nearer the prospect of there being no heir-male to the vast Spanish
monarchy. The French Queen, Maria Theresa, was the eldest child of
Philip; and, though on her marriage she had renounced her claim to the
Spanish throne, it was well known that Louis intended to insist upon her
rights, particularly in regard to the Spanish Netherlands. He was afraid
that the States, always suspicious of his ambitious projects, might be
tempted to come to terms with England on the basis of a defensive
alliance against French aggression in Flanders and Brabant, for both
powers were averse to seeing Antwerp in French hands. To avert this
danger Louis determined to take part in the war on the side of the
Dutch. The move however was diplomatic rather than serious, for the
French admiral, de Beaufort, never sailed into the North Sea or effected
a junction with the Dutch fleet. Nevertheless, as will be seen, his
presence in the Atlantic exercised an important effect upon the naval
campaign of 1666.

The English fleet was not ready until the beginning of June. The ravages
of the plague and financial difficulties had caused delay; and the fleet
only numbered about eighty sail, including a squadron which had been
recalled from the Mediterranean. The "Generals-at-Sea," as they were
called, were Monk and Rupert. They began by committing the great blunder
of dividing their force. Rupert was detached with twenty ships to keep
watch over de Beaufort, a diversion which had serious consequences for
the English. The Dutch fleet, consisting of seventy-two men-of-war with
twelve frigates, was the most powerful that the Admiralties had ever
sent to sea, not in numbers but in the quality of the ships. De Witt
himself had supervised the preparations and had seen that the equipment
was complete in every respect. De Ruyter was in supreme command and led
the van, Cornelis Evertsen the centre, Cornelis Tromp the rear. On June
11 the English fleet under Monk was sighted between the North Foreland
and Dunkirk, and the famous Four Days' Battle was begun. The English had
only fifty-four ships, but having the weather gauge Monk attacked
Tromp's squadron with his whole force; nor was it till later in the day
that De Ruyter and Evertsen were able to come to the relief of their
colleague. Night put an end to an indecisive contest, in which both
sides lost heavily. The next day Monk renewed the attack, at first with
some success; but, De Ruyter having received a reinforcement of sixteen
ships, the weight of numbers told and Monk was forced to retreat. On the
third morning De Ruyter pursued his advantage, but the English admiral
conducted his retirement in a most masterly manner, his rear squadron
covering the main body and fighting stubbornly. Several ships, however,
including the flag-ship of Vice-Admiral Ayscue, had to be abandoned and
were either destroyed or captured by the Dutch. At the end of the day
Monk had only twenty-eight ships left fit for service. Very opportunely
he was now rejoined by Rupert's squadron and other reinforcements; and
on the fourth morning the two fleets confronted one another in almost
equal numbers, each having some sixty vessels. Once more therefore the
desperate struggle was resumed and with initial advantage to the
English. Rupert forced his way through the Dutch fleet, which was for
awhile divided. But the English habit of firing at the hulls, though it
did most damage, was not so effective as the Dutch system of aiming at
the masts and rigging in crippling the freedom of tacking and
manoeuvring; and Monk and Rupert were unable to prevent De Ruyter from
re-uniting his whole force, and bearing down with it upon the enemy. The
English were forced to retreat again, leaving several of their "lamed"
vessels behind. They lost in all ten ships besides fireships, something
like 3000 killed and wounded and 2500 prisoners. Vice-Admiral Berkeley
was killed, Vice-Admiral Ayscue taken prisoner. Nor were the Dutch much
better off. Four or five of their ships were sunk, a number severely
damaged, and their casualty list was probably as large as that of their
foes. Nevertheless the victory was undoubtedly theirs; and the fleet on
its return was greeted with public rejoicings in Holland and Zeeland.
The triumph was of short duration.

By vigorous efforts on both sides the damaged fleets were rapidly
repaired. De Ruyter was the first to put to sea (July 9) with some
ninety ships; three weeks later Monk and Rupert left the Thames with an
equal force. The encounter took place on August 4. It ended in a
decisive English victory after some fierce and obstinate fighting. The
Dutch van, after losing its two admirals, Evertsen and De Vries, gave
way. Monk and Rupert then attacked with a superior force the centre
under De Ruyter himself, who to save his fleet from destruction was
compelled to take refuge behind the Dutch shoals. Meanwhile the squadron
under Tromp, driving before it the rear squadron of the English, had
become separated and unable to come to De Ruyter's assistance. For this
abandonment he was bitterly reproached by De Ruyter and accused of
desertion. The quarrel necessitated Tromp's being deprived of his
command, as the States-General could not afford to lose the services of
the admiral-in-chief.

For a time the English were now masters of the narrow seas, and,
cruising along the Dutch coast, destroyed a great number of Dutch
merchantmen, made some rich prizes and even landed on the island of
Terschelling, which was pillaged. Lack of supplies at length compelled
them to withdraw for the purpose of revictualling. On this De Ruyter,
accompanied by Cornelis de Witt as special commissioner, sailed out in
the hopes of effecting a junction with De Beaufort. Rupert also put to
sea again, but storms prevented a meeting between the fleets and
sickness also seriously interfered with their efficiency. De Ruyter
himself fell ill; and, though John de Witt was himself with the fleet,
no further operations were attempted. Both sides had become weary and
exhausted and anxious for peace.

To De Witt the war had been from the outset distasteful; and he had been
much disturbed by the constant intrigues of the Orangist party to
undermine his position. He was aware that in this hour of the country's
need the eyes of a considerable part of the people, even in Holland,
were more and more directed to the young prince. There was a magic in
his name, which invested the untried boy with the reflected glory of his
ancestor's great deeds. The council-pensionary, a past-master in the
arts of expediency, was driven to avert the danger which threatened
the supremacy of the States party, by proposing to the Princess Amalia
that the province of Holland should not only charge themselves with
William's education, but should adopt him as "a Child of State." It was
a short-sighted device for, as the princess shrewdly saw, this
exceptional position assigned to her grandson must ensure, when he grew
to man's estate, the reversion of his ancestral dignities. She willingly
assented; and in April, 1666, the Estates of Holland appointed a
Commission, of which John de Witt was himself the head, which was
entrusted with the religious and political instruction of the prince. A
few months later De Witt was to discover that Orangist intrigues were
being still clandestinely carried on. An officer of French extraction,
the lord of Buat, though an Orange partisan, had been employed by the
pensionary to make tentative proposals of peace to the English court
through Lord Arlington. In August a packet of intercepted letters showed
that Buat had played him false and was seeking to compass his overthrow.
Buat was brought to trial, condemned to death, and executed on October
11.

This strong action by the council-pensionary did not prevent, however,
the preliminaries of a peaceful settlement being discussed both at the
Hague and in London during the winter months, with the result that a
conference of delegates representing Great Britain, the United Provinces
and France, met at Breda in May, 1667, to discuss the terms of peace.
But the negotiations did not progress. The English envoys raised afresh
all the old questions, while the Dutch were not ready to concede
anything unless the Navigation Act was largely modified. In these
circumstances De Witt determined by bold action to try to expedite the
negotiations in a sense favourable to Holland. He knew that the English
were unprepared. Charles II, in opposition to the advice of Rupert, Monk
and the Duke of York, had refused to spend money in preparation for a
campaign at sea, which he felt confident would never take place. The
ravages of the plague and of the Great Fire of London had made the year
1666 one of the darkest in English history and had caused the heavy
financial drain and losses of the war to be more severely felt. There
was widespread discontent in the country; and the king in sore financial
distress was immovable in his resolve that no steps should be taken for
refitting the fleet. The ships remained laid up in port, although the
Dutch despatched in April a squadron to the Firth of Forth and dominated
the Channel.

In deep secrecy De Witt now made preparations for the despatch of a
great fleet with orders to sail up the estuary of the Thames and attack
the English ships in harbour. De Ruyter, accompanied by Cornelis de
Witt, left the Texel on June 14, at the head of a fleet numbering more
than eighty vessels. A squadron under Admiral Van Ghent sailed up the
Thames on June 19, followed by the main body. Sheerness was captured,
and on the 22nd De Ruyter determined to force his way up the Medway. The
river had been blocked by drawing up a line of ships behind a heavy
chain. The Dutch fire-ships broke through the chain and burnt the
vessels, and then proceeding upwards burnt, scuttled or captured some
sixteen vessels, among the latter the flag-ship, _Royal Charles_. The
sound of the Dutch guns was heard in London and for a time panic
reigned. But the narrowness of the river and the prompt measures that
were taken to call out the militia and man the forts prevented any
further success. The Dutch fleet withdrew to the Nore and, beyond
blocking the mouth of the river, were able to effect no further damage.
The blow to English prestige was however irreparable, and the people
felt deeply humiliated that short-sightedness and lack of preparation on
the part of the government should have exposed them to an insult galling
to the national pride. One of its consequences, as had been anticipated
by De Witt, was a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the English
envoys at Breda. Peace was concluded on July 26, on terms more
favourable than the Dutch could have expected. The Navigation Act was
modified, various commercial advantages were conceded and Poeloe-Rum
was retained. On the other hand, the custom of the striking of the flag
remained unchanged. It was agreed that the English colony of Surinam,
which had been captured in March, 1667, by a Zeeland squadron should be
kept in exchange for New York, an exchange advantageous to both parties.

By the treaty of Breda the Dutch republic attained the summit of its
greatness, and the supremacy of De Witt appeared to be not only secure
but unassailable. Yet events were preparing which were destined to
undermine the prosperity of Holland and the position of the statesman to
whom in so large a measure that prosperity was due. France under the
absolute rule of Louis XIV had become by far the most powerful State
in Europe, and the king was bent upon ambitious and aggressive projects.
It has already been explained that after the death of Philip IV of Spain
he claimed for his queen, Maria Theresa, the succession, by the
so-called "law of devolution," to a large part of the southern
Netherlands. He now determined that the hour had come for enforcing his
claim. In May, 1667, before the treaty of Breda had been signed, a
French army of 50,000 men crossed the Belgic frontier. Castel-Rodrigo,
the Spanish governor, had no force at his disposal for resisting so
formidable an invasion; fortress after fortress fell into French hands;
and Flanders, Brabant and Hainault were speedily overrun. This rapid
advance towards their borders caused no small consternation in Holland,
and De Witt's efforts to reach an understanding with King Louis proved
unavailing. The States were not in a position to attempt an armed
intervention, and the once formidable Spanish power was now feeble and
decrepit. The only hope lay in the formation of a coalition. De Witt
therefore turned to England and Sweden for help.

The anti-French party in Sweden was then predominant; and Dohna, the
Swedish ambassador at the Hague, was ordered to go to London, there to
further the efforts of the newly appointed Dutch envoy, John Meerman,
for the formation of a coalition to check French aggrandisement. They
had difficulties to overcome. The English were sore at the results of
the peace of Breda. Charles disliked the Dutch and was personally
indebted to Louis XIV for many favours. But the feeling in England was
strongly averse to French aggression towards Antwerp. The fall of
Clarendon from power at this time and the accession of Arlington, who
was son-in-law to Beverweert, turned the scale in favour of the
proposals of De Witt; and Charles found himself obliged to yield. Sir
William Temple, whose residence as English minister at Brussels had
convinced him of the gravity of the French menace, was ordered to go to
the Hague to confer personally with the council-pensionary and then to
proceed to London. His mission was most promptly and skilfully carried
out. His persuasiveness overcame all obstacles. After a brief stay in
London he returned to the Hague, January 17, 1668. Even the proverbial
slowness of the complicated machinery of the Dutch government did not
hinder him from carrying out his mission with almost miraculous
rapidity. Having first secured the full support of De Witt to his
proposals, he next, with the aid of the council-pensionary, pressed
the urgency of the case upon the States-General with such convincing
arguments that the treaty between England and the United Provinces was
signed on January 23. Three days afterwards Dohna was able to announce
the adhesion of the Swedish government; and on January 26, the Triple
Alliance was an accomplished fact. It was essentially a defensive
alliance, and its main object was to offer mediation between France and
Spain in order to moderate the French claims and to back up their
mediation, if necessity should arise, by joint action. As a preliminary
precaution, a strong force was promptly placed under the command of Joan
Maurice of Nassau, and a fleet of forty-eight ships was fitted out.

These steps had their effect. Louis, suddenly confronted by this
formidable coalition, preferred to accept mediation, though it involved
his waiving a portion of his pretensions. Knowing well that the alliance
was a very unstable one, for the consent of Charles was given under
duress and the aims of Sweden were mercenary, he foresaw that by biding
his time, he could have ample revenge later upon the republic of traders
who had ventured to thwart him. At a meeting at St Germain-en-Laye
between the French Foreign Minister, Lionne, and the Dutch and English
ambassadors, Van Beuningen and Trevor, preliminaries were settled on
April 15. These were confirmed by a conference of representatives of all
the interested States at Aix-la-Chapelle (May 2), in which Temple took
an active part. Louis gave up Franche-Comte, which he had conquered, but
retained Mons, Courtrai, Tournai, Lille, Charleroi and other frontier
towns. This treaty, following on that of Breda, was the crowning
triumph of De Witt's administration, for it had given to the Dutch
Republic a decisive voice in the Councils of the Great Powers of Europe.

But, though he had proved himself so successful in the fields of
diplomacy and statesmanship, the position of the council-pensionary had,
during the course of the English war, become distinctly weaker. De
Witt's authoritative ways, his practical monopoly of power, and his
bestowal of so many posts upon his relatives and friends, aroused
considerable jealousy and irritation. Cabals began to be formed against
him and old supporters to fall away. He lost the help of Van Beverningh,
who resigned the office of Treasurer-General, and he managed to estrange
Van Beuningen, who had much influence in Amsterdam. The Bickers and De
Graeffs were no longer supreme in that city, where a new party under the
leadership of Gillis Valckenier had acceded to power. This party, with
which Van Beuningen now associated himself, was at present rather
anti-De Witt than pro-Orange. Valckenier and Beuningen became in
succession burgomasters; and De Witt's friend, Pieter de Groot, had to
resign the office of pensionary. In the Estates of Holland, therefore,
De Witt had to face opposition, one of the leaders being the able
Pensionary of Haarlem, Caspar Fagel. And all this time he had ever
before his eyes the fact that the Prince of Orange could not much longer
remain "the Child of State"; and that, when he passed out of the
tutelage of the Estates of Holland, his future position would have to be
settled. De Witt had himself devoted much personal care to William's
instruction; and the prince had submitted patiently and apparently with
contentment to the restrictions with which he was surrounded. Physically
weakly, his health was at all times delicate, but his intelligence was
remarkable and his will-power extraordinary. Cold and impenetrable in
manner and expression, unbending in his haughty aloofness, he knew how
with perfect courtesy to keep his own counsel and to refrain from giving
utterance to an unguarded word. But behind this chilling and sphinx-like
exterior was a mind of singular precocity, already filled with deep-laid
schemes and plans for the future, confident that his opportunity would
come, and preparing when the hour struck to seize it. One can well
imagine how anxiously in their many personal interviews the
council-pensionary must have tried to read what was passing in his
pupil's inmost thoughts, only to be baffled.

So early as August, 1667, steps had been taken by the Estates of Holland
to forestall the danger that threatened. On the proposal of Van
Beuningen and Valckenier, who had not yet detached themselves from the
States party, an edict was passed to which, somewhat infelicitously, the
name of the "Eternal Edict" was given. It abolished in Holland the
office of stadholder for ever and affirmed the right of the
town-corporations (_vroedschappen_) to elect their own magistrates. It
was further resolved to invite the other provinces to declare that no
stadholder could hold either the captain-or admiral-generalship of the
Union. This resolution was styled the "Concept of Harmony." Deputations
were sent to urge the acceptation of the Concept; and De Witt himself
used his utmost power of persuasion to bring about a general
agreement. He was successful in Utrecht, Gelderland and Overyssel. But
Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen, where the Orangists were strong,
refused to give their assent; and the approval of the States-General was
only carried by a bare majority. De Witt himself doubtless knew that the
erection of this paper barrier against the inherited influence of one
bearing the honoured title of Prince of Orange was of little real value.
It is reported that Vivien, the Pensionary of Dordrecht, De Witt's
cousin, stuck his pen-knife into a copy of the Eternal Edict as it lay
on the table before him, and in reply to a remonstrance said: "I was
only trying what steel can do against parchment."

The second period of five years during which De Witt had held the post
of council-pensionary was now drawing to an end. For a decade he had
wielded a power which had given to him almost supreme authority in the
republic, especially in the control of foreign affairs. But all the time
he had lived the life of a simple burgher, plainly dressed, occupying
the same modest dwelling-house, keeping only a single manservant. He was
devotedly attached to his wife and children, and loved to spend the
hours he could spare from public affairs in the domestic circle. The
death of Wendela on July 1, 1668, was a great blow to him and damped the
satisfaction which must have filled him at the manner in which he was
reelected at the end of that month to enter upon his third period of
office. In recognition of his great services his salary of 6000 guilders
was doubled, and a gratuity of 45,000 guilders was voted to him, to
which the nobles added a further sum of 15,000 guilders. De Witt again
obtained an Act of Indemnity from the Estates of Holland and likewise
the promise of a judicial post on his retirement.

The Prince of Orange had received the announcement of the passing of the
Eternal Edict without showing the slightest emotion, or making any
protest. He now, two months after the re-election of the
council-pensionary, took the first step towards self-assertion. Under
cover of a visit to his ancestral town of Breda, William made his way to
Middelburg, where the Estates of Zeeland were assembled. Being now
eighteen years of age he claimed his inherited right to take his seat as
"first noble," and after being duly installed he appointed his relative,
Seigneur van Odijk, to act as his deputy. This done, he quietly
returned to the Hague, having given a clear indication of the course he
meant to pursue.

The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle had left a deep feeling of humiliation and
rancour in the heart of Louis XIV; and he was resolved to leave no stone
unturned to wreak his vengeance on Holland and its council-pensionary.
The Triple Alliance was plainly an ill-assorted combination. Charles II
cared nothing about the fate of the Spanish Netherlands, and there was a
strong party in England which hated the Dutch and wished to wipe out
the memory of Chatham and to upset the treaty of Breda. Grievances about
the settlement of questions concerning the East Indies and Surinam were
raked up. Both Van Beuningen in London and Pieter de Groot in Paris sent
warnings that the States should be prepared for war and at an early
date, but the council-pensionary pinned his faith on Temple and the
Alliance, and kept his eyes shut to the imminent danger. Meanwhile Louis
had been bribing freely both in England and Sweden, and he had no
difficulty in detaching the latter power from the Alliance. To England
he sent over the beautiful Henrietta, Duchess of Orleans, Charles'
favourite sister, on a secret mission to the king, and she was speedily
successful. The offer of an annual payment of 3,000,000 francs and the
possession of Walcheren, which commanded the entrance to the Scheldt,
effected their purpose. A secret treaty was signed at Dover on December
31, 1670, between Louis and Charles, by which the latter agreed, on
being called upon to do so, to declare war upon Holland in conjunction
with the French.

Meanwhile De Witt was so absorbed in domestic politics and in the
maintenance of the burgher-aristocratic party in power, that he seemed
to have lost his usual statesmanlike acumen. He never ceased to work for
the general acceptance of the Concept of Harmony. At last the three
recalcitrant provinces (Friesland, Groningen and Zeeland), when William
had reached his twenty-first year, agreed to accept it on condition that
the prince were at once admitted to the Council of State. Even now De
Witt tried to prevent the prince from having more than an advisory vote,
but he was overruled through the opposition of Amsterdam to his views.
All this time Louis was preparing his great plan for the crushing of the
republic. He succeeded in gaining the promised assistance of England,
Muenster and Cologne, and in detaching from the Dutch the Emperor and
the Swedes. The finances under Colbert were in a flourishing state, and
a splendid army had been equipped by the great war minister, Louvois. It
was in vain that Pieter de Groot sent warnings of coming peril. The
council-pensionary was deaf, and the States-General still deafer. Temple
had left (August, 1670) for a visit to London, and he never returned.
For some months there was no resident English ambassador at the Hague.
Finally, at the end of the year, Downing arrived, the very man who had
done his utmost to bring about the war of 1665. De Witt still placed
his hopes in the anti-French views of the English Parliament; but in
August, 1671, it was dissolved by the king and was not summoned to meet
again for a year and a half. Charles had therefore a free-hand, and the
secret treaty of Dover was the result. The reports of De Groot became
more and more alarming; and De Witt found it necessary to urge the
States to make preparations both by sea and land to resist attack. But
he met with a luke-warm response. The fleet indeed was considerably
strengthened, but the army was in a miserable state. At no time during
the English wars had a powerful army been required, and the lesson
taught by the invasion of the Bishop of Muenster had had little effect.
The heavy charges of the naval war compelled the States and especially
Holland, on whom the chief burden fell, to economise by cutting down the
military expenses. Politically also the ruling burgher-regents in
Holland had from past experience a wholesome fear lest the power of the
sword wielded by another Maurice or William II should again overthrow
the civil power. The consequence was that when Charles II declared war
on March 28, 1672, and Louis on the following April 6, and a great
French army of 120,000 men under Conde, Turenne and Luxemburg marched
through Liege to invade the States, while another army of 30,000 men
from Muenster and Cologne attacked farther north, all was confusion and
panic, for it was felt that there was no possibility of effective
resistance. The Bishop of Muenster was eager to take vengeance for his
defeat in 1666, and the Elector-Archbishop of Cologne was a Bavarian
prince friendly to France. His help was the more valuable, as he was
likewise Bishop of Liege, and thus able to offer to the French armies a
free passage through his territory.

Not until the storm was actually bursting on them by sea and land at
once were the various authorities in the threatened land induced to
move in earnest. Confronted by the sudden crisis, De Witt however made
the most strenuous efforts to meet it. A fleet of 150 ships was got
ready and an army of some 50,000 men, mercenaries of many nationalities,
hastily gathered together. It was a force without cohesion, discipline
or competent officers. In the peril of the country all eyes were turned
towards the Prince of Orange. William was now twenty-one years of age,
but by the provisions of the Concept of Harmony his name was not to be
proposed as captain-general until he had reached the age of twenty-two.
But in the wave of feeling which swept over the country the paper
barrier was dashed aside. In the Estates of Holland, which De Witt had
so long controlled, and despite his strong opposition, the proposal to
confer the post on William for one year was carried. All that the
council-pensionary could effect was to surround the exercise of the
office with so many restrictions as to deprive the prince of any real
authority. These restrictions did not, however, meet the approval of the
other provinces, and William himself refused to accept them. De Witt had
to give way. William was appointed captain-general for one year
(February 25, 1672). It appeared to be an absolutely hopeless task that
this utterly inexperienced young man had to face. But the mere fact that
once more a Prince of Orange was in command gave new hope. It was a name
to conjure with; and the holder of it, young as he was and with no
previous military training, faced his task with the calm confidence
which comes from conscious power and an inherited aptitude for the
leadership of men.

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XVII

WAR WITH FRANCE AND ENGLAND. WILLIAM III, STADHOLDER. MURDER OF THE
BROTHERS DE WITT, 1672


The advance of the French armies and those of Muenster and Cologne to
attack the eastern frontier of the United Provinces met with little
serious resistance. Fortress after fortress fell; the line of the Yssel
was abandoned. Soon the whole of Gelderland, Overyssel, Drente and
Utrecht were in the possession of the enemy. Even the castle of Muiden,
but ten miles from Amsterdam, was only saved from capture at the last
moment by Joan Maurice throwing himself with a small force within the
walls. The Prince of Orange had no alternative but to fall back behind
the famous waterline of Holland. He had at his disposal, after leaving
garrisons in the fortresses, barely 4000 men as a field-force. With some
difficulty the people were persuaded to allow the dykes to be cut, as in
the height of the struggle against Spain, and the country to be
submerged. Once more behind this expanse of flood, stretching like a
gigantic moat from Muiden on the Zuyder Zee to Gorkum on the Maas,
Holland alone remained as the last refuge of national resistance to an
overwhelming foe. True the islands of Zeeland and Friesland were yet
untouched by invasion, but had Holland succumbed to the French armies
their resistance would have availed little. At the end of June the
aspect of affairs looked very black, and despite the courageous attitude
of the young captain-general, and the ceaseless energy with which the
council-pensionary worked for the equipment of an adequate fleet, and
the provision of ways and means and stores, there seemed to be no ray of
hope. Men's hearts failed them for fear, and a panic of despair filled
the land.

Had the combined fleets of England and France been able at this moment
to obtain a victory at sea and to land an army on the coast, it is
indeed difficult to see how utter and complete disaster could have been
avoided. Fortunately, however, this was averted. It had been De Witt's
hope that De Ruyter might have been able to have struck a blow at the
English ships in the Thames and the Medway before they had time to put
to sea and effect a junction with the French. But the Zeeland contingent
was late and it was the middle of May before the famous admiral,
accompanied as in 1667 by Cornelis de Witt as the representative of the
States-General, sailed at the head of seventy-five ships in search of
the Anglo-French fleet. After delays through contrary winds the
encounter took place in Southwold Bay on June 7. The Duke of York was
the English admiral-in-chief, D'Estrees the French commander, and they
had a united force of ninety ships. The Dutch, who had the wind-gauge,
found the hostile squadrons separated from one another. De Ruyter at
once took advantage of this. He ordered Vice-Admiral Banckers with the
Zeeland squadron to contain the French, while he himself with the rest
of his force bore down upon the Duke of York. The battle was contested
with the utmost courage and obstinacy on both sides and the losses were
heavy. The advantage, however, remained with the Dutch. The English
flag-ship, the _Royal James_, was burnt; and the duke was afterwards
three times compelled to shift his flag. Both fleets returned to the
home ports to refit; and during the rest of the summer and early autumn
no further attack was made on De Ruyter, who with some sixty vessels
kept watch and ward along the coasts of Holland and Zeeland. The Dutch
admiral had gained his object and no landing was ever attempted.

But the battle of Southwold Bay, though it relieved the immediate naval
danger, could do nothing to stay the advancing tide of invasion on land.
The situation appeared absolutely desperate; trade was at a standstill;
and the rapid fall in the State securities and in the East India
Company's stock gave alarming evidence of the state of public opinion.
In these circumstances De Witt persuaded the States-General and the
Estates of Holland to consent to the sending of two special embassies to
Louis, who was now at Doesburg, and to London, to sue for peace. They
left the Hague on June 13, only to meet with a humiliating rebuff.
Charles II refused to discuss the question apart from France. Pieter de
Groot and his colleagues were received at Doesburg with scant courtesy
and sent back to the Hague to seek for fuller powers. When they arrived
they found the council-pensionary lying on a sick-bed. The country's
disasters had been attributed to the De Witts, and the strong feeling
against them led to a double attempt at assassination. John de Witt,
while walking home at the close of a busy day's work was (June 21)
attacked by four assailants and badly wounded. The leader, Jacob van der
Graeff, was seized and executed; the others were allowed to escape, it
was said by the prince's connivance. A few days later an attack upon
Cornells de Witt at Dordrecht likewise failed to attain its object. That
such dastardly acts could happen without an outburst of public
indignation was ominous of worse things to come. It was a sign that the
whole country had turned its back upon the States party and the whole
system of government of which for nineteen years John de Witt had been
the directing spirit, and had become Orangist. Revolutionary events
followed one another with almost bewildering rapidity. On July 2 the
Estates of Zeeland appointed William to the office of Stadholder. The
Estates of Holland repealed the Eternal Edict on July 3; and on the next
day it was resolved on the proposal of Amsterdam to revive the
stadholdership with all its former powers and prerogatives in favour of
the Prince of Orange. The other provinces followed the lead of Holland
and Zeeland; and on July 8 the States-General appointed the young
stadholder captain-and admiral-general of the Union. William thus found
himself invested with all the offices and even more than the authority
that had been possessed by his ancestors. Young and inexperienced as he
was, he commanded unbounded confidence, and it was not misplaced.

Meanwhile, despite the strong opposition of Amsterdam and some other
towns, the fuller powers asked for by De Groot were granted, and he
returned to the camp of Louis to endeavour to obtain more favourable
terms of peace. He was unsuccessful. The demands of the French king
included concessions of territory to Cologne, to Muenster and to England,
and for himself the greater part of the Generality-lands with the great
fortresses of Hertogenbosch and Maestricht, a war indemnity of
16,000,000 francs, and complete freedom for Catholic worship. On July 1
De Groot returned to the Hague to make his report. The humiliating terms
were rejected unanimously, but it was still hoped that now that the
Prince of Orange was at the head of affairs negotiations might be
resumed through the mediation of England. William even went so far as to
send a special envoy to Charles II, offering large concessions to
England, if the king would withdraw from the French alliance. But it
was in vain. On the contrary at this very time (July 16) the treaty
between Louis and Charles was renewed; and the demands made on behalf of
England were scarcely less exorbitant than those put forward by Louis
himself--the cession of Sluis, Walcheren, Cadsand, Voorne and Goerce, an
indemnity of 25,000,000 francs, the payment of an annual subsidy for the
herring fishery, and the striking of the flag. If all the conditions
made by the two kings were agreed to, the sovereignty of the remnants of
the once powerful United Provinces, impoverished and despoiled, was
offered to the prince. He rejected it with scorn. When the Estates of
Holland on the return of De Groot asked his advice about the French
terms, the stadholder replied, "all that stands in the proposal is
unacceptable; rather let us be hacked in pieces, than accept such
conditions"; and when an English envoy, after expressing King Charles'
personal goodwill to his nephew, tried to persuade him to accept the
inevitable, he met with an indignant refusal. "But don't you see that
the Republic is lost," he is reported to have pleaded. "I know of one
sure means of not seeing her downfall," was William's proud reply, "to
die in defence of the last ditch."

The firm attitude of the prince gave courage to all; and, whatever
might be the case with the more exposed provinces on the eastern and
south-eastern frontiers, the Hollanders and Zeelanders were resolved to
sacrifice everything rather than yield without a desperate struggle. But
the fact that they were reduced to these dire straits roused the popular
resentment against the De Witts and the system of government which had
for more than two decades been in possession of power. Their wrath was
especially directed against the council-pensionary. Pamphlets were
distributed broadcast in which he was charged amongst other misdoings
with appropriating public funds for his private use. While yet suffering
from the effects of his wounds De Witt appeared (July 23) before the
Estates and vigorously defended himself. A unanimous vote declared him
free from blame.

Cornelis de Witt was, no less than his brother, an object of popular
hatred. In the town of Dordrecht where the De Witt influence had been so
long supreme his portrait in the Town-hall was torn to pieces by the mob
and the head hung on a gallows. On July 24 he was arrested and
imprisoned at the Hague on the charge brought against him by a barber
named Tichelaer, of being implicated in a plot to assassinate the
prince. Tichelaer was well known to be a bad and untrustworthy
character. On the unsupported testimony of this man, the Ruwaard, though
indignantly denying the accusation, was incarcerated in the
Gevangenpoort, to be tried by a commission appointed by the Estates.
Great efforts were made by his friends and by his brother to obtain his
release; but, as the prince would not interfere, the proceedings had to
take their course. John de Witt meanwhile, wishing to forestall a
dismissal which he felt to be inevitable, appeared before the Estates on
August 4, and in an impressive speech voluntarily tendered his
resignation of the post of council-pensionary, asking only for the
redemption of the promise made to him that at the close of his tenure of
office he should receive a judicial appointment. The resignation was
accepted, the request granted, but owing to opposition no vote of thanks
was given. Caspar Fagel was appointed council-pensionary in his place.

The enemies of John de Witt were not content with his fall from power. A
committee of six judges were empanelled to try his brother Cornelis for
his alleged crime. On August 17, to their eternal disgrace, they by a
majority vote ordered the prisoner, who was suffering from gout, to be
put to the torture. The illustrious victim of their malice endured the
rack without flinching, insisting on his absolute innocence of any plot
against the prince's life. Nevertheless, early on August 19, sentence
was pronounced upon him of banishment and loss of all his offices.
Later on the same day Cornelis sent a message to his brother that he
should like to see him. John, in spite of strong warnings, came to the
Gevangenpoort and was admitted to the room where the Ruwaard, as a
result of the cruel treatment he had received, was lying in bed; and the
two brothers had a long conversation. Meanwhile a great crowd had
gathered round the prison clamouring for vengeance upon the De Witts.
Three companies of soldiers were however drawn up under the command of
Count Tilly with orders from the Commissioned-Councillors to maintain
order. At the same time the _schutterij_--the civic guard--was called
out. These latter, however, were not to be trusted and were rather
inclined to fraternise with the mob. So long as Tilly's troops were at
hand, the rioters were held in restraint and no acts of violence were
attempted. It was at this critical moment that verbal orders came to
Tilly to march his troops to the gates to disperse some bands of
marauding peasants who were said to be approaching. Tilly refused to
move without a written order. It came, signed by Van Asperen, the
president of the Commissioned-Councillors, a strong Orange partisan. On
receiving it Tilly is said to have exclaimed, "I will obey, but the De
Witts are dead men." The soldiers were no sooner gone than the crowd,
under the leadership of Verhoef, a goldsmith, and Van Bankhem, a banker,
forced the door of the prison (the _schutterij_ either standing aloof,
or actually assisting in the attack), and rushing upstairs found John de
Witt sitting calmly at the foot of his brother's bed reading aloud to
him a passage of Scripture. Hands were laid upon both with brutal
violence; they were dragged into the street; and there with blows of
clubs and repeated stabs done to death. It was 4 p.m. when Tilly
departed, at 4.30 all was over, but the infuriated rabble were not
content with mere murder. The bodies were shamefully mis-handled and
were finally hung up by the feet to a lamppost, round which to a late
hour in the evening a crowd shouted, sang and danced. It is impossible
to conceive a fate more horrible or less deserved. The poor dishonoured
remains were taken down when night fell by faithful hands and were at
dawn in the presence of a few relatives and friends interred in the
Nieuwe Kerk.

That William III had any complicity in this _execrable faict_, as it
was well styled by the new council-pensionary Fagel, there is not the
slightest evidence. He was absent from the Hague at the time and wholly
preoccupied with the sore necessities of the military position; and it
is said that he was much affected at hearing the dreadful news. But his
naturally cold and self-contained nature had been hardened in the school
of adversity during the long years of humiliation which had been imposed
upon him by John de Witt and his party. He had endured in proud patience
awaiting the hour when he could throw off the yoke, and now that it had
come he could not forgive. Under the plea that the number of those
implicated in the deed was so large that it was impossible to punish
them and thus stir up party passions at a time when the whole energies
of the nation were needed for the war, he took no steps to bring the
offenders to justice. Unfortunately for his reputation he was not
content with a neutral attitude, but openly protected and rewarded the
three chief offenders Tichelaer, Verhoef and Van Bankhem, all of them
men of disreputable character.

Thus two of the greatest statesmen and patriots that Holland has
produced, John van Oldenbarneveldt and John de Witt, both perished
miserably, victims of the basest national ingratitude; and it will ever
remain a stain upon the national annals and upon the memory of two
illustrious Princes of Orange, Maurice and William III, that these
tragedies were not averted.

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XVIII

THE STADHOLDERATE OF WILLIAM III, 1672-1688


In the early summer of 1672, when William resolved to concentrate all
his available forces for the defence of Holland covered by its
water-line, the military situation was apparently hopeless. Had Turenne
and Luxemburg made a united effort to force this line at the opening of
the campaign the probability is that they would have succeeded. Instead
of doing so they expended their energies in the capture of a number of
fortified places in Gelderland, Overyssel and North Brabant; and in the
meantime the stadholder was week by week strengthening the weak points
in his defences, encouraging his men, personally supervising every
detail and setting an example of unshaken courage and of ceaseless
industry. He had at his side, as his field-marshal, George Frederick,
Count of Waldeck, an officer of experience and skill who had entered the
Republic's service, and Van Beverningh as Commissioner of the
States-General. With their help and counsel he had before autumn an
efficient army of 57,000 men on guard behind entrenchments at all
assailable points, while armed vessels patrolled the waterways. Outside
the line Nijmwegen, Grave, Coevorden, Steenwijk and other smaller places
had fallen; but the Muenster-Cologne forces, after a siege lasting from
July 9 to August 28, had to retire from Groningen. The French armies
were all this time being constantly weakened by having to place
garrisons in the conquered provinces; and neither Turenne nor Luxemburg
felt strong enough to attack the strongly-protected Dutch frontiers
behind the water-line.

The prince, however, was not content with inaction. Assuming the
offensive, he ventured on a series of attacks on Naarden and on Woerden,
raised the siege of Maestricht, and finally made an attempt to cut the
French communications by a march upon Charleroi. All these raids were
more or less failures, since in each case William had to retreat without
effecting anything of importance. Nevertheless the enterprise shown by
the young general had the double effect of heartening his own troops and
of undermining the overweening confidence of the enemy. A hard frost
in December enabled Luxemburg to penetrate into Holland, but a rapid
thaw compelled a hasty withdrawal. The only road open to him was blocked
by a fortified post at Nieuwerbrug, but Colonel Vin et Pain, who was in
command of the Dutch force, retired to Gouda and left the French a free
passage, to the stadholder's great indignation. The colonel was tried on
the charge of deserting his post, and shot.

The year 1673 was marked by a decisive change for the better in the
position of the States. Alarm at the rapid growth of the French power
brought at last both Spanish and Austrian assistance to the hard-pressed
Netherlands; and the courage and skill of De Ruyter held successfully
at bay the united fleets of England and France, and effectually
prevented the landing of an army on the Dutch coast. Never did De Ruyter
exhibit higher qualities of leadership than in the naval campaign of
1673. His fleet was greatly inferior in numbers to the combined
Anglo-French fleet under Prince Rupert and D'Estrees. A stubborn action
took place near the mouth of the Scheldt on June 7, in which the English
had little assistance from the French squadron and finally retired to
the estuary of the Thames. Another fierce fight at Kijkduin on August 21
was still more to the advantage of the Dutch. Meanwhile on land the
French had scored a real success by the capture of the great fortress of
Maestricht with its garrison of 6000 men, after a siege which lasted
from June 6 to July 1. All attempts, however, to pass the water-line and
enter Holland met with failure; and, as the summer drew to its close,
the advance of Imperial and Spanish forces began to render the position
of the French precarious. William seized his opportunity in September to
capture Naarden before Luxemburg could advance to its relief. He then
took a bolder step. In October, at the head of an army of 25,000 men, of
whom 15,000 were Spanish, he marched to Cologne and, after effecting a
junction with the Imperial army, laid siege to Bonn, which surrendered
on November 15. This brilliant stroke had great results. The French,
fearing that their communications might be cut, withdrew from the Dutch
frontier; and at the same time the Muenster-Cologne forces hastily
evacuated the eastern provinces. The stadholder before the end of the
year entirely freed the country from its invaders. Once more a Prince of
Orange had saved the Dutch Republic in its extremity.

The effect of this was to place almost supreme power in his hands. Had
the prince at this moment set his heart upon obtaining the title of
sovereign, he would have had but little difficulty in gratifying his
ambition. Leading statesmen like the Council-Pensionary Fagel, the
experienced Van Beverningh, and Valckenier, the most influential man in
Amsterdam, would have supported him. But William was thoroughly
practical. The freeing of the Provinces from the presence of the enemy
was but the beginning of the task which he had already set before
himself as his life-work, _i.e._ the overthrow of the menacing
predominance of the French power under Louis XIV. His first care was the
restoration of the well-nigh ruined land. The country outside the
water-line had been cruelly devastated by the invaders, and then
impoverished by having for a year and a half to maintain the armies of
occupation. Large tracts on the borders of Holland, Utrecht and
Friesland, submerged by the sea-waters through the cutting of the dams,
had been rendered valueless for some years to come, while those parts of