-general, who should reside at Bantam,
armed with powers which made him, far removed as he was from
interference by the home authorities, almost a sovereign in the
extensive region which he administered. Jan Pieterszoon Koen, appointed
in 1614, was the first of a series of capable men by whose vigorous and
sometimes unscrupulous action the Dutch company became rapidly the
dominant power in the eastern seas, where their trade and influence
overshadowed those of their European competitors. The most enterprising
of those competitors were the English. Disputes quickly arose between
the rival companies as to trading rights in the Moluccas, the Banda
group and Amboina; and some islands, where the English had made treaties
with the natives, were occupied by the Dutch, and the English expelled.

Another grievance was the refusal of the States-General in 1616 to admit
English dyed cloths into the United Provinces. This had caused especial
irritation to King James. The manufacture of woollen cloth and the
exportation of wool had for long been the chief of English industries;
and the monopoly of the trade was, when James ascended the throne, in
the hands of the oldest of English chartered companies, the Fellowship
of Merchant Adventurers. The Adventurers held since 1598 their Court and
Staple at Middelburg in Zeeland. The English had not learnt the art of
finishing and dyeing the cloth that they wove; it was imported in its
unfinished state, and was then dyed and prepared for commerce by the
Dutch. Some thousands of skilled hands found employment in Holland in
this work. James, always impecunious, determined in 1608, on the
proposal of a certain Alderman Cockayne, to grant Cockayne a patent for
the creation of a home-dyeing industry, reserving to the crown a
monopoly for the sale of the goods. The Adventurers complained of this
as a breach of their charter; and, after much bickering, the king in
1615 settled the dispute by withdrawing the charter. Cockayne now hoped
that the company he had formed would be a profitable concern, but he and
the king were doomed to disappointment. The Estates of Holland refused
to admit the English dyed cloths, and their example was followed by the
other provinces and by the States-General. Cockayne became bankrupt, and
in 1617 the king had to renew the charter of the Adventurers. James was
naturally very sore at this rebuff, and he resolved upon reprisals by
enforcing the proclamation of 1609 and exacting a toll from all foreign
vessels fishing in British waters. Great was the indignation in Holland,
and the fishing fleet in 1617 set sail with an armed convoy. A Scottish
official named Browne, who came to collect the toll, was seized and
carried as a prisoner to Holland. James at once laid hands on two Dutch
skippers in the Thames, as hostages, and demanded satisfaction for the
outrage upon his officer. Neither side would at first give way, and it
was not until after some months that an accommodation was patched up.
The general question of the fishery privileges remained however just
as far from settlement as ever, for the States stood firm upon their
treaty rights. At length it was resolved by the States to send a special
mission to England to discuss with the king the four burning questions
embittering the relations between the two countries. The envoys arrived
in London, December, 1618. For seven months the parleyings went on
without any definite result being reached, and in August, 1619, the
embassy returned. Very important events had meanwhile been occurring
both in the United Provinces and in Germany, which made it necessary to
both parties that the decision on these trade questions, important as
they were, should be postponed for awhile, as they were overshadowed by
the serious political crises in Holland and in Bohemia, which were then
occupying all men's attention.

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER IX

MAURICE AND OLDENBARNEVELDT


The conclusion of the truce did not bring, with material progress and
trade expansion, internal peace to the United Provinces. The relations
between the Prince-stadholder and the all-powerful Advocate had long
been strained. In the long-drawn-out negotiations Maurice had never
disguised his dislike to the project of a truce, and, though he finally
acquiesced, it was a sullen acquiescence. At first there was no overt
breach between the two men, but Maurice, though he did not refuse to
meet Oldenbarneveldt, was cold and unfriendly. He did not attempt to
interfere with the old statesman's control of the machinery of
administration or with his diplomatic activities, for he was naturally
indolent and took little interest in politics. Had he been ambitious, he
might many years before have obtained by general consent sovereign
power, but he did not seek it. His passion was the study of military
science. From his early youth he had spent his life in camps, and now he
found himself without occupation. The enemies of Oldenbarneveldt seized
the opportunity to arouse Maurice's suspicions of the Advocate's motives
in bringing about the truce, and even to hint that he had been bribed
with Spanish gold. Chief among these enemies was Francis van Aerssens,
for a number of years ambassador of the States at Paris. Aerssens owed
much to the Advocate, but he attributed his removal from his post at
the French court to the decision of Oldenbarneveldt to replace him by
his son-in-law, Van der Myle. He never forgave his recall, and alike by
subtle insinuation and unscrupulous accusation, strove to blacken the
character and reputation of his former benefactor.

By a curious fatality it was the outbreak of fierce sectarian strife and
dissension between the extreme and the moderate Calvinists which was
eventually to change the latent hostility of Maurice to Oldenbarneveldt
into open antagonism. Neither of the two men had strong religious
convictions, but circumstances brought it about that they were to range
themselves irrevocably on opposite sides in a quarrel between
fanatical theologians on the subject of predestination and grace.

From early times Calvinism in the northern Netherlands had been divided
into two schools. The strict Calvinists or "Reformed," known by their
opponents as "Precisians," and the liberal Calvinists, "the
Evangelicals," otherwise "the Libertines." To this Libertine party
belonged William the Silent, Oldenbarneveldt and the majority of the
burgher-regents of Holland. These men regarded the religious question
from the statesman's point of view. Having risen in rebellion against
the tyranny of the Spanish Inquisition, they were anxious to preserve
their countrymen (only a minority of whom were Protestants) from being
placed under the heel of a religious intolerance as narrow and bigoted
as that from which they had escaped. The "Reformed" congregations on the
other hand, led by the preachers, were anxious to summon a National
Synod for the purpose of creating a State Church to whose tenets,
rigidly defined by the Heidelberg catechism and the Netherland
confession, all would be required to conform on pain of being deprived
of their rights as citizens. The Libertines were opposed to such a
scheme, as an interference with the rights of each province to regulate
its own religious affairs, and as an attempt to assert the supremacy of
Church over State.

The struggle between the two parties, which had continued intermittently
for a number of years, suddenly became acute through the appointment by
Maurice of Jacob Harmensz, better known as Arminius, to the Chair of
Theology at Leyden, vacated by the death of Junius in 1602. The leader
of the strict Calvinist school, the learned Franciscus Gomarus, had at
the time of the appointment of Arminius already been a professor at
Leyden for eight years. Each teacher gathered round him a following of
devoted disciples, and a violent collision was inevitable. Prolonged and
heated controversy on the high doctrines of Predestination and Freewill
led to many appeals being made to the States-General and to the Estates
of Holland to convene a Synod to settle the disputed questions, but
neither of these bodies in the midst of the negotiations for the truce
was willing to complicate matters by taking a step that could not fail
to accentuate existing discords. Six months after the truce was signed
Arminius died. The quarrel, however, was only to grow more embittered.
Johannes Uyttenbogaert took the leadership of the Arminians, and
finally, after consultation with Oldenbarneveldt, he called together a
convention of Arminian preachers and laymen at Gouda (June, 1610). They
drew up for presentation to the Estates a petition, known as the
_Remonstratie,_ consisting of five articles, in which they defined the
points wherein they differed from the orthodox Calvinist doctrines on
the subjects of predestination, election and grace. The Gomarists on
their part drew up a _Contra-Remonstratie_ containing seven articles,
and they declined to submit to any decision on matters of doctrine, save
from a purely Church Synod. These two weighty declarations gained for
the two parties henceforth the names of Remonstrants and
Contra-Remonstrants. For the next three years a fierce controversy raged
in every province, pulpit replying to pulpit, and pamphlet to pamphlet.
The Contra-Remonstrants roundly accused their adversaries of holding
Pelagian and Socinian opinions and of being Papists in disguise. This
last accusation drew to their side the great majority of the Protestant
population, but the Remonstrants had many adherents among the
burgher-regents, and they could count upon a majority in the Estates of
Holland, Utrecht and Overyssel, and they had the powerful support of
Oldenbarneveldt.

The Advocate was no theologian, and on the doctrinal points in dispute
he probably held no very clear views. He inclined, however, to the
Arminians because of their greater tolerance, and above all for their
readiness to acknowledge the authority of the State as supreme, in
religious as well as in civil matters. He was anxious to bring about an
accommodation which should give satisfaction to both parties, but he was
dealing with fanatics, and the fires of religious bigotry when once
kindled are difficult to quench. And now was seen a curious object
lesson in the many-headed character of the government of the United
Netherlands. A majority of the provinces in the States-General favoured
the Contra-Remonstrants. The Estates of Holland, however, under the
influence of Oldenbarneveldt by a small majority refused the
Contra-Remonstrant demand and resolved to take drastic action against
the Gomarists. But a number of the representative towns in Holland, and
among them Amsterdam, declined to enforce the resolution. At Rotterdam,
on the other hand, and in the other town-councils, where the Arminians
had the majority, the Gomarist preachers were expelled from their
pulpits; and the Advocate was determined by coercion, if necessary, to
enforce the authority of the Estates throughout the province. But
coercion without the use of the military force was impossible in face of
the growing uprising of popular passion; and the military forces could
not be employed without the consent of the stadholder. Thus in 1617,
with the question of civil war in Holland trembling in the balance, the
ultimate decision lay with the stadholder; and Maurice after long
hesitation determined to throw the sword of the soldier into the scale
against the influence of the statesman.

Maurice had not as yet openly broken with his father's old friend, whose
immense services to the republic during the greater part of four decades
he fully recognised. As to the questions now in dispute the stadholder
was to an even less degree than the Advocate a zealous theologian. It is
reported that he declared that he did not know whether predestination
was blue or green. His court-chaplain, Uyttenbogaert, was a leading
Arminian; and both his step-mother, Louise (see p. 78), to whose
opinions he attached much weight, and his younger brother, Frederick
Henry, were by inclination "libertines." On the other hand William
Lewis, the Frisian Stadholder, was a zealous Calvinist, and he used all
his influence with his cousin to urge him to make a firm stand against
Oldenbarneveldt, and those who were trying to overthrow the Reformed
faith. Sir Dudley Carleton, the new English ambassador, ranged himself
also as a strong opponent of the Advocate. While Maurice, however, was
hesitating as to the action he should take, Oldenbarneveldt determined
upon a step which amounted to a declaration of war. In December, 1616,
he carried in the Estates of Holland a proposal that they should, in
the exercise of their sovereign rights, enlist a provincial force of
4000 militia (_waardgelders_) in their pay. Thus Holland, though a
strong minority in the Estates was in opposition, declared its intention
of upholding the principle of provincial sovereignty against the
authority of the States-General. The States-General at the instance of
the two stadholders, May, 1617, declared for the summoning of a National
Synod by a vote of four provinces against three. The Estates of Holland,
again with a sharp division of opinion but by a majority, declined to
obey the summons. An impasse was thus reached and Maurice at last openly
declared for the Contra-Remonstrant side.

On July 23 the Prince, accompanied by his suite, ostentatiously attended
divine service at the Cloister Church at the Hague, where the
Contra-Remonstrants had a fortnight before, in face of the prohibition
of the Estates, established themselves. This step was countered by
decisive action on the part of Oldenbarneveldt. A proposal was made in
the Estates of Holland, August 4, known as the "Sharp Resolution"--and
it well merited its name, for it was of the most drastic character. It
was a most unqualified declaration of provincial sovereignty, and yet it
was only passed in the teeth of a strong minority by the exertion of the
Advocate's personal influence. By this resolution Holland declined to
assent to the summoning of any Synod, National or Provincial, and
asserted the supremacy of the Estates in matters of religion. The
municipal authorities were ordered to raise levies of _Waardgelders_ to
keep the peace; and all officials, civil or military, were required to
take an oath of obedience to the Estates on pain of dismissal. A strong
protest was made by the representatives of the dissenting cities headed
by Reinier Pauw, burgomaster of Amsterdam.

On the plea of ill-health Oldenbarneveldt now left the Hague, and took
up his residence at Utrecht. His object was to keep this province firm
in its alliance with Holland. He did not return till November 6, but all
the time he was in active correspondence with his party in Holland, at
whose head were the three pensionaries of Rotterdam, Leyden and
Haarlem--De Groot, Hoogerbeets and De Haan. Under their leadership
levies of _Waardgelders_ were made in a number of towns; but other
towns, including Amsterdam, refused, and the total levy did not amount
to more than 1800 men. Meanwhile the majority of the States-General,
urged on by Maurice and William Lewis, were determined, despite the
resistance of Holland and Utrecht, to carry through the proposal for the
summoning of a National Synod. Overyssel had been overawed and persuaded
to assent, so that there were five votes against two in its favour. All
through the winter the wrangling went on, and estrangement between the
contending parties grew more bitter and acute. A perfect flood of
pamphlets, broadsheets and pasquinades issued from the press; and in
particular the most violent and envenomed attacks were made upon the
character and administration of the Advocate, in which he was accused of
having received bribes both from Spanish and French sources and to have
betrayed the interests of his country. The chief instigator of these
attacks was Oldenbarneveldt's personal enemy, Francis van Aerssens,
whose pen was never idle. The defenders of the Remonstrant cause and
of the principles of provincial sovereignty were not lacking in the
vigour and virulence of their replies; and the Advocate himself felt
that the accusations which were made against him demanded a formal and
serious rejoinder. He accordingly prepared a long and careful defence of
his whole career, in which he proved conclusively that the charges made
against him had no foundation. This _Remonstratie_ he addressed to the
Estates of Holland, and he also sent a copy to the Prince. If this
document did not at the time avail to silence the voices of prejudiced
adversaries whose minds were made up, it has at least had the effect of
convincing posterity that, however unwise may have been the course now
deliberately pursued by the Advocate, he never for the sake of personal
gain betrayed the interests of his country. Had he now seen that the
attempt of a majority in the Estates of Holland to resist the will of
the majority in the States-General could only lead to civil war, and had
he resigned his post, advising the Estates to disband the _Waardgelders_
and yield to superior force, a catastrophe might have been averted.
There is no reason to believe that in such circumstances Maurice would
have countenanced any extreme harshness in dealing with the Advocate.
But Oldenbarneveldt, long accustomed to the exercise of power, was
determined not to yield one jot of the claim of the sovereign province
of Holland to supremacy within its own borders in matters of religion.
The die was cast and the issue had to be decided by force of arms.

On June 28, 1618, a solemn protest was made by the Advocate in the
States-General against the summoning of a National Synod in opposition
to the expressed opinion of the Estates of Holland; and a threat was
made that Holland might withhold her contribution to the general fund.
The majority of the States-General (July 9) declared the raising of
local levies illegal, and (July 23) it was resolved that a commission be
sent to Utrecht with Maurice at its head to demand the disbanding of the
_Waardgelders_ in that town.

The Estates of Holland[5] impelled by Oldenbarneveldt now took a very
strong step, a step which could not be retrieved. They resolved also to
despatch commissioners to Utrecht to urge the town-council to stand
firm. De Groot, Hoogerbeets and two others were nominated, and they at
once set out for Utrecht. Maurice, with the deputation from the
States-General and a large suite, left the Hague only a little later
than De Groot and his companions, and reached Utrecht on the evening of
the 25th. This strange situation lasted for several days, and much
parleying and several angry discussions took place. Matters were further
complicated by the news that the dissentient towns of Holland were also
sending a deputation. This news had a considerable effect upon Colonel
Ogle, the commander of the _Waardgelders_ in Utrecht, and his officers.
They were already wavering; they now saw that resistance to the orders
of the States-General would be useless. The Prince, who had been
collecting a body of troops, now determined on action. His force entered
the city on the evening of the 31st, and on the following morning he
commanded the local levies to lay down their arms. They at once obeyed,
and Maurice took possession of the city. The Holland commissioners and
the members of the town-council fled. Maurice appointed a new
town-council entirely Contra-Remonstrant; and changes were made in both
branches of the Estates, so as to secure a Contra-Remonstrant majority
and with it the vote of the province in the States-General for the
National Synod. Holland now stood alone, and its opposition had to be
dealt with in a fashion even sterner than that of Utrecht.

The Remonstrant cities of Holland were still for resistance, and
attempts were made to influence the stadholder not to resort to extreme
measures. Maurice had, however, made up his mind. On August 18 the
States-General passed a resolution demanding the dismissal of the
_Waardgelders_ in Holland within twenty-four hours. The placard was
published on the 20th and was immediately obeyed. The Estates of
Holland had been summoned to meet on the 21st, and were at once called
upon to deal with the question of the National Synod. A few days later
(August 28) a secret resolution was adopted by the majority in the
States-General, without the knowledge of the Holland deputies, to arrest
Oldenbarneveldt, De Groot, Hoogerbeets and Ledenburg, the secretary of
the Estates of Utrecht, on the ground that their action in the troubles
at Utrecht had been dangerous to the State. On the following day the
Advocate, on his way to attend the meeting of the Estates, was arrested
and placed in confinement. De Groot, Hoogerbeets and Ledenburg met with
similar treatment. After protesting the Estates adjourned on the 30th
until September 12, the deputies alleging that it was necessary to
consult their principals in this emergency, but in reality because the
suddenness of the blow had stricken them with terror. It was a prudent
step, for Maurice was resolved to purge the Estates and the
town-councils of Holland, as he had already purged those of Utrecht.
Attended by a strong body-guard he went from town to town, changing the
magistracies, so as to place everywhere the Contra-Remonstrants in
power. As a consequence of this action the deputies sent by the towns
were likewise changed; and, when the Estates next met, the supporters of
Oldenbarneveldt and his policy had disappeared. A peaceful revolution
had been accomplished. All opposition to the summoning of the Synod was
crushed; and (November 9) the Estates passed a vote of thanks to the
stadholder for "the care and fidelity" with which he had discharged a
difficult and necessary duty.

Meanwhile Oldenbarneveldt and the other prisoners had been confined in
separate rooms in the Binnenhof and were treated with excessive
harshness and severity. They were permitted to have no communication
with the outside world, no books, paper or writing materials; and the
conditions of their imprisonment were such as to be injurious to health.
A commission was appointed by the States-General to examine the accused,
and it began its labours in November. The method of procedure was unjust
and unfair in the extreme, even had it been a case of dealing with vile
criminals. The treatment of Oldenbarneveldt in particular was almost
indecently harsh. The aged statesman had to appear sixty times before
the commission and was examined and cross-examined on every incident of
the forty years of his administration and on every detail of his
private life. He was allowed not only to have no legal adviser, but
also was forbidden access to any books of reference or to any papers or
to make any notes. It was thus hoped that, having to trust entirely to
his memory, the old man might be led into self-contradictions or to
making damaging admissions against himself. De Groot and Hoogerbeets had
to undergo a similar, though less protracted, inquisition. Such was its
effect upon Ledenburg that he committed suicide.

It was not until February 20, 1619, that the States-General appointed an
extraordinary court for the trial of the accused. It consisted of
twenty-four members, of whom twelve were Hollanders.

It is needless to say that such a court had no legal status; and the
fact that nearly all its members were the Advocate's personal or
political enemies is a proof that the proceedings were judicial only in
name. It was appointed not to try, but to condemn the prisoners.
Oldenbarneveldt protested in the strongest terms against the court's
competence. He had been the servant of the Estates of the sovereign
province of Holland, and to them alone was he responsible. He denied to
the States-General any sovereign rights; they were simply an assembly
representing a number of sovereign allies. These were bold statements,
and they were accompanied by an absolute denial of the charges brought
against him. It was quite useless. All the prisoners were condemned,
first De Groot, then Hoogerbeets, then Oldenbarneveldt. The trials were
concluded on May 1, but it was resolved to defer the sentences until
after the close of the National Synod, which had been meeting at
Dordrecht. This took place on May 9.

Meanwhile strong and influential efforts were made for leniency. The
French ambassador, Aubrey du Maurier, during the trial did his utmost to
secure fair treatment for the Advocate; and a special envoy, Châtillon,
was sent from Paris to express the French king's firm belief in the aged
statesman's integrity and patriotism based on an intimate knowledge of
all the diplomatic proceedings during and after the negotiations for the
Truce. But these representations had no effect and were indeed resented.
Equally unfruitful were the efforts made by Louise de Coligny to soften
the severity of her step-son's attitude. Even William Lewis wrote to
Maurice not to proceed too harshly in the matter. All was in vain. The
Prince's heart was steeled. He kept asking whether the Advocate or his
family had sued for pardon. But Oldenbarneveldt was far too proud to
take any step which implied an admission of guilt; and all the members
of his family were as firmly resolved as he was not to supplicate for
grace. Few, however, believed that capital punishment would be carried
out. On Sunday, May 12, however, sentence of death was solemnly
pronounced; and on the following morning the head of the great statesman
and patriot was stricken off on a scaffold erected in the Binnenhof
immediately in front of the windows of Maurice's residence. The
Advocate's last words were a protestation of his absolute innocence of
the charge of being a traitor to his country; and posterity has endorsed
the declaration.

That Oldenbarneveldt had in the last two years of his life acted
indiscreetly and arrogantly there can be no question. His long tenure of
power had made him impatient of contradiction; and, having once
committed himself to a certain course of action, he determined to carry
it through in the teeth of opposition, regardless of consequences and
with a narrow obstinacy of temper that aroused bitter resentment. His
whole correspondence and private papers were however seized and
carefully scrutinised by his personal enemies; and, had they found any
evidence to substantiate the charges brought against him, it would have
been published to the world. It is clear that not a shred of such
evidence was discovered, and that the Advocate was perfectly innocent of
the treasonable conduct for which a packed court condemned him to suffer
death. Such was the reward that Oldenbarneveldt received for life-long
services of priceless value to his country. He more than any other man
was the real founder of the Dutch Republic; and it will remain an
ineffaceable stain on Maurice's memory that he was consenting unto this
cruel and unjust sentence.