Meanwhile both nations had been getting sick of the war. The Dutch were

suffering terribly from the serious interference with their commerce and
carrying trade and from the destruction of the important fisheries
industry, while the English on their side were shut out from the Baltic,
where the King of Denmark, as the ally of the United Provinces, had
closed the Sound, and from the Mediterranean, where Admiral van Galen,
who lost his life in the fight, destroyed a British squadron off Leghorn
(March 23). In both countries there was a peace party. Cromwell had
always wished for a closer union with the United Provinces and was
averse to war. In the Dutch republic the States party, especially in
Holland the chief sufferer by the war, was anxious for a cessation of
hostilities; and it found its leader in the youthful John de Witt, who
on the death of Adrian Pauw on February 21, 1653, had been appointed
council-pensionary. Cromwell took pains to let the Estates of Holland
know his favourable feelings towards them by sending over, in February,
a private emissary, Colonel Dolman, a soldier who had served in the
Netherland wars. On his part John de Witt succeeded in persuading the
Estates of Holland to send secretly, without the knowledge of the
States-General, letters to the English Council of State and the
Parliament expressing their desire to open negotiations. Thus early did
the new council-pensionary initiate a form of diplomacy in which he was
to prove himself an adept. This first effort was not a success. The
Parliament published the letter with the title "Humble Supplication of
the States of Holland." The indignation of the Orange partisans was
great, and they threatened internal disturbances throughout the country.
Such however was the skill of De Witt that, on Parliament showing a
willingness to resume the negotiations that had been broken off in the
previous summer, he induced the States-General by a bare majority (four
provinces to three) to send a conciliatory letter, the date of which
(April 30, 1653) coincided with Cromwell's forcible dissolution of the
Rump Parliament and the assumption by him, with the support of the army,
of dictatorial powers. The English Council of State, however, was well
informed of the serious economical pressure of the war upon Holland; and
their insistence now on the full satisfaction of all the English demands
made a continuation of hostilities inevitable.

Tromp, after successfully bringing in two large convoys of merchantmen,
encountered (June 12), near the Gabbard, the English fleet under Monk
and Deane. Each fleet numbered about 100 sail, but the Dutch ships were
inferior in size, solidity and weight of metal. For two days the fight
was obstinately and fiercely contested, but on Blake coming up with a
reinforcement of thirteen fresh ships, Tromp was obliged to retreat,
having lost twenty ships. He complained bitterly, as did his
vice-admirals De Ruyter and De With, to the Board of Admiralty of the
inferiority of the vessels of his fleet, as compared with those of the
adversary.

The English now instituted a blockade of the Dutch coast, which had the
effect of reducing to desperate straits a land whose welfare and
prosperity depended wholly on commerce. Amsterdam was ruined. In these
circumstances direct negotiation was perforce attempted. Four envoys
were sent representing the three maritime provinces. At first it seemed
impossible that any common ground of agreement could be found. Cromwell
was obsessed with the idea of a politico-religious union between the two
republics, which would have meant the extinction of Dutch independence.
The Council of State met the Dutch envoys with the proposal _una gens,
una respublica,_ which nothing but sheer conquest and dire necessity
would ever induce the Dutch people to accept. Accordingly the war went
on, though the envoys did not leave London, hoping still that some
better terms might be offered. But in order to gain breathing space for
the efforts of the negotiators, one thing was essential--the breaking
of the blockade. The Admiralties made a supreme effort to refit and
reinforce their fleet, but it lay in two portions; eighty-five sail
under Tromp in the Maas, thirty-one under De With in the Texel. Monk
with about 100 ships lay between them to prevent their junction. On
August 4 Tromp sailed out and, after a rearguard action off Katwijk,
out-manoeuvred the English commander and joined De With. He now turned
and with superior numbers attacked Monk off Scheveningen. The old hero
fell mortally wounded at the very beginning of what proved to be an
unequal fight. After a desperate struggle the Dutch retired with very
heavy loss. Monk's fleet also was so crippled that he returned home to
refit. The action in which Tromp fell thus achieved the main object for
which it was fought, for it freed the Dutch coast from blockade. It was,
moreover, the last important battle in the war. The States, though much
perplexed to find a successor to Martin Tromp, were so far from being
discouraged that great energy was shown in reorganising the fleet. Jacob
van Wassenaer, lord of Obdam, was appointed lieutenant-admiral of
Holland, with De Ruyter and Evertsen under him as vice-admirals. De With
retained his old command of a detached squadron, with which he safely
convoyed a large fleet of East Indiamen round the north of Scotland into
harbour. After this there were only desultory operations on both sides
and no naval engagement.

Meanwhile negotiations had been slowly dragging on. The accession of
Cromwell to supreme power in December, 1653, with the title of Lord
Protector seemed to make the prospects of the negotiations brighter, for
the new ruler of England had always professed himself an opponent of the
war, which had shattered his fantastic dream of a union between the two
republics. Many conferences took place, but the Protector's attitude and
intentions were ambiguous and difficult to divine. The fear of an Orange
restoration appears to have had a strange hold on his imagination and to
have warped at this time the broad outlook of the statesman. At last
Cromwell formulated his proposals in twenty-seven articles. The demands
were those of the victor, and were severe. All the old disputes were to
be settled in favour of England. An annual sum was to be paid for the
right of fishing; compensation to be made for "the massacre of Amboina"
and the officials responsible for it punished; the number of warships in
English waters was to be limited; the flag had to be struck when
English ships were met and the right of search to be permitted. These
demands, unpalatable as they were, might at least have furnished a basis
of settlement, but there was one demand besides these which was
impossible. Article 12 stipulated that the Prince of Orange should not
at any time hold any of the offices or dignities which had been held by
his ancestors, or be appointed to any military command. De Witt, in
whose hands were all the threads of the negotiations, was perfectly
aware that it would be useless to present such proposals to the
States-General. Not only would they indignantly reject them, but he had
not the slightest hope of getting any single province, even Holland, to
allow a foreign power to interfere with their internal affairs and to
bid them to treat with harsh ingratitude the infant-heir of a family to
which the Dutch people owed so deep a debt. There was nothing for it but
to prepare for a vigorous resumption of the war. Strong efforts were
therefore made at De Witt's instigation to increase the fleet and secure
the active co-operation of Denmark and France, both friendly to the
States. But Cromwell really wanted peace and showed himself ready to
yield on certain minor points, but he continued to insist on the
exclusion of the Prince of Orange. Not till the Dutch envoys had
demanded their passports did the Protector give way so far as to say he
would be content to have the exclusion guaranteed by a secret article.

What followed forms one of the strangest chapters in the history of
diplomacy. De Witt had all this time been keeping up, in complete
secrecy, a private correspondence with the leading envoy, his confidant
Van Beverningh. Through Van Beverningh he was able to reach the private
ear of Cromwell, and to enter into clandestine negotiations with him.
The council-pensionary knew well the hopelessness of any attempt to get
the assent of the States-General to the proposed exclusion, even in a
secret article. Van Beverningh was instructed to inform Cromwell of the
state of public feeling on this point, with the result that the
Protector gave the envoy to understand that he would be satisfied if the
Estates of Holland alone would affirm a declaration that the Prince
should never be appointed stadholder or captain-general. Whether this
concession was offered by Cromwell _proprio motu_ or whether it was in
the first instance suggested to him by De Witt through Van Beverningh is
unknown. In any case the council-pensionary, being convinced of the
necessity of peace, resolved to secure it by playing a very deep and
dangerous game. Not only must the whole affair be kept absolutely from
the cognisance of the States-General, but also De Witt was fully aware
that the assent of the Estates of Holland to the proposed exclusion
article could only be obtained with the greatest difficulty. He was to
prove himself a very past master in the art of diplomatic chicanery and
intrigue.

The council-pensionary first set to work to have the treaty, from which
the exclusion article had been cut out, ratified rapidly by the
States-General, before bringing the secret article to the knowledge of
the Estates of Holland. The Estates adjourned for a recess on April 21,
1654. On the following day he presented the treaty to the
States-General, and such was his persuasive skill that he accomplished
the unprecedented feat of getting this dilatory body to accept the
conditions of peace almost without discussion. On April 23 the treaty
ratified and signed was sent back to London. Only one article aroused
opposition (Art. 32), the so-called "temperament clause"; but Cromwell
had insisted upon it. By this article the States-General and the
Provincial Estates separately undertook that every stadholder,
captain-general or commander of military or naval forces should be
required to take an oath to observe the treaty. Meanwhile De Witt had
received a letter from Van Beverningh and his colleague Nieuwpoort
addressed to the Estates of Holland (not at the moment in session)
stating that Cromwell refused on his part to ratify the treaty until he
received the Act of Exclusion[8] from the Estates, who were until now
wholly ignorant that any such proposal would be made to them.

The cleverness and skill now shown by the council-pensionary were truly
extraordinary. A summons was sent out to the Estates to meet on April 28
without any reason being assigned. The members on assembly were sworn to
secrecy, and then the official letter from London was read to them. The
news that Cromwell refused to sign the treaty until he received the
assent of the Province of Holland to the Act of Exclusion came upon the
Estates like a thunder-bolt. The sudden demand caused something like
consternation, and the members asked to be allowed to consider the
matter with their principals before taking so momentous a decision.
Three days were granted but, as it was essential to prevent publicity,
it was settled that only the burgomasters should be consulted, again
under oath of secrecy. At the meeting on May 1 another despatch from Van
Beverningh was read in which the envoy stated that the demand of
Cromwell--that the Act should be placed in his hands within two days
after the ratification of the treaty--was peremptory and threatening.
Unless he received the Act he would consider the treaty as not binding
upon him. Using all his powers of advocacy, De Witt succeeded after an
angry debate in securing a majority for the Act. Five towns however
obstinately refused their assent, and claimed that it could not be
passed without it. But De Witt had made up his mind to risk illegality,
and overruled their protest. The Act was declared to have been passed
and was on May 5 sent to Van Beverningh and Nieuwpoort with instructions
not to deliver it until circumstances compelled them to do so. The
proclamation of peace followed amidst general rejoicing both in England
and the Netherlands; but for some five weeks the existence of the Act
was unknown to the States-General, and during that period, as a fact, it
remained in Van Beverningh's possession still undelivered.

Early in June a bribe induced one of De Witt's clerks to betray the
secret to Count William Frederick. The news soon spread, and loud was
the outcry of the Orange partisans and of the two princesses, who at
once addressed a remonstrance to the States-General. All the other
provinces strongly protested against the action of the Estates of
Holland and of the council-pensionary. De Witt attempted to defend
himself and the Estates, by vague statements, avoiding the main issue,
but insisting that nothing illegal had been done. His efforts were in
vain. On June 6 the States-General passed a resolution that the envoys
in England should be ordered to send back at once all the secret
instructions they had received from Holland, and the Act of Exclusion.
Meanwhile the Estates of Holland themselves, frightened at the clamour
which had been aroused, began to show signs of defection. They went so
far as to pass a vote of thanks to the envoys for not having delivered
the Act to Cromwell. De Witt's position appeared hopeless. He extricated
himself and outwitted his opponents by the sheer audacity and cleverness
of the steps that he took. His efforts to prevent the resolution of the
States-General from taking immediate effect proving unavailing, he put
forward the suggestion that on account of its importance the despatch
should be sent to the envoys in cipher. This was agreed to, and on June
7 the document was duly forwarded to London by the council-pensionary;
but he enclosed a letter from himself to Van Beverningh and Nieuwpoort
informing them that the Estates of Holland assented to the request made
by the States-General, and that they were to send back the secret
correspondence and also the Act, _if it were still undelivered_. The
result answered to his expectations. While the clerk was laboriously
deciphering the despatch, the envoys read between the lines of De Witt's
letter, and without a moment's delay went to Whitehall and placed the
Act in Cromwell's hands. The States-General had thus no alternative
between acceptance of the _fait accompli_ and the risk of a renewal of
the war. No further action was taken, and the Protector professed
himself satisfied with a guarantee of such doubtful validity.

It is impossible to withhold admiration from De Witt's marvellous
diplomatic dexterity, and from the skill and courage with which he
achieved his end in the face of obstacles and difficulties that seemed
insurmountable; but for the course of double-dealing and chicanery by
which he triumphed, the only defence that can be offered is that the
council-pensionary really believed that peace was an absolute necessity
for his country, and that peace could only be maintained at the cost of
the Act of Exclusion. Whether or no Cromwell would have renewed the war,
had the Act been withdrawn, it is impossible to say. There is, however,
every reason to believe that De Witt was prompted to take the risks he
did by purely patriotic motives, and not through spite against the house
of Orange. Be this as it may, the part that he now played was bitterly
resented, not merely by the Orange partisans, but by popular opinion
generally in the United Provinces, and it was never forgiven.

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XV

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN DE WITT 1654-1665

FROM THE PEACE OF WESTMINSTER TO THE OUT-BREAK OF THE SECOND ENGLISH WAR


The position of John de Witt in July, 1654, was a difficult one. The
conduct of the council-pensionary in the matter of the Act of Exclusion
was openly attacked in the States-General. Had the leaders of the Orange
party been united, the attack might have had serious consequences; but
notoriously the princess royal, the princess dowager and William
Frederick were on bad terms, and De Witt, with his usual adroitness,
knew well how to play off one against another. To meet the accusations
of his assailants in the States-General he drew up however an elaborate
defence of the action taken by the Estates of Holland and by himself.
The document bore the title "Deduction of the Estates of Holland." It
was laborious rather than convincing, and it did not convince opponents.
Nevertheless, though resentment continued to smoulder, the fact that
peace had been assured soon reconciled the majority to allow the
doubtful means by which it had been obtained to be overlooked. The tact,
the persuasiveness, the great administrative powers of the
council-pensionary effected the rest; and his influence from this time
forward continued to grow, until he attained to such a control over
every department of government, as not even Oldenbarneveldt had
possessed in the height of his power.

John de Witt was possibly not the equal of the famous Advocate in sheer
capacity for great affairs, but he had practical abilities of the
highest order as a financier and organiser, and he combined with these
more solid qualifications a swiftness of courageous decision in moments
of emergency which his almost infinite resourcefulness in extricating
himself from difficult and perilous situations, enabled him to carry to
a successful issue. His marriage in February, 1655, to Wendela Bicker,
who belonged to one of the most important among the ruling
burgher-families of Amsterdam, brought to him enduring domestic
happiness. It was likewise of no slight political value. Andries and
Cornelis Bicker, who had headed the opposition to William II and had
been declared by him in 1650 incapable of holding henceforth any
municipal office, were her uncles; while her maternal uncle, Cornelis de
Graeff, was a man of weight and influence both in his native town and in
the Provincial Estates. By this close relationship with such leading
members of the regent-aristocracy of Amsterdam the council-pensionary
became almost as secure of the support of the commercial capital in the
north of Holland, as he was already of Dordrecht in the south. Two of
his cousins, Slingelandt and Vivien, were in turn his successors, as
pensionaries of Dordrecht, while for his predecessor in that post,
Nicolas Ruysch, he obtained the extremely influential office of
_griffier_ or secretary to the States-General. Nor did he scruple to
exercise his powers of patronage for other members of his family. His
father, Jacob de Witt, was made a member of the Chamber of Finance; his
elder brother, Cornelis, Ruwaard of Putten. By these and other
appointments of men who were his friends and supporters, to important
positions diplomatic, military and naval, De Witt contrived to
strengthen more and more his personal authority and influence. And yet
in thus favouring his relatives and friends, let us not accuse De Witt
of base motives or of venality. He firmly believed in his own ability to
serve the State, and, without doubt, he was convinced that it was for
the best interest of his country for him to create for himself, as far
as was possible amidst the restrictions by which he was hemmed in on
every side, a free field of diplomatic and administrative action. No
one, not even his bitterest enemies, ever charged John de Witt with
personal corruption. Throughout his whole career he lived quietly and
unostentatiously, as a simple citizen, on a very moderate income, and he
died a poor man.

One of the first cares of the council-pensionary after the peace with
England was to deal with the internal troubles which were disturbing
certain parts of the land, notably Groningen, Zeeland and Overyssel. In
the last-named province a serious party struggle arose out of the
appointment of a strong Orangist, named Haersolte, to the post of Drost
or governor of Twente. The Estates were split up, the Orange partisans
meeting at Zwolle, the anti-Orange at Deventer. Both enlisted troops,
but those of Zwolle were the stronger and laid siege to Deventer. The
victorious Orangists then nominated William III as stadholder with
William Frederick as his lieutenant. At last, after three years' strife,
the parties called in De Witt and William Frederick as mediators. But De
Witt was far too clever for the Friesland stadholder. It happened that
the post of field-marshal had just fallen vacant by the death of
Brederode. Both William Frederick and his cousin Joan Maurice aspired to
the office. The council-pensionary induced his co-mediator, with the
hope of becoming Brederode's successor, to yield on all points.
Haersolte was deprived of office; the prince's appointment as stadholder
was suspended until his majority; and therefore William Frederick could
not act as his lieutenant. Thus peace was restored to Overyssel, but
William Frederick was not appointed field-marshal. In the other
provinces the tact and skill of De Witt were equally successful in
allaying discord. He would not have been so successful had the Orange
party not been hopelessly divided and had it possessed capable leaders.

As an administrator and organiser the council-pensionary at once applied
himself to two most important tasks, financial reform and naval
reconstruction. The burden of debt upon the province of Holland, which
had borne so large a part of the charges of the war, was crushing. The
rate of interest had been reduced in 1640 from 6 J to 5 per cent. But
the cost of the English war, which was wholly a naval war, had caused
the debt of Holland to mount to 153,000,000 guilders, the interest on
which was 7,000,000 guilders per annum. De Witt first took in hand a
thorough overhauling of the public accounts, by means of which he was
enabled to check unnecessary outlay and to effect a number of economies.
Finding however that, despite his efforts to reduce expenditure, he
could not avoid an annual deficit, the council-pensionary took the bold
step of proposing a further reduction of interest from 5 to 4 per cent.
He had some difficulty in persuading the investors in government funds
to consent, but he overcame opposition by undertaking to form a sinking
fund by which the entire debt should be paid off in 41 years. Having
thus placed the finances of the province on a sound basis, De Witt next
brought a similar proposal before the States-General with the result
that the interest on the Generality debt was likewise reduced to 4 per
cent.

The English war had conclusively proved to the Dutch their inferiority
in the size and armament of their war-vessels, and of the need of a
complete reorganisation of the fleet. De Witt lost no time in taking the
necessary steps. The custom which had hitherto prevailed of converting
merchantmen into ships of war at the outbreak of hostilities was
abandoned. Steps were taken to build steadily year by year a number of
large, strongly-constructed, powerfully armed men-of-war, mounting 60,70
and 80 guns. These vessels were specially adapted for passing in and out
of the shallow waters and were built for strength rather than for speed.
Again, the part taken in the war by the light, swift-sailing English
frigates led to a large flotilla of these vessels being built, so useful
for scouting purposes and for preying upon the enemy's commerce. The
supply and training of seamen was also dealt with, and the whole system
of pay and of prize-money revised and reorganised. It was a great and
vitally necessary task, and subsequent events were to show how admirably
it had been carried out.

No one knew better than John de Witt that peace was the chief interest
of the United Provinces, but his lot was cast in troubled times, and he
was one of those prescient statesmen who perceive that meekness in
diplomacy and willingness to submit to injury do not promote the cause
of peace or further the true interests of any country.

The conquests of France in the southern Netherlands caused great anxiety
to the Dutch; and the high-handed action of French pirates in searching
and seizing Dutch merchantmen in the Mediterranean aroused much
indignation. The States, acting on De Witt's advice, replied by sending
a squadron under De Ruyter to put a stop to these proceedings. The Dutch
admiral took vigorous action and captured some French freebooters. The
French government thereupon forbade Dutch vessels to enter French
harbours. The Dutch replied by a similar embargo and threatened to
blockade the French coast. This threat had the desired effect, and an
accommodation was reached. The peace of the Pyrenees in 1659, by which
the French retained a large part of their conquests in Flanders,
Hainault and Namur, while the English acquired possession of Dunkirk,
was disquieting. For the relations with England, despite the goodwill
of the Protector, were far from satisfactory. The trade interests of
the two republics clashed at so many points that a resumption of
hostilities was with difficulty prevented. More especially was this the
case after the outbreak of war with Portugal in November, 1657.

The Dutch accused the Portuguese government of active connivance with
the successful revolt of the Brazilian colonists against Dutch rule.
What was once Dutch Brazil was now claimed by the Lisbon government as a
Portuguese possession, and De Witt demanded an indemnity. As this was
not conceded, a squadron under Obdam, November, 1657, blockaded the
Portuguese coast, while another under De Ruyter made many seizures of
merchant vessels. Cromwell was disposed to intervene, but his death on
September 3,1658, removed any fears of English action. Meanwhile the
Dutch captured Ceylon and Macassar and practically cut off Portuguese
intercourse with the East Indies. At last in August, 1661, a treaty was
signed by which the Dutch abandoned all territorial claims in Brazil,
but were granted freedom of trade and an indemnity of 8,000,000 fl. to
be paid in sixteen years, and, what was more valuable, they retained
possession of their conquests in the East.

The protracted dispute with Portugal was however of quite subordinate
importance to the interest of the Dutch in the complications of the
so-called Northern War. On the abdication of Christina in 1654, Charles
X Gustavus had succeeded to the Swedish throne. The new king was fired
with the ambition of following in the footsteps of Gustavus Adolphus,
and of rendering Sweden supreme in the Baltic by the subjection of
Poland and Denmark. Charles was a man of great force of character and
warlike energy, and he lost no time in attempting to put his schemes of
conquest into execution. Having secured the alliance of the Great
Elector, anxious also to aggrandise himself in Polish Prussia, the
Swedish king declared war against Poland, and in the early summer of
1656 laid siege to Danzig. But the importance of the Baltic trade to
Holland was very great and Danzig was the corn emporium of the Baltic.
Under pressure therefore of the Amsterdam merchants the States-General
despatched (July) a fleet of forty-two ships under Obdam van Wassenaer
through the Sound, which raised the siege of Danzig and with Polish
consent left a garrison in the town. Thus checked, the Swedish king at
Elbing (September, 1656) renewed amicable relations with the republic,
and Danzig was declared a neutral port. At the same time a defensive
alliance was concluded between the States and Denmark. It was obvious
from, this that the Dutch were hostile to Swedish pretensions and
determined to resist them. De Witt was anxious to preserve peace, but
he had against him all the influence of Amsterdam, and that of the able
diplomatist, Van Beuningen, who after being special envoy of the States
at Stockholm had now been sent to Copenhagen. Van Beuningen held that,
whatever the risks of intervention on the part of the States, the
control of the Sound must not fall into the hands of Sweden. The
emergency came sooner than was expected.

Brandenburg having changed sides, the Swedes were expelled from Poland;
and Frederick III of Denmark, despite the advice of De Witt, seized the
opportunity to declare war on Sweden. Although it was the depth of
winter Charles Gustavus lost no time in attacking Denmark. He quickly
drove the Danes from Schonen and Funen and invaded Seeland. Frederick
was compelled at Roeskilde (February, 1658) to accept the terms of the
conqueror. Denmark became virtually a Swedish dependency, and undertook
to close the Sound to all foreign ships. Involved as the republic was in
disputes at this time with both France and England, and engaged in war
with Portugal, De Witt would have been content to maintain a watchful
attitude in regard to Scandinavian matters and to strive by diplomacy to
secure from Sweden a recognition of Dutch rights. But his hand was
forced by Van Beuningen, who went so far as to urge the Danish king to
rely on his defensive alliance with the republic and to break the treaty
of Roeskilde. Charles Gustavus promptly invaded Denmark, drove the
Danish fleet from the sea, placed strong garrisons at Elsinore and
Kronborg, and laid siege to Copenhagen. Van Beuningen had proudly
asserted that "the oaken keys of the Sound lay in the docks of
Amsterdam," and his boast was no empty one. At the beginning of October
a force of thirty-five vessels under Obdam carrying 4000 troops sailed
for the Sound with orders to destroy the Swedish fleet, and to raise the
siege of Copenhagen. On November 8 Obdam encountered the Swedes in the
entrance to the Baltic. The Swedish admiral Wrangel had forty-five ships
under his command, and the battle was obstinate and bloody. Obdam
carried out his instructions. Only a remnant of the Swedish fleet found
refuge in the harbour of Landskrona, but the Dutch also suffered
severely. The two vice-admirals, Witte de With and Floriszoon, were
killed, and Obdam himself narrowly escaped capture, but Copenhagen was
freed from naval blockade.

Charles Gustavus however held military possession of a large part of
Denmark, and in the spring began to press the attack on the capital
from the land side. As both England and France showed a disposition to
interfere in the conflict, the States-General now acted with unexpected
vigour, recognising that this question to them was vital. An imposing
force of seventy-five warships, carrying 12,000 troops and mounting 3000
guns, was despatched in May, 1659, under De Ruyter to the Baltic.
Negotiations for peace between the Scandinavian powers under the
mediation of France, England and the United Provinces, were now set on
foot and dragged on through the summer. But neither Charles Gustavus nor
Frederick could be brought to agree to the terms proposed, and the
former in the autumn again threatened Copenhagen. In these circumstances
De Ruyter was ordered to expel the Swedes from Funen. On November 24 the
town of Nyborg was taken by storm and the whole Swedish force compelled
to surrender. De Ruyter was now supreme in the Baltic and closely
blockaded the Swedish ports. The spirit of Charles Gustavus was broken
by these disasters; he died on February 20, 1660. Peace was now
concluded at Oliva on conditions favourable to Sweden, but securing for
the Dutch the free passage of the Sound. The policy of De Witt was at
once firm and conciliatory. Without arousing the active opposition of
England and France, he by strong-handed action at the decisive moment
succeeded in maintaining that balance of power in the Baltic which was
essential in the interest of Dutch trade. The republic under his skilful
leadership undoubtedly gained during the northern wars fresh weight and
consideration in the Councils of Europe.

The peace of the Pyrenees, followed by the peace of Oliva and the
settlement with Portugal, seemed to open out to the United Provinces a
period of rest and recuperation, but probably no one knew better than
the council-pensionary that outward appearances were deceptive. In the
spring of 1660 a bloodless revolution had been accomplished in England,
and Charles II was restored to the throne. The hostility of De Witt and
of the States party to the house of Stuart had been marked. It happened
that Charles was at Breda when he received the invitation recalling him
to England. The position was a difficult one, but the council-pensionary
at once saw, with his usual perspicacity, that there was but one course
to pursue. Acting under his advice, every possible step was taken by the
States-General and the Estates of Holland to propitiate the prince,
who from being a forlorn exile had suddenly become a powerful king.
Immense sums were spent upon giving him a magnificent reception at the
Hague; and, when he set sail from Scheveningen, deputations from the
States-General and the Estates of Holland attended in state his
embarkation and lavish promises of friendship were exchanged. It was
significant, however, that Charles handed to the council-pensionary a
declaration commending to the care of their High Mightinesses "the
Princess my sister and the Prince of Orange my nephew, persons who are
extremely dear to me." He had previously expressed the same wish to De
Witt privately; and compliance with it, _i.e._ the annulling of the Act
of Exclusion, was inevitable. But all the actors in this comedy were
playing a part. Charles was not deceived by all this subservience, and,
continuing to entertain a bitter grudge against De Witt and his party,
only waited his time to repay their enmity in kind. De Witt on his side,
though in his anxiety to conciliate the new royalist government he
consented to deliver up three regicides who were refugees in Holland (an
act justly blamed), refused to restore the Prince of Orange to any of
the ancient dignities and offices of his forefathers. Acting however on
his advice, the Estates of Holland passed a unanimous resolution
declaring William a ward of the Estates and voting a sum of money for
his maintenance and education.

Very shortly after this momentous change in the government of England,
Cardinal Mazarin died (March, 1661); and the youthful Louis XIV took the
reins of power into his own hands. Outwardly all seemed well in the
relations between France and the republic, and in point of fact an
offensive and defensive alliance for twenty-five years was concluded
between them on April 27,1662. Later in the same year Count D'Estrades,
formerly ambassador in the time of Frederick Henry, resumed his old
post. The relations between him and De Witt were personally of the
friendliest character, but the conciliatory attitude of D'Estrades did
not deceive the far-sighted council-pensionary, who was seriously
disquieted as to the political aims of France in the southern
Netherlands.

By the treaty of the Pyrenees, 1659, the French had already acquired a
large slice of territory in Flanders and Artois. They had since obtained
Dunkirk by purchase from Charles II. Moreover Louis XIV had married the
eldest daughter of Philip IV, whose only son was a weakly boy. It is
true that Maria Theresa, on her marriage, had renounced all claims to
the Spanish succession. But a large dowry had been settled upon her, and
by the treaty the renunciation was contingent upon its payment. The
dowry had not been paid nor was there any prospect of the Spanish
treasury being able to find the money. Besides it was no secret that
Louis claimed the succession to Brabant for his wife and certain other
portions of the Netherlands under what was called the Law of Devolution.
By this law the female child of a first wife was the heir in preference
to the male child of a later marriage. The Dutch dreaded the approach of
the French military power to their frontiers, and yet the decrepitude of
Spain seemed to render it inevitable. There appeared to De Witt to be
only two solutions of the difficulty. Either what was styled "the
cantonment" of the southern Netherlands, _i.e._ their being formed into
a self-governing republic under Dutch protection guaranteed by a French
alliance, or the division of the Belgic provinces between the two
powers. The latter proposal, however, had two great disadvantages: in
the first place it gave to France and the Republic the undesirable
common frontier; in the second place Amsterdam was resolved that Antwerp
should not be erected into a dangerous rival. The last objection proved
insuperable; and, although De Witt had many confidential discussions
with D'Estrades, in which the French envoy was careful not to commit
himself to any disclosure of the real intentions of his government, no
settlement of any kind had been arrived at, when the threatening state
of relations with England threw all other questions into the background.

The accession of Charles II placed upon the throne of England a man who
had no goodwill to Holland and still less to the council-pensionary, and
who, like all the Stewart kings, had a keen interest in naval and
maritime matters. The Navigation Act, far from being repealed, was
vigorously enforced, as were the English claims to the sovereignty of
the narrow seas. The grievances of the English East India Company
against its Dutch rival with regard to the seizure of certain ships and
especially as to the possession of a small island named Poeloe-Rum in
the Moluccas led to a growing feeling of bitterness and hostility. A
special embassy, headed by De Witt's cousin, Beverweert, was sent to
London in the autumn of 1660 to try to bring about a friendly
understanding, but was fruitless. At the same time George Downing, a
skilful intriguer and adventurer, who after serving Cromwell had
succeeded in gaining the confidence of the royal government, had been
sent as ambassador to the Hague, where he worked underhand to exacerbate
the disputes and to prevent a settlement of the differences between the
two peoples. The position and treatment of the Prince of Orange had
likewise been a source of difficulty and even of danger to the supremacy
of the States party. There arose a general movement among the provinces,
headed by Gelderland and Zeeland, to nominate William captain-and
admiral-general of the Union and stadholder. The lack of leadership in
the Orangist party, and the hostility between the two princesses,
rendered, however, any concentrated action impossible. De Witt, with his
usual adroitness, gained the ear of the princess royal, who accepted the
proposal that the Estates of Holland should undertake the education of
the prince, and even consented that De Witt himself and his wife's
uncle, De Graef, should superintend the prince's studies. This arranged,
Mary, for the first time since her marriage, paid a visit to her native
land, being desirous to consult her brother on various subjects.
Unfortunately she died of small-pox in January, 1661, having nominated
Charles as her son's guardian. This nomination did not tend to smooth
matters between the two countries.

There was a powerful war party in England, supported by the Duke of
York. It was at his instigation that a strong-handed act took place
which aroused intense indignation in Holland. A company called "The
Royal African Company" had been formed in which the duke had a large
interest. A fleet fitted out by this company under the command of
Admiral Holmes seized, in February, 1664, a portion of the coast of
Guinea on which the Dutch had settlements. Strong protests meeting with
nothing but evasive replies, in all secrecy a squadron was got ready to
sail under De Ruyter, nominally to the Mediterranean. Dilatory
negotiations were in the meantime being conducted by Beverweert in
London, and by Downing at the Hague in regard to this and other
grievances, but without any approach to a settlement. Downing in fact
was surreptitiously doing his best not to reconcile, but to aggravate
differences. Matters were brought to a head by the news that an English
fleet had crossed the Atlantic and had taken possession of the Dutch
colony of New Netherland (September), and that Holmes had made himself
master of Cabo Corso on the West African coast, and was threatening
further conquests. This was too much. De Ruyter received orders to
proceed to Guinea, where he speedily drove out the English intruders and
reoccupied the lost settlements. During the winter both powers prepared
for a struggle for maritime supremacy which had become inevitable; and
at last war was declared by England (March 4, 1665).

*       *       *       *       *




CHAPTER XVI

THE LAST YEARS OF DE WITT'S ADMINISTRATION, 1665-1672. THE SECOND
ENGLISH WAR. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. THE FRENCH INVASION


THE declaration of war in March, 1665, found the Dutch navy, thanks to
the prescience and personal care of the council-pensionary, far better
prepared for a struggle with the superior resources of its English rival
than was the case in 1654. John de Witt, aided by his brother Cornelis,
had supplied the lack of an admiral-general by urging the various
Admiralty Boards to push on the building of vessels in size,
construction and armaments able to contend on equal terms with the
English men-of-war. He had, moreover, with his usual industry taken
great pains to study the details of admiralty-administration and naval
science; and now, in company with the Commissioners of the
States-General, he visited all the ports and dockyards and saw that
every available ship was got ready for immediate service, provided with
seasoned crews, and with ample stores and equipment. The English on
their side were equally ready for the encounter. After the death of
Cromwell the fleet had been neglected, but during the five years that
had passed since the Restoration steps had been taken to bring it to an
even greater strength and efficiency than before. Whatever may have
been the faults of the Stewart kings, neglect of the navy could not be
laid to their charge. One of the first steps of Charles II was to
appoint his brother James, Duke of York, to the post of
Lord-High-Admiral; and James was unremitting in his attention to his
duties, and a most capable naval administrator and leader, while Charles
himself never ceased during his reign to take a keen interest in naval
matters. In his case, as previously in the case of his father, it was
lack of the necessary financial means that alone prevented him from
creating an English fleet that would be capable of asserting that
"sovereignty in the narrow seas," which was the traditional claim of the
English monarchy.

The English were ready before the Dutch, who were hampered in their
preparations by having five distinct Boards of Admiralty. The Duke of
York put to sea with a fleet of 100 ships at the end of April and,
cruising off the coast of Holland, cut off the main Dutch fleet in the
Texel from the Zeeland contingent. It was unfortunate for Holland that
Michael Adriansz de Ruyter, one of the greatest of seamen, was at this
time still in the Mediterranean Obdam, to whom the chief command was
given, waited until a storm drove the enemy to their harbours. He then
united all the Dutch squadrons and crossing to Southwold Bay found the
English fleet ready for battle. After some manoeuvring the action was
joined on June 13, and after a bloody fight ended most disastrously for
the Dutch. The flag-ships in the course of the struggle became closely
engaged, with the result that Obdam's vessel suddenly blew up, while
that of the English admiral was seriously damaged and he himself
wounded. The Dutch line had already been broken, and the fate of their
commander decided the issue. The Dutch in great confusion sought the
shelter of their shoals, but their habit of firing at the masts and
rigging had so crippled their opponents that a vigorous pursuit was
impossible. Nevertheless the English had gained at the first encounter a
decided victory. Sixteen Dutch ships were sunk or destroyed, nine
captured, and at least 2000 men were killed, including three admirals,
and as many more taken prisoners. The English had but one vessel sunk,
and their casualties did not amount to more than a third of the Dutch
losses. The consternation and anger in Holland was great. Jan Evertsen,
the second-in-command, and a number of the captains were tried by
court-martial; and the reorganisation of the fleet was entrusted to
Cornells Tromp, who, encouraged and aided by the council-pensionary,
set himself with great energy to the task.

The English meanwhile were masters of the sea, though administrative
shortcomings, defects of victualling and shortage of men prevented them
from taking full advantage of their success. Early in August, however, a
fleet under the Earl of Sandwich attempted to capture a number of Dutch
East Indiamen, who had sailed round the north of Scotland. The East
Indiamen took refuge in the neutral port of Bergen. Here Sandwich
ventured to attack them but was driven off by the forts. While he was
thus engaged in the north the Channel was left free; and De Ruyter with
his squadron seized the opportunity to return to home-waters without
opposition. His arrival was of the greatest value to the Dutch, and he
was with universal approval appointed to succeed Obdam as
lieutenant-admiral of Holland, and was given the supreme command on the
sea. Tromp, angry at being superseded, was with difficulty induced to
serve under the new chief, but he had to yield to the force of public
opinion. De Ruyter at once gave proof of his skill by bringing back
safely the East Indiamen from Bergen, though a severe storm caused some
losses, both to the fleet and the convoy. The damage was however by the
energy of De Witt and the admiral quickly repaired; and De Ruyter again
sailed out at the beginning of October to seek the English fleet. He
cruised in the Channel and off the mouth of the Thames, but no enemy
vessels were to be seen; and at the end of the month fresh storms
brought the naval campaign of 1665 to a close, on the whole to the
advantage of the English.

Nor were the misfortunes of the Dutch confined to maritime warfare.
Between England and Holland indeed the war was entirely a sea affair,
neither of them possessing an army strong enough to land on the enemy's
coast with any hope of success; but the United Provinces were
particularly vulnerable on their eastern frontier, and Charles II
concluded an alliance with the Bishop of Muenster, who had a grievance
against the States on account of a disputed border-territory, the
lordship of Borkelo. Subsidised by England, the bishop accordingly at
the head of 18,000 men (September, 1665) overran a considerable part of
Drente and Overyssel and laid it waste. There was at first no organised
force to oppose him. It had been the policy of Holland to cut down the
army, and the other provinces were not unwilling to follow her example.
No field-marshal had been appointed to succeed Brederode; there was no
army of the Union under a captain-general, but seven small provincial
armies without a military head. Some thousands of fresh troops were now
raised and munitions of war collected, but to whom should the chief
command be given? William Frederick was dead (October 31, 1664) and had
been succeeded by his youthful son, Henry Casimir, in the Stadholderate
of Friesland. Joan Maurice of Nassau had withdrawn from the Netherlands
and was Governor of Cleves in the service of Brandenburg. He was however
persuaded to place himself at the head of the army, though complaining
bitterly of the inadequacy of the forces placed at his disposal. De
Witt, however, had not been idle. He secured the assistance of
Brunswick-Lueneburg, and an army of 12,000 Brunswickers under the command
of George Frederick von Waldeck attacked Muenster; while a force of 6000
French likewise, under the terms of the treaty of 1662, advanced to the
help of the Dutch. Threatened also by Brandenburg, the bishop was
compelled to withdraw his troops for home defence and in April, 1666,
was glad to conclude peace with the States.

French naval co-operation against England was also promised; and war was
actually declared by Louis XIV in the early spring of 1666. The real
cause of this strong action was due to other motives than enmity to
England. The death of Philip IV of Spain in September, 1665, had brought