The remaining three years of the Brunswick _regime_ were uneventful in
the home country. Differences with the English East India Company
however led to the expulsion of the Dutch from their trading settlements
on the Hooghley and Coromandel; and in Berbice there was a serious
revolt of the negro slaves, which, after hard fighting in the bush, was
put down with much cruelty. The young Prince of Orange on the attainment
of his eighteenth year, March 8,1766, succeeded to his hereditary
rights. His grandmother, Maria Louisa, to whose care he had owed much,
had died on April 9, in the previous year. During the interval the
Princess Caroline had taken her place as regent in Friesland.

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXIV

WILLIAM V. FIRST PERIOD, 1766-1780


Of all the stadholders of his line William V was the least
distinguished. Neither in appearance, character nor manner was he fitted
for the position which he had to fill. He had been most carefully
educated, and was not wanting in ability, but he lacked energy and
thoroughness, and was vacillating and undecided at moments when resolute
action was called for. Like his contemporary Louis XVI, had he been born
in a private station, he would have adorned it, but like that unhappy
monarch he had none of the qualities of a leader of men in critical and
difficult times. It was characteristic of him that he asked for
confirmation from the Provincial Estates of the dignities and offices
which were his by hereditary right. In every thing he relied upon the
advice of the Duke of Brunswick, whose methods of government he
implicitly followed. To such an extent was this the case that, soon
after his accession to power, a secret Act was drawn up (May 3, 1766),
known as the Act of Consultation, by which the duke bound himself to
remain at the side of the stadholder and to assist him by word and deed
in all affairs of State. During the earlier years therefore of William
V's stadholderate he consulted Brunswick in every matter, and was thus
encouraged to distrust his own judgment and to be fitful and desultory
in his attention to affairs of State.

One of the first of Brunswick's cares was to provide for the prince a
suitable wife. William II, William III and William IV had all married
English princesses, but the feeling of hostility to England was strong
in Holland, and it was not thought advisable for the young stadholder to
seek for a wife in his mother's family. The choice of the duke was the
Prussian Princess Wilhelmina. The new Princess of Orange was niece on
the paternal side of Frederick the Great and on the maternal side of the
Duke of Brunswick himself. The marriage took place at Berlin on October,
4 1767. The bride was but sixteen years of age, but her attractive
manners and vivacious cleverness caused her to win the popular
favour on her first entry into her adopted country.

The first eight years of William's stadholdership passed by quietly.
There is little to record. Commerce prospered, but the Hollanders were
no longer content with commerce and aimed rather at the rapid
accumulation of wealth by successful financial transactions.
Stock-dealing had become a national pursuit. Foreign powers came to
Amsterdam for loans; and vast amounts of Dutch capital were invested in
British and French funds and in the various German states. And yet all
the time this rich and prosperous country was surrounded by powerful
military and naval powers, and, having no strong natural frontiers, lay
exposed defenceless to aggressive attack whether by sea or land. It was
in vain that the stadholder, year by year, sent pressing memorials to
the States-General urging them to strengthen the navy and the army and
to put them on a war footing. The maritime provinces were eager for an
increase of the navy, but the inland provinces refused to contribute
their quota of the charges. Utrecht, Gelderland, Overyssel and Groningen
on the other hand, liable as they were to suffer from military invasion,
were ready to sanction a considerable addition to the land forces, but
were thwarted by the opposition of Holland, Zeeland and Friesland. So
nothing was done, and the Republic, torn by divided interests and with
its ruling classes lapped in self-contented comfort and luxury, was a
helpless prey that seemed to invite spoliation.

This was the state of things when the British North American colonies
rose in revolt against the mother-country. The sympathies of France were
from the first with the colonials; and a body of volunteers raised by
Lafayette with the connivance of the French overnment crossed the
Atlantic to give armed assistance to the rebels. Scarcely less warm was
the feeling in the Netherlands. The motives which prompted it were
partly sentimental, partly practical. There was a certain similarity
between the struggle for independence on the part of the American
colonists against a mighty state like Great Britain, and their own
struggle with the world-power of Spain. There was also the hope that the
rebellion would have the practical result of opening out to the Dutch
merchants a lucrative trade with the Americans, one of whose chief
grievances against the mother-country had been the severity of the
restrictions forbidding all trading with foreign lands. At the same
time the whole air was full of revolutionary ideas, which were
unsettling men's minds. This was no less the case in the Netherlands
than elsewhere; and the American revolt was regarded as a realisation
and vindication in practical politics of the teaching of Montesquieu,
Voltaire and Rousseau, whose works were widely read, and of the
Englishmen Hume, Priestley and Richard Price. Foremost among the
propagandists of these ideas were Jan Dirk van der Capellen tot de Pol,
a nobleman of Overyssel, and the three burgomasters of Amsterdam, Van
Berckel, De Vrij Temminck and Hooft, all anti-Orange partisans and
pro-French in sentiment. Amidst all these contending factions and
opinions, the State remained virtually without a head, William V
drifting along incapable of forming an independent decision, or of
making a firm and resolute use of the great powers with which he was
entrusted.

Torn by internal dissensions, the maintenance of neutrality by the
Republic became even more difficult than in the Seven Years' War. The
old questions of illicit trade with the enemy and the carrying of
contraband arose. The Dutch islands of St Eustatius and Curacoa became
centres of smuggling enterprise; and Dutch merchant vessels were
constantly being searched by the British cruisers and often carried off
as prizes into English ports. Strong protests were made and great
irritation aroused. Amsterdam was the chief sufferer. Naturally in this
hot-bed of Republican opinion and French sympathies, the prince was
blamed and was accused of preferring English interests to those of his
own country. The arrival of the Duke de la Vauguyon, as French
ambassador, did much to fan the flame. Vauguyon entered into close
relations with the Amsterdam regents and did all in his power to
exacerbate the growing feeling of hostility to England, and to persuade
the Republic to abandon the ancient alliance with that country in favour
of one with France.

The British ambassador, Yorke, lacked his ingratiating manners; and his
language now became imperative and menacing in face of the flourishing
contraband trade that was carried on at St Eustatius. In consequence of
his strong protest the governor of the island, Van Heyliger, was
replaced by De Graeff, but it was soon discovered that the new governor
was no improvement upon his predecessor. He caused additional offence to
the British government by saluting the American flag on November 16,
1776. The threats of Yorke grew stronger, but with small result. The
Americans continued to draw supplies from the Dutch islands. The entry
of France into the war on February 6, 1778, followed by that of Spain,
complicated matters. England was now fighting with her back to the wall;
and her sea-power had to be exerted to its utmost to make head against
so many foes. She waged relentless war on merchant ships carrying
contraband or suspected contraband, whether enemy or neutral. At last
money was voted under pressure from Amsterdam, supported by the prince,
for the building of a fleet for protection against privateers and for
purposes of convoy. But a fleet cannot be built in a day; and, when
Admiral van Bylandt was sent out in 1777, his squadron consisted of five
ships only. Meanwhile negotiations with England were proceeding and
resulted in certain concessions, consent being given to allow what was
called "limited convoy." The States-General, despite the opposition of
Amsterdam, accepted on November 13, 1778, the proffered compromise. But
the French ambassador Vauguyon supported the protest of Amsterdam by
threatening, unless the States-General insisted upon complete freedom of
trade, to withdraw the commercial privileges granted to the Republic by
France. Finding that the States-General upheld their resolution of
November 13, he carried his threat into execution. This action brought
the majority of the Estates of Holland to side with Amsterdam and to
call for a repeal of the "limited convoy" resolution. The English on
their part, well aware of all this, continued to do their utmost to stop
all supplies reaching their enemies in Dutch bottoms, convoy or no
convoy. The British government, though confronted by so many foes, now
took strong measures. Admiral van Bylandt, convoying a fleet of
merchantmen through the Channel, was compelled by a British squadron to
strike his flag; and all the Dutch vessels were taken into Portsmouth.
This was followed by a demand under the treaty of 1678 for Dutch aid in
ships and men, or the abrogation of the treaty of alliance and of the
commercial privileges it carried with it. Yorke gave the States-General
three weeks for their decision; and on April 17, 1779, the long-standing
alliance, which William III had made the keystone of his policy, ceased
to exist. War was not declared, but the States-General voted for
"unlimited convoy" on April 24; and every effort was made by the
Admiralties to build and equip a considerable fleet. The reception
given to the American privateer, Paul Jones, who, despite English
protests, was not only allowed to remain in Holland for three months,
but was feted as a hero (October-December, 1779), accentuated the
increasing alienation of the two countries.

At this critical stage the difficult position of England was increased
by the formation under the leadership of Russia of a League of Armed
Neutrality. Its object was to maintain the principle of the freedom of
the seas for the vessels of neutral countries, unless they were carrying
contraband of war, _i.e._military or naval munitions. Further a blockade
would not be recognised if not effective. Sweden and Denmark joined the
league; and the Empress Catherine invited the United Provinces and
several other neutral powers to do likewise. Her object was to put a
curb upon what was described by Britain's enemies as the tyranny of the
Mistress of the Seas. The Republic for some time hesitated. Conscious of
their weakness at sea, the majority in the States-General were unwilling
to take any overt steps to provoke hostilities, when an event occurred
which forced their hands.

In 1778 certain secret negotiations had taken place between the
Amsterdam regents and the American representatives at Paris,
Franklin and Lee. It chanced that Henry Lawrence, a former
President of the Congress, was on his way from New York to
Amsterdam in September, 1780, for the purpose of raising a loan.
Pursued by an English frigate, the ship on which he was sailing
was captured off Newfoundland; and among his papers were found
copies of the negotiations of 1778 and of the correspondence which
then took place. Great was the indignation of the British government,
and it was increased when the Estates of Holland, under the
influence of Amsterdam, succeeded in bringing the States-General
(by a majority of four provinces to three) to join the League of
Armed Neutrality. Better open war than a sham peace. Instructions
were therefore sent to the ambassador Yorke to demand the
punishment of the Amsterdam regents for their clandestine transactions
with the enemies of England. The reply was that the matter
should be brought before the Court of Holland; and Van Welderen,
the Dutch ambassador in London, in vain endeavoured to give
assurances that the States were anxious to maintain a strict neutrality.
Yorke demanded immediate satisfaction and once more called
upon the Republic to furnish the aid in men and ships in accordance
with the treaty. Further instructions were therefore sent
to Van Welderen, but they were delayed by tempestuous weather.
In any case they would have been of no avail. The British
government was in no mood for temporising. On December 20,
1780 war was declared against the United Provinces; and three
days later Yorke left the Hague.

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXV

STADHOLDERATE OF WILLIAM V, _continued_, 1780-1788


The outbreak of war meant the final ruin of the Dutch Republic. Its
internal condition at the close of 1780 made it hopelessly unfitted to
enter upon a struggle with the overwhelming sea-power of England. Even
had William V possessed the qualities of leadership, he would have had
to contend against the bitter opposition and enmity of the anti-Orange
party among the burgher-regents, of which Van der Capellen was one of
the most moving spirits, and which had its chief centre in Amsterdam.
But the prince, weak and incompetent, was apparently intent only on
evading his responsibilities, and so laid himself open to the charges of
neglect and mal-administration that were brought against him by his
enemies.

Against an English fleet of more than 300 vessels manned by a force of
something like 100,000 seamen, the Dutch had but twenty ships of the
line, most of them old and of little value. Large sums of money were now
voted for the equipment of a fleet; and the Admiralties were urged to
press forward the work with all possible vigour. But progress was
necessarily slow. Everything was lacking--material, munitions,
equipment, skilled labour--and these could not be supplied in time to
prevent Dutch commerce being swept from the seas and the Dutch colonies
captured. The Republicans, or Patriots, as they began to name
themselves, were at first delighted that the Orange stadholder and his
party had been compelled to break with England and to seek the alliance
of France; but their joy was but short-lived. Bad tidings followed
rapidly one upon another. In the first month of the war 200 merchantmen
were captured, of the value of 15,000,000 florins. The fishing fleets
dared not put out to sea. In 1780 more than 2000 vessels passed through
the Sound, in 1781 only eleven. On February 3 St Eustatius surrendered
to Admiral Rodney, when one hundred and thirty merchantmen together with
immense stores fell into the hands of the captors. Surinam and Curacoa
received warning and were able to put themselves into a state of
defence, but the colonies of Demerara, Berbice and Essequibo were taken,
also St Martin, Saba and the Dutch establishments on the coast of
Guinea. In the East Indies Negapatam and the factories in Bengal passed
into English possession; and the Cape, Java and Ceylon would have shared
the same fate, but for the timely protection of a French squadron under
the command of Suffren, one of the ablest and bravest of French seamen.

The losses were enormous, and loud was the outcry raised in Amsterdam
and elsewhere against the prince of being the cause of his country's
misfortunes. "Orange," so his enemies said, "is to blame for everything.
He possessed the power to do whatsoever he would, and he neglected to
use it in providing for the navy and the land's defences." This was to a
considerable extent unjust, for William from 1767 onwards had repeatedly
urged an increase of the sea and land forces, but his proposals had been
thwarted by bitter opposition, especially in Amsterdam itself. The
accusations were to this extent correct that he was undoubtedly invested
with large executive power which he had not the strength of will to use.
It was at this period that Van der Capellen and others started a most
violent press campaign not only against the stadholder, but against the
hereditary stadholdership and all that the house of Orange-Nassau stood
for in the history of the Dutch Republic. Brunswick was attacked with
especial virulence. The "Act of Consultation" had become known; and, had
the prince been willing to throw responsibility upon the duke for bad
advice he might have gained some fleeting popularity by separating
himself from the hated "foreigner." But William, weak though he was,
would not abandon the man who in his youth had been to him and to his
house a wise and staunch protector and friend; and he knew, moreover,
that the accusations against Brunswick were really aimed at himself. The
duke, however, after appealing to the States-General, and being by them
declared free from blame, found the spirit of hostility so strong at
Amsterdam and in several of the Provincial Estates that he withdrew
first (1782) to Hertogenbosch, of which place he was governor, and
finally left the country in 1784.

The war meanwhile, which had been the cause, or rather the pretext, for
this outburst of popular feeling against Brunswick, was pursuing its
course. In the summer of 1781 Rear-Admiral Zoutman, at the head of a
squadron of fifteen war-ships, was ordered to convoy seventy-two
merchantmen into the Baltic. He met an English force of twelve vessels,
which were larger and better armed than the Dutch, under Vice-Admiral
Hyde Parker. A fierce encounter took place at the Doggerbank on August
5, which lasted all day without either side being able to claim the
victory. Parker was the first to retreat, but Zoutman had likewise to
return to the Texel to repair his disabled ships, and his convoy never
reached the Baltic. The Dutch however were greatly elated at the result
of the fight, and Zoutman and his captains were feted as heroes.

Doggerbank battle was but, at the most, an indecisive engagement on a
very small scale, and it brought no relaxation in the English blockade.
No Dutch admiral throughout all the rest of the war ventured to face the
English squadrons in the North Sea and in the Channel; and the Dutch
mercantile marine disappeared from the ocean. England was strong enough
to defy the Armed Neutrality, which indeed proved, as its authoress
Catherine II is reported to have said, "an armed nullity." There was
deep dissatisfaction throughout the country, and mutual recriminations
between the various responsible authorities, but there was some justice
in making the stadholder the chief scapegoat, for, whatever may have
been the faults of others, a vigorous initiative in the earlier years of
his stadholdership might have effected much, and would have certainly
gained for him increased influence and respect.

The war lasted for two years, if war that could be called in which there
was practically no fighting. There were changes of government in
England during that time, and the party of which Fox was the leader had
no desire to press hardly upon the Dutch. Several efforts were made to
induce them to negotiate in London a separate peace on favourable terms,
but the partisans of France in Amsterdam and elsewhere rendered these
tentative negotiations fruitless. Being weak, the Republic suffered
accordingly by having to accept finally whatever terms its mightier
neighbour thought fit to dictate. On November 30, 1782, the preliminary
treaty by which Great Britain conceded to the United States of America
their independence was concluded. A truce between Great Britain and
France followed in January, 1783, in which the United Provinces, as a
satellite of France, were included. No further hostilities took place,
but the negotiations for a definitive peace dragged on, the protests of
the Dutch plenipotentiaries at Paris against the terms arranged
between England and France being of no avail. Finally the French
government concluded a separate peace on September 3; but it was not
till May 20, 1784, that the Dutch could be induced to surrender
Negapatam and to grant to the English the right of free entry into the
Moluccas. Nor was this the only humiliation the Republic had at this
time to suffer, for during the course of the English war serious
troubles with the Emperor Joseph II had arisen.

Joseph had in 1780 paid a visit to his Belgian provinces, and he had
seen with his own eyes the ruinous condition of the barrier fortresses.
On the pretext that the fortresses were now useless, since France and
the Republic were allies, Joseph informed the States-General of his
intention to dismantle them all with the exception of Antwerp and
Luxemburg. This meant of course the withdrawal of the Dutch garrisons.
The States-General, being unable to resist, deemed it the wiser course
to submit. The troops accordingly left the barrier towns in January,
1782. Such submission, as was to be expected, inevitably led to further
demands.

The Treaty of Muenster (1648) had left the Dutch in possession of
territory on both banks of the Scheldt, and had given them the right to
close all access by river to Antwerp, which had for a century and a
quarter ceased to be a sea-port. In 1781, during his visit to Belgium,
Joseph had received a number of petitions in favour of the liberation
of the Scheldt. At the moment he did not see his way to taking action,
but in 1783 he took advantage of the embarrassments of the Dutch
government to raise the question of a disputed boundary in Dutch
Flanders; and in the autumn of that year a body of Imperial troops took
forcible possession of some frontier forts near Sluis. Matters were
brought to a head in May, 1784, by the emperor sending to the
States-General a detailed summary of all his grievances, _Tableau
sommaire des pretentions_. In this he claimed, besides cessions of
territory at Maestricht and in Dutch Flanders, the right of free
navigation on the Scheldt, the demolition of the Dutch forts closing the
river, and freedom of trading from the Belgian ports to the Indies. This
document was in fact an ultimatum, the rejection of which meant war. For
once all parties in the Republic were united in resistance to the
emperor's demands; and when in October, 1784, two ships attempted to
navigate the Scheldt, the one starting from Antwerp, the other from
Ostend, they were both stopped; the first at Saftingen on the
frontier, the second at Flushing. War seemed imminent. An Austrian army
corps was sent to the Netherlands; and the Dutch bestirred themselves
with a vigour unknown in the States for many years to equip a strong
fleet and raise troops to repel invasion. It is, however, almost certain
that, had Joseph carried out his threat of sending a force of 80,000 men
to avenge the insult offered to his ships, the hastily enlisted Dutch
troops would not have been able to offer effectual resistance. But the
question the emperor was raising was no mere local question. He was
really seeking to violate important clauses of two international
treaties, to which all the great powers were parties, the Treaty of
Muenster and the Treaty of Utrecht. His own possession of the Belgian
Netherlands and the independence and sovereign rights of the Dutch
Republic rested on the same title. Joseph had counted upon the help or
at least the friendly neutrality of his brother-in-law, Louis XVI, but
France had just concluded an exhausting war in which the United
Provinces had been her allies. The French, moreover, had no desire to
see the Republic over-powered by an act of aggression that might give
rise to European complications. Louis XVI offered mediation, and it was
accepted.

It is doubtful indeed whether the emperor, whose restless brain was
always full of new schemes, really meant to carry his threats into
execution. In the autumn of 1784 a plan for exchanging the distant
Belgian Netherlands for the contiguous Electorate of Bavaria was
beginning to exercise his thoughts and diplomacy. He showed himself
therefore ready to make concessions; and by the firmness of the attitude
of France both the disputants were after lengthy negotiations brought to
terms, which were embodied in a treaty signed at Fontainebleau on
November 8,1785. The Dutch retained the right to close the Scheldt, but
had to dismantle some of the forts; the frontier of Dutch Flanders was
to be that of 1664; and Joseph gave up all claim to Maestricht in
consideration of a payment of 9,500,000 florins. A few days later an
alliance between France and the Republic, known as "the Defensive
Confederacy" of Fontainebleau, was concluded, the French government
advancing 4,500,000 florins towards the ransom of Maestricht. The return
of peace, however, far from allaying the spirit of faction in the
Republic, was to lead to civil strife.

The situation with which William V now had to deal was in some ways
more difficult and dangerous than in the days of his greater
predecessors. It was no longer a mere struggle for supremacy between the
Orange-Stadholder party (_prins-gezinderi_) and the patrician-regents of
the town corporations (_staats-gezinderi_); a third party had come into
existence, the democratic or "patriot" party, which had imbibed the
revolutionary ideas of Rousseau and others about the Rights of Man and
the Social Contract. These new ideas, spread about with fiery zeal by
the two nobles, Van der Capellen tot de Pol and his cousin Van der
Capellen van den Marsch, had found a fertile soil in the northern
Netherlands, and among all classes, including other nobles and many
leading burgomasters. Their aim was to abolish all privileges whether in
Church or State, and to establish the principle of the sovereignty of
the people. These were the days, be it remembered, which immediately
succeeded the American Revolution and preceded the summoning of the
States-General in France with its fateful consequences. The atmosphere
was full of revolution; and the men of the new ideas had no more
sympathy with the pretensions of an aristocratic caste of
burgher-regents to exclude their fellow-citizens from a voice in the
management of their own affairs, than they had with the quasi-sovereign
position of an hereditary stadholder. Among the Orange party were few
men of mark. The council-pensionary Bleiswijk was without character,
ready to change sides with the shifting wind; and Count Bentinck van
Rhoon had little ability. They were, however, to discover in burgomaster
Van de Spiegel of Goes a statesman destined soon to play a great part in
the history of the country. During this period of acute party strife
Patriot and Orangeman were not merely divided from one another on
questions of domestic policy. The one party were strong adherents of the
French alliance and leant upon its support; the other sought to renew
the bonds which had so long united the Republic with England. Indeed the
able representatives of France and England at the Hague at this time,
the Count de Verac and Sir James Harris (afterwards Lord Malmesbury),
were the real leaders and advisers, behind the scenes, of the opposing
factions.

The strength of parties varied in the different provinces. Holland,
always more or less anti-stadholder, was the chief centre of the
patriots. With Holland were the majority of the Estates of Friesland,
Groningen and Overyssel. In Utrecht the nobles and the regents were
for the stadholder, but the townsmen were strong patriots. Zeeland
supported the prince, who had with him the army, the preachers and the
great mass of small _bourgeoisie_ and the country folk. Nothing could
exceed the violence and unscrupulousness of the attacks that were
directed against the stadholder in the press; and no efforts were spared
by his opponents to curtail his rights and to insult him personally.
Corps of patriot volunteers were enrolled in different places with
self-elected officers. The wearing of the Orange colours and the singing
of the _Wilhelmus_ was forbidden, and punished by fine and imprisonment.
In September, 1785, a riot at the Hague led to the Estates of Holland
taking from the stadholder the command of the troops in that city. They
likewise ordered the foot-guards henceforth to salute the members of the
Estates, and removed the arms of the prince from the standards and the
facings of the troops. As a further slight, the privilege was given to
the deputies, while the Estates were in session, to pass through the
gate into the Binnenhof, which had hitherto been reserved for the use of
the stadholder alone. Filled with indignation and resentment, William
left the Hague with his family and withdrew to his country residence at
Het Loo. Such a step only increased the confusion and disorder that was
filling every part of the country, for it showed that William had
neither the spirit nor the energy to make a firm stand against those who
were resolved to overthrow his authority.

In Utrecht the strife between the parties led to scenes of violence. The
"patriots" found an eloquent leader in the person of a young student
named Ondaatje. The Estates of the province were as conservative as the
city of Utrecht itself was ultra-democratic; and a long series of
disturbances were caused by the burgher-regents of the Town Council
refusing to accede to the popular demand for a drastic change in their
constitution. Finally they were besieged in the town hall by a numerous
gathering of the "free corps" headed by Ondaatje, and were compelled to
accede to the people's demands. A portion of the Estates thereupon
assembled at Amersfoort; and at their request a body of 400 troops were
sent there from Nijmwegen. Civil war seemed imminent, but it was averted
by the timely mediation of the Estates of Holland.

Scarcely less dangerous was the state of affairs in Gelderland. Here the
Estates of the Gelderland had an Orange majority, but the patriots had
an influential leader in Van der Capellen van den Marsch. Petitions
and requests were sent to the Estates demanding popular reforms. The
Estates not only refused to receive them but issued a proclamation
forbidding the dissemination of revolutionary literature in the
province. The small towns of Elburg and Hattem not only refused to obey,
but the inhabitants proceeded by force to compel their Councils to yield
to their demands. The Estates thereupon called upon the stadholder to
send troops to restore order. This was done, and garrisons were placed
in Elburg and Hattem. This step caused a very great commotion in Holland
and especially at Amsterdam; and the patriot leaders felt that the time
had come to take measures by which to unite all their forces in the
different parts of the country for common defence and common action. The
result of all this was that the movement became more and more
revolutionary in its aims. To such an extent was this the case that many
of the old aristocratic anti-stadholder regents began to perceive that
the carrying out of the patriots' programme of popular reform would mean
the overthrow of the system of government which they upheld, at the same
time as that of the stadholderate.

The reply of the Estates of Holland to the strong measures taken against
Elburg and Hattem was the "provisional" removal of the prince from the
post of captain-general, and the recalling, on their own authority, of
all troops in the pay of the province serving in the frontier fortresses
(August, 1786). As the year went on the agitation grew in volume;
increasing numbers were enrolled in the free corps. The complete
ascendancy of the ultra-democratic patriots was proved and assured by
tumultuous gatherings at Amsterdam (April 21, 1787), and a few days
later at Rotterdam, compelling the Town Councils to dismiss at Amsterdam
nine regents and at Rotterdam seven, suspected of Orange leanings.
Holland was now entirely under patriot control; and the democrats in
other districts were eagerly looking to the forces which Holland could
bring into the field to protect the patriot cause from tyrannous acts of
oppression by the stadholder's troops. In the summer of 1787 the forces
on both sides were being mustered on the borders of the province of
Utrecht, and frequent collisions had already taken place. Nothing but
the prince's indecision had prevented the actual outbreak of a general
civil war. At the critical moment of suspense an incident occurred,
however, which was to effect a dramatic change in the situation.

William's pusillanimous attitude (he was actually talking of withdrawing
from the country to Nassau) was by no means acceptable to his
high-spirited wife. The princess was all for vigorous action, and she
wrung from William a reluctant consent to her returning from Nijmwegen,
where for security she had been residing with her family, to the Hague.
In that political centre she would be in close communication with Sir J.
Harris and Van de Spiegel, and would be able to organise a powerful
opposition in Holland to patriot ascendancy. It was a bold move, the
success of which largely depended on the secrecy with which it was
carried out. On June 28 Wilhelmina started from Nijmwegen, but the
commandant of the free corps at Gouda, hearing that horses were being
ordered at Schoonhoven and Haasrecht for a considerable party,
immediately sent to headquarters for instructions. He was told not to
allow any suspicious body of persons to pass. He accordingly stopped the
princess and detained her at a farm until the arrival at Woerden of the
members of the Committee of Defence. By these Her Highness was treated
(on learning her quality) with all respect, but she was informed that
she could not proceed without the permit of the Estates of Holland. The
indignant princess did not wait for the permit to arrive, but returned
to Nijmwegen.

The British ambassador, Harris, at once brought the action of the
Estates of Holland before the States-General and demanded satisfaction;
and on July 10 a still more peremptory demand was made by the Prussian
ambassador, von Thulemeyer. Frederick William II was incensed at the
treatment his sister had received; and, when the Estates of Holland
refused to punish the offending officials, on the ground that no insult
had been intended, orders were immediately given for an army of 20,000
men under Charles, Duke of Brunswick, to cross the frontier and exact
reparation. The Prussians entered in three columns and met with little
opposition. Utrecht, where 7000 "patriot" volunteers were encamped, was
evacuated, the whole force taking flight and retreating in disorder to
Holland. Gorkum, Dordrecht, Kampen and other towns surrendered without a
blow; and on September 17 Brunswick's troops entered the Hague amidst
general rejoicings. The populace wore Orange favours, and the streets
rang with the cry of _Oranje boven_. Amsterdam still held out and
prepared for defence, hoping for French succour; and thither the leaders
of the patriot party had fled, together with the representatives of
six cities. The nobility, the representatives of eight cities, and the
council-pensionary remained at the Hague, met as the Estates of Holland,
repealed all the anti-Orange edicts, and invited the prince to return.
Amidst scenes of great enthusiasm the stadholder made his entry into the
Binnenhof on September 20. The hopes held by the patriot refugees at
Amsterdam of French aid were vain, for the French government was in no
position to help anyone. As soon as the Prussian army appeared before
the gates, the Town Council, as in 1650, was unwilling to jeopardise the
welfare of the city by armed resistance, and negotiations were opened
with Brunswick. On October 3 Amsterdam capitulated, and the campaign was
over.

The princess was now in a position to demand reparation for the insult
she had received; and, though her terms were severe, the Estates of
Holland obsequiously agreed to carry them out (October 6). She demanded
the punishment of all who had taken part in her arrest, the disbanding
of the free corps, and the purging of the various Town Councils of
obnoxious persons. All this was done. In the middle of November the main
body of the Prussians departed, but a force of 4000 men remained to
assist the Dutch troops in keeping order. The English ambassador,
Harris, and Van de Spiegel were the chief advisers of the now dominant
Orange government; and drastic steps were taken to establish the
hereditary stadholderate henceforth on a firm basis. All persons filling
any office were required to swear to maintain the settlement of 1766,
and to declare that "the high and hereditary dignities" conferred upon
the Princes of Orange were "an essential part not only of the
constitution of each province but of the whole State." An amnesty was
proclaimed by the prince on November 21, but it contained so many
exceptions that it led to a large number of the patriots seeking a place
of refuge in foreign countries, as indeed many of the leaders had
already done, chiefly in France and the Belgian Netherlands. It has been
said that the exiles numbered as many as 40,000, but this is possibly an
exaggeration. The victory of the Orange party was complete; but a
triumph achieved by the aid of a foreign invader was dearly purchased.
The Prussian troops, as they retired laden with booty after committing
many excesses, left behind them a legacy of hatred.

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XXVI

THE ORANGE RESTORATION. DOWNFALL OF THE REPUBLIC, 1788-1795


One of the first steps taken, after the restoration of the stadholder's
power had been firmly established, was the appointment of Laurens Pieter
van de Spiegel to the post of council-pensionary of Holland in place of
the trimmer Bleiswijk. It was quite contrary to usage that a Zeelander
should hold this the most important post in the Estates of Holland, but
the influence of the princess and of Harris secured his unanimous
election on December 3, 1787. Van de Spiegel proved himself to be a
statesman of high capacity, sound judgment and great moderation, not
unworthy to be ranked among the more illustrious occupants of his great
office. He saw plainly the hopeless deadlock and confusion of the
machinery of government and its need of root-and-branch revision, but he
was no more able to achieve it than his predecessors. The feebleness of
the stadholder, the high-handedness of the princess, and the selfish
clinging of the patrician-regents to their privileged monopoly of civic
power were insuperable hindrances to any attempts to interfere with the
existing state of things. Such was the inherent weakness of the Republic
that it was an independent State in little more than name; its form of
government was guaranteed by foreign powers on whom it had to rely for
its defence against external foes.

Prussia by armed force, England by diplomatic support, had succeeded in
restoring the hereditary stadholderate to a predominant position in the
State. It was the first care of the triumvirate, Harris, Van de Spiegel
and the princess, to secure what had been achieved by bringing about a
defensive alliance between the Republic, Great Britain and Prussia.
After what had taken place this was not a difficult task; and two
separate treaties were signed between the States-General and the two
protecting powers on the same day, April 15, 1788, each of the three
states undertaking to furnish a definite quota of troops, ships or
money, if called upon to do so. Both Prussia and England gave a strong
guarantee for the upholding of the hereditary stadholderate. This was
followed by the conclusion of an Anglo-Prussian alliance directed
against France and Austria (August 13). The marriage of the hereditary
prince with Frederika Louise Wilhelmina of Prussia added yet another to
the many royal alliances of the House of Orange; but, though it raised
the prestige of the stadholder's position, it only served to make that
position more dependent on the support of the foreigner.

The council-pensionary, Van de Spiegel, did all that statesman could do
in these difficult times to effect reforms and bring order out of chaos.
It was fortunate for the Republic that the stadholder should have
discerned the merits of this eminent servant of the state and entrusted
to him so largely the direction of affairs. Internally the spirit of
faction had, superficially at least, been crushed by Prussian military
intervention, but externally there was serious cause for alarm. Van de
Spiegel watched with growing disquietude the threatening aspect of
things in France, preluding the great Revolution; and still more serious
was the insurrection, which the reforming zeal of Joseph II had caused
to break out in the Austrian Netherlands. Joseph's personal visit to his
Belgian dominions had filled him with a burning desire to sweep away the
various provincial privileges and customs and to replace them by
administrative uniformity. Not less was his eagerness to free education
from clerical influence. He stirred up thereby the fierce opposition of
clericals and democrats alike, ending in armed revolt in Brabant and
elsewhere. A desultory struggle went on during the years 1787, '88 and
'89, ending in January, 1790, in a meeting of the States-General at
Brussels and the formation of a federal republic under the name of "the
United States of Belgium." All this was very perturbing to the Dutch
government, who were most anxious lest an Austrian attempt at reconquest
might lead to a European conflict close to their borders. The death of
Joseph on February 24, 1790, caused the danger to disappear. His
brother, Leopold II, at once offered to re-establish ancient privileges,
and succeeded by tact and moderation in restoring Austrian rule under
the old conditions. That this result was brought about without any
intervention of foreign powers was in no small measure due to a
conference at the Hague, in which Van de Spiegel conducted negotiations
with the representatives of Prussia, England and Austria for a
settlement of the Belgian question without disturbance of the peace.

The council-pensionary found the finances of the country in a state of
great confusion. One of his first cares was a re-assessment of the
provincial quotas, some of which were greatly in arrears and inadequate
in amount, thus throwing a disproportionate burden upon Holland. It was
a difficult task, but successfully carried out. The affairs of the East
and West India Companies next demanded his serious attention. Both of
them were practically bankrupt.

The East India Company had, during the 18th century, been gradually on
the decline. Its object was to extract wealth from Java and its other
eastern possessions; and, by holding the monopoly of trade and
compelling the natives to hand over to the Company's officials a
proportion of the produce of the land at a price fixed by the Company
far below its real value (_contingent-en leverantie-stelsel_), the
country was drained of its resources and the inhabitants impoverished
simply to increase the shareholder's dividends. This was bad enough, but
it was made worse by the type of men whom the directors, all of whom
belonged to the patrician regent-families, sent out to fill the posts of
governor-general and the subordinate governorships. For many decades
these officials had been chosen, not for their proved experience or for
their knowledge of the East or of the Indian trade, but because of
family connection; and the nominees went forth with the intention of
enriching themselves as quickly as possible. This led to all sorts of
abuses, and the profits of the Company from all these causes kept
diminishing. But, in order to keep up their credit, the Board of XVII
continued to pay large dividends out of capital, with the inevitable
result that the Company got into debt and had to apply for help to the
State. The English war completed its ruin. In June, 1783, the Estates of
Holland appointed a Commission to examine into the affairs of the
Company. Too many people in Holland had invested their money in it, and
the Indian trade was too important, for an actual collapse of the
Company to be permitted. Accordingly an advance of 8,000,000 florins was
made to the directors, with a guarantee for 38,000,000 of debt. But
things went from bad to worse. In 1790 the indebtedness of the Company
amounted to 85,000,000 florins. Van de Spiegel and others were convinced
that the only satisfactory solution would be for the State to dissolve
the Company and take over the Indian possessions in full sovereignty at
the cost of liquidating the debt, A commission was appointed in 1791 to
proceed to the East and make a report upon the condition of the
colonies. Before their mission was accomplished the French armies were
overrunning the Republic. It was not till 1798 that the existence of the
Company actually came to an end. To the West India Company the effect of
the English war was likewise disastrous. The Guiana colonies, whose
sugar plantations had been a source of great profit, had been conquered
first by the English, then by the French; and, though they were restored
after the war, the damage inflicted had brought the Company into heavy
difficulties. Its charter expired in 1791, and it was not renewed. The
colonies became colonies of the State, the shareholders being
compensated by exchanging their depreciated shares for Government bonds.

The Orange restoration, however, and the efforts of Van de Spiegel to
strengthen its bases by salutary reforms were doomed to be short-lived.
The council-pensionary, in spite of his desire to relinquish office at
the end of his quinquennial term, was reelected by the Estates of
Holland on December 6, 1792, and yielded to the pressure put upon him to
continue his task. A form of government, which had been imposed against
their will on the patriot party by the aid of foreign bayonets, was
certain to have many enemies; and such prospect of permanence as it had
lay in the goodwill and confidence inspired by the statesmanlike and
conciliatory policy of Van de Spiegel. But it was soon to be swept away
in the cataclysm of the French Revolution now at the height of its
devastating course.

In France extreme revolutionary ideas had made rapid headway, ending in
the dethronement and imprisonment of the king on August 10, 1792. The
invasion of France by the Prussian and Austrian armies only served to
inflame the French people, intoxicated by their new-found liberty, to a
frenzy of patriotism. Hastily raised armies succeeded in checking the
invasion at Valmy on September 20, 1792; and in their turn invading
Belgium under the leadership of Dumouriez, they completely defeated the