countries agreed to refer the dispute to a conference of the
ambassadors of the great Powers at St. Petersburg. Dr. Daneff, who
represented Bulgaria, adopted a most truculent attitude and refused to
yield on any point. As a result of the skilful diplomacy of the French
ambassador, M. Delcasse, in reconciling the divergent views of the
great Powers, Roumania was awarded, on April 19th, the town of
Silistria and a three-mile zone around it, but was refused an increase
on the seaboard. The award was very unpopular in Roumania, but M.
Jonescu risked his official life by successfully urging the Roumanian
Government to accept it. But when it became perfectly evident, after
the signing of the Treaty of London on May 30th, that the former allies
were now to be enemies, the Roumanian government notified Bulgaria that
she could not rely upon its neutrality without compensation in the
interests of the equilibrium of the Balkans.

Such was the diplomatic situation when the Czar's telegram of June 11th
was received by King Ferdinand. Nothing could have been more
inopportune for the Bulgarian cause. Though the government had no
intention of changing its plan, sufficient deference had to be paid to
the Czar's request to suspend the forward movement of troops. The delay
was fatal. The Servians, who were already aware that the Bulgarians
were in motion, now learned their direction and their actual positions.
The Servian Government hastened to fortify the passes of the Balkans
between Bulgaria and the home territory, and the Servian army in
Macedonia effected a junction with the Greek army from Salonika. There
was nothing left for the Bulgarians but to direct their offensive
movements against the southern Servian divisions in Macedonia. The
great _coup_ had failed. Instead of attacking first the Servians and
then the Greeks and overwhelming them separately, it was necessary to
fight their combined forces.

Every element in the situation demanded the utmost caution on the part
of Bulgaria. Elementary prudence dictated that she yield to Roumanians
demand for a slice of the seaboard to Baltchik in order to prevent
Roumania from joining Servia and Greece. No doubt, had Daneff yielded
he would have been voted out of office by the opposition, for the
military party was in the ascendant at Sofia also. But a real statesman
would not have flinched. Seldom has the influence of home politics upon
the foreign affairs of a State operated so disastrously upon both. It
was determined to carry out that part of the original plan of campaign
which called for a surprise attack upon the Servians. It must be
remembered that all the engagements that had hitherto taken place
between the former allies had been unofficial, Daneff all the while
insisting that there existed no war, but "only military action to
enforce the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty." Nevertheless, on June 29th the
word went forth from Bulgarian headquarters for a general attack upon
the Servian line which, taken by surprise, yielded.

In the mean time public opinion at Bucharest became almost
uncontrollable in its demand for the mobilization of the troops, and
the government was outraged at the continued prohibition by Russia of a
forward movement. The Roumanian Government had already appealed to
Count Berchtold for Austro-Hungarian support against Russian
interference, but Austria-Hungary, like every other great power,
expected Bulgaria to win, and she intended that Bulgaria should take
the place vacated by Turkey as a counterpoise to Russia in the Balkans.
Hence Count Berchtold informed Roumania that she could not rely upon
Austro-Hungarian support, were she to ignore the Russian veto. But in
the mean time an exaggerated report of the Servian defeat had reached
St. Petersburg on July 1st, and to save Servia, Russia lifted the
embargo on Roumanian action.

Forty-eight hours later Europe knew that the Greeks had fought the
fearful battle of Kilchis, resulting in the utter rout of the
Bulgarians, who were in full retreat to defend the Balkan passes into
their home territory. Russia at once recalled her permission for
Roumanian mobilization, but it was too late. The army was on the march.

The situation of Bulgaria was now truly desperate. Not only had her
_coup_ against the Servians failed, but her troops were fleeing before
the victorious Greeks up the Struma valley. On July 5th war was
officially recognized by the withdrawal of the representatives of
Greece, Montenegro, and Roumania, from Sofia. On the same day Turkey
requested the withdrawal of all Bulgarian troops east of the Enos-Midia
line. In the bloody battles which continued to be fought against Greeks
and Servians, the Bulgarians were nearly everywhere defeated, and on
July 10th Bulgaria placed herself unreservedly in the hands of Russia
with a view to a cessation of hostilities.

This did not, however, prevent the forward movement of all her enemies.
On July 15th, Turkey, "moved by the unnatural war" existing in the
Balkan Peninsula, dispatched Enver Bey with an army to Adrianople,
which he reoccupied July 20th. By that time the Roumanians were within
twenty miles of Sofia, and the guns of the Servians and Greeks could be
heard in the Bulgarian capital. The next day King Ferdinand telegraphed
to King Charles of Roumania, asking him to intercede with the kings of
Greece, Servia, and Montenegro. He did so, and all the belligerents
agreed to send peace delegates to Bucharest. They assembled there on
July 29th and at once concluded an armistice.

Each of the belligerent States sent its best man to the peace
conference. Greece was represented by M. Venezelos, Servia by M.
Pashitch, Roumania by M. Jonescu, Montenegro by M. Melanovitch, and
Bulgaria chiefly by General Fitcheff, who had opposed the surprise
attack upon the Servians. The policy of Bulgaria at the conference was
to satisfy the demands of Roumania at once, sign a separate treaty
which would rid her territory of Roumanian troops, and then treat with
Greece and Servia. But M. Jonescu, who controlled the situation,
insisted that peace must be restored by one treaty, not by several. At
the same time he let it be known that Roumania would not uphold
extravagant claims on the part of Greece and Servia which they could
never have advanced were her troops not at the gates of Sofia. The
moderate Roumanian demands were easily settled. Her southern boundary
was to run from Turtukai via Dobritch to Baltchik on the Black Sea. She
also secured cultural privileges for the Kutzovlachs in Bulgaria. The
Servians, who before the second Balkan war would have been satisfied
with the Vardar river as a boundary, now insisted upon the possession
of the important towns of Kotchana, Ishtib, Radovishta, and Strumnitza,
to the east of the Vardar. With the assistance of Roumania, Bulgaria
was permitted to retain Strumnitza. The Greeks were the most
unyielding. Before the war they would have been perfectly satisfied to
have secured the Struma river as their eastern boundary. Now they
demanded much more of the Aegean seacoast, including the important port
of Kavala. The Bulgarian representatives refused to sign without the
possession of Kavala, but under pressure from Roumania they had to
consent. But they would yield on nothing else. The money indemnity
demanded by Greece and Servia and the all-around grant of religious
privileges suggested by Roumania had to be dropped. The treaty was
signed August 6, 1913.

In the mean time the Powers had not been passive onlookers.
Austria-Hungary insisted that Balkan affairs are European affairs and
that the Treaty of Bucharest should be considered as merely
provisional, to be made definitive by the great Powers. On this
proposition the members of both the Triple Alliance and the Triple
Entente divided. Austria and Italy in the one, and Russia in the other,
favored a revision. Austria fears a strong Servia, and Italy dislikes
the growth of Greek influence in the eastern Mediterranean. These two
States and Russia favored a whittling-down of the gains of Greece and
Servia and insisted upon Kavala and a bigger slice of the Aegean
seaboard for Bulgaria. But France, England, and Germany insisted upon
letting well-enough alone. King Charles of Roumania, who demanded that
the peace should be considered definitive, sent a telegram to Emperor
William containing the following sentence: "Peace is assured, and
thanks to you, will remain definitive." This gave great umbrage at
Vienna; but in the divided condition of the European Concert, no State
wanted to act alone. So the treaty stands.

The condition of Bulgaria was indeed pitiable, but her cup was not yet
full. Immediately after occupying Adrianople on July 20th, the Turks
had made advances to the Bulgarian government looking to the settlement
of a new boundary. But Bulgaria, relying upon the intervention of the
Powers, had refused to treat at all. On August 7th the representatives
of the great Powers at Constantinople called collectively upon the
Porte to demand that it respect the Treaty of London. But the Porte had
seen Europe so frequently flouted by the little Balkan States during
the previous year, that it had slight respect for Europe as a
collective entity. In fact, Europe's prestige at Constantinople had
disappeared. _J'y suis, j'y reste_ was the answer of the Turks to the
demand to evacuate Adrianople. The recapture of that city had been a
godsend to the Young Turk party. The Treaty of London had destroyed
what little influence it had retained after the defeat of the armies,
and it grasped at the seizure of Adrianople as a means of awakening
enthusiasm and keeping office. As the days passed by, it became evident
that further delay would cost Bulgaria dear. On August 15th the Turkish
troops crossed the Maritza river and occupied western Thrace, though
the Porte had hitherto been willing to accept the Maritza as the
boundary. The Bulgarian hope of a European intervention began to fade.
The Turks were soon able to convince the Bulgarian Government that most
of the great Powers were willing to acquiesce in the retention of
Adrianople by the Turks in return for economic and political
concessions to themselves. There was nothing for Bulgaria to do but
yield, and on September 3d General Savoff and M. Tontcheff started for
Constantinople to treat with the Turkish government for a new boundary
line. They pleaded for the Maritza as the boundary between the two
States, the possession of the west bank being essential for railway
connection between Bulgaria and Dedeagatch, her only port on the
Aegean. But this plea came in conflict with the determination of the
Turks to keep a sufficient strategic area around Adrianople. Hence the
Turks demanded and secured a considerable district on the west bank,
including the important town of Dimotika. By the preliminary agreement
signed on September 18th the boundary starts at the mouth of the
Maritza river, goes up the river to Mandra, then west around Dimotika
almost to Mustafa Pasha. On the north the line starts at Sveti Stefan
and runs west so that Kirk Kilesseh is retained by Turkey.

While the Balkan belligerents were settling upon terms of peace among
themselves, the conference of ambassadors at London was trying to bring
the settlement of the Albanian problem to a conclusion. On August 11th
the conference agreed that an international commission of control,
consisting of a representative of each of the great Powers, should
administer the affairs of Albania until the Powers should select a
prince as ruler of the autonomous State. The conference also decided to
establish a _gendarmerie_ under the command of military officers
selected from one of the small neutral States of Europe. At the same
time the conference agreed upon the southern boundary of Albania. This
line was a compromise between that demanded by Greece and that demanded
by Austria-Hungary and Italy. Unfortunately it was agreed that the
international boundary commission which was to be appointed should in
drawing the line be guided mainly by the nationality of the inhabitants
of the districts through which it would pass. At once Greeks and
Albanians began a campaign of nationalization in the disputed
territory, which resulted in sanguinary conflicts. Unrest soon spread
throughout the whole of Albania. On August 17th a committee of
Malissori chiefs visited Admiral Burney, who was in command, at
Scutari, of the marines from the international fleet, to notify him
that the Malissori would never agree to incorporation in Montenegro.
They proceeded to make good their threat by capturing the important
town of Dibra and driving the Servians from the neighborhood of Djakova
and Prizrend. Since then the greater part of northern and southern
Albania has been practically in a state of anarchy.

The settlement of the Balkans described in this article will probably
last for at least a generation, not because all the parties to the
settlement are content, but because it will take at least a generation
for the dissatisfied States to recuperate. Bulgaria is in far worse
condition than she was before the war with Turkey. The second Balkan
war, caused by her policy of greed and arrogance, destroyed 100,000 of
the flower of her manhood, lost her all of Macedonia and eastern
Thrace, and increased her expenses enormously. Her total gains, whether
from Turkey or from her former allies, were but eighty miles of
seaboard on the Aegean, with a Thracian hinterland wofully depopulated.
Even railway communication with her one new port of Dedeagatch has been
denied her. Bulgaria is in despair, but full of hate. However, with a
reduced population and a bankrupt treasury, she will need many years to
recuperate before she can hope to upset the new arrangement. And it
will be hard even to attempt that; for the _status quo_ is founded upon
the principle of a balance of power in the Balkan peninsula; and
Roumania has definitely announced herself as a Balkan power. Servia,
and more particularly Greece, have made acquisitions beyond their
wildest dreams at the beginning of the war and have now become strong
adherents of the policy of equilibrium.

The future of the Turks is in Asia, and Turkey in Asia just now is in a
most unhappy condition. Syria, Armenia, and Arabia are demanding
autonomy; and the former respect of the other Moslems for the governing
race, _i.e._, the Turks, has received a severe blow. Whether Turkey can
pull itself together, consolidate its resources, and develop the
immense possibilities of its Asiatic possessions remains, of course, to
be seen. But it will have no power, and probably no desire, to upset
the new arrangement in the Balkans.

The settlement is probably a landmark in Balkan history in that it
brings to a close the period of tutelage exercised by the great Powers
over the Christian States of the Balkans. Neither Austria-Hungary nor
Russia emerges from the ordeal with prestige. The pan-Slavic idea has
received a distinct rebuff. To Roumania and Greece, another non-Slavic
State, _i.e._, Albania, has been added; and in no part of the peninsula
is Russia so detested as in Bulgaria which unreasonably protests that
Russia betrayed her. "Call us Huns, Turks, or Tatars, but not Slavs."
Twice the Austro-Hungarians, in their anxiety to maintain the balance
of power in the Balkans, made the mistake of backing the wrong
combatant. In the first war, they upheld Turkey; and in the second,
they favored Bulgaria. In encouraging Bulgarian aggression they
estranged Roumania, the faithful friend of a generation, and Bulgaria
won only debt and disgrace. Yet Austria-Hungary must now continue to
support Bulgaria as a counterpoise to a stronger Servia which they
consider a menace to their security because of Servian influence on
their southern Slavs. The Balkan states will manage their own affairs
in the future, but they will still offer abundant opportunity for the
play of Russian and Austro-Hungarian rivalry. It had been hoped that
the Balkan peninsula, when freed from the incubus of Turkish misrule,
would settle down to a period of general tranquillity. Instead of this,
the ejectment of the Turk has resulted in increased bitterness and more
dangerous hate.


CAPT. ALBERT H. TRAPMANN

I doubt if history can show a more brilliant or dramatic campaign than
that which the Greeks commenced on the first of July and ended on the
last day of the same month; certainly no country has ever been drenched
with so much blood in so short a space of time as was Macedonia, and
never in the history of the human race have such enormities been
committed upon the helpless civilian inhabitants of a war-stricken
land.

Bulgaria felt herself amply strong enough to crush the Servian and
Greek armies single-handed, provided peace with Turkey could be
assured, and the Bulgarian troops at Tchataldja set free. Thus, while
Bulgaria talked loudly about the conference at St. Petersburg, she was
making feverish haste to persuade the Allies to join with her in
concluding peace with Turkey. But the Allies were quite alive to the
dangers they ran. As peace with Turkey became daily more assured, the
Bulgarian army at Tchataldja was gradually withdrawn and transported to
face the Greek and Servian armies in Macedonia.

But meanwhile Bulgaria had got one more preparation to make. Her plan
was to attack the Allies suddenly, but to do it in such a way that the
Czar and Europe might believe that the attack was mutual and
unpremeditated. She therefore set herself to accustom the world to
frontier incidents between the rival armies. On no fewer than four
occasions various Bulgarian generals acting under secret instructions
attacked the Greek or Servian troops in their vicinity. The last of
these incidents, which was by far the most serious, took place on the
24th of May in the Pangheion region, when the sudden attack at sunset
of 25,000 Bulgarians drove the Greek defenders back some six miles upon
their supports. On each occasion the Bulgarian Government disclaimed
all responsibility, and attributed the bloodshed to the personal
initiative of individual soldiers acting under (imaginary) provocation.

The incident of the 24th of May cost the Bulgarians some 1,500
casualties, while the Greeks lost about 800 men, sixteen of whom were
prisoners; two of these subsequently died from ill-treatment. In
connection with this last "incident" a circumstance arose which
demonstrates more vividly than mere adjectives the underhand methods
employed by the Sofia authorities. It was announced that the Bulgarians
had captured six Greek guns, and these were duly displayed at Sofia and
inspected by King Ferdinand. I myself was at Salonica at the time, and,
knowing that this was not true, I protested through the _Daily
Telegraph_ against the misleading rumor. A controversy arose, but it
was subsequently proved by two artillery experts who inspected the guns
in question that they were really Bulgarian guns painted gray, with
their telltale breech-blocks removed.

On the morning of the 29th of June we at Salonica received the news
that during the night Bulgarian troops in force had attacked the Greek
outposts in the Pangheion region and driven them in. All through the
day came in fresh news of further attacks all along the line. At
Guevgheli, where the Greek and Servian armies met, the Bulgarians had
attacked fiercely, occupied the town, and cut the railway line. The two
armies were separated from each other by an interposing Bulgarian
force. On the morning of the 30th of June it was learned that all along
the line the Bulgarians had crossed the neutral line and were
advancing, while at Nigrita they had driven back a Greek detachment and
pressed some fifteen miles southward, thus threatening entirely to cut
off the Greek troops remaining in the Pangheion district. The situation
was critical and demanded prompt attention. King Constantine was away
at Athens, but he sent his instructions by wireless and hastened
hotfoot back to Salonica to place himself at the head of the army.

At noon General Hessaptchieff (brother-in-law of M. Daneff), the
Bulgarian plenipotentiary accredited to Greek Army Headquarters, drove
to the station and with his staff left by the last train for Bulgarian
Headquarters at Serres. Orders were immediately given for all Bulgarian
troops to be confined to barracks, and the Cretan gendarmerie duly
arrested any found about the streets. Gradually as the afternoon wore
on, the civilian element retired behind closed doors and shuttered
windows; all shops were shut, and pickets of Greek soldiery were alone
to be seen in the deserted streets. At 4.30 P.M. the Bulgarian
battalion commander was invited to surrender the arms of his men, when
they would be conveyed in two special trains to Serres or anywhere else
they liked. He was given an hour to decide. Owing to the intervention
of the French Consul the time limit was extended, but the offer was
refused, and at 6.50 P.M. on the 30th of June the Greeks applied force.
Around every house occupied by Bulgarian soldiery Greek troops had been
introduced into neighboring houses, machine guns had been installed on
rooftops, companies of infantry were picketed at street corners.
Suddenly throughout the town all this hell was let loose. The streets
gave back the echo a thousandfold. The crackle of musketry and din of
machine guns was positively infernal. As evening came and darkened into
night, one after another of the Bulgarian forts Chabrol surrendered,
sometimes persuaded thereto by the deadly effect of a field-gun at
thirty yards' range, but the sun had risen ere the chief stronghold
containing five hundred Bulgarians gave up the hopeless struggle. By
nine o'clock the Bulgarian garrison of Salonica, deprived of its arms,
was safely stowed in the holds of Greek ships bound for Crete. The
casualty list was as follows: Bulgarians--prisoners: 11 officers, 1,241
men; 11 men wounded; 51 men killed; comitadjis, 4 wounded, 11 killed.
Greeks: 11 soldiers killed; 4 Cretan gendarmes killed; 4 officers
wounded; 6 soldiers wounded; while 6 Bulgarian officers who had
deserted their men and escaped in women's clothing were not captured
until later in the day.

All the morning of the 1st of July the Greek troops were busy rounding
up Bulgarian comitadjis and collecting hidden explosives, but at 4 P.M.
the Second Division marched out of the town. King Constantine, who had
arrived in the small hours of the morning, had given the order for a
general advance of his army. Greek patience was expended, and no
wonder.

Meanwhile, let us consider the Bulgarian intentions as revealed by the
captured dispatch-box of the General commanding the 3d Bulgarian
Division, which contained documents likely to become historic. On the
28th of June the Bulgarian Divisional Commanders received orders from
the Commander-in-Chief to undertake a general attack upon the Allies on
the 2d of July. Unfortunately for the Bulgarians, General Ivanoff,
Commanding-in-Chief against the Greeks, could not restrain his
impatience, and instead of waiting for a sudden and general attack on
the 2d of July his troops attacked piecemeal during the nights of the
29th and 30th of June as described; thus the Greek general forward
movement on the 1st and 2d of July found the bulk of his troops
unprepared, while the 14th Bulgarian Division, scheduled to arrive at
Kilkis on the 2d of July from Tchataldja, was not available during that
day to oppose the Greek initiative, though they saved the situation on
the 3d of July by detraining partly at Kilkis and partly at Doiran.

The two weak points of the Allies were at Guevgheli and in the
Pangheion region, and it was precisely at these points that the
Bulgarians struck. As regards numbers, on the 2d of July the respective
forces numbered: Bulgarians, 80,000; Greeks, 60,000; on the 3d of July
(not deducting losses)--Bulgarians, 115,000; Greeks, 80,000; in both
cases the troops on lines of communication are not reckoned with; these
probably amounted to--Bulgarians, 25,000; Greeks, 12,000.

Almost immediately and at all points the opposing armies came into
contact. The Bulgarian gunners had very carefully taken all ranges on
the ground over which the Greeks had to advance, and at first their
shrapnel fire was extremely damaging. The Greeks, however, did not wait
to fight the battle out according to the usual rules of warfare--by
endeavoring to silence the enemy's artillery before launching their
infantry forward. Phenomenal rapidity characterized the Greek tactics
from the moment their troops first came under fire. Their artillery
immediately swept into action and plied the Bulgarian batteries with
shell and shrapnel, the while Greek infantry deployed into lines of
attack and pushed forward. At Kilkis so rapid was the advance of the
Greek infantry that the Bulgarian gunners could hardly alter their
ranges sufficiently fast, and every time that the Greek infantry had
made good five hundred yards the Greek artillery would gallop forward
and come into action on a new alinement. It was a running fight. By
leaps and bounds the incredible _elan_ of the Greek troops drove the
Bulgarians back toward Kilkis itself, which position had been heavily
entrenched. By 4 P.M. on the 2d of July, the Greek main army was within
three miles of the town, while the 10th Division, helped by two
battalions of Servian infantry, gradually fought its way up the Vardar
toward Guevgheli. At 4.30 P.M. (at Kilkis) the Bulgarians delivered a
furious counter-attack in which some 20,000 bayonets took part, but it
was repulsed with heavy slaughter, and the weary Greek soldiers, who
had fought their way over twenty miles of disputed country, rolled over
on their sides and slept. Toward Guevgheli the Evzone battalions had
for two hours to advance through waist-deep marshes under a heavy
artillery fire, but they struggled along through muddy waters singing
their own melancholy songs and without paying the least attention to
the heavy losses they were sustaining. On the 3d of July the Greeks
reoccupied Guevgheli, and toward evening the Bulgarian trenches at
Kilkis were taken at the bayonet's point, the town being entirely
destroyed, partly by Greek shell fire (for the Bulgarian batteries had
been located in the streets) and partly by the Bulgarians, who fired
the town as they retired. On the 3d and 4th the Bulgarians retired
sullenly northward toward Doiran, contesting every yard and putting in
the units of the 14th Division as quickly as they could be detrained;
but the Greeks never flagged for one moment in the pursuit. The 10th
and 3d Divisions, marching at tremendous speed, came up on the left,
menacing the line of retreat on Strumnitza. It was in the pass ten
miles south of this town that remnants of the Bulgarian 3d and 14th
Divisions made their last stand upon the 8th of July. Throughout the
week they had been fighting and retreating incessantly, had lost at
least 10,000 in killed and wounded, some 4,500 prisoners, and about
forty guns, while the Greeks lost about 4,500 and 5,000 men in front of
Kilkis and another 3,000 between Doiran and Strumnitza.

Meanwhile at Lakhanas an equally sanguinary two days' conflict had been
in progress. The Greeks attacked and finally captured the Bulgarian
entrenched positions. Time after time their charges failed to reach,
but eventually their persistent courage and inimitable _elan_ won home,
and the Bulgarians fled in utter rout and panic, leaving everything,
even many of their uniforms, behind them.

King Constantine, speaking in Germany recently, attributed the success
of the Greek armies to the courage of his men, the excellence of the
artillery, and to the soundness of the strategy, but I think he
overlooked the chief factor that made for victory--the unspeakable
horror, loathing, and rage aroused by the atrocities committed upon the
Greek wounded whenever a temporary local reverse left a few of the
gallant fellows at the mercy of the Bulgarians. I have seen an officer
and a dozen men who had had their eyes put out, and their ears,
tongues, and noses cut off, upon the field of battle during the lull
between two Greek charges. And there were other worse, but nameless,
barbarities both upon the wounded and the dead who for a brief moment
fell into Bulgarian hands.

This was during the very first days of the war; later, when the news of
the wholesale massacres of Greek peaceable inhabitants at Nigrita,
Serres, Drama, Doxat, etc., became known to the army, it raised a
spirit which no pen can describe. The men "saw red," they were drunk
with lust for honorable revenge, from which nothing but death could
stop them. Wounds, mortal wounds, were unheeded so long as the man
still had strength to stagger on; I have seen a sergeant with a great
fragment of common shell through his lungs run forward for several
hundred yards vomiting blood, but still encouraging his men, who, truth
to tell, were as eager as he. It is impossible to describe or even
conceive the purposeful and aching desire to get to close quarters
regardless of all losses and of all consequences. The Bulgarians, in
committing those obscene atrocities, not only damned themselves forever
in the eyes of humanity, but they doubled, nay, quadrupled, the
strength of the Greek army. Nothing short of extermination could have
prevented the Greek army from victory; there was not a man who would
not have a million times rather died than have hesitated for a moment
to go forward.

The days of those first battles were steaming hot with a pitiless
Macedonian sun. The Greek troops were in far too high a state of
spiritual excitation to require food, even if food had been able to
keep pace with their lightning advance. All that the men wanted, all
they ever asked for, was water and ammunition; and here the greatest
self-sacrifice of all to the cause was frequently seen; for a wounded
man, unable to struggle forward another yard, would, as he fell to the
ground, hastily unbuckle water-bottle and cartridge-cases and hand them
to an advancing comrade with a cheery word, "Go on and good luck, my
lad," and then as often as not he would lay him down to die with
parched lips and cleaving tongue.

I was myself, at the pressing and personal invitation of King
Constantine, the first to visit Nigrita, where the Bulgarian General,
before leaving, had the inhabitants locked into their houses, and then
with guncotton and petroleum burned the place to the ground. Here 470
victims were burned alive, mostly old folk, women, and children.
Serres, Drama, Kilkis, and Demir Hissar (all important towns) have
similar tales to tell, only the death-roll is longer. Small wonder that
these stories of ferocity are not given credence, for they are
incredible, and it is only when one studies the Bulgarian character
that one can understand how such orgies of carnage were possible.

The scope of this article does not permit me to describe in detail the
minor battles and operations between the 6th of July and the 25th of
July; suffice it to say that the rapidity of the Greek advance upon
Strumnitza and up the valley of the Struma forced the Bulgarians to
beat in full retreat toward their frontier, leaving behind them all
that impeded their flight. Military stores, guns, carts, and even
uniforms strewed the line of their march, and they were only saved from
annihilation because the mountains which guarded their flanks were
impassable for the Greek artillery. By blowing up the bridges over the
Struma the impetuosity of the Greek pursuit was delayed, and it was in
the Kresna Pass that the Bulgarian rear-guard first turned at bay. The
pass is a twenty-mile gorge cut through mountains 7,000 feet high, but
the Greeks turned the Bulgarian positions by marching across the
mountains, and it was near Semitli, five miles north of the pass, that
the Bulgarians offered their last serious resistance. It was a
wonderful battle. The Greeks, at the urgent request of the Servian
General Staff, had detailed two divisions to help the Servians. On the
west bank of the Struma they pushed the 2d and 4th Divisions gently
northward, while in the narrow Struma valley (it is little better than
a gorge in most places) they had the 1st Division on the main road with
the 5th behind it in reserve; on the right, perched on the summit of
well-nigh inaccessible mountains, was the Greek 6th Division, with the
7th Division on its right, somewhat drawn back.

It came to the knowledge of Greek headquarters that the Bulgarians
contemplated an attack upon Mehomia, a village six miles on the extreme
right and rear of the 7th Division, only held by a small detachment of
that Division; reenforcements were immediately dispatched to relieve
the pressure, and the 6th Division was called upon to reenforce the
positions of the 7th during the absence of the relief column, with the
result that on the 25th of July the 6th Division only had some 6,000
men available.

Meanwhile, the Bulgarians had secretly transferred the 40,000 men of
their 1st Division from facing the Servians at Kustendil to Djumaia;
20,000 of these were sent in a column to strike at the junction of the
Greek and Servian armies, where they were held by the 3d and 10th Greek
divisions after a bloody battle which lasted three days; 5,000 marched
on Mehomia and were annihilated by the Greek 7th Division; the
remaining 15,000 reenforced the troops facing the Greek 6th Division.
It was a most dramatic fight. On the 25th of July the Greeks,
unconscious of the Bulgarian reenforcements, pushed northward, and all
day long their 1st, 5th, and 6th Divisions gradually drove the enemy in
front of them. The fighting was of the most desperate nature, and at
one moment, the ammunition on both sides having given out, the troops
pelted each other with fragments of rock. At last, toward 5 P.M., the
Greek 6th Division found the enemy in front of them retiring; they
pushed onward fighting for every yard. The men were dead-weary; they
had slept for days upon bleak and waterless mountain summits--frozen at
night, they were grilled at noon, but they pushed ever onward. At last,
when victory seemed within their grasp, when their foe was seen to run,
a general advance was ordered. The men sprang forward with a last
effort of physical endurance--the Bulgars were running! They gave
chase. Suddenly, in one solid wall, 15,000 entirely new Bulgarian
troops of the 1st Division rose, as if from the ground, and delivered a
counter-attack. It was a crucial moment: some 4,000 Greeks chasing a
similar number of Bulgarians suddenly had to face 15,000 new troops.
The impact was terrible. The Greek line broke up into fragments, around
which the Bulgarians clustered and pecked like vultures at a feast. For
ten minutes it was anybody's battle. The remnants of each Greek company
formed itself into a ring and defended itself as best it could. These
rings gradually grew smaller as bullet and bayonet claimed their
victims; many of them were wiped out altogether, and when the battle
was over it was possible to find the places where these companies had
made their last stands, for there was not a single survivor--the
wounded were killed by the victors.

But the victory was short-lived. True, the right of the 6th Division
had crumpled up, but a regiment of the 1st Division came up at the
critical moment and stiffened up the left and center, and again the
tide of battle swayed irresolute; then, ten minutes later perhaps, a
regiment from the 5th Division came up at the double on the right rear
of the Bulgarians, taking them in reverse and enfilade. The Bulgarian
right and center crumpled like a rotten egg, while their left fell
hastily back. The Bulgars had thrown their last hazard and had lost.
The carnage was appalling on both sides. The Greek 6th Division had
commenced the day with about 6,000 men; at sunset barely 2,000
remained. Opposite the Greek positions nearly 10,000 Bulgarians were
buried next day, which speaks well for the fighting power of the Greek
when he is making his last stand.

The holocaust of wounded beggars description, but that eminent French
painter, George Scott, told me an incident which came to his own
notice. He was riding up to the front the day after Semitli, and was
just emerging from the awesome Kresna Pass, when he and his companion
came upon a Greek dressing station. The narrow space between cliff and
river was entirely occupied by some hundreds of Greek wounded, some of
them already dead, many dying, and others fainting. They were lying
about awaiting their turn for the surgeon's knife. In the center stood
the surgeon, with the sleeves of his operating-coat turned up, his arms
red to the elbow in blood, all about him blood-stained bandages and
wads of cotton-wool. They reined in their horses and surveyed the
scene; as one patient was being removed from the packing-case that
served as operating-table, the surgeon raised his weary eyes and saw
them, the only unwounded men in all that vast and silent gathering.
"You are newspaper correspondents?" he asked. "Well, tell me, tell me
when this butchery will cease! For seventy-two hours I have been plying
my knife, and look at those who have yet to come"--he swept the circle
of wounded with an outstretched bloody hand. "O God! If you know how to
write, write to your papers and tell Europe she must stop this gruesome
war." Then, tired out and enervated, he swooned into the arms of the
medical orderly. As he came to to be apologized. "That," he said, "is
the third time I have fainted; I suppose I must waste precious time in
eating something to sustain me!"

The battle of Semitli was fought almost contemporaneously with that of
the 3d and 10th Greek Divisions on the extreme Greek left flank, which
latter action resulted in a Bulgarian repulse after a temporary
success, and these were the last great battles of the shortest and
bloodiest campaign on record. On the 29th and 30th of July there were
some skirmishes three miles south of Djumaia. On the 31st of July the
armistice was conceded. During the month of July the Greek army had
practically wiped out the 1st, 3d, 4th, and 14th Bulgarian Divisions,
some 160,000 strong; they had marched 200 miles over terrible
mountains; they had taken 12,000 prisoners, 120 guns; and had
cheerfully sustained 27,000 casualties out of a total number of 120,000
troops engaged.

It is difficult to do justice to such an exploit within the scope of a
single article. The privations suffered by the troops, their
uncomplaining endurance, the fight with cholera, the appalling
atrocities perpetrated by the Bulgarians upon those who fell within
their power, furnish matter for a monumental volume.




OPENING OF THE PANAMA CANAL A.D. 1914

COL. GEO. W. GOETHALS BAMPFYLDE FULLER

As was told in a previous volume, the United States acquired possession
of the Panama Canal territory in 1903. Actual work on the Canal was
begun by Americans in 1905 with the prediction that the Canal would be
finished in ten years, 1915. The engineers have been better than their
word. The difficulties with Mexico rendered the Canal suddenly useful
to the United States, and Colonel Goethals reported that he would have
the "big ditch" ready for the passage of any war-ship by May 15, 1914.
That promise he carried out. The Canal is still in danger of being
blocked by slides of mud in the deep Culebra Cut, and probably will
continue exposed to this difficulty for some years to come. But the
work is practically complete; ships passed through the Canal under
government orders in 1914. The greatest engineering work man ever
attempted, the profoundest change he has ever made in the geographical
face of the globe, has been successfully accomplished.

Honor where honor is due! The man chiefly responsible for the success
of this great work has been Colonel Goethals. We quote here by his
special permission a portion of one of his official reports on the
Canal. We then show the work "as others see us," by giving an account
of the Canal and the impression it has made on other nations, written
by one of the most distinguished of its recent British visitors, the
Hon. Bampfylde Fuller.


COL. GEO. W. GOETHALS, U.S. ARMY

A canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans has occupied public
attention for upward of four centuries, during which period various
routes have been proposed, each having certain special or peculiar
advantages. It was not until the nineteenth century, however, that any
definite action was taken looking toward its accomplishment.

In 1876 an organization was perfected in France for making surveys and
collecting data on which to base the construction of a canal across the
Isthmus of Panama, and in 1878 a concession for prosecuting the work
was secured from the Colombian Government.

In May, 1879, an international congress was convened, under the
auspices of Ferdinand de Lesseps, to consider the question of the best
location and plan of the Canal. This congress, after a two weeks'
session, decided in favor of the Panama route and of a sea-level canal
without locks. De Lesseps's success with the Suez Canal made him a
strong advocate of the sea-level type, and his opinion had considerable
influence in the final decision.

Immediately following this action the Panama Canal Company was
organized under the general laws of France, with Ferdinand de Lesseps
as its president. The concession granted in 1878 by Colombia was
purchased by the company, and the stock was successfully floated in
December, 1880. The two years following were devoted largely to
surveys, examinations, and preliminary work. In the first plan adopted
the Canal was to be 29.5 feet deep, with a ruling bottom width of 72
feet. Leaving Colon, the Canal passed through low ground to the valley
of the Chagres River at Gatun, a distance of about 6 miles; thence
through this valley, for 21 miles, to Obispo, where, leaving the river,
it crossed the continental divide at Culebra by means of a tunnel, and
reached the Pacific through the valley of the Rio Grande. The
difference in the tides of the two oceans, 9 inches in either direction
from the mean in the Atlantic and from 9 to 11 feet from the same datum
in the Pacific, was to be overcome and the final currents reduced by a
proper sloping of the bottom of the Pacific portion of the Canal. No
provisions were made for the control of the Chagres River.

In the early eighties after a study of the flow due to the tidal
differences, a tidal lock near the Pacific was provided. Various
schemes were also proposed for the control of the Chagres, the most
prominent being the construction of a dam at Gamboa. The dam as
proposed afterward proved to be impracticable, and this problem
remained, for the time being, unsolved. The tunnel through the divide
was also abandoned in favor of an open cut.

Work was prosecuted on the sea-level canal until 1887, when a change to
the lock type was made, in order to secure the use of the Canal for
navigation as soon as possible. It was agreed at that time that the
change in plan did not contemplate abandonment of the sea-level Canal,
which was ultimately to be secured, but merely its postponement for the
time being. In this new plan the summit level was placed above the
flood line of the Chagres River, to be supplied with water from that
stream by pumps. Work was pushed forward until 1889, when the company
went into bankruptcy; and on February 4th that year a liquidator was
appointed to take charge of its affairs. Work was suspended on May 15,
1889. The new Panama Canal Company was organized in October, 1894, when
work was again resumed, on the plan recommended by a commission of
engineers.

This plan contemplated a sea-level canal from Limon Bay to Bohio, where
a dam across the valley created a lake extending to Bas Obispo, the
difference in level being overcome by two locks; the summit level
extended from Bas Obispo to Paraiso, reached by two more locks, and was
supplied with water by a feeder from an artificial reservoir created by
a dam at Alhajuela, in the upper Chagres Valley. Four locks were
located on the Pacific side, the two middle ones at Pedro Miguel
combined in a flight.

A second or alternative plan was proposed at the same time, by which
the summit level was to be a lake formed by the Bohio dam, fed directly
by the Chagres. Work was continued on this plan until the rights and
property of the new company were purchased by the United States.

The United States, not unmindful of the advantages of an isthmian
canal, had from time to time made investigations and surveys of the
various routes. With a view to government ownership and control,
Congress directed an investigation of the Nicaraguan Canal, for which a
concession had been granted to a private company. The resulting report
brought about such a discussion of the advantages of the Panama route
to the Nicaraguan route that by an act of Congress, approved March 3,
1889, a commission was appointed to "make full and complete
investigation of the Isthmus of Panama, with a view to the construction
of a canal." The commission reported on November 16, 1901, in favor of
Panama, and recommended the lock type of canal.

By act of Congress, approved June 28, 1902, the President of the United
States was authorized to acquire, at a cost not exceeding $40,000,000,
the property rights of the New Panama Canal Company on the Isthmus of
Panama, and also to secure from the Republic of Colombia perpetual
control of a strip of land not less than 6 miles wide, extending from
the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean, and "the right ... to excavate,
construct, and to perpetually maintain, operate, and protect thereon a
canal of such depth and capacity as will afford convenient passage of
ships of the greatest tonnage and draft now in use."