Other measures of the government aroused Catholic hostility. In this
year, 1819, a decree forbade the holding of more than two religious
processions in a year. In such a country as Belgium this restriction was
strongly resented. But the establishment in 1825 by the king of a
_Collegium Philosophicum_ at Louvain, at which all candidates for the
priesthood were by royal decree required (after 1826) to have a
two-years' course before proceeding to an episcopal seminary, met with
strenuous resistance. The instruction was in ancient languages, history,
ethics and canon-law; and the teachers were nominated by the king. The
first effect of this decree was that young men began to seek education
in foreign seminaries. Another royal decree at once forbade this, and
all youths were ordered to proceed either to the _Collegium_ or to one
of the High Schools of the land; unless they did so, access to the
priesthood or to any public office was barred to them. This was perhaps
the most serious of all the king's mistakes. He miscalculated both the
strength and the sincerity of the opposition he thus deliberately
courted. His decrees were doomed to failure. The bishops on their part
refused to admit to their seminaries or to ordination anyone who
attended the _Collegium Philosophicum_. The king, in the face of the
irrevocable decision of the Belgian hierarchy, found himself in an
untenable position. He could not compel the bishops to ordain candidates
for Holy Orders, and his decrees were therefore a dead letter; nor on
the other hand could he trample upon the convictions of the vast
majority of his Belgian subjects by making admission to the priesthood
impossible. He had to give way and to send a special envoy--De
Celles--to the Pope in 1827 to endeavour to negotiate a Concordat. It
was accomplished. By Article III of the Concordat, there were to be
eight bishops in the Netherlands instead of five. They were to be chosen
by the Pope, but the king was to have the right of objection, and they
were required to take the oath of allegiance. The course at the
_Collegium Philosophicum_ was made optional. William thus yielded on
practically all the points at issue, but prided himself on having
obtained the right of rejecting a papal nominee. The Pope, however, in
an allocution made no mention of this right, and declared that the
decree about the _Collegium_ was annulled, and that in matters of
education the bishops would act in accordance with instructions from
Rome. The government immediately issued a confidential notice to the
governors of provinces, that the carrying-out of the Concordat was
indefinitely postponed. Thus the effort at conciliation ended in the
humiliation of the king, and the triumph of the astute diplomacy of the
Vatican.

The financial situation, as we have seen, was from the outset full of
difficulty. The king was personally parsimonious, but his many projects
for the general welfare of the land involved large outlay, and the
consequence was an annual average deficit of seven million florins. At
first the revenue was raised by the increase of customs and excise,
including colonial imports. This caused much dissatisfaction in Holland,
especially when duties were placed on coffee and sugar. The complaint
was that thus an undue share of taxation fell on the maritime north. In
order to lighten these duties on colonial wares, other taxes had to be
imposed. In 1821 accordingly it was proposed to meet the deficit by two
most unwise and obnoxious taxes, known as _mouture_ and _abbatage_. The
first was on ground corn, the second on the carcases of beasts, exacted
at the mill or the slaughter-house--in other words on bread and on
butcher's meat. Both were intensely unpopular, and the _mouture_ in
particular fell with especial severity on the Belgian working classes
and peasantry, who consumed much more bread per head than the Dutch.
Nevertheless by ministerial pressure the bill was passed (July 21, 1821)
by a narrow majority of four--55 to 51. All the minority were Belgians,
only two Belgians voted with the majority. It is inconceivable how the
government could have been so impolitic as to impose these taxes in face
of such a display of national animosity. The _mouture_ only produced a
revenue of 5,500,000 fl.; the _abbatage_ 2,500,000 fl.

This amount, though its exaction pressed heavily on the very poor,
afforded little relief; and to meet recurring deficits the only resource
was borrowing. To extricate the national finances from ever-increasing
difficulties the _Amortisatie-Syndikaat_ was created in December, 1822.
Considerable sources of income from various public domains and from
tolls passed into the hands of the seven members of the Syndicate, all
of whom were bound to secrecy, both as to its public and private
transactions. Its effect was to diminish still further the control of
the Representative Chamber over the national finances. The Syndicate
did indeed assist the State, for between 1823 and 1829 it advanced no
less than 58,885,443 fl. to meet the deficits in the budget, but the
means by which it achieved this result were not revealed.

Yet another device to help the government in its undertakings was the
_million de l'industrie_, which was voted every year, as an
extraordinary charge, but of which no account was ever given. That this
sum was beneficially used for the assistance of manufacturing and
industrial enterprise, as at Seraing and elsewhere, and that it
contributed to the growing prosperity of the southern provinces, is
certain. But the needless mystery which surrounded its expenditure led
to the suspicion that it was used as a fund for secret service and
political jobbery.

The autocratic temper of the king showed itself not merely in keeping
the control of finance largely in his own hands, but also in carrying
out a series of measures arousing popular discontent by simple _arretes_
or decrees of the Council of State without consultation with the
representative Chamber. Such were the decree of November 6,1814,
abolishing trial by jury and making certain other changes in judicial
proceedings; that of April 15, 1815, imposing great restrictions on the
liberty of the press; that of September 15, 1819, making Dutch the
official language of the country; that of June 25,1825, establishing the
_Collegium Philosophicum_; and finally that of June 21, 1830, making the
Hague the seat of the supreme court of justice. All these produced
profound discontent and had a cumulative effect.

The language decree of 1819 was tentative, declaring a knowledge of
Dutch obligatory for admission to all public offices, but it was
followed by a much more stringent decree in 1822 by which, in the two
Flanders, South Brabant and Limburg, Dutch was to be used in the
law-courts and in all public acts and notices. Although the operation of
this decree was confined to the Flemish-speaking districts, it must be
remembered that, from the time of the Burgundian dukes right through the
Spanish and Austrian periods, French had always been the official
language of the country, the upper classes only spoke French, and with
few exceptions the advocates could only plead in that language. This was
a great hardship upon the Belgian bar, which would have been greatly
increased had the royal decree (June 21,1830), placing the court of
appeal for the whole kingdom at the Hague, been carried into effect.

More serious in its results was the infringement of Art. CCXXVII of the
Fundamental Law guaranteeing liberty of the press. The return of
Napoleon from Elba, and the imminent danger to which the, as yet,
unorganised kingdom of the Netherlands was exposed, led to the issue of
an _arrete_ of the severest character. By it all persons publishing news
of any kind, or giving information injurious to the State, or writing or
distributing political pamphlets, were to be brought before a special
tribunal of nine judges holding office at the king's pleasure; and, if
condemned, were liable to be sentenced to exposure in the pillory,
deprivation of civic rights, branding, imprisonment, and fines varying
from 100 to 10,000 francs. This harsh measure was possibly justifiable
in an extreme emergency upon the plea that it was necessary for the
safety of the State. When the danger was over, and the Fundamental Law
was passed, there was no excuse for its further maintenance on the
Statute-book. Yet before this court Abbe de Foere was summoned for
having defended in the _Spectateur Beige_ the _jugement doctrinal_ of
Bishop de Broglie, and he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. In
the following year, 1818, the government obtained the approval of the
States-General (with slight modification) for the continuance of this
war-time censorship of the press. The penalties remained, but the court
consisted of a judge and four assessors, all government nominees. Under
this law a Brussels advocate, Van der Straeten, was fined 3000 fl. for a
brochure attacking the ministers; and several other advocates were
disbarred for protesting that this sentence was in conflict with the
Fundamental Law. Prosecutions henceforth followed prosecutions, and the
press was gagged.

As a result of these press persecutions, the two Belgian political
parties, the clericals and the liberals, poles apart as they were in
their principles, drew closer together. All differences of religious and
political creed were fused in a common sense of national grievances
under what was regarded as a foreign tyranny. This brought about in 1828
the formation of the _Union_, an association for the co-operation of
Belgians of all parties in defence of liberty of worship, liberty of
instruction and liberty of the press. The ultra-clericals, who looked to
the Vatican for their guidance, and the advanced liberals who professed
the principles of the French Revolution were thus by the force of
events led on step by step to convert an informal into a formal
alliance. The Abbe de Foere in the _Spectateur_ and MM. D'Ellougue and
Donker in the _Observateur_ had been for some years advocating united
action; and it was their success in winning over to their side the
support and powerful pen of Louis de Potter, a young advocate and
journalist of Franco-radical sympathies, that the _Union_, as a party,
was actually effected. From this time the onslaughts in the press became
more and more violent and embittered, and stirred up a spirit of unrest
throughout the country. Petitions began to pour in against the _mouture_
and _abbatage_ taxes and other unpopular measures, especially from the
Walloon provinces. These were followed by a National Petition, signed by
representatives of every class of the community asking for redress of
grievances, but it met with no response from the unyielding king. He had
in the early summer of this year, 1828, made a tour in Belgium and had
in several towns, especially in Antwerp and Ghent, met with a warm
reception, which led him to underestimate the extent and seriousness of
the existing discontent. At Liege, a centre of Walloon liberalism, he
was annoyed by a number of petitions being presented to him; and, in a
moment of irritation, he described the conduct of those who there
protested against "pretended grievances" as infamous, "une conduite
in-fame." The words gave deep offence; and the incident called forth a
parody of the League of the Beggars in 1566, an Order of Infamy being
started with a medal bearing the motto _fideles jusqu' a l'infamie._ The
movement spread rapidly, but it remains a curious fact that the
animosity of the Belgians, as yet, was directed against the Dutch
ministers (especially Van Maanen the Minister of Justice) and the Dutch
people, whose overbearing attitude was bitterly resented, rather than
against the king or the House of Orange. William's good deeds for the
benefit of the country were appreciated; his arbitrary measures in
contravention to the Fundamental Law were attributed chiefly to his bad
advisers.

The month of December, 1829, was however to bring the king and his
Belgian subjects into violent collision. A motion was brought forward in
the Second Chamber (December 8) by M. Charles de Broukere, an eminent
Belgian liberal supported by the Catholics under the leadership of M. de
Gerlache, for the abolition of the hated Press Law of 1815. The motion
was defeated by the solid Dutch vote, supplemented by the support of
seven Belgians. The decennial budget was due, and opposition to it was
threatened unless grievances were remedied--the cry was "point de
redressements de griefs, point d'argent." On December 11 came a royal
message to the States-General which, while promising certain concessions
regarding the taxes, the _Collegium Philosophicum_ and the language
decree, stated in unequivocal terms the principle of royal absolutism.
To quote the words of a competent observer of these events:

The message declared in substance that the constitution was an act of
condescension on the part of the throne; that the king had restrained
rather than carried to excess the rights of his house; that the press
had been guilty of sowing discord and confusion throughout the State;
and that the opposition was but the fanatic working of a few misguided
men, who, forgetting the benefits they enjoyed, had risen up in an
alarming and scandalous manner against a paternal government[10].

The Minister of Justice, Van Maanen, on the next day issued a circular
calling upon all civil officials to signify their adherence to the
principles of the message within 24 hours. Several functionaries, who
had taken part in the petition-agitation, were summarily dismissed; and
prosecutions against the press were instituted with renewed energy. From
this time Van Maanen became the special object of Belgian hatred.

The threat of the Belgian deputies to oppose the decennial budget was
now carried out. At the end of December the ministerial proposals were
brought before the States-General. The expenditure was sanctioned, the
ways and means to meet it were rejected by 55 votes to 52. The Finance
Minister in this emergency was obliged to introduce fresh estimates for
one year only, from which the _mouture_ and _abbatage_ taxes were
omitted. This was passed without opposition, but in his vexation at this
rebuff the king acted unworthily of his position by issuing an _arrete_
(January 8, 1830) depriving six deputies, who had voted in the majority,
of their official posts. Meanwhile the virulence of the attacks in the
press against the king and his ministers from the pens of a number of
able and unscrupulous journalists were too daring and offensive to be
overlooked by any government. Foremost in the bitterness of his
onslaught was Louis de Potter, whose _Lettre de Demophile au Roi_ was
throughout a direct challenge to the autocratic claims advanced by the
royal message. Nor was De Potter content only with words. An appeal
dated December 11, of which he and his friend Tielemans were
originators, appeared (January 31,1830) in seventeen news-papers, for
raising a national subscription to indemnify the deputies who had been
ejected from their posts and salaries for voting against the budget.
Proceedings were taken against De Potter and Tielemans, and also against
Barthels, editor of the _Catholique_, and the printer, De Neve, and all
were sentenced by the court to banishment--De Potter for eight years,
Tielemans and Barthels for seven years, DeNeve for five years. These men
had all committed offences which the government were fully justified in
punishing, for their language had passed the limits not only of good
order but of decency, and was subversive of all authority. Nevertheless
they were regarded by their Belgian compatriots as political martyrs
suffering for the cause of their country's liberties. Their condemnation
was attributed to Van Maanen, already the object of general detestation.

The ministry had meanwhile taken the wise step of starting an organ, the
_National_, at Brussels to take their part in the field of controversy.
But in the circumstances it was an act of almost inconceivable folly to
select as the editor a certain Libri-Bagnano, a man of Italian
extraction, who, as it was soon discovered by his opponents, had twice
suffered heavy sentences in France as a forger. He was a brilliant and
caustic writer, well able to carry the polemical war into his
adversaries' camp. But his antecedents were against him, and he aroused
a hatred second only to the aversion felt for Van Maanen.

We have now arrived at the eve of the Belgian Revolt, which had its
actual origin in a riot. But the riot was not the cause of the revolt;
it was but the spark which brought about an explosion, the materials for
which had been for years preparing. The French secret agent, Julian,
reports a conversation which took place between the king and Count
Bylandt on July 20,1823[11]. The following extract proves that, so early
as this date, William had begun to perceive the impossibility of the
situation:

I say it and I repeat it often to Clancarty (the British Minister)
that I should love much better to have my Holland quite alone. I
should be then a hundred times happier.... When I am exerting
myself to make a whole of this country, a party, which in
collusion with the foreigner never ceases to gain ground, is
working to disunite it. Besides the allies have not given me this
kingdom to submit it to every kind of influence. This situation
cannot last.

Another extract from a despatch of the French Minister at the Hague,
Lamoussaye, dated December 26, 1828, depicts a state of things in the
relations between the two peoples, tending sooner or later to make a
political separation of some kind inevitable:

The Belgian hates the Hollander and he (the Hollander) despises
the Belgian, besides which he assumes an infinite _hauteur_, both
from his national character, by the creations of his industry and
by the memories of his history. Disdained by their neighbour of
the North, governed by a prince whose confidence they do not
possess, hindered in the exercise of their worship, and, as they
say, in the enjoyment of their liberties, overburdened with taxes,
having but a share in the National Representation disproportionate
to the population of the South, the Belgians ask themselves
whether they have a country, and are restless in a painful
situation, the outcome of which they seek vainly to discover[12].

From an intercepted letter from Louvain, dated July 30, 1829:

What does one see? Hesitation uncertainty, embarrassment and fear
in the march of the government; organisation, re-organisation and
finally disorganisation of all and every administration. Again a
rude shock and the machine crumbles.

A true forecast of coming events.

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXXI

THE BELGIAN REVOLUTION, 1830-1842


During the last days of July, 1830, came the revolution at Paris that
overthrew Charles X and placed the Duke of Orleans at the head of a
constitutional monarchy with the title of Louis Philippe, King of the
French. The Belgian liberals had always felt drawn towards France rather
than Holland, and several of the more influential among them were in
Paris during the days of July. Through their close intercourse with
their friends in Brussels the news of all that had occurred spread
rapidly, and was eagerly discussed. Probably at this time few
contemplated the complete separation of Belgium from Holland, but rather
looked to the northern and southern provinces becoming administratively
autonomous under the same crown. This indeed appeared to be the only
practical solution of the _impasse_ which had been reached. Even had the
king met the complaints of the Belgians by large concessions, had he
dismissed Van Maanen, removed Libri-Bagnano from the editorship of the
_National_, and created a responsible ministry--which he had no
intention of doing--he could not have granted the demand for a
representation of the south in the Second Chamber proportionate to the
population. For this would have meant that the position of Holland would
have henceforth been subordinate to that of Belgium; and to this the
Dutch, proud of their history and achievements, would never have
submitted. It had been proved that amalgamation was impossible, but the
king personally was popular with those large sections of the Belgian
mercantile and industrial population whose prosperity was so largely due
to the royal care and paternal interest; and, had he consented to the
setting-up of a separate administration at Brussels, he might by a
conciliatory attitude have retained the loyalty of his Belgian subjects.

He did none of these things; but, when in August, he and his two sons
paid a visit to Brussels at a time when the town was celebrating with
festivities the holding of an exhibition of national industry, he was
well received and was probably quite unaware of the imminence of the
storm that was brewing. It had been intended to close the exhibition by
a grand display of fireworks on the evening of August 23, and to have a
general illumination on the king's birthday (August 24). But the king
had hurried back to the Hague to keep his birthday, and during the
preceding days there were abundant signs of a spirit of revolutionary
ferment. Inscriptions were found on blank walls--_Down with Van Maanen;
Death to the Dutch; Down with Libri-Bagnano and the National_; and, more
ominous still, leaflets were distributed containing the words _le 23
Aout, feu d'artifice; le 24 Aout, anniversaire du Roi; le 25 Aout,
revolution._

In consequence of these indications of subterranean unrest, which were
well known to Baron van der Fosse, the civil governor of Brabant, and to
M. Kuyff, the head of the city police, the municipal authorities weakly
decided on the ground of unfavourable weather to postpone the fireworks
and the illumination. The evening of the 23rd, as it turned out, was
exceedingly fine. At the same time the authorities permitted, on the
evening of the 25th, the first performance of an opera by Scribe and
Auber, entitled _La Muette de Portici_, which had been previously
proscribed. The hero, Masaniello, headed a revolt at Naples in 1648
against foreign (Spanish) rule. The piece was full of patriotic,
revolutionary songs likely to arouse popular passion.

The evening of the performance arrived, and the theatre was crowded. The
excitement of the audience grew as the play proceeded; and the thunders
of applause were taken up by the throng which had gathered outside.
Finally the spectators rushed out with loud cries of vengeance against
Libri-Bagnano and Van Maanen, in which the mob eagerly joined. Brussels
was at that time a chosen shelter of political refugees, ready for any
excesses; and a terrible riot ensued. The house of Van Maanen and the
offices of the _National_ were attacked, pillaged and burnt. The city
was given over to wild confusion and anarchy; and many of the mob
secured arms by the plunder of the gun-smiths' shops. Meanwhile the
military authorities delayed action. Several small patrols were
surrounded and compelled to surrender, while the main body of troops,
instead of attacking and dispersing the rioters, was withdrawn and
stationed in front of the royal palace. Thus by the extraordinary
passiveness of Lieut.-General Bylandt, the military governor of the
province, and of Major-General Wauthier, commandant of the city, who
must have been acting under secret orders, the wild outbreak of the
night began, as the next day progressed and the troops were still
inactive, to assume more of the character of a revolution.

This was checked by the action of the municipal authorities and certain
of the principal inhabitants, who called together the civic-guard to
protect any further tumultuary attacks by marauders and ne'er-do-wells
on private property. The guard were joined by numbers of volunteers of
the better classes and, under the command of Baron D'Hoogvoort, were
distributed in different quarters of the town, and restored order. The
French flags, which at first were in evidence, were replaced at the Town
Hall by the Brabant tricolor--red, yellow and black. The royal insignia
had in many places been torn down, and the Orange cockades had
disappeared; nevertheless there was at this time no symptom of an
uprising to overthrow the dynasty, only a national demand for redress of
grievances. Meanwhile news arrived that reinforcements from Ghent were
marching upon the city. The notables however informed General Bylandt
that no troops would be allowed to enter the city without resistance;
and he agreed to stop the advance and to keep his own troops in their
encampment until he received further orders from the Hague. For this
abandonment of any attempt to re-assert the royal authority he has been
generally blamed.

There is no lack of evidence to show that the riot of August 25 and its
consequences were not the work of the popular leaders. The
correspondence of Gendebien with De Potter at this time, and the tone of
the Belgian press before and after the outbreak, are proofs of this. The
_Catholique_ of Ghent (the former organ of Barthels) for instance
declared:

There is no salvation for the throne, but in an ample concession
of our rights. The essential points to be accorded are royal
inviolability and ministerial responsibility; the dismissal of Van
Maanen; liberty of education and the press; a diminution of
taxation ... in short, justice and liberty in all and for all, in
strict conformity with the fundamental law.

The _Coursier des Pays Bos_ (the former organ of De Potter), after
demanding the dismissal of Van Maanen as the absolute condition of
pacification, adds:

We repeat that we are neither in a state of insurrection nor
revolution; all we want is a mitigation of the grievances we have
so long endured, and some guarantees for a better future.

In accordance with such sentiments an infuencial meeting on the on
the 28th at the townhall appointed a deputation of five, headed by
Alexandre de Gendebien and Felix, count de Merode, to bear to the
king a loyal address setting forth the just grievances which had led
to the Brussels disturbances, and asking respectfully for their removal.

The news of the uprising reached the king on the 27th, and he was much
affected. At a Council held at the Hague the Prince of Orange earnestly
besought his father to accept the proffered resignation of Van Maanen,
and to consider in a conciliatory spirit the grievances of the Belgians.
But William refused flatly to dismiss the minister or to treat with
rebels. He gave the prince, however, permission to visit Brussels, not
armed with powers to act, but merely with a mission of enquiry. He also
consented to receive the deputation from Brussels, and summoned an
extraordinary meeting of the States-General at the Hague for September
13. Troops were at once ordered to move south and to join the camp at
Vilvoorde, where the regiments sent to reinforce the Brussels garrison
had been halted. The Prince of Orange and his brother Frederick
meanwhile had left the Hague and reached Vilvoorde on August 31. Here
Frederick assumed command of the troops; and Orange sent his
_aide-de-camp_ to Baron D'Hoogvoort to invite him to a conference at
headquarters. The news of the gathering troops had aroused immense
excitement in the capital; and it was resolved that Hoogvoort, at the
head of a representative deputation, should go to Vilvoorde to urge the
prince to stop any advance of the troops on Brussels, as their entrance
into the town would be resisted, unless the citizens were assured that
Van Maanen was dismissed, and that the other grievances were removed.
They invited Orange to come to Brussels attended only by his personal
suite, and offered to be sureties for his safety.

The prince made his entry on September 1, the streets being lined with
the civic guard. He was personally popular, but, possessing no powers,
he could effect nothing. After three days of parleying he returned to
the camp, and his mission was a failure. On the same day when Orange
entered Brussels the deputation of five was received by King William at
the Hague. His reply to their representations was that by the
Fundamental Law he had the right to choose his ministers, that the
principle of ministerial responsibility was contrary to the
Constitution, and that he would not dismiss Van Maanen or deal with any
alleged grievances with a pistol at his head.

William, however, despite his uncompromising words, did actually accept
the resignation of Van Maanen (September 3); but when the Prince of
Orange, returning from his experiences at Brussels, urged the necessity
of an administrative separation of north and south, and offered to
return to the Belgian capital if armed with full authority to carry it
out, his offer was declined. The king would only consent to bring the
matter to the consideration of the States-General, which was to meet on
the 13th. Instead of taking any immediate action he issued a
proclamation, which in no way faced the exigencies of the situation, and
was no sooner posted on the walls at Brussels than it was torn down and
trampled underfoot. It is only just to say that the king had behind him
the unanimous support of the Dutch people, especially the commercial
classes. To them separation was far preferable to admitting the Belgians
to that predominant share of the representation which they claimed on
the ground of their larger population.

Meanwhile at Brussels, owing to the inaction of the government, matters
were moving fast. The spirit of revolt had spread to other towns,
principally in the Walloon provinces. Liege and Louvain were the first
to move. Charles Rogier, an advocate by profession and a Frenchman by
birth, was the leader of the revolt at Liege; and such was his fiery
ardour that at the head of some 400 men, whom he had supplied with arms
from the armourer's warehouses, he marched to Brussels, and arrived in
that disturbed city without encountering any Dutch force. The example of
Liege was followed by Jemappes, Wavre, and by the miners of the
Borinage; and Brussels was filled with a growing crowd of men filled
with a revolutionary spirit. Their aim was to proclaim the independence
of Belgium, and set up a provisional government.

For such a step even pronounced liberals like Gendebien, Van de Weyer
and Rouppe, the veteran burgomaster of the city, were not yet prepared;
and they combined with the moderates, Count Felix de Merode and
Ferdinand Meeus, to form a Committee of Public Safety. They were aided,
in the maintenance of order, by the two Barons D'Hoogvoort (Emmanuel and
Joseph), the first the commander of the civic guard, and both popular
and influential, and by the municipality. While these were still
struggling to maintain their authority, the States-General had met at
the Hague on September 13. It was opened by a speech from the king which
announced his firm determination to maintain law and order in the face
of revolutionary violence. He had submitted two questions to the
consideration of the States-General: (1) whether experience had shown
the necessity for a modification of the Fundamental Law; (2) whether any
change should be made in the relations between the two parts of the
kingdom. Both questions were, after long debate (September 29) answered
in the affirmative; but, before this took place, events at Brussels had
already rendered deliberations at the Hague futile and useless.

The contents of the king's speech were no sooner known in Brussels than
they were used by the revolutionary leaders to stir up the passions of
the mob by inflammatory harangues. Rogier and Ducpetiaux, at the head of
the Liegeois and the contingents from the other Walloon towns, with the
support of the lowest elements of the Brussels population, demanded the
dissolution of the Committee of Public Safety and the establishment of a
Provisional Government. The members of the Committee and of the
Municipality, sitting in permanence at the Hotel de Ville, did their
utmost to maintain order with the strong support of Baron D'Hoogvoort
and the Civic Guard. But it was in vain. On the evening of September 20
an immense mob rushed the Hotel de Ville, after disarming the Civic
Guard; and Rogier and Ducpetiaux were henceforth masters of the city.
The Committee of Public Safety disappeared and is heard of no more.
Hoogvoort resigned his command. On receipt of this news Prince Frederick
at Vilvoorde was ordered to advance upon the city and compel submission.
But the passions of the crowd had been aroused, and the mere rumour that
the Dutch troops were moving caused the most vigorous steps to be taken
to resist _a outrance_ their penetrating into the town.

The royal forces, on the morning of September 23, entered the city at
three gates and advanced as far as the Park. But beyond that point they
were unable to proceed, so desperate was the resistance, and such the
hail of bullets that met them from barricades and from the windows and
roofs of the houses. For three days almost without cessation the fierce
contest went on, the troops losing ground rather than gaining it. On
the evening of the 26th the prince gave orders to retreat, his troops
having suffered severely.

The effect of this withdrawal was to convert a street insurrection into
a national revolt. The moderates now united with the liberals, and a
Provisional Government was formed, having amongst its members Rogier,
Van de Weyer, Gendebien, Emmanuel D'Hoogvoort, Felix de Merode and
Louis de Potter, who a few days later returned triumphantly from
banishment. The Provisional Government issued a series of decrees
declaring Belgium independent, releasing the Belgian soldiers from their
allegiance, and calling upon them to abandon the Dutch standard. They
were obeyed. The revolt, which had been confined mainly to the Walloon
districts, now spread rapidly over Flanders. Garrison after garrison
surrendered; and the remnants of the disorganised Dutch forces retired
upon Antwerp (October 2). Two days later the Provisional Government
summoned a National Congress to be elected by all Belgian citizens of 25
years of age. The news of these events caused great perturbation at the
Hague. The Prince of Orange, who had throughout advocated conciliation,
was now permitted by his father to go to Antwerp (October 4) and
endeavour to place himself at the head of the Belgian movement on the
basis of a grant of administrative separation, but without severance of
the dynastic bond with Holland.

King William meanwhile had already (October 2) appealed to the Great
Powers, signatories of the Articles of London in 1814, to intervene and
to restore order in the Belgic provinces. The difficulties of the prince
at Antwerp were very great, for he was hampered throughout by his
father's unwillingness to grant him full liberty of action. He issued a
proclamation, but it was coldly received; and his attempts to negotiate
with the Provisional Government at Brussels met with no success. Things
had now gone too far, and any proposal to make Belgium connected with
Holland by any ties, dynastic or otherwise, was unacceptable. The
well-meaning prince returned disappointed to the Hague on October 24. A
most unfortunate occurrence now took place. As General Chasse, the Dutch
commander at Antwerp, was withdrawing his troops from the town to the
citadel, attacks were made upon them by the mob, and some lives were
lost. Chasse in reprisal (October 27) ordered the town to be bombarded
from the citadel and the gunboats upon the river. This impolitic act
increased throughout Belgium the feeling of hatred against the Dutch,
and made the demand for absolute independence deeper and stronger.

The appeal of William to the signatory Powers had immediate effect; and
representatives of Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain, to whom a
representative of France was now added, met at London on November 4.
This course of action was far from what the king expected or wished.
Their first step was to impose an armistice; their next to make it clear
that their intervention would be confined to negotiating a settlement on
the basis of separation. A Whig ministry in England had (November 16)
taken the place of that of Wellington; and Lord Palmerston, the new
Foreign Secretary, was well-disposed to Belgium and found himself able
to work in accord with Talleyrand, the French plenipotentiary. Austria
and Russia were too much occupied with their own internal difficulties
to think of supporting the Dutch king by force of arms; and Prussia,
despite the close family connection, did not venture to oppose the
determination of the two western Powers to work for a peaceful
settlement. While they were deliberating, the National Congress had met
at Brussels, and important decisions had been taken. By overwhelming
majorities (November 18) Belgium was declared to be an independent
State; and four days later, after vigorous debates, the Congress (by 174
votes to 13) resolved that the new State should be a constitutional
monarchy and (by 161 votes to 28) that the house of Orange-Nassau be for
ever excluded from the throne. A committee was appointed to draw up a
constitution.

William had appealed to the Powers to maintain the Treaties of Paris and
Vienna and to support him in what he regarded, on the basis of those
treaties, as his undoubted rights; and it was with indignation that he
saw the Conference decline to admit his envoy, Falck, except as a
witness and on precisely the same terms as the representatives of the
Brussels Congress. On December 20 a protocol was issued by the Powers
which defined their attitude. They accepted the principle of separation
and independence, subject to arrangements being made for assuring
European peace. The Conference, however, declared that such arrangements
would not affect the rights of King William and of the German
Confederation in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. This part of the protocol
was as objectionable to the Belgians as the former part was to the
Dutch king. The London Plenipotentiaries had in fact no choice, for they
were bound by the unfortunate clauses of the treaties of 1815, which, to
gratify Prussian ambition for cis-Rhenan territory, converted this
ancient Belgian province into a German state. This ill-advised step was
now to be the chief obstacle to a settlement in 1831. The mere fact that
William had throughout the period of union always treated Luxemburg as
an integral part of the southern portion of his kingdom made its
threatened severance from the Belgic provinces a burning question. For
Luxemburgers had taken a considerable part in the revolt, and Luxemburg
representatives sat in the National Congress. Of these eleven voted for
the perpetual exclusion of the Orange-Nassau dynasty, one only in its
favour. It is not surprising, therefore, that a strong protest was made
against the decision of the London Conference to treat the status of
Luxemburg as outside the subject of their deliberations. The Conference,
however, unmoved by this protest, proceeded in a protocol of January
20,1831, to define the conditions of separation. Holland was to retain
her old boundaries of the year 1790, and Belgium to have the remainder
of the territory assigned to the kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815.
Luxemburg was again excluded. The Five Powers, moreover, declared that
within these limits the new Belgian State was to be perpetually neutral,
its integrity and inviolability being guaranteed by all and each of the
Powers. A second protocol (January 27) fixed the proportion of the
national debt to be borne by Belgium at sixteen parts out of thirty-one.
The sovereign of Belgium was required to give his assent to these
protocols, as a condition to being recognised by the Powers. But the
Congress of Brussels was in no submissive mood. They had already
(January 19) resolved to proceed to the election of a king without
consulting anyone. The territorial boundaries assigned to Belgium met
with almost unanimous reprobation, a claim being made to the
incorporation not merely of Luxemburg, but also of Maestrieht, Limburg
and Dutch Flanders, in the new State. Nor were they more contented with
the proportion of the debt Belgium was asked to bear. On February 1 the
Five Powers had agreed that they would not assent to a member of any of
the reigning dynasties being elected to the throne of Belgium.
Nevertheless (February 3) the Duc de Nemours, son of Louis Philippe, was
elected by 94 votes, as against 67 recorded for the Duke of
Leuchtenberg, son of Eugene Beauharnais. The Conference took immediate
action by refusing to permit either Nemours or Leuchtenberg to accept
the proffered crown.

These acute differences between the Conference and the Belgian Congress
were a cause of much satisfaction to the Dutch king, who was closely
watching the course of events; and he thought it good policy (February
18) to signify his assent to the conditions set forth in the protocols
of January 20 and 27. He had still some hopes of the candidature of the
Prince of Orange (who was in London) being supported by the Powers, but
for this the time was past.

At this juncture the name of Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who had resided in
England since the death of his wife the Princess Charlotte, was put
forward. This candidature was supported by Great Britain; France raised
no objection; and in Belgium it met with official support. Early in
April a deputation of five commissioners was sent to offer the crown
provisionally to the prince, subject to his endeavouring to obtain some
modification of the protocols of January 20 and 27. The Five Powers,
however, in a protocol, dated April 15, announced to the Belgian
Government that the conditions of separation as laid down in the January
protocols were final and irrevocable, and, if not accepted, relations
would be broken off. Leopold was not discouraged, however; and such was
his influence that he did succeed in obtaining from the Conference an
undertaking that they would enter into negotiations with King William in
regard both to the territorial and financial disputes with a view to a
settlement, _moyennant de justes compensations_.

The Saxe-Coburg prince was elected king by the Congress (June 4); and in
redemption of their undertaking the Conference promulgated (June 26) the
preliminary treaty, generally known as the Treaty of the XVIII Articles.
By this treaty the question of Luxemburg was reserved for a separate
negotiation, the _status quo_ being meanwhile maintained. Other boundary
disputes (Maestricht, Limburg and various _enclaves_) were to be
amicably arranged, and the share of Belgium in the public debt was
reduced. Leopold had made his acceptance of the crown depend upon the
assent of the Congress being given to the Treaty. This assent was given,
but in the face of strong opposition (July 9); and the new king made his
public entry into Brussels and took the oath to the Constitution twelve
days later. On the same day (July 21) the Dutch king refused to accept
the XVIII Articles, declaring that he adhered to the protocols of
January 20 and 27, which the plenipotentiaries had themselves declared
(April 15) to be fundamental and irrevocable. Nor did he confine himself
to a refusal. He declared that if any prince should accept the
sovereignty of Belgium or take possession of it without having assented
to the protocols as the basis of separation he could only regard such
prince as his enemy. He followed this up (August 2) by a despatch
addressed to the Foreign Ministers of the Five Powers, announcing his
intention "to throw his army into the balance with a view to obtaining
more equitable terms of separation."

These were no empty words. The facile success of the Belgian revolution
had led to the Dutch army being branded as a set of cowards. The king,
therefore, despite a solemn warning from the Conference, was determined
to show the world that Holland was perfectly able to assert her rights
by armed force if she chose to do so. In this course he had the
whole-hearted support of his people. It was a bold act politically
justified by events. Unexpectedly, on August 2, the Prince of Orange at
the head of an army of 30,000 picked men with 72 guns crossed the
frontier. The Belgians were quite taken by surprise. Their army, though
not perhaps inferior in numbers to the invaders, was badly organised,
and was divided into two parts--the army of the Scheldt and the army of
the Meuse. The prince knew that he must act with promptness and
decision, and he thrust his army by rapid movements between the two
Belgian corps. That of the Meuse fell back in great disorder upon Liege;
that of the Scheldt was also forced to beat a rapid retreat. Leopold,
whose reign was not yet a fortnight old, joined the western corps and
did all that man could do to organise and stiffen resistance. At Louvain
(August 12) he made a last effort to save the capital and repeatedly
exposed his life, but the Belgians were completely routed and Brussels
lay at the victor's mercy. It was a terrible humiliation for the new
Belgian state. But the prince had accomplished his task and did not
advance beyond Louvain. On hearing that a French army, at the invitation
of King Leopold, had entered Belgium with the sanction of the Powers, he
concluded an armistice, by the mediation of the British Minister, Sir
Robert Adair, and undertook to evacuate Belgian territory. His army
recrossed the Dutch frontier (August 20), and the French thereupon
withdrew.

The Ten Days' Campaign had effected its purpose; and, when the
Conference met to consider the new situation, it was felt that the XVIII
Articles must be revised. Belgium, saved only from conquest by French
intervention, had to pay the penalty of defeat. A new treaty in XXIV
Articles was drawn up, and was (October 14) again declared to be final
and irrevocable. By this treaty the northwestern (Walloon) portion of
Luxemburg was assigned to Belgium, but at the cost of ceding to Holland
a considerable piece of Belgian Limburg giving the Dutch the command of
both banks of the river Meuse from Maestricht to the Gelderland
frontier. The proportion of the debt was likewise altered in favour of
Holland. King William was informed that he must obtain the assent of the
Germanic Confederation and of the Nassau agnates to the territorial
adjustments.

These conditions created profound dissatisfaction both in Belgium and
Holland. It was again the unhappy Luxemburg question which caused so
much heart-burning. The Conference however felt itself bound by the
territorial arrangements of the Congress of Vienna; and Palmerston and
Talleyrand, acting in concert throughout, could not on this matter
overrule the opposition of Prussia and Austria supported by Russia. All