summer was marked by a series of successes against the hostile forces
both of the French and the Netherlanders. There was no decisive
encounter, but the Spanish forces foiled the efforts of their
adversaries to effect an invasion or capture any towns.

The Cardinal Archduke Albert arrived at Brussels to replace Fuentes in
January, 1596. Albert was the favourite nephew of King Philip, and had
been brought up at Madrid. Although an ecclesiastic, he proved himself
to be a statesman and soldier of more than ordinary capacity. It was
intended that he should, as soon as the Pope's consent could be
obtained, divest himself of his orders and marry his cousin the Infanta
Isabel. The bankrupt condition of Spain prevented Philip from furnishing
the archduke with adequate financial help on entering upon his
governorship, but Albert was provided with some money, and he found in
the Netherlands the well-disciplined and war-tried force of which
Fuentes had made such good use in the previous campaign. He was anxious
to emulate that general's success, and as the veteran leaders, Mondragon
and Verdugo, had both died, he gave the command to the Seigneur de
Rosne, a French refugee. This man was a commander of skill and
enterprise, and special circumstances enabled him by two brilliant
offensive strokes to capture first Calais and afterwards Hulst. Hulst
was only taken after a severe struggle, in which De Rosne himself
fell.

The special circumstances which favoured these operations were brought
about by the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between France, England
and the States. This treaty was the result of prolonged negotiations; it
was of short duration and its conditions were far from favourable to the
United Provinces, but it was of great importance from the fact that for
the first time the new-fledged republic was recognised by the
neighbouring sovereigns of France and England as an independent state
and was admitted into alliance on terms of equality. It was, however,
only with difficulty and through the insistence of Henry IV that
Elizabeth was induced to acknowledge the independent status of the rebel
provinces. In return the republic was required to keep up a force of
8000 men for service in the Netherlands, and to despatch 4000 men to act
with the French army in northern France--this auxiliary force to include
the five English regiments in the States' service. Thus Maurice was
deprived of a considerable part of his army and obliged to act on the
defensive. Elizabeth also insisted upon the carrying out of Leicester's
placard forbidding trade with the enemy. This clause of the treaty was
very unpalatable to Amsterdam and the Hollanders generally, and only a
sullen acquiescence was given to it. From the first it was
systematically evaded. The English government on their part undertook to
support the French king with a force equal in strength to that furnished
by the Provinces, _i.e._ 4000 men, but at the same time a secret treaty
was drawn up by which Henry agreed to a reduction of the English troops
by one-half. This piece of underhand work was in due time discovered by
the States, who saw that their allies were not to be trusted and that
they must be on the watch lest their interests should be sacrificed to
the selfish policy of France. The issue showed that Henry IV was in fact
ready to make terms with Spain, as soon as it was to his advantage to do
so. Meanwhile in 1597 the French king, by advancing in force into
Picardy, drew upon this frontier the chief attention of the Spaniards;
and Maurice seized the opportunity that was offered to him to conduct an
offensive campaign with signal success.

He began the year brilliantly by surprising in January, while still in
its winter quarters, a Spanish force of 4500 near Turnhout. More than
half the force was destroyed. On the side of the Netherlands eight men
only fell. With the spring began a series of sieges; and, one after the
other, Rheinberg, Meurs, Groenloo, Breedevoort, Enschede, Ootmarsum,
Oldenzaal and Lingen were captured. Gelderland, Overyssel and Drente
were entirely freed from the presence of the enemy. With the opening of
1598 Henry IV and Philip II entered upon negotiations for a peace. The
French king felt the necessity of a respite from war in order to
reorganise the resources of his country, exhausted by a long continuance
of civil strife; and Philip was ill and already feeling his end
approaching. The States strove hard to prevent what they regarded as
desertion, and two embassies were despatched to France and to England to
urge the maintenance of the alliance. Oldenbarneveldt himself headed the
French mission, but he failed to turn Henry from his purpose. A treaty
of peace between France and Spain was signed at Vervins, May 2, 1598.
Oldenbarneveldt went from Paris to England and was more successful.
Elizabeth bargained however for the repayment of her loan by annual
installments, and for armed assistance both by land and sea should an
attack be made by the Spaniards on England. The queen, however, made two
concessions. Henceforth only one English representative was to have a
seat in the Council of State; and all the English troops in the
Netherlands, including the garrisons of the cautionary towns, were to
take an oath of allegiance to the States.

This year saw the accomplishment of a project on which the Spanish king
had for some time set his heart--the marriage of the Cardinal Archduke
Albert to his cousin the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia, and the erection
of the Netherlands into an independent sovereignty under their joint
rule. Philip hoped in this way to provide suitably for a well-beloved
daughter and at the same time, by the grant of apparent independence to
the Netherland provinces, to secure their allegiance to the new
sovereigns. The use of the word "apparent" is justified, for provision
was made in the deed of cession that the Netherlands should revert to
the Spanish crown in case the union should prove childless; and there
was a secret agreement that the chief fortresses should still be
garrisoned by Spanish troops and that the archdukes, as they were
officially styled, should recognise the suzerainty of the King of Spain.
Philip did not actually live to carry his plan into execution. His
death took place on September 13, 1598. But all the necessary
arrangements for the marriage and the transfer of sovereignty had
already been made. Albert, having first divested himself of his
ecclesiastical dignities, was married by proxy to Isabel at Ferrara in
November. It was not until the end of the following year that the new
rulers made their _joyeuse entrée_ into Brussels, but their marriage
marks the beginning of a fresh stage in the history of the Netherlands.
Albert and Isabel were wise and capable, and they succeeded in gaining
the affection and willing allegiance of the southern provinces. The
States-General of the revolted provinces of the north had, however,
already enjoyed for some years a real independence won by suffering and
struggle and they showed no disposition to meet the overtures of the
archdukes. They were resolved to have no further connection with Spain
or with Spanish rulers, and from this time forward the cleavage in
character, sentiment, and above all in religion, between north and south
was to become, as time went on, more and more accentuated. The Dutch
republic and the Spanish Netherlands were henceforth destined to pursue
their separate course along widely divergent paths.

The ten years which had elapsed between the departure of Leicester and
the advent of Albert and Isabel had witnessed a truly marvellous
transformation in the condition of the rebel provinces, and especially
of Holland and Zeeland. Gradually they had been freed from the presence
of the Spaniard, while at the same time the Spanish yoke had been firmly
riveted upon Flanders and Brabant. These provinces were now devastated
and ruined. The quays of Antwerp were deserted, the industries of Ghent
and Bruges destroyed. The most enterprising and skilful of their
merchants and artisans had fled over the frontier into Holland or across
the sea into England. Holland and Zeeland were thronged with refugees,
Flemings and Brabanters, French Huguenots and numerous Spanish and
Portuguese Jews, driven out by the pitiless persecution of Philip II.
The Hollanders and Zeelanders had long been a seafaring people, who had
derived the chief part of their wealth from their fisheries and their
carrying trade; and this influx of new and vigorous blood, merchants,
traders, and textile workers, bringing with them their knowledge, skill
and energy, aroused such a phenomenal outburst of maritime and
commercial activity and adventure as the world had never seen before.
The fleets of the Hollanders and Zeelanders had during the whole of the
war of independence been the main defence of those provinces against
Spanish invasion; but, great as had been the services they had
rendered, it was the carrying-trade which had furnished the rebel states
with the sinews of war, and of this a large part had been derived from
that very trading with the enemy which Leicester had striven in vain to
prevent. The Spaniards and Portuguese were dependent upon the Dutch
traders for the supply of many necessaries of life; and thus Spanish
gold was made to pay for the support of the war which was waged against
the Spanish king. The dues in connection with this trade, known as
licences and convoys, alone furnished large sums to replenish the
war-chest; and it is said that from 25,000 to 30,000 seamen found
employment by it.

Amsterdam during this decade had been rapidly growing in importance and
it was soon to be the first seaport in the world. It had become the
_emporium_ of the Baltic trade. In 1601 it is stated that between 800
and 900 ships left its quays in three days, carrying commodities to the
Baltic ports. They came back laden with corn and other "east-sea" goods,
which they then distributed in French, Portuguese and Spanish havens,
and even as far as Italy and the Levant. Ship-building went on apace at
Enkhuizen, Hoorn and other towns on the Zuyder Zee; and Zaandam was soon
to become a centre of the timber trade. In Zeeland, Middelburg, through
the enterprise of an Antwerp refugee of French extraction, by name
Balthazar de Moucheron, was second only to Amsterdam as a sea-port,
while Dordrecht and Rotterdam were also busy with shipping.

The energies of the Dutch at this springtide of their national life were
far from being confined to European, waters. Dutch sailors already knew
the way to the East-Indies round the Cape of Good Hope through
employment on Portuguese vessels; and the trade-routes by which the
Spaniards brought the treasures of the New World across the Atlantic
were likewise familiar to them and for a similar reason. The East-Indies
had for the merchants of Holland and Zeeland, ever keenly on the
look-out for fresh markets, a peculiar attraction. At first the Cape
route was thought to be too dangerous, and several attempts were made to
discover a north-west passage along the coast of Siberia. Balthazar de
Moucheron was the pioneer in these northern latitudes. He established a
regular traffic with the Russians by way of the White Sea, and had a
factory (built in 1584) at Archangel. Through his instances, aided by
those of the famous geographer Petrus Plancius (likewise a refugee from
Antwerp), an expedition was fitted out and despatched in 1594 to try
to sail round northern Asia, but it was driven back after passing
through the Waigat by ice and storms. A like fate befell a second
expedition in the following year. Discouraged, but still not despairing,
a third fleet set out in 1596 under the command of Jacob van Heemskerk
with William Barendtsz as pilot. Forced to winter in Spitsbergen, after
terrible sufferings, Heemskerk returned home in the autumn of 1597 with
the remnant of his crews. Barendtsz was one of those who perished. This
was the last effort in this direction, for already a body of Amsterdam
merchants had formed a company for trafficking to India by the Cape; and
four ships had sailed, April 2, 1596, under the command of Cornelis
Houtman, a native of Gouda. A certain Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, who
had been in the Portuguese service, had published in 1595 a book
containing a description from personal knowledge of the route to the
East and the character of the Portuguese commerce. It was the
information contained in this work that led the Amsterdam merchants to
venture their money upon Houtman's expedition, which Linschoten himself
accompanied as guide. They reached Madagascar, Java and the Moluccas,
and, after much suffering and many losses by sickness, what was left of
the little fleet reached home in July, 1597. The rich cargo they brought
back, though not enough to defray expenses, proved an incentive to
further efforts. Three companies were formed at Amsterdam, two at
Rotterdam, one at Delft and two in Zeeland, for trading in the
East-Indies, all vying with one another in their eagerness to make large
profits from these regions of fabled wealth, hitherto monopolised by the
Portuguese. One expedition sent out by two Amsterdam companies under the
command of Jacob van Neck and Wybrand van Waerwyck was very successful
and came back in fifteen months richly laden with East-Indian products.
The year 1598 was one of great commercial activity. Two-and-twenty large
vessels voyaged to the East-Indies; others made their way to the coasts
of Guinea, Guiana and Brazil; and one daring captain, Olivier van Noort,
sailing through the Straits of Magellan, crossed the Pacific. It was in
this year that Philip II prohibited by decree all trading in Spain with
the Dutch, and all the Dutch ships in the harbours of the Peninsula were
confiscated. But the Spanish trade was no longer of consequence to the
Hollanders and Zeelanders. They had sought and found compensation
elsewhere.

The small companies formed to carry out these ventures in the
far-Eastern seas continued to grow in number, and by the very keenness
of their competition threatened each other's enterprises with ruin. In
these circumstances the States-General and the Estates of Holland
determined, under the leadership of Oldenbarneveldt, to take a step
which was to be fraught with very important consequences. The rival
companies were urged to form themselves into a single corporation to
which exclusive rights would be given for trading in the East-Indies.
Such a proposal was in direct contradiction to that principle of free
trade which had hitherto been dear to the Netherlanders, and there was
much opposition, and many obstacles had to be overcome owing to the
jealousies of the various provinces, towns and bodies of merchants who
were interested. But at length the patience and statesmanship of
Oldenbarneveldt overcame all difficulties, and on March 20,1601, a
charter was issued creating the United East-India Company and giving it
a monopoly of the East-India trade (for 21 years) with all lands east of
the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Straits of Magellan. The executive
control was vested in a College known as the Seventeen. Extensive
sovereign privileges were conferred upon the company and exercised by
the Seventeen in the name of the States-General. They might make
treaties with native rulers and potentates, erect forts for the
protection of their factories, appoint governors and officials with
administrative and judicial functions, and enlist troops, but these
officials and troops were required to take an oath of allegiance to the
States-General. The States-General themselves became "participants" by
investing the 25,000 pounds, which the company had paid them for the
grant of the charter. The capital speedily reached the amount of six and
a half million guilders.

The warlike operations of the year 1599 were uneventful and in the main
defensive, except on the eastern frontier where the Spanish forces under
the command of the Admiral of Aragon, Mendoza, captured Wesel and
Rheinberg. The new rulers of the Netherlands, Albert and Isabel, did
not make their entry into Brussels until the end of 1599; and almost
before they had had time to organise the new government and gain firm
possession of the reins of power in the Belgic provinces, they found
themselves confronted with a serious danger. The seaport of Dunkirk had
for many years been a nest of pirates, who preyed upon Dutch commerce
in the narrow seas. The States-General, urged on by Oldenbarneveldt,
resolved in the spring of 1606 to despatch an expedition to besiege and
capture Dunkirk. Both Maurice and William Lewis were opposed to the
project, which they regarded as rash and risky. The States-General,
however, hearing reports of the archduke's soldiery being mutinous for
lack of pay, persisted in their purpose, and Maurice, against his better
judgment, acquiesced. A body of picked troops, 12,000 foot and 3000
horse, was assembled on the island of Walcheren. A succession of
contrary winds delaying the sailing of the force, it was determined to
march straight through West Flanders to Nieuport and then along the
shore to Dunkirk. A deputation of the States-General, of which
Oldenbarneveldt was the leading member, went to Ostend to supervise,
much to Maurice's annoyance, the military operations. The stadholder,
however, reached Nieuport without serious opposition and proceeded to
invest it. Meanwhile the Archduke Albert had been acting with great
energy. By persuasive words and large promises he succeeded in winning
back the mutineers, and at the head of a veteran force of 10,000
infantry and 1500 cavalry he followed Maurice and, advancing along the
dunes, came on July 1 upon a body of 2000 men under the command of
Ernest Casimir of Nassau, sent by the stadholder to defend the bridge of
Leffingen. At the sight of the redoubtable Spanish infantry a panic
seized these troops and they were routed with heavy loss. The fight,
however, gave Maurice time to unite his forces and draw them up in
battle order in front of Nieuport. Battle was joined the following
afternoon, and slowly, foot by foot, after a desperate conflict the
archduke's Spanish and Italian veterans drove back along the dunes the
troops of the States. Every hillock and sandy hollow was fiercely
contested, the brunt of the conflict falling on the English and Frisians
under the command of Sir Francis Vere. Vere himself was severely
wounded, and the battle appeared to be lost. At this critical moment the
Spaniards began to show signs of exhaustion through their tremendous
exertions in two successive fights under a hot sun in the yielding
sand-hills; and the prince, at the critical moment, throwing himself
into the midst of his retreating troops, succeeded in rallying them. At
the same time he ordered some squadrons of cavalry which he had kept in
reserve to charge on the flank of the advancing foe. The effect was
instantaneous. The Spaniards were thrown into confusion, broke and
fled. The victory was complete. The archduke only just escaped capture,
and of his army 5000 perished and a large number were taken prisoners,
among these the Admiral of Aragon. Almost by a miracle was the States'
army thus rescued from a desperate position. Maurice's hard-won triumph
greatly enhanced his fame, for the battle of Nieuport destroyed the
legend of the invincibility of the Spanish infantry in the open field.
The victorious general, however, was not disposed to run any further
risks. He accordingly retreated to Ostend and there embarked his troops
for the ports from which they had started. The expedition had been very
costly and had been practically fruitless. Oldenbarneveldt and those who
had acted with him were deeply disappointed at the failure of their
plans for the capture of Dunkirk and were far from satisfied with
Maurice's obstinate refusal to carry out any further offensive
operations. From this time there arose a feeling of soreness between the
advocate and the stadholder, which further differences of opinion were
to accentuate in the coming years.

The vigour and powers of leadership displayed by their new sovereigns in
meeting the invasion of Flanders by the States' army, though a defeat in
the field had been suffered at Nieuport, had inspired their subjects in
the southern Netherlands with confidence and loyalty. Albert had proved
himself a brave commander, and his efforts had at least been successful
in compelling the enemy to withdraw within his own borders.

Ostend had long been a thorn in the side of the government at Brussels
and energetic steps were soon taken to besiege it. But the possession of
Ostend was important also to Elizabeth, and she promised active
assistance. The larger part of the garrison was, indeed, formed of
English troops, and Sir Francis Vere was governor of the town. The siege
which ensued was one of the memorable sieges of history, it lasted for
more than three years (July 15,1601, to September 20,1604) and was
productive of great feats of valour, skill and endurance on the part
alike of besiegers and besieged. The States' army under Maurice, though
it did not march to the relief of Ostend, endeavoured to divert the
attention of Albert from his objective by attacks directed elsewhere. In
1601 the fortresses of Rheinberg and Meurs on the Rhine were captured,
and an attack made upon Hertogenbosch. In 1602 the important town of
Grave on the Meuse was taken and a raid made into Brabant and
Luxemburg.

Meanwhile the defenders of Ostend had been making a desperate
resistance, and little progress was made by the besiegers, with the
result that a great drain was made upon the finances of the archdukes
and there were threatenings of mutiny among the troops. But the
situation was saved by the intervention of a wealthy Genoese banker,
Ambrosio de Spinola, who offered his services and his money to the
archdukes and promised that if he, though inexperienced in warfare, were
given the command, he would take Ostend. He fulfilled his promise.
Without regard to loss of life he pressed on the siege, and though as
fast as one line of defences was taken another arose behind it to bar
his progress, little by little he advanced and bit by bit the area held
by the garrison grew less. At last in the spring of 1604, under the
pressure of the States-General, Maurice led an army of 11,000 men into
Flanders in April, 1604, and laid siege to Sluis on May 19. Both Maurice
and William Lewis were still unwilling to run the risk of an attack on
Spinola's army in its lines, and so the two sieges went on side by side,
as it were independently. Sluis fell at the end of August, and Ostend
was then at its last gasp. Urged now by the deputies of the States to
make a direct effort to relieve the heroic garrison, Maurice and his
cousin, after wasting some precious time in protesting against the step,
began to march southward. It was too late. What was left of Ostend
surrendered on September 20, and Spinola became the master of a heap of
ruins. It is said that this three years' siege cost the Spaniards 80,000
lives, to say nothing of the outlay of vast expenditure. Whether Maurice
and William Lewis were right or wrong in their reluctance to assail
Spinola's entrenched camp, it is certain that they were better judges of
the military situation than the civilian deputies of the States. In any
case the capture of Sluis was an offset to the loss of Ostend; and its
importance was marked by the appointment of Frederick Henry, the young
brother of the stadholder, as governor of the seaport and the
surrounding district, which received the name of States-Flanders. The
tremendous exertions put forward for the defence of Ostend had been a
very serious drain upon the resources of the United Provinces,
especially upon those of Holland. Taxation was already So high that
Oldenbarneveldt and many other leading members of the States-General and
Provincial Estates began to feel despondent and to doubt whether it were
possible to continue the war. No longer could the States rely upon the
assistance of England. James I had concluded peace with Spain; and,
though he made professions of friendship and goodwill to the Dutch, wary
statesmen, like the Advocate, did not trust him, and were afraid lest he
should be tempted to deliver up the cautionary towns into the hands of
the enemy. Reverting to the policy of William the Silent,
Oldenbarneveldt even went so far as to make tentative approaches to
Henry IV of France touching the conditions on which he would accept the
sovereignty of the Provinces. Indeed it is said that such was the
despair felt by this great statesman, who knew better than any man the
economic difficulties of the situation, that he even contemplated the
possibility of submission to the archdukes. Had he suggested submission,
there would have been no question, however, that he could not have
retained office, for Maurice, William Lewis and the military leaders on
the one hand, and on the other the merchants and the adventurous seamen,
whom they employed in the profitable Indian traffic, would not have
listened for a moment to any thought of giving up a struggle which had
been so resolutely and successfully maintained for so many years. For
financially the archdukes were in even worse plight than the
Netherlanders, even though for a short time, with the help of Spinola,
appearances seemed to favour the Belgic attacks on the Dutch frontier
districts. In 1605 the Genoese general, at the head of a mixed but
well-disciplined force in his own pay, made a rapid advance towards
Friesland, and, after capturing Oldenzaal and Lingen and ravaging the
eastern provinces, concluded the campaign with a brilliant success
against a body of the States cavalry commanded by Frederick Henry, who
nearly lost his life. Maurice with inferior forces kept strictly on the
defensive, skilfully covering the heart of the land from attack, but
steadily refusing a pitched battle. In the following year Spinola with
two armies attempted to force the lines of the Waal and the Yssel, but,
though thwarted in this aim by the wariness of the stadholder and by a
very wet season, he succeeded in taking the important fortresses of
Groll and Rheinberg. Maurice made no serious effort to relieve them, and
his inactivity caused much discontent and adverse comment. His military
reputation suffered, while that of his opponent was enhanced. But
subsequent events showed that Maurice, though perhaps erring on the side
of caution, had acted rightly. The armies which had threatened the
safety of the Provinces had been raised at the charges of a private
individual, but the financial resources, even of a Spinola, were not
capable of a prolonged effort; there was no money in the State treasury;
and the soldiery, as soon as their pay was in arrears, began once more
to be mutinous. The bolt had been shot without effect, and the year 1607
found both sides, through sheer lack of funds, unable to enter upon a
fresh campaign on land with any hope of definite success. But though the
military campaigns had been so inconclusive, it had been far different
with the fortunes of maritime warfare in these opening years of the
seventeenth century. The sea-power of the Dutch republic was already a
formidable factor which had to be reckoned with and which was destined
to be decisive.

The East-India Company was no sooner founded than active steps were
taken to make full use of the privileges granted by the Charter. A fleet
of 17 vessels was despatched in 1602 under Wybrand van Waerwyck.
Waerwyck visited Ceylon and most of the islands of the Malay
Archipelago, established a factory at Bantam with a staff of officials
for developing trade relations with the natives, and even made his way
to Siam and China. He sent back from time to time some of his vessels
richly laden, and finally returned himself with the residue of his fleet
after an absence of five years in June, 1607. Another expedition of
thirteen ships sailed in 1604 under Steven van der Hagen, whose
operations were as widespread and as successful as those of Waerwyck.
Van der Hagen took possession of Molucca and built factories at Amboina,
Tidor and other places in the spice-bearing islands. On his way back in
1606 with his cargo of cloves, spices and other products of the far
Orient, he encountered at Mauritius another westward-bound fleet of
eleven ships under Cornelis Matelief. Matelief's first objective was the
town of Malacca, held by the Portuguese and commanding the straits to
which it gave its name. Alphonso de Castro, the Viceroy of India,
hastened however with a naval force far more powerful than the Dutch
squadron to the relief of this important fortress; and after a
hardly-fought but indecisive action Matelief raised the siege on August
17. Returning, however, about a month later, the Dutch admiral found
that De Castro had sailed away, leaving only a detachment of ten vessels
before Malacca. Matelief at once attacked this force, whose strength was
about equal to his own, and with such success that he sank or burnt
every single ship of the enemy with scarcely any loss, September 21,
1606.

These successful incursions into a region that the Spaniards and
Portuguese had jealously regarded as peculiarly their own aroused both
anger and alarm. All available forces in the East (the Portuguese from
the Mozambique and Goa, the Spaniards from the Philippines) were
equipped and sent to sea with the object of expelling the hated and
despised Netherlanders from East-Indian waters. Paulus van Caerden,
Matelief's successor in command, was defeated and himself taken
prisoner. Nor were the Spaniards content with attacking the Dutch fleets
in the far East. As the weather-worn and heavily-laden Company's vessels
returned along the west coast of Africa, they had to pass within
striking distance of the Spanish and Portuguese harbours and were in
constant danger of being suddenly assailed by a superior force and
captured. In 1607 rumours reached Holland of the gathering of a large
Spanish fleet at Gibraltar, whose destination was the East-Indies. The
directors of the Company were much alarmed, an alarm which was shared by
the States-General, many of whose deputies were cargo-shareholders.
Accordingly, in April, 1607, a fleet of twenty-six vessels set sail for
the purpose of seeking out and attacking the Spaniards whether in
harbour or on the open sea. The command was given to one of the most
daring and experienced of Dutch seamen, Jacob van Heemskerk. He found
twenty-one ships still at anchor in Gibraltar Bay, ten of them large
galleons, far superior in size and armament to his own largest vessels.
Heemskerk at once cleared for action. Both Heemskerk and the Spanish
commander, d'Avila, were killed early in the fight, the result of which
however was not long doubtful. The Spanish fleet was practically
destroyed. On the Dutch side no vessel was lost and the casualties were
small. Such a disaster was most humiliating to Castilian pride, and its
effect in hastening forward the peace negotiations, which were already
in progress, was considerable.

The initial steps had been taken by the archdukes. Through the secret
agency of Albert's Franciscan Confessor, Father John Neyen, both
Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice were approached in May, 1606, but without
any result. Early in 1607 however the efforts were renewed, and
negotiations were actively set on foot for the purpose of concluding a
peace or a truce for a term of twelve, fifteen or twenty years. There
were, however, almost insuperable difficulties in the way. In the first
place the stadholders, the military and naval leaders, the Calvinist
clergy, and the great majority of the traders honestly believed that a
peace would be detrimental to all the best interests of the States, and
were thoroughly distrustful of the motives which had prompted the
archdukes and the Spanish government to make these advances.
Oldenbarneveldt on the other hand thought that peace was necessary for
the land to recuperate after the exhausting struggle, which had already
lasted for forty years; and he found strong support among the
burgher-regents and that large part of the people who were over-burdened
and impoverished by the weight of taxation, and sick and weary of
perpetual warfare. There were, however, certain preliminary conditions,
which all were agreed must be assented to, and without which it would be
useless to continue the negotiations. The independence of the United
Provinces must be recognised, freedom of trade in the Indies conceded,
and the public exercise of Catholic worship prohibited. After some
parleying the archdukes agreed to treat with the United Provinces "in
the quality and as considering them free provinces and states," and an
armistice was concluded in April, 1607, for eight months, in order that
the matters in dispute might be referred to the King of Spain and his
views upon them ascertained. Not till October did the king's reply
arrive at Brussels. He consented to negotiate with the States "as free
and independent" parties, but he required that liberty of Catholic
worship should be permitted during the truce, and no mention was made of
the Indian trade. This was by no means satisfactory; nevertheless the
influence of Oldenbarneveldt prevailed and the negotiations were not
broken off. On February 1, 1608, the archdukes' envoys, the two leading
members being Ambrosio de Spinola and the president of the Privy
Council, Ricardot, arrived in Holland. They were met at Ryswyck by
Maurice and William Lewis in person, and with much ceremony and
splendour a solemn entry was made into the Hague, the procession with
the brilliant retinues forming a memorable spectacle, as it made its way
through the crowds which lined the roads. The negotiations were
conducted in the Binnenhof. The Special Commissioners to represent the
States-General were William Lewis of Nassau, Walraven, lord of
Brederode, and a deputy from each of the provinces under the leadership
of Oldenbarneveldt. Envoys from France, England, Denmark, the
Palatinate and Brandenburg were present, took part in the discussions,
and acted as friendly mediators.

The question of treating the United Provinces "as free States" was soon
settled. The archdukes, who were aiming at the conclusion of a truce in
which to recuperate and not of a definitive peace, showed an unexpected
complaisance in granting a concession which they regarded as only
temporary. Then came the really serious questions as to freedom of trade
in the Indies and the liberty of Catholic worship. Of these the first
was of most immediate interest, and showed irreconcilable differences
between the two parties. The Spaniards would never consent to any
trespassing in the closed area, which they regarded as their own
peculiar preserve. The Dutch traders and sailors were fired with the
spirit of adventure and of profit, and their successful expeditions had
aroused an enthusiasm for further effort in the distant seas, which had
hardened into a fixed resolve not to agree to any peace or truce
shutting them out from the Indian trade. For months the subject was
discussed and re-discussed without result. Some of the foreign delegates
left. The armistice was prolonged, in order that Father Neyen might go
to Madrid for further instructions. It was found, however, that the King
of Spain would yield nothing. The negotiations came to a standstill, and
both sides began to make preparations for a renewal of the war.
President Jeannin on behalf of the French king, by his skilful
mediation, in which he was supported by his English colleague, saved the
situation. He proposed as a compromise a twelve years' truce, pointing
out that whatever terms were arranged would only be binding for that
short period. He managed to bring about a personal interview between
Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice, who had respectively headed the peace and
war parties in the provinces; and henceforth both consented to work
together for this proposal of a limited truce, during which the trade to
the Indies should be open and the religious question be untouched. The
assent of the States-General and of the several Provincial Estates was
obtained. The two most interested, Holland and Zeeland, were won over,
Holland by the arguments and persuasions of the Advocate, Zeeland, which
was the last to agree, by the influence of Maurice. Jeannin was aware
that the finances of Spain were at their last gasp, and that both the
archdukes and Philip III were most anxious for a respite from the
ever-consuming expense of the war. At last the long and wearisome
negotiations came to an end, and the treaty concluding a truce for
twelve years was signed at the Hague on April 9,1609. The territorial
_status quo_ was recognised. The United Provinces were treated "as free
States over which the archdukes made no pretensions." Nothing was said
about the religious difficulty nor about trade in the Indies, but in a
secret treaty the King of Spain undertook not to interfere with Dutch
trade, wherever carried on. Thus access to the Indies was conceded,
though to save appearances the word was not mentioned. This result was
due solely to the diplomatic tact and resource of Jeannin, who was able
to announce to Henry IV that he had accomplished his task "to the
satisfaction of everyone, and even of Prince Maurice."

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER VII

THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT


One of the reasons which influenced the archdukes and the King of Spain
to make large concessions in order to secure the assent of the
States-General to the conclusion of a twelve years' truce was their firm
belief that the unstable political condition of the United Provinces
must lead to civil discord, as soon as the relaxing of the pressure of
war loosened the bonds which had, since Leicester's departure, held
together a number of separate authorities and discordant interests. They
were right in their supposition. In order, therefore, to understand the
course of events in the republic, which had been correctly recognised by
the treaty not as a single state, but as a group of "free and
independent States," it is necessary to give a brief account of one of
the most strangely complicated systems of government that the world has
ever seen--especially strange because no one could ever say positively
where or with whom the sovereignty really resided.

Let us take into separate consideration the powers and functions of (1)
the Council of State, (2) the States-General, (3) the Provincial
Estates, (4) the Stadholders, (5) the Advocate (later the
_Raad-Pensionarius_ or Council-Pensionary) of Holland, (6) the Admiralty
Colleges.

The Council of State was not a legislative, but an executive, body. In
the time of Leicester the Council was the executive arm of the
governor-general and had large powers. After his departure the presence
of the English ambassador, who by treaty had a seat in the Council,
caused the States-General gradually to absorb its powers, and to make
its functions subordinate to their own, until at last its authority was
confined to the administration of the affairs of war and of finance. The
right of the English representative to sit in the Council and take an
active part in its deliberations continued till 1626. The Stadholders
were also _ex officio_ members. The Provinces, since 1588, were
represented by twelve councillors. Holland had three; Gelderland,
Zeeland and Friesland two each; Utrecht, Overyssel and Groningen
(_Stad en Landeri_) one each. The treasurer-general and the clerk
(_Griffier_) of the States-General took part in the deliberations and
had great influence. The chief duty of the Council, during the period
with which we are dealing, was the raising of the "quotas" from the
various provinces for the military defence of the State. The General
Petition or War Budget was prepared by the Council and presented to the
States-General at the end of each year, providing for the military
expenses in the following twelve months. The "quotas" due towards these
expenses from the several provinces were set forth in smaller petitions
sent to the Provincial Estates, whose consent was necessary. The
so-called _repartitie_ fixing the amount of these quotas was likewise
drawn up by the Council of State, and was the subject at times of
considerable haggling and discontent. In 1612 it was settled that the
proportions to be borne by the provinces should be Holland 57.1 per
cent.; Friesland 11.4; Zeeland 11 (afterwards reduced to 9); Utrecht and
Groningen 5.5; Overyssel 3.5. It will thus be seen that the quota of
Holland was considerably more than half of the whole; and, as the naval
expenditure was to an even larger extent borne by Holland, the
preponderating influence of this province in the Union can be easily
understood. The forces of the republic that were distributed in the
several provinces received their pay from the provinces, but those
maintained by the Council, as troops of the State, were paid by monies
received from the Generality lands, _i.e._ lands such as the conquered
portions of Brabant and Flanders, governed by the States-General, but
without representation in that body. The Council of State, though its
political powers were curtailed and absorbed by the States-General,
continued to exercise, as a court of justice, appellate jurisdiction in
military and financial questions.

The States-General consisted of representatives of the Estates of the
seven sovereign provinces of Gelderland, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht,
Friesland, Overyssel, and Groningen (_Stad en Landeri_) in the order of
precedence given above. Gelderland, having been a duchy, ranked before
those that had formerly been counties or lordships. The provinces sent
deputations varying in number; Holland and Gelderland generally six, the
others less. Each province had but a single vote. The president changed
week by week, being chosen in turn from each province according to their
order of precedence. Holland had nominally no more weight than the
others; its practical influence, however, was great in proportion to the
burden of taxation that it bore and was increased by the fact that the
sessions, which after 1593 were permanent, were held at the Hague in the
same building with the Estates of Holland, and that the
Council-Pensionary of Holland was the spokesman of the province in the
States-General. The States-General had control of the foreign affairs of
the Union. To them belonged the supreme control of military and naval
matters. The Captain-General and Admiral-General of the Union were
appointed by them; and a deputation of the States-General accompanied
the army into the field and the commanders were bound to consult it.
They exercised a strong supervision of finance, and sovereign authority
over the entire administration of the "Generality" lands. Ambassadors
were appointed by them, also the Treasurer-General of the Union, and
numerous other important officials. Yet with all these attributes and
powers the States-General possessed only a derived, not an inherent,
authority. To foreigners the sovereignty of the republic of the United
Netherlands appeared to be vested in their "High-Mightinesses." In
reality the States-General was, as already stated, a gathering of
deputations from the seven sovereign provinces. Each deputation voted as
a unit; and in all important affairs of peace and war, treaties and
finance, there must be no dissentient. A single province, however small,
could, by obstinate opposition, block the way to the acceptance of any
given proposal. Moreover the members, despite their lofty designation as
High-Mightinesses, did not vote according to their convictions or
persuasions, but according to the charge they had received from their
principals. The deputation of a province had no right to sanction any
disputable measure or proposal without referring it back to the Estates
of that province for approval or disapproval. Hence arose endless
opportunities and occasions for friction and dissension and manifold
delays in the transaction of the business of the republic, oftentimes
in a manner inimical to its vital interests.

The Provincial Estates in their turn were by no means homogeneous or
truly representative bodies. In Holland the nobles had one vote; and
eighteen towns, Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft, Leyden, Amsterdam, Gouda,
Rotterdam, Gorkum, Schiedam, Schoonhoven, Brill, Alkmaar, Hoorn,
Enkhuizen, Edam, Monnikendam, Medemblik and Purmerend, had one each.
The nobles, though they had only one vote, were influential, as they
represented the rural districts and the small towns which had no
franchise, and they voted first. Here again, as in the States-General,
though each of the privileged towns counted equal in the voting, as a
matter of fact their weight and influence was very different. The
opposition of wealthy and populous Amsterdam was again and again
sufficient to override the decision of the majority, for there was no
power to enforce its submission, except the employment of armed force.
For at this point it may be as well to explain that each one of these
municipalities (_vroedschappen_) claimed to be a sovereign entity, and
yet, far from being bodies representing the citizens as a whole, they
were close corporations of the narrowest description. The ordinary
inhabitants of these towns had no voice whatever in the management of
their own affairs. The governing body or _vroedschap_ consisted of a
limited number of persons, sometimes not more than forty, belonging to
certain families, which filled up vacancies by co-option and chose the
burgomasters and sheriffs (_schepenen_). Thus it will be seen that
popular representation had no place in Holland. The regent-burghers were
a small patrician oligarchy, in whose hands the entire government and
administration of the towns rested, and from their number were chosen
the deputies, who represented the eighteen privileged cities in the
Provincial Estates.

The other provinces do not need such detailed notice. In Zeeland the
Estates consisted of seven members, the "first noble" (who presided) and
six towns. There was but one noble, the Marquis of Flushing and Veere.
William the Silent in 1581 obtained this marquisate by purchase; and his
heirs, through its possession, continued to exercise great influence in
the Provincial Estates. As Philip William, Prince of Orange, was in
Madrid, Maurice sat in the assembly as "first noble" in his place. In
Utrecht the three Estates were represented, _i.e._ the nobles, the towns
(four in number) and the clergy. The representatives of the clergy
were, however, chosen no longer from the Chapter but from the possessors
of what had been Church lands and property. They were elected by the
knights and the small towns out of a list drawn up by the corporation of
Utrecht. They necessarily belonged to the Reformed (Calvinist) faith.
Gelderland was divided into three (so-called) quarters, Nijmwegen,
Zutphen and Arnhem. Each of these quarters had its separate assembly;
and there was also a general diet. The nobles, who were numerous and had
large estates, were here very influential. Friesland was divided into
four quarters, three of which (Oostergoo, Westergoo and Zevenwolden)
were country districts, the fourth a gathering of the deputies of eleven
towns. The Diet of Friesland was not formed of Estates, the nobles and
the town representatives sitting together in the same assembly, which was
elected by a popular vote, all who had a small property-qualification
possessing the franchise, Roman Catholics excepted. The system of
administration and divided authority was in Friesland a very
complicated one, inherited from mediaeval times, but here again the
nobles, being large land-owners, had much influence. The stadholder
presided at the diet and had a casting vote. The Estates of Groningen
were divided into two parts--town and districts--each with one vote. The
districts were those of Hunsingoo, Fivelingoo and the West-Quarter. Here
also the stadholder had a casting vote. In Overyssel the Estates, like
those of Groningen, consisted of two members, the nobles from the
three quarters, Sallant, Twente and Vollenhove, and the deputies of
the three towns, Deventer, Kampen and Zwolle.

The ordinary executive and administrative work of Provincial
government was carried out in Holland by a body known as the
Commissioned-Councillors--_Gecommitteerde-Raden;_ in the other provinces
by Deputed-Estates--_Gedeputeerde-Staten._ The Commissioned-Councillors
were to the Estates of Holland what the Council of State was to the
States-General. They enjoyed considerable independence, for they were
not appointed by the Estates but directly by the nobles and cities
according to a fixed system of rotation, and they sat continuously,
whereas the Estates only met for short sessions. Their duty was to see
that all provincial edicts and ordinances decreed by the Estates were
published and enforced, to control the finances and to undertake the
provision and oversight of all military requirements; and to them it
belonged to summon the meetings of the Estates. The Deputed-Estates in
the other provinces had similar but generally less extensive and
authoritative functions.

Such a medley of diverse and often conflicting authorities within a
state of so small an area has no counterpart in history. It seemed
impossible that government could be carried on, or that there could be
any concerted action or national policy in a republic which was rather a
many-headed confederation than a federal state. That the United
Netherlands, in spite of all these disadvantages, rapidly rose in the
17th century to be a maritime and commercial power of the first rank was
largely due to the fact that the foreign policy of the republic and the
general control of its administration was directed by a succession of
very able men, the stadholders of the house of Orange-Nassau and the
council-pensionaries of Holland. For a right understanding of the period
of Dutch history with which we are about to deal, it is necessary to
define clearly what was the position of the stadholder and of the
council-pensionary in this cumbrous and creaking machinery of government